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Helsinki, Koneen säätiö, and The Department of Research Affairs at the University of Helsinki.
On a more personal note, I am indebted to my parents, Kauko and Anita Salmi, and
my sister Sanna Mattila, who have always exemplified unwavering trust towards me
and my aspirations. Mikko Mattila has always been ready to participate in the many
supportive tasks relating to the usual life of a family with little kids. Thank you for
your generosity. Timo, Anne & Tuula Karlsson have shared an interest in my somewhat
hermetic undertakings. It has been a pleasure to delight in the beautiful scenery and
serenity of Trullevi, thanks to your cooperation and warm hospitality. Mr. Arto Koski-
nen has contributed towards the completion of this project more than he can be aware
of. His exemplary intellectual and moral integrity have encouraged me to pursue my
interests despite all the contingencies that occasionally befall a citizen of this planet. For
his support I am extremely grateful. Mr. Matti Helaste has been a solid rock support in
spite of the lamentable distance between our present home towns. People that possess
similar gifts for providing assurance and encouragement are rare. Thank you. I express
my warmest thanks to Mr. Veli-Pekka Suomalainen for interesting conversations ranging
over a wide spectrum spanning astronomy, physics, mathematics, ophthalmology, music
and literature, for charitably putting at our disposal the Hammond A-100, and most of
all for his friendship. Anna-Stiina Tarkka, Jani Indrén, Jouni Jarnamo & Mika Kaalikoski,
as well as Ilkka Joronen, Okko Kivikataja, Olli-Pekka Kankimäki & Mikael Seire, thank
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1“All humans desire to know by nature.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics I.980a21)

Samuli Juhani Salmi
University of Helsinki, 2012
Abstract
This dissertation concentrates on a particular exemplification of the ideal of the unity of science in
the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Taking Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) as an exemplar
of a scholar whose work in philosophy of science was at bottom motivated by the ideal of a uni-
fied conception of science, it attempts to distillate the essential characteristics and methodological
significance of such a conception by a combination of historical and systematic analysis. Given
the conspicuously holoscopic character of Carnap’s philosophical orientation, there arises an in-
teresting question about the relation of his work to that of other prominent “seekers of the wider
view” in the history of philosophy (and history of science). On a more general level, we ask what
kind of intellectual and moral characteristics are associated with a scholar who is motivated by
the unification of science. Making it explicit: if a coherent representation of a unified conception
of science is conceivable, what kind of normative criteria can then be applied to a scholar and his
actions? In other words, what are the external and internal qualifications of scholar’s vocation
under the unified conception of science? On our view, the question can be answered satisfactorily
only when one supplements the philosophical approach of Carnap with a comprehensive view
on man, the formation of a (scientific) self and the relationship between the concepts of the moral
and the scientific.
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INTRODUCTION
Halten wir uns bereit, die Gewöhnungen unseres Tages abzustreifen und das
Vergangene wieder als Hort verschertzer und vergessener, aber lebendigen
Möglichkeiten zu ehren! Nur so entrinnen wir nämlich der würdelosen Despotie des
Zeitgeists, nur so gewinnen wir jene Freiheit, die einzig der Raum der Gesichte gewährt.
Wir haben uns von Nachteil der Historie überzeugen lassen und viel zu spät bemerkt,
wie eng sich unser Horizont einschränkt, wie kümmerlich unser Wachstum ist, sobald
wir in der Geschichte nichts als Widerspruch oder Bestätigung suchen, statt, vorerst von
nichts als Neugier geleitet, unbekümmert und selbstvergessen, in ihre Gefilde
auszuschweifen.
– Emil Staiger, Goethe, vol. I
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) is generally acknowledged as one of the most important
philosophers of the twentieth century. In the last twenty years or so, the philosophi-
cal community has witnessed a veritable renaissance of Carnap scholarship.2 The fruits
of this collective effort have now been available as high-quality monographs and articles
that provide a comprehensive and balanced picture of the emergence, development and
reception of various aspects of Carnap’s philosophy. This body of work is both informa-
tive and enlightening, ruminating in areas that lie outside the ring of special questions
that were studied by the circle of specialists that followed in Carnap’s footsteps around
the middle of the twentieth century. From the 1950s on, Carnap’s overt interests were
mainly focused on inductive logic. His pupils, advocates and acolytes were inspired by
2The range of scholars that have contributed to this new wave of historically and scientifically informed
study of Carnap, the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism is extensive and exemplifies the truly cosmopoli-
tan spirit of enquiry within this particular domain. The scholars and works that have most of all opened
up new vistas and lines of interpretation in this vein are Steve Awodey [Awodey & Carus (2001), (2003),
(2004), (2007a), (2007b)], [Awodey & Klein (2004)], [Awodey & Reck (2002a), (2002b)], André Carus [Carus
(1999), (2001), (2004), (2007)], Alberto Coffa [Coffa (1987), (1991)], Richard Creath [Creath (1982), (1990),
(1996)], Hans-Joachim Dahms [Dahms (1994), (2004)], Michael Friedman [Friedman (1999)], [Friedman &
Creath (2007)], Manfred Geier [Geier (1992)], Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock [Haddock (2008)], Juha Man-
ninen [Manninen (1995), (2001), (2002a), (2002b), (2002c), (2002d), (2002e), (2003), (2004a), (2004b), (2009a),
(2009b)], Thomas Mormann [Mormann (2000), (2003), (2007)], Erich H. Reck [Reck (2002), (2004), (2007)],
George A. Reisch [Reisch (1991), (2005)], Alan Richardson [Richardson (1998), (2007)], [Richardson & Uebel
(2007)], Thomas Ricketts [Ricketts (1996)], Thomas Ryckman [Ryckman (2005)], Friedrich Stadler [Stadler
(1997), (2007)], Klemens Szaniawski [Szaniawski (1989)] and Thomas Uebel [Uebel (1991)]. Naturally, this
list is incomplete. However, it forms a kind of a minimal set by the help of which one might start to find
one’s bearings in the domain of Carnap studies.
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Carnap’s work in this area and immersed themselves in the numerous technical questions
springing forth from their study. Much of this work related to the problem of formulat-
ing a mathematical framework for rational decision making, conceived in the twofold
sense of comprising both statistical inference as used in the evaluation and estimation
of hypotheses, and decision theory as a framework for guiding our actions in the face
of uncertainty. Carnap had joined the philosophy department at UCLA in 1954, where
Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953) had held the chair in philosophy before him. There Car-
nap continued to work on the foundations of probability, thermodynamics and inductive
logic, collaborating with many younger colleagues, until his death in 1970. The results of
this work are compiled in the impressive two-volume Studies in Inductive Logic and Prob-
ability [Carnap & Jeffrey (1971); Jeffrey (1980)] Antecedent to this intense period of work
in inductive logic and foundations of probability Carnap had immersed himself in the
study of semantics. This work, culminating in the book Meaning and Necessity [Carnap
(1947)] was characterized with a technical sophistication that had, by then, come to epito-
mize Carnap’s highly distinctive style in philosophy. In the University of Chicago where
Carnap was a professor of philosophy from 1936 to 1952, he was regarded by the faculty
as a kind of a technician, not engaging in philosophy at all.3 Intense concentration on
overtly technical questions during the latter part of his career, eschewing any attempt to
disclose the underlying motivation or broader ideological background of this technical
work, contributed towards the distorted view of his philosophy in particular and of log-
ical empiricism in general that emerged in the general consciousness during the 1960s.
The radical shift in intellectual atmosphere during that time, fueled in part by the geopo-
litical tensions as well as social and political surges, and most prominently by the radical
attitudes of the idealistic young of the 1968, made it evident that the seemingly sterile
doctrines of scientific philosophy that had been conceived in Vienna in the 1920s and
1930s were of no interest to the youth that attempted to find their place in the chaotic and
tumultuous world. Influenced by the historicist turn in the philosophy of science, that
was mainly catalyzed by Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the
Academe, so the story goes, was liberated from a positivist or objectivist conception of
science that privileged the so called ‘hard’ sciences at the expense of humanistic or social
disciplines. All of these factors together contributed to the fact that from the 1960s and
1970s on some monographs and articles referring to the history of logical empiricism and
its philosophical import perpetuated a curious view of its basic doctrines and especially
of Carnap. In these accounts (inspired, as pointed above, mainly by Kuhnian ideas in
history and philosophy of science) the intellectual portrait of Carnap was painted with
cubistic strokes resulting in a picture of a stern technocrat interested only in a very nar-
row field of problems. (Although it has to be said that as far as the manifest image of
Carnap is concerned, this assessment was justified.) Carnap’s famous dictum in the Lo-
gische Syntax der Sprache [Carnap (1934a)] that “philosophy is the logical syntax of the
3His sometime pupil Richard Jeffrey has related that: “What Carnap was doing wasn’t seen as philosophy
by most of the faculty; they regarded it as a kind of engineering. And Carnap seemed perfectly content
with that description. [. . . ]” [Carus (2007), 36n] Indeed, within the faculty only Charles W. Morris (1901–
1979) shared with him the conviction about the primacy of logic and science as the cornerstones of rigorous
philosophy. Their colleagues included Richard McKeon (1900–1985), Mortimer Adler (1902–2001), Charles
Hartshorne (1897–2000), and Manley Thompson (1917–1994), all of whom were more or less inspired by the
then current variety of American pragmatism.
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language of science ” accompanied with the earlier vehement manifesto of Scheinprob-
leme in Philosophie [Carnap (1928b)] that culminated in the veto to eliminate philosophical
problems that had traditionally been conceived as having perennial value,4 made Car-
nap appear as a scientific purist on par with such hard-boiled positivists as Ernst Haeckel
(1834–1919), Dimitri Pisarev (1840–1868) or Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932). The technical
machinery of his publications, which to the uninitiated must have appeared as a spirit-
sapping formalism which only the few and devoted had the patience or perseverance to
master, surely helped to conceal his status as a philosopher of first rank in the eyes of
the wider public interested in philosophical questions. But the impression of Carnap as
a technocrat obscured the underlying motivation driving Carnap in his particular ‘lan-
guage engineering’ projects. Indeed, the projects that Carnap was engaged with during
the last twenty years of his life were very much in the service of the radical ideas that
he had conceived already in 1931–1932. But unfortunately for the philosophical commu-
nity and culture at large, because of the adverse circumstances, this failed to come across
in the America, where the intellectual and cultural atmosphere was very much different
from the exuberant and lively milieu of Vienna of the 1920s, where logical empiricism was
born. Still, Carnap himself has to be taken as accountable for not having made explicit the
connections between his philosophical program and his political activity which he con-
tinued even while at the United States. In keeping with his earlier activities in Europe, he
was involved in radical politics, and was, mainly for this reason, extensively spied on by
FBI.5 The conditions of McCarthyism in the 1950s made Carnap careful to not associate
his philosophical work with anything that might compromise his freedom in the way of
attracting unnecessary attention from state authorities or university administration. All
in all, given the various social and political tensions characterizing the American society
in the middle of twentieth century, it is not surprising that Carnap suspended from any
public expression of the ambitious and radical utopianism that underlay the philosophy
of the Vienna Circle.
4I have in mind, naturally, problems that are usually labeled metaphysical. Not that Carnap alone was
influential in propounding such an antimetaphysical view; as a matter of fact, some of his colleagues in the
Vienna Circle showed a much more militant attitude against such questions (Otto Neurath is an example
par excellence). Carnap was antimetaphysical only in the sense that he denied the possibility of meaningfully
engaging in metaphysical discussions using the medium of scientific (philosophical) language. Emotionally
he was most sympathetic to expressions of the Lebensgefühle in the form of poetry and music, for example.
Indeed, the most striking simile Carnap ever produced concerning this question, is the following given
in [Carnap 1931 [Carnap 1959, 80]]: “The harmonious feeling or attitude that the metaphysician tries to
express in a monistic system is given clearer expression in the music of Mozart. And when a metaphysician
gives verbal expression to his dualistic-heroic attitude towards life in a dualistic system, is it not perhaps
because he lacks the ability of a Beethoven to express this attitude in an adequate medium? Metaphysicians are
musicians without musical ability.” Just to see how much the general atmosphere surrounding these questions
has relaxed even within the confines of the analytic ‘school’, it is illuminating to relate how Michael Dummett
empathizes with the layman’s expectations that philosophers should answer “deep questions of great import
for an understanding of the world”. According to Dummett, an inventory of such questions would include
at least the following: “Do we have free will?”, “Can the soul, or the mind, exist apart from the body?”,
“How can we tell what is right and what is wrong?”, “Is there any right and wrong, or do we just make
it up?”, “Could we know the future and affect the past?”, “Is there a God?”. Although these concerns are
“disconcertingly remote from the writings of the analytical school”, as Dummett emphasizes, “if philosophy
does not aim at answering such questions, it is worth nothing”. [Dummett 1991, 1]
5George A. Reisch has established these facts in his recent book How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy
of Science [Reisch (2005)].
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But who, then, was Carnap? An answer to this question has begun to take definite shape
through the collective efforts of many scholars (some of whom were mentioned above).
Rudolf Carnap, the philosophical leader de facto of the Vienna Circle is no longer consid-
ered as a solitary character of passing interest that he was made into in the 1960s when
the antagonism towards logical empiricism and everything that it was taken to represent
reached its high-point. Indeed, the contrast with the picture of the early reception history
of Carnap is conspicuous, to say the least. This is due, in part, to the acknowledgement by
the recent scholarship of the influence of a number of seemingly incompatible currents of
German and Austrian thought on Carnap’s philosophy. Most prominent among these in-
fluences are the neo-Kantian movement, particularly the Marburg school represented by
Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), Paul Natorp (1854–1924) and Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945),
the pragmatically oriented fictionalism of the neo-Kantian Hans Vaihinger (1852–1933),
the phenomenalism of Ernst Mach (1838–1916), the Lebensphilosophie and philosophical
pedagogy of Herman Nohl (1879–1960), the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–
1938) and the logic and philosophy of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925). Although the great im-
portance of Frege’s thought for Carnap’s philosophy has been emphasized by a range of
scholars from the 1960s on, and even by Carnap himself, the impact of Edmund Husserl
has demonstrably been of equal rank, at least upon Carnap’s early philosophy.6 Dis-
closing the broader German background of Carnap’s thought in its totality is a welcome
palliative against the one-sided emphasis on the anglo-saxon analytic tradition, foremost
Frege, Wittgenstein and Russell, as the background of Carnap’s philosophy. It was pre-
cisely this one-sidedness that led to the caricatures of both Carnap and logical empiricism
that were so influential in the post-war academic philosophy. That Carnap was a first-
rate philosopher of science, no one seems to dispute, but that he also perceived wider
intellectual horizons than what is made explicit in his technical work, escapes many.
Carnap’s philosophy, fueled as it was with an intense motivation to analyse the most
essential conceptual tools used in science, to clarify the procedures of introducing hy-
potheses and the methods of confirmation within different compartments of science and
to make explicit the complex edifice constituted by the knowledge provided by different
disciplines, building upon the foundations of the exact specification of the different lan-
guages used in them, including the menagerie of logics, the vast domain of mathematics
and the different interpretations of probability, was also nourished by a more humane
source of questions, worries and desires. A central problem which underpins Carnap’s
philosophical program is the relevance of philosophical and scientific thought to the prac-
tical worries of mankind, in effect, to life. Despite Carnap’s apparent focus on research
topics that directly bear on the most theoretical and abstract work in the sciences, he was,
at least implicitly, striving for an integrative conception of the significance of science and
systematic knowledge for the everyday life of society and the individual. He was es-
sentially attempting to work out the implications of the programmatic manifesto of the
Vienna Circle, in the conception of which he played a part, published under the name
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (“Scientific World Conception: The Vi-
6This is a rather recent finding which I shall have occasion to comment upon in this work. The most
prominent scholars who have studied Carnap’s connection with Husserl are Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock
[Haddock (2008)], Thomas Ryckman [Ryckman (2007)], Jean-Michel Roy [Roy (2004)] and Sahotra Sarkar
[Sarkar (2003)].
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enna Circle”) in 1929. In place of the utopian verse of that manifesto he put concrete
proposals for improving the conceptual practices of science (the most important part of
this work concerning the notion of confirmation in the empirical sciences and different
systems of inductive logic), with a view that such proposals would ultimately contribute
towards a wider appreciation of science and the scientific world view, by removing the
opaqueness of scientific language and unifying different domains of scientific work by
eliminating unintended ambiguity and idiosyncratic expressions from the vocabulary of
the special sciences. These conceptual clarifications, or ‘conceptual engineering tasks’,
formed only a part of the overall mission that lay implicit in the particular projects that
Carnap delved in. Carnap was very much inspired by ideas that began to emerge in
the fin-de-siècle central Europe, mainly in Berlin and Vienna, ideas fermented in the at-
mosphere of modernism that spanned the diverse fields of philosophy, literature, poetry,
visual art, architecture, music, religion and politics. The variety of cultural, social and
political influences in “Wittgenstein’s Vienna” constituted a unique blend, resulting in
an exuberant blossoming of a wide range of cultural activity, novel ideas and forms of
expression, not to mention political scuffles.7 The Vienna of the 1920s where Carnap
spent the most fruitful and creative years of his philosophical activity was thus perme-
ated with a myriad of influences that constituted the essence of modern Europe. The
ideas that foremost inspired the members of the Vienna Circle, and Carnap in particular,
had their roots in the Enlightenment. Quite similarly, in the spirit of the French Ency-
clopédistes (foremost d’Alembert, Condorcet and Diderot) the main goal of whom was to
make scientific knowledge available to everyone in the true spirit of intellectual equality,
pursuing an ideal of a cosmopolitan republic of letters, the constitution of an architec-
tonic for a unified science, with mutual respect and openness between colleagues in an
international scale, was one of Carnap’s ideals. The explication of concepts, the attempt
to render them more conducive to scientific work and to facilitate the progress of sci-
ence in general while aspiring simultaneously to link the diverse findings and results of
scientific investigation more appropriately with practical life became the modus operandi
of his mature philosophy. Similar questions formed the focus of many other European
scientists in the earlier part of twentieth century. Wolfgang Köhler had boldly addressed
the question about “the place of value in the world of facts” in the 1930s when general
opinion of science was quite reserved, even hostile. The post-World-War societies, on the
contrary, were infused with exuberant enthusiasm and trust in the utility of science, es-
pecially in America (where the growth of technology it spurred in an unforeseen manner
had played a prominent role in winning the war) and in Germany (where the experience
of the catastrophe of the Nazi regime with its anti-scientific romanticism made post-war
governments generally very favorable towards enlightened and scientific views). In spite
of these developments there gradually arose opinions underlining the truculent implica-
tions of ‘scienticism’ among public. The Cold War (the first truly global civil war) and
the tragedy of Vietnam, as well as ecological catastrophes like the Seveso disaster in 1976,
at the latest, opened the eyes of the new generation to evaluate critically the conceptual
and moral foundations of the post-war way of life which was largely based on a scien-
7The atmosphere of Vienna in the first third of twentieth century with its diametrically opposite ideolo-
gies and the tangible tension between the attitudes of the Alt Wien and the Jung Wien has been masterfully
depicted by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin. [Janik & Toulmin (1973)]
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tific world conception. The impending global ecological crisis could, according to one
view, be seen as a consequence of the gradual opening of a cleft between physical being
and consciousness, the historical consciousness of the distinction between a pure con-
sciousness and nature without subjectivity, to be found in its most extreme form in the
Cartesian dualism between res cogitans and res extensa.
How was the scientifically oriented world vision of Carnap’s related to these socio-
psychological changes? In the eyes of the new generation, it no doubt appeared in a
suspicious light, representing a narrow-minded and obsolete view on the nature of hu-
man cognitive projects in general, and philosophy in particular. This impression rested
on a one-sided view of Carnap’s philosophy, however. Carnap’s overall conception of
philosophy as one among the cognitive disciplines was very similar to the one of Köhler.
Like Köhler, Carnap was brought up in an environment where science and all the other
branches of human knowledge were held in high esteem. In Germany, as a young stu-
dent, he came under the influence of many eminent scientists, philosophers and artists,
whose work comprised in his eyes achievements of highest value. In Germany the gov-
ernments considered it as one of their noblest and honorable duties to support all forms
of research and fine arts that were seen to contribute towards the overall spiritual well-
being of mankind. Coming from such an environment, Carnap very clearly perceived
the intricate, but enormously important, task of reconciling the content of highest scien-
tific and artistic achievements with the practical problems of daily life. Carnap’s motives
were thus political in the widest sense; he wished to find ways to transform society and its
established policies that he conceived as opposite to the ideal that appertained to the en-
lightened and tolerant thinking associated with the scientific world conception. This was
a markedly pragmatic ingredient in Carnap’s philosophical temperament. It is a mistake
to see in it a sign of slender utopianism; it really was an exemplification of his deep feel-
ing of responsibility that he thought every scientist or scientifically oriented human being
was endowed with. In perpetuating his ideas, Carnap was not content with mere philo-
sophical elucidations [philosophische Erörterungen]. The programmatic ethos of his philos-
ophy was inextricably entwined with a concrete and pervasive knowledge of the details
of the problems he tackled. Indeed, he might well have applauded the words of William
James, who took it as a necessary desideratum in all his work to “forge every sentence
in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts.” Carnap thought that the reconciliation he
sought for could be accomplished by a completely new philosophy. This philosophy he
conceived as a science, or at least, as a ‘scientific philosophy’, inspired by the systematic
work of the great scientists of the twentieth century, including Einstein, Poincaré, Weyl,
Pauli, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, and others, whose exemplary work could be used as a
model in devising the foundations of this new philosophy.
When Carnap was interviewed in 1964 by Dr. Hochkeppel, he was asked what is meant
by the expression “scientific philosophy” of which he was generally considered to be one
of the main representatives. Carnap came up with a thoughtful and qualified answer, as
always:
Ich bin nicht ganz sicher ob das die beste und glücklichste Bezeichnung ist,
aber wir haben sie oft verwendet, und ich glaube, sie hat doch eine gewisse
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Berichtigung. Natürlich, man muß sie nicht mißverstehen, als wäre die
Philosophie wissenschaftlich in dem Sinne, daß sie genau dieselbe Methode
und denselben Inhalt hat, wie die Wissenschaft. Das ist sicherlich nicht der
Fall. Da ist ja ein deutlicher Unterschied. Die Wissenschaft hat die Aufgabe,
die Fakten in der Natur aufzusuchen, zusammenzustellen, zu vergleichen,
zu erklären und so weiter und uns dadurch ein Bild der Natur zu geben.
Die Philosophie dagegen soll sich in das Gebiet der Wissenschaft nicht ein-
mischen. Manchmal haben das Philosophen getan. Das halte ich für un-
berechtigt. Sie erinnern sich, solche kosmologischen Philosophen taten das.
Die ganze Kosmologie ist aber Sache der Wissenschaft, das ist nicht unsere
Sache.
Trotzdem, glaube ich, kann man sagen, daß die Philosophie wissenschaftlich
ist oder sein sollte, und wir bemühen uns, sie dahin zu bringen; aber nur in
dem Sinne, daß sie dieselben Forderungen stellt, nämlich Standards von Ob-
jektivität und Rationalität in der Argumentation. Wir glauben, daß in der tra-
ditionellen Philosophie, besonders in der Metaphysik, oft in einer, so könnte
man beinache sagen, unverantwortlichen Weise, jedenfalls un einer sehr sub-
jektiven Weise, versucht worden ist, etwas darzustellen, das dann als Erken-
ntnis gelten sollte. [Carnap (1993), 133–134]
The members of Vienna Circle — at least the more radical and enlightened of them —
were really attempting to redefine the criteria of objectivity and rationality — in their
cognitive, emotional and conative aspects — that underpin the aspirations of mankind.
And this is what Carnap’s work in philosophy really amounts to: it is an attempt to figure
out the broad outlines of human rationality, providing a radically new alternative to the
received view deriving from Kant and his predecessors.
The evolving conception of analysis in Carnap’s philosophy is the thread that connects all
the aspects of his work together. Especially pertinent to this conception is Carnap’s de-
marcation between logical and non-logical expressions in any given system of logic, and
the criterion of logicality in general which is exemplified in this demarcation. The cen-
trality of logic and mathematics in Carnap’s philosophical program is seen to be based
on the tenet that they constitute the largest compartment of science where one can define
validity by syntactic means alone. Although Carnap seems to abandon this view in the
early 1940s, adopting a semantic approach to the question of logicality, the original idea
remained an essential element in Carnap’s thought. Indeed, the need for a definition of
logical expressions becomes all the more urgent as one makes a transition from strict logi-
cal universalism to logical pluralism, as Carnap in fact did. Thus, on the one hand, along
with the different senses of analysis there emerge different senses of logicality and in-
variance the most explicit rendering of which Carnap provides in the Logische Syntax der
Sprache. On the other hand, from the Logische Syntax der Sprache on, the Principle of Toler-
ance constitutes the fundamentum philosophiæ in Carnap’s thought. The liberation that is
marked by the transition from the universal logical framework (epitomized by the rami-
fied type-theory of Russell and Whitehead) to the pluralism of many different logics (“the
open sea of free possibilities”) constitutes one of the watersheds of Carnap’s intellectual
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development. These two issues are naturally inextricably entwined. Towards the end of
1940s the Carnap’s task becomes manifestly pragmatic, i.e., one of making available dif-
ferent tools of communication and expression, tools that could be utilized in every-day
scientific work. The broader implications of the Principle of Tolerance, however, are not
overtly discussed. Carnap steadfastly continues to work on the specific problems that
he finds the most relevant for the explicit expression of the scientific philosophy. The
method of explication which becomes the hallmark of Carnap’s philosophical work in
the late 1940s, however, is clearly undergirded by the Principle. Carnap illustrated the
use of the method and discussed its underlying motivation in the first chapter of Logical
Foundations of Probability. But he never discussed explicitly the broader questions and
problems that the method would enable one to formulate accurately. Indeed, the gen-
eral questions about the practical utility of theoretical knowledge and the evaluation of
different proposals for a theoretical description of a practical problem within a social or
political framework, which could be fruitfully addressed with his method of explication,
were never elaborated in his published writings. That Carnap’s thought ramified into ar-
eas outside the immediate concerns of philosophy of science to encompass such broader
questions is hinted at by the striking parable of Herbert G Bohnert:
For a philosopher to concentrate very hard on any one thing, even if that thing
be generality, is, for some, a sign of narrowness, the mark of the specialist.
A.J. Ayer once divided all philosophers into pontiffs and journeymen, with
Carnap as the chief example of the latter. And Richard McKeon sorted them
into holoscopic and meroscopic types, with Carnap as the chief example of
the part-peerer. Ayer’s division was more kindly to Carnap than McKeon’s
but both missed Carnap’s scope. [. . . ] Perhaps the only way I can convey my
counterimpression is by a parable of my own.
Picture a very holoscopic mind. Suppose it is a very powerful one. After a
survey of the whole scene it would, of course, form plans. The plans would
require deeper study in certain areas. This deeper study would reveal broader
promises and puzzles. Interrelationships would be perceived. Plans and
studies, by interaction, would quickly become global. Science would have to
be unified, language systematized, the foundations of reasoning and experi-
ence scrutinized. Many specialized, meroscopic jobs would have to be done.
Some could be done best by the mind itself — like constructing the needed
overall conceptual framework — but time is limited. Minds must organize.
A journal must be started. A manifesto of the new plan must be issued, con-
gresses scheduled, an encyclopedia planned. Delays must be expected, of
course. Wars. The interaction of minds is uncertain; the interaction of groups
is unguided. In the meantime, the mind applies itself to those very special but
very basic jobs which few but it can perceive as essential and promising. This
brings the mind fame as a great specialist.
At some point, of course, the whole plan is seen as unlikely to progress be-
yond its most initial phases in the time the mind sees as available to it. But
then it was never unaware of probabilities. As a holoscopic mind, it un-
derstands its predicament perfectly. It still likes the plan. It proceeds in its
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painstaking work as if it had millennia. [Bohnert (1975) [Hintikka (1975b),
XLIII–XLIV]]
Despite the numerous post mortem reviews explaining the reasons behind its ultimate
failure, Carnap’s program of explication, it seems to me, has very much pertinence and
philosophical staying power even today. These reviews have for the most part taken
the singular — and obvious — shortcomings of the specific suggestions Carnap made
as evidence for arguing for the overall impossibility of carrying through a project that
Carnap envisaged. But surely the specific failure of one inadequate construction is not
tantamount to a refutation of the possibility of devising a better and more coherent con-
struction.
This dissertation concentrates on a particular exemplification of the ideal of the unity
of science in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Taking Rudolf Carnap (1891–
1970) as an exemplar of a scholar whose work in philosophy of science was at bottom
motivated by the ideal of a unified conception of science, it attempts to distillate the es-
sential characteristics and methodological significance of such a conception by a combi-
nation of historical and systematic analysis. Given the conspicuously holoscopic character
of Carnap’s philosophical orientation, there arises an interesting question about the re-
lation of his work to that of other prominent “seekers of the wider view” in the history
of philosophy (and history of science). On a more general level, we ask what kind of
intellectual and moral characteristics are associated with a scholar who is motivated by
the unification of science. Making it explicit: if a coherent representation of a unified con-
ception of science is conceivable, what kind of normative criteria can then be applied to a
scholar and his actions? In other words, what are the external and internal qualifications
of scholar’s vocation under the unified conception of science?
In the first part of the dissertation we provide a general account of the problem’s back-
ground in the intersection of intellectual history and systematics. In the first chapter
main emphasis will be put to the dialectic between agent-based and structural explana-
tions in historiography. The survey of a few exemplars of models of historical explana-
tion is intended to provide a background framework for discussing the relation between
descriptive analysis and analysis of values. In as much as our modern scientific world
conception and the general, essentially human, consciousness of the domain of validity
seem to be in a fundamental conflict, a philosophical clarification of the issues that de-
pend on this fundamental distinction is contingent on having proper tools at its disposal.
Indeed, it is necessary to acknowledge – with respect to both scientific knowledge and
moral positions – that the issues of genesis and validity have little in common. Both the
image of nature, built upon the masses of scientific and technological knowledge gath-
ered, and the modern conceptions of the moral have developed in the course of history.
The lesson that historicism can teach us is the possibility to adopt a symmetrical attitude
with respect to the status of the questions of genesis and validity within these (very dif-
ferent) domains. This symmetric attitude enables us to see that the validity of a theory
or position (in science or in moral philosophy) cannot depend on the diachronic aspects
of its genesis. Rather, it is precisely the case that the late appearance of certain scientific
theories and certain moral positions is an index that they are complex and presuppose a
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great deal genetically, and this is seen to be a common feature of all good theories. Thus,
if we would like to be able to approach the evolution of these ideas from a general per-
spective, we have to acknowledge their fundamental ontological difference and adopt a
variety of tools to study these domains. I present four different approaches to the study
of historical phenomena that appertain to the themes of this dissertation.
In the second chapter we provide a synopsis of the important thematic about the rela-
tionship between morals and science. After a brief examination of the concepts of the
moral and the scientific, we proceed to give an account of the concept of scientific self
which acts as a kind of normative meta-concept co-ordinating the interaction between
the epistemic and the ethical requirements appertaining to the education and professional
formation of a scientist. From a historical perspective it is easy to to see that the inten-
sion of the concept of scientific self varies according to the contingent factors such as
the external conditions of education and the requirements set by new experimental tech-
niques, but the essential, axiologically relevant, internal determinates of the concept are
seen to accumulate over time in a conservative manner. Especially interesting here are
the determinates that can be traced back to the complementary intellectual traditions of
Enlightenment and Romanticism. One of the most important exemplifications of an ar-
ticulated conception of scientific self can be found in J. G. Fichte’s “Vorlesungen über die
Bestimmung des Gelehrten” of 1794. In these lectures Fichte develops a beautiful – and still
highly relevant – conception of the true goals of a scholar as well as the qualifications he
must fulfill to attain those goals. From Fichte we turn to study the history of one partic-
ular intellectual virtue that has direct relevance for the questions tackled in the second
part of the dissertation, viz. tolerance.
In the third chapter we focus on the importance of a priori knowledge for both ethics
and science. These themes are developed only in their barest outlines in order to pro-
vide some theoretical support to the fundamental philosophical thesis of the dissertation
concerning the distinction between Is and Ought and its relevance for the question of the
unity of science. We will briefly touch upon the question about the relationship of a priori
and empirical knowledge in ethics, and provide a brief synopsis of the relevance of the
distinction analytic/synthetic in this domain. With respect to the discussion about the
dynamics between the a priori and empirical elements we provide criteria for decisions
that are morally right. Finally we address the ontologically crucial problem about the
moral element in man and present – with a view to the Enlightenment virtues – a syn-
opsis of the process of the dissociation of the concept of the moral from the concept of
the scientific. We describe the characteristics of ethical impulse in modern times and the
quite idiosyncratic view on morals and especially on moral justification advocated by the
members of Vienna Circle. We will see how the dissociation of the moral from the do-
main of the rational discourse inevitably results in the philosophically poverished stance
of moral non-cognitivism which Carnap maintained throughout his career.
In the second part of the dissertation we can finally address the adduced problem in its
particular ramifications in the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Given this general problem-
atic, we attempt to vindicate the underlying overall motivation of Carnap’s philosophy
and to reconstruct the architectonic of Carnap’s systematic thought in the light of the most
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recent research. One of the main tasks is to evaluate the coherence of interpretations pro-
vided in the research literature which place Carnap in the continuum of thinkers that are,
in some sense, committed to the ideals and values of Enlightenment. The most explicit
rendering of this line of thought is the recent monograph by A.W. Carus [Carus 2007]
which puts Carnap’s method of explication on center stage. I critically examine this line
of interpretation indicated by Carus and explore more deeply its historical dimensions.
Over and above the interpretation of Carus, we assess to what extent Carnap’s philo-
sophical program fulfills the criteria that are imposed upon it by the requirement of an
Enlightenment conception of unified science.
The central significance of logic and mathematics in Carnap’s philosophical program is
seen to derive from the fundamental conception of Carnap that within the total system
of knowledge logic and mathematics are performing the essential role of supplying the
forms of concepts, statements, and inferences, forms which are then applicable every-
where, hence also to non-logical knowledge. Therefore, the demarcation between logical
and non-logical expressions, along with the Principle of Tolerance and logical pluralism,
constitutes one of the central strands of Carnap’s thought. Indeed, the Principle of Tol-
erance and the logicality criterion are seen to be two inextricably entwined aspects of a
solution to a fundamental problem that Carnap searches a solution to and which char-
acterizes his aspirations throughout the period under consideration here, i.e. the prob-
lem of the rationality of scientific discourse under the variability of linguistic systems of
knowledge representation.
I depict the overall development of Carnap’s philosophy with this central idea continu-
ally in focus. As a supplement to the interpretation of Carnap’s program as a concerted
attempt to look for the fundamental invariants of thought and experience, I provide the
view that a necessary condition for implementing his ideal of explication is a coherent for-
mulation of what might be called the task of providing genealogies of important scientific
concepts and ideas. This complies with the attractive account represented by Howard
Stein about the two basic functions of philosophy, i.e., a distinction between “the enter-
prise of knowledge” and the “enterprise of understanding” [Stein (2004)] It is argued here
that an essential ingredient of Carnap’s method of explication is a variety of philosoph-
ical history of science which provides the necessary insight into the problem complex
one is tackling with under the purview of explication. Therefore, a significant role is be-
stowed upon historical knowledge and historiography. I attempt to accommodate this
aspect of the “enterprise of understanding” within the more explicitly confined “enter-
prise of knowledge” that Carnap was overtly concerned with. However, it is argued that
the “enterprise of understanding” constituted an equally important aspect of Carnap’s
philosophical program, although it remained covert in his publications.
Having provided a critical assessment of Carnap’s program of explication, we indicate
its ramifications within the domain of values. In a certain sense, then, although Carnap’s
philosophical program did not manage to articulate the elements that on the basis of the
general and systematic discussion conducted in this dissertation can be considered as
essential for a scholar’s vocation, we can see Carnap as a rare exemplar of the scholar’s
vocation. His lasting value for philosophy is not reduced by the fact he did not artic-
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ulate a systematic theory of ethics. It is only that his philosophical significance would
have been of even higher order of magnitude had he taken seriously the possibility of
constructing ethics within the domain of rational discourse. With the hindsight provided
by Carnap’s example we can finally formulate in a general level the challenges faced in
the education of new generations of scientists. Having provided us with a skeleton of
a critical praxeology, Carnap has done us a tremendous service by enabling us to orient
ourselves within the problem space of modern science and technological society, encour-
aging us to boldly encounter problems such as dealing with risk, science and survival,
and ultimately, the place of science in modern life. 8
8A final note on a few technicalities concerning the typography in the text. Firstly, the distinction between
use and mention is marked by using double quotes for terms or phrases mentioned as in, for example, refer-
ring to the paradigmatic sentence of Aristotelean syllogistic containing metavariables: “A is B”. Secondly,
single quotes (also known as ‘sneer quotes’ or ‘scare quotes’) are applied to indicate special or unusual (or, if
you wish, ‘tongue-in-cheek’) uses of terms or phrases. An example of these is the use of “good” and “bad”
in the phrase “Evidently, those ‘good’ people have done much evil to the allies, while we, the ‘bad’ ones,
have caused them many benefits”. (Vlastos: Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher) I do not, however, restrict
my use of single quotes to sudden flights of irony. Another way of using them is marking the instances
where one could not come up with a term or phrase that conveys exactly what one intends to say. In these
instances, which I hope are not too numerous, I have used single quotes to accentuate literary expedients.
Thirdly, italicization is used for emphasis, for established foreign (mostly German, French, Latin and translit-
erated Greek) terms and phrases conveying special meanings and for mentioning books and monographs.




Outline of the Problem’s Background








“In historic events the rule forbidding us to eat of the fruit of the Tree of
Knowledge is specially applicable. Only unconscious action bears fruit, and
he who plays a part in an historic event never understands its significance. If
he tries to realize it his efforts are fruitless.” — Tolstoy, War and Peace, book
XII, ch. 2.
In this chapter I investigate some pertinent views about historiography that have figured
prominently in modern European and American scholarship. I will also consider sys-
tematic issues related to the methodologies of history and sociology of science as well as
issues related to conceptual, formal and mathematical tools that are expedient in study-
ing the complex networks of influence that characterize the collaboration of scientists and
the acquisition of knowledge in the framework of ‘collective cognition’. The methodolog-
ical inquiry undertaken in this chapter is at bottom motivated by the observation that in
order to study the complementary domains of fact and value, distinct methods of en-
quiry are required in the two domains. The fundamental distinction between agent-based
and structural explanations is here taken as a point of departure, because (i) traditional
historiography and ‘integrated general history’1 (a significant part of this work may be
included within the latter field) may benefit from a research orientation that has recourse
to both kinds of models of explanation, (ii) circumventing the problems that result from
the legacy of historicism in philosophy is possible only through a non-biased analysis
of the constructive value and methodological limits of historiography; it is not possi-
ble to ignore this issue altogether, and (iii) any systematic enquiry concentrating on the
domains of fact and value, and their relationship, necessarily presupposes this kind of di-
vision of labour (not in the sense of a Collingwoodian absolute presupposition but rather
1A term coined by Jonathan Israel.
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in the sense of an ontological demarcation between natural and criteriological).2 The var-
ious methods introduced in this chapter include (1) the re-enactment model of historical
explanation of R. G. Collingwood, (2) the narrative model of historical explanation of
Arthur Danto, (3) the structurist model of historical explanation by Christopher Lloyd,
and (4) theoretical models of collective cognition (exemplified by David Wolpert’s model
of collective intelligence for representing complex interactions among a group).
Although the necessity of putting at our disposal a variety of tools as diverse as the ones
mentioned above may not seem evident on first look, I can only hope that the reader can
bear the suspense until chapters two and three, where the fundamental role of agent-
based modes of explanation in the history of the concept of the moral is demonstrated. I
take it that the relevance of the sctructurist modes of explanation is an uncontested issue
in philosophy of science as the great majority of our scientific knowledge corpus is based
on them. In any case, the latter play a crucial role in assessing the substantial content of
the ideal of the unity of science.
1.1 Methods of Historiography
For history to make any claims about its status as a science, it must be based on a careful
analysis of the possibilities regarding the extent to which the crucial processes of history,
both in the socio-economic context as well as in the individual context, can be made into a
coherent domain of scientific inquiry. It would seem that a pluralistic approach to histori-
cal research in as much as it means a recourse to relativism, post-modernism, pragmatism
and ‘common-sense’,3 is in a sharp contrast with a scientifc conception of historical en-
2This distinction is a natural (natural in the sense of appertaining to the order of things) one, i.e., one
determined by the essential form of the phenomena within both domains. It is manifested in the essential
difference between Is and Ought.
3The last one having, presumably, very little to do with its remote ancestor, senso commune. A delicate,
yet important distinction is figured here. The association of ‘common-sense’ philosophy with the ordinary
language philosophy of G.E. Moore and post-Tractatus-Wittgenstein has mainly caused the confusion. The
philosophy of senso commune has its roots in an altogether different intellectual and cultural climate of the
Renaissance. Indeed, the explicit definition of senso commune is to be found in Giambattista Vicos’s La scienza
nuova: “The senso commune is a judgement without reflection, experienced in common by a whole class, by a
whole people, by a whole nation, or the whole mankind”. [“Elements XII”, Scienza nuova, 142] Its meaning
is further clarified by Eric Voegelin [Voegelin (1998), 133–134]: “The senso commune is the point of origin
of a civilizational course. It comprises the primordial religious and legal institutions of a nation, and the
unreflected ideas embodied in these institutions are the stock of meaning that is penetrated in the historical
course increasingly by reason, until at the akme of the course, the moment of perfect balance between sub-
stance and reason is achieved. The meaning of the corso is the refinement of an initial, dense, unreflected
substance to a maximum of rational differentiation. The later, rational phase does not add to the substance.
Reason can operate only on the initial stock. [. . . ] Under this aspect, the concept of the senso commune es-
tablished the great principle of civilizational interpretation that the history of a civilization is the history of
the exhaustion of its initial myth and of such mythical elements as may have entered the course from other
resources.” It is thus an understatement to say that “the philosophy of ordinary language is not exactly the
same as the philosophy of common sense, yet historically speaking they treat overlapping themes”, as is
related by Philip Larrey in Sensus Communis Vol. 5 (2004), No. 2-3 (April - September). Although the latter
clause is undoubtedly true, the intended contrast is too weak. Although one could, feasibly, be sceptical
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quiry. For my purposes in this dissertation, I assume that in history it is possible to adopt
an attitude that is akin to scientific realism. I do not wish to engage here in an in-depth dis-
cussion about the notorious controversy between realism and anti-realism which forms
the background for the general debate about historiography, largely instigated by the
post-modern theorists.4 From the present point of view it is sufficient to describe the
realistic underpinnings of the methodology adopted here by referring to the distinction
between the ‘theatre of history’ (history a parte objecti) and the interpretations of histori-
ans (history a parte subjecti). Both aspects figure in a realistic conception of history, in as
much as history a parte objecti forms the ontological grounding of any meaningful scien-
tific investigation, and in as much as the world is studied by means of the methodological
tools available within the purview of history a parte subjecti. This amounts to a conception
of history which affirms the belief that the world of human affairs is, in principle, within
the power of humanity to control. Given that different historians have different goals and
priorities, the ideal picture given above raises suspicion. Is there, then, any possibility of
ordering the goals themselves in a way that guarantees the ‘objectivity’ of the realistic
representation? One way of answering this question in the positive is grounded in R. G.
Collingwood’s conception of the scale of forms.5 E. H. Carr provides an example of how
such a standard operates in practice:
‘Historiography’ is a progressive science in the sense that it seeks to provide
constantly expanding and deepening insights into a course of events which
is itself progressive. [. . . ] To take the simplest of illustrations. So long as
the main goal appeared to be the organization of constitutional liberties and
political rights, the historian interpreted the past in constitutional and polit-
ical terms. When economic and social ends began to replace constitutional
and political ends, historians turned to economic and social interpretation
about the prospects of doing ‘common-sense’ history, from the point of view of the rooted consciousness of
social evolution embodied by Vico, the senso commune would form a valid basis of historical enquiry.
4The post-modernist scholars mainly draw on the philosophical writings of such figures as Barthes, Fou-
cault, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Irigaray, Kristeva, Lacoue-Labarthe, Spivak, Judith Butler,
Laclau, Sande Cohen, Stanley Fish, and Richard Rorty, to name a few. The central tenets of the post-modern
historiography can be stated as follows: (1) the past has gone forever and that our statements cannot, there-
fore, be said to correspond to it; and, (2) language as such is referential and characterized by endlessly
deferred chains of meaning. [Connelly (2006) [Macfie (2006), 187]]. Some of the most vigorous proponents
of the post-modernist program in history are Alun Munslow [(1997): Deconstructing History, Routledge, Lon-
don and New York], Keith Jenkins [(1991): Re-Thinking History, Routledge, London and New York; (1995):
On “What Is History?” From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White, Routledge, London and New York; (1997):
(ed.) The Postmodern History Reader, Routledge, London and New York; (1999): Why History? Ethics and Post-
modernity, Routledge, London and New York.], Robert Berkhofer [(1995): “A Point of View on Viewpoints
in Historical Practice” in F.R. Ankersmit and H. Kellner (eds.) A New Philosophy of History, Reaktion Books,
London.] and Frank Ankersmith, [Ankersmit, F.R. and H. Kellner (eds.)(1995): A New Philosophy of History,
Reaktion Books, London.] The post-modernist position has been succinctly adduced by Michael Stanford
(representing ‘traditional’ historians) in the following way: “[. . . ] In historiography the representation is the
reality — texts are self-referential and do not refer to anything else; to such texts only aesthetic criteria are
relevant, not epistemological norms or standards; we have no established texts and no past, but only (more
or less plausible) interpretations; criteria of truth and falsehood are inapplicable to historiography; histor-
ical accounts are opaque and cannot be paraphrased; the historical past is only the creation of the present
historians, rather than existing in its own right — this is ‘constructivism’ ” [Stanford (1998) 234].
5Collingwood’s conception of history is outlined in 1.2.
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of the past. In this process, the sceptic might plausibly allege that the new
interpretation is no truer than the old; each is true for its period. Neverthe-
less, since the preoccupation with the economic and social ends represents
a broader and more advanced stage in human development than the preoc-
cupation with political and constitutional ends, so the economic and social
interpretation of history may be said to represent a more advanced stage in
history than the exclusively political interpretation. The old interpretation is
not rejected, but is both included and superseded in the new. [Carr (1962),
118]
The realistic picture of historical research as reaching towards more accurate depictions
and more comprehensive explanations of historical phenomena functions as an ideal,
a sort of Peircean limit of research, that regulates the formation of the variety of ex-
planatory strategies and patterns presented by historians. This picture of historiogra-
phy openly consents to the view that there exist severe practical difficulties of discov-
ering and conceptualizing the relevant elements of historical explanation. History is ir-
reducibly theory-laden, regarding equally the suggested patterns of explanation as well
as the generally accepted methods of collection of data. However, this does not exclude
the possibility of envisaging history as an epistemological project aspiring continually
towards better and more refined explanations, the corroboration of which is the task of
competent historians. The kernel of realism included in the overall view propounded in
this dissertation is just the contention that there exist historical processes (independently of
our representations), but that these become objects of scientific investigation only via our
theoretical representations. These representations, in turn, provide us with an increased
understanding. Indeed, as Collingwood put it:
The historical process is a process in which man creates for himself this or
that kind of human nature by recreating in his own thought the past to which
he is heir. [. . . ] [B]y understanding it historically we incorporate it into our
present thought, and enable ourselves by developing and criticizing it to use
that heritage for our own achievement. [Collingwood (1946); 226, 230]
In the following two sections I look forward to delve in depth into the more philosophical
aspects of historical explanation. In order to tackle the main difficulties pertaining to the
task at hand, I will adduce a few historiographical methodologies that have figured in
philosophy in the twentieth century, mainly in the European and American traditions.6
6As is made evident by the group of representative thinkers of historiography I draw on in my study, I
have no sympathies for the analytic/continental divide taken in an ideological sense. That it is a tangible
distinction in a historical, sociological and topical sense I do not wish to deny (although some will deny
even this!), but to choose between the representations of the analytic and the continental traditions of his-
toriography as an attempt to discover methodologically sound principles, is in my opinion futile, not least
because philosophy generally lacks a definite methodology and because the conceptual tools and styles of
argumentation of different philosophical ‘schools’ may (and in particular cases do) overlap significantly. I
am inclined to think that the approaches represented by the thinkers I am about to adduce, supplement,
rather than contradict each other. It is beneficial to have various methods and modes of thought at hand;
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I will assess these methodologies in the light of the most urgent priority of current his-
toriography, viz., the necessity of redefining the field of ‘history of philosophy’ in any
contemporary attempt to devise a methodology of intellectual history capable of serv-
ing as a frame for ‘integrated general history’. The necessity of redefining the field of
history of philosophy derives, essentially, from the confusing present state of historical
studies in general and from severe misunderstandings in the study of ‘modernity’ in
particular.7 The number of different methodological approaches in historiography has
grown beyond control; so much so, that it is no longer possible for a single scholar to
get a coherent overall view of the field. Some kind of unification is therefore necessary.
Moreover, the history of philosophy is generally so narrowly defined that it is impossi-
ble to satisfactorily accommodate the Enlightenment meaning of the term “philosophy”
within its scope. This is, of course, one of the most pressing reasons to attempt to refor-
mulate history of philosophy from our point of view. Indeed, as Jonathan Israel has put
it: “[. . . ] without a dramatic widening of the scope of ‘history of philosophy’, breaking
in this respect with the Lockean and Humean legacy, no historian, or philosopher, can be
said to engage broadly with Enlightenment ideas about revolutions and society or deal
comprehensively with a principle of ‘modernity’ conceived as a set of values, attitudes,
and ideas generated by the Radical Enlightenement.” [Israel (2006), 15]
The goal of a historian of ideas is to provide fruitful interpretations of conceptual phe-
nomena in their historical context. These interpretations should open up new possibilities
for systematic developments that still retain the valid kernel of substantial insight of the
earlier suggestions and ideas. The challenge is more or less to frame hypotheses which
it is like having a toolkit that contains different tools that are appropriate for various tasks. This does not,
however, amount to any sort of relativism, as I will argue in the following. Indeed, I agree wholeheartedly
with Ryle, when he says that: “There is no place for ‘isms’ in philosophy. The alleged party issues are never
the important philosophic questions, and to be affiliated to a recognizable party is to be the slave of a non-
philosophical prejudice in favor of a (usually non-philosophic) article of belief. To be a ‘so-and-so’ is to be
philosophically frail. And while I am ready to confess or to be accused of such frailty, I ought no more to
boast of it than to boast of astigmatism or mal de mer.” [Ryle (1937) [Ryle (1971b), 153–154]]
7The reasons for this state of affairs derive, in the first place, from the lamentably common anti-historical
attitude of philosophers, particularly in the anglophone countries, and, in the second place, from the lop-
sided Enlightenment historiography which has failed to deliver the essential difference between the so-
called mainstream Enlightenment and Radical Enlightenment. Jonathan Israel has analysed the situation as
follows: “[D]ue to the leanings of much recent historiography, as well as the anti-historical orientation of
twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy, the modern reader investigating the rise of ‘modernity’ as
a system of democratic values and individual liberties in the Enlightenment encounters a bewildering and
curious paradox. For the crucible in which those values originated and developed — the Radical Enlighten-
ment — has not only, until recently, been very little studied by scholars but at the same time confronts us with
a major philosophical challenge in that its prime feature is a conception of ‘philosophy’ (and indeed of ‘revo-
lution’) from which during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries western liberal thought and
historiography, especially in the English-speaking world, managed to become profoundly estranged. Part of
the difficulty, in contemporary Britain and America, is that philosophy’s proper zone of activity has come to
be so narrowly defined by the intellectual heirs of Locke and Hume that philosophy is generally conceived
to be a marginal, technical discipline which neither does, nor should, affect anything very much, let alone
define the whole of reality in which we live, an approach which firmly places ‘philosophy’ at the very oppo-
site end of the spectrum from the Radical Enlightenment’s (and indeed Marx’s and Nietzsche’s) conception
of ‘philosophy’ as discussion of the human cosmic condition in its entirety, the quest for a coherent picture,
the basic architecture, so to speak, of everything we know and are.” [Israel (2006), 13]
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skillfully balance the contrary requirements of accuracy and attractiveness.8 An illuminat-
ing historical study results from an optimal combination of these qualities.
1.2 Agent-Based Explanations in Intellectual History
Collingwood’s re-enactment model of historical explanation
“[. . . ] there is no such thing as knowledge either of the particular or of the universal, but
only of the individual [. . . ]” — R. G. Collingwood, “Are History and Science Different
Kinds of Knowledge?”
Underlying Collingwood’s philosophy of history is a fundamental distinction of meta-
physical origin. According to Collingwood, the function and scope of the human mind
should be characterized along the lines of a dichotomy between thinking and feeling.9
Regarding the cornucopia of activities and functions that can be accommodated under
the generic term “mind”, this distinction amounted to a thoroughgoing division of the
entire range of these activities falling under either thinking or feeling. Moreover, not
only the metaphysical contrast was drawn as a sharp demarcation, but Collingwood
even went so far as to find it appropriate to speak of some actions as “determined by
thought” and of others as determined by “mere impulse and appetite”. [Collingwood
(1993), 216] Hence, a value-theoretic position was also built into the framework of mind
that laid the basis for his philosophy of history. From a methodological point of view,
thought has a primary role as an explanatory element in human sciences. Indeed, those
actions in which the thought of the agent plays an essential and causative role are termed
by Collingwood as “reflective” or “rational” actions. Characteristic elements of reflective
thinking include the agent’s situational awareness (providing his motives for acting),
his purposes, his scruples and values, and his dispositions, his know-how,10 prudence
(weighing of practical means and consequences), etc.
The emphasis on the rational aspects of human agency was in fact a necessary ingredi-
ent of Collingwood’s conception of history. Moreover, it was an ingredient which took
a concise and definite form in his thinking only gradually. He spent a long time search-
ing for such a methodological basis that could provide him with a criterion to discern
the rational content of history as an academic discipline, and enable him to justify the
underlying overall vision of his according to which history and philosophy were essen-
tially one and the same discipline. Indeed, the rapprochement of philosophy and history
was the main theme of all of Collingwood’s later writings. Collingwood crystallized his
conception of the purpose of philosophy in a lecture on the philosophy of history in 1930
8A pair of terms used in [Carus (2007), 40n]
9This contrast is clearly visible in all of Collingwood’s later writings, from The Idea of History on.
10In some cases, a reference to the agent’s expertise could be more accurate and illuminating, comprising
such procedural maxims as (1) reinvestment in learning, (2) seeking out more difficult problems, (3) tackling
more complex representations of recurrent problems, etc. For a comprehensive treatment of this kind of
cognitive characterization of agents, see [Bereiter & Scardamalia (1993)].
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in the following terms: “Philosophy is thinking about the world as a whole. To study the
nature of selected parts of the world is to be a scientist; to study its nature as a whole is
to be a philosopher.” [Collingwood (1930) [Collingwood (1965), 121]] To see how such a
conception of philosophy fitted with Collingwood’s conception of history, it is expedient
to clarify how he saw the relation of philosophy to other disciplines in general. In the
same lecture he maintains that “ ‘The philosophy of something’ is a legitimate phrase
only when the ‘something’ in question is no mere fragment of the world, but is an aspect
of the world as a whole — a universal and necessary characteristic of things.” [ibid., 122]
History was an ideal companion to philosophy in this respect. The purpose of history,
according to Collingwood, was not encapsulated by the ‘scissors-and-paste’ style of his-
tory that prevailed in the academia at the time. In history it was not a question of merely
providing reliable chronicles relating what had happened in the past. Even if such ap-
proaches accommodated principles that could be called ‘scientific’ in a very loose sense
(verging on a kind of eliminative induction á la Francis Bacon), they did not fulfill their
promise to deliver an adequate account of the past, an account that could be of use in
solving problems arising at present. This was the fundamental criticism of Collingwood
regarding traditional academic history. History as a science professed to be something
completely different. As Collingwood put it: “If there is to be philosophy of history,
history must be something more than a trade or an amusement. It must be a univer-
sal and necessary human interest, the interest in a universal and necessary aspect of the
world.”[ibid., 123] Moreover, history is not a mere intellectual interest in its own right, it
is a form of knowledge. It is the justification of this line of thought that becomes the modus
operandi of Collingwood’s intellectual aspirations.
It is evident that this kind of conception of history necessitated a specific view of its
methodology. But Collingwood had such a view ready at hand. He was inclined to think
that the peculiarity of the historical method laid in its reliance on a kind of penetration
into an agent’s mind. When Collingwood used such terms as “penetration” and “inside
of the event”, he was not alluding to some vague and mysterious ways of intuitively
grasping what an historical agent thought, but metaphorically stating the aim of the sci-
ence of human action: the task of human science in enquiring the actions of individual
agents in their historical surroundings is to disclose the “thought” of the agent in order
to explain that action and to render it rationally understood. In the case of an histo-
rian the enquiry of human actions is of course of a peculiar nature. The historian does
not have direct access to the facts that pertain to the action or event under examination.
He will have to rely on the usual sources of information in such cases (what is usually
called ‘evidence’), for example testimony, reports, documents and artifacts. On the basis
of this evidence the historian reconstructs the “inside of the event” reflecting on that ev-
idence and making inferences from it. This stage of the explanation construction might
be called ‘disclosing the thought of the agent’. This, however, is not the end point of re-
search. After having constructed a plausible candidate for the “thought” of the agent that
might account for the action he performed, it is necessary to ascertain that the deed per-
formed actually is the “expression” of the reconstituted thought. Collingwood uses here
the quite strong phrase “deed determined by the thought”. What it essentially means is
that the historian should, rather than devising arbitrary or imagined reasons for the ac-
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tion, consider as many alternative courses of action as possible, measure these against the
presumable motives of the agent in question, and finally weigh all of these alternatives
against the relevant available evidence. This process of re-enactment, although relying on
empathetic identification with the agent at one stage of the inquiry, is not an intuitionistic
approach to historical explanation. It aims at being a realistic one, conferring an equally
important status to both inductive reconstruction and empathetic deliberation. These
two aspects constitute what can be called the dimensions of chronicle and narrative in
Collingwood’s historical method. In his Autobiography Collingwood succinctly described
the core of his historical methodology:
So I reached my third proposition: ‘Historical knowledge is the re-enactment
of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by con-
tradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs.’ How is one to know
which of these planes is ‘real’ life, and which mere ‘history’? By watching the
way in which historical problems arise. Every historical problem ultimately
arises out of ‘real’ life. The scissors-and-paste men think differently; they
think that first of all people get into the habit of reading books, and then the
books put questions into their heads. But I am not talking about scissors-and-
paste history. In the kind of history that I am thinking of, the kind I have been
practising all my life, historical problems arise out of practical problems. We
study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are
called upon to act. Hence the plane on which, ultimately, all problems arise
is the plane of ‘real’ life: that to which they are referred to for their solution is
history. [Collingwood (1978), 114]
There is, however, a flavour of relativism in Collingwood’s approach that has not satisfied
all theorists of historiography. For example, Rex Martin remarks that
What is disconcerting about Collingwood’s suggested criterion is its notion
of radical subjectivism. If there can be no appeal beyond the investigator’s
subjective appraisal, then we have subtly shifted the focus of our account of
explanation from the apparently objective connection of deed with thought,
which is what was originally meant by the statement that this deed makes
sense in the light of that thought, to the psychology of the investigator when
he asserts a connection of plausibility. [Martin (1977), 64]
Even though Martin expresses a here a well-founded worry, I think he has not adequately
seen the implications of Collingwood’s methodological thought in their overall context.
Collingwood was not suggesting that the capricious elements of an investigator’s psy-
chology should be let to determine the content of an historical account by themselves. In
fact, Collingwood was deeply aware of the risk and constantly searching for criteria that
would render an intentionalistic approach scientifically acceptable.
Now, without going into the details of the criteria that Collingwood himself provided for
the epistemological grounding of re-enactment, I want to make a couple of points which
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make his approach more plausible. In the first place, an agent’s11 action may belong to
one of these ranks: (i) impulse actions that are closely related to reflexes, (ii) actions that
are not goal-directed and (iii) actions in the proper sense of the term which are character-
ized by the conscious anticipation of results, in short, a concrete goal that is subjectively
intended. Generally speaking, all of these might be relevant for explaining a particular
historical event. However, it is only actions in the proper sense (iii) that can be satis-
factorily embedded in the re-enactment scheme of explanation. The reason is that for
Collingwood only actions in the sense (iii) can be subsumed under the criteriological
framework which constitutes the general conditions of possibility of the process of re-
enactment; a necessary condition for discerning the possible conscious motives of an act
of a particular agent is that the act was intended with a particular goal in mind in the first
place. An unconscious act, even if it could be ex post facto shown to be a result of definite
ratiomorphic processes embedded in the organic functions of the agent, could not be un-
derstood within the framework of re-enactment which presupposes an intentional basis
for the act under scrutiny. What is it then, that makes it possible to reconstruct the con-
scious motives of historical agents on the basis of historical evidence (testimony, reports,
documents and artifacts)? Moreover, what makes such a view plausible? The answer lies
in the conception of self and its irreducible historical character. From the point of view of
a self, the accounts it provides – for others as well as for itself – of the cognitive, emotive and
conative aspects of its psychological states as well as of the acts it takes are irreducibly
historical: “knowing oneself is historical — It is only by historical thinking that I can dis-
cover what I thought ten years ago, by re-reading what I then thought, or what I thought
five minutes ago, by reflecting on an action that I then did, which surprised me when I
realized what I had done. In this sense all knowledge of mind is historical.” [Colling-
wood (1936), 19] From a first-person perspective it is natural to describe the determining
conditions of self-identity in such historical terms. But then there is nonetheless a con-
spicuous rupture between the subjective, experiential quality of historicity characterizing
self-formation from this first-person perspective and the objective, purely descriptive el-
ements of historicity to be found within scientific accounts of the development of man
in the domain of historical psychology (the history of human cognition), as exemplified
in the interesting work of A.R. Luria and L. Vygotsky, for example. What is notewor-
thy in their work is their emphasis on the socially constituted structure of self which is a
product of historical evolution:
The behaviour of contemporary civilised man is the product not only of bio-
logical evolution or childhood development; it is also the product of historical
development. In the process of man’s historical development, external relations
between people, and relations between mankind and nature are not all that
has changed and developed. Man himself changed and developed; human nature
has changed. [Luria & Vygotsky (1992), 41]12
11Let us not be deceived by the seeming value-neutrality of the term; we are here mainly concerned with
men and it is a determining condition of their nature that the background framework of their actions include
irreducible axiological (Gk. xÐa (worth)) elements, both moral and prudential.
12Italics added.
11
They make the indisputable observation that the project of historical psychology is at
the outset fraught with severe methodological difficulties, not least because the available
evidence for a reliable and systematic reconstruction of the psychological structures and
lawlike regularities of the self is very scarce. Especially the hypothetical constructions on
the basis of archaeological artefacts are suspect in as much as they fail to give a “remotely
objective or complete account of the psychological mechanisms of behaviour.” [ibid.] It is
thus not surprising that historical psychology can draw on a very much smaller body of
material than is provided for the study of external history. Luria’s and Vygotsky’s unit of
analysis is the individual, and this is so even within the domain of historical psychology.
The emphasis on the individual aspects of the history of cognition immediately raises the
question about the possibility of acquiring theoretically relevant information on the basis
of historical evidence the partition of which into the classes of relatively numerous but
categorically inadequate data (such as typical archaeological artefacts) and scarce, but in-
trinsically relevant data (such as protocols of different tasks involving various cognitive
functions such as attention, memory, producing and understanding language, solving
problems, and making decisions), seems to set unassailable limits to the scope of his-
torical psychology.13 Furthermore, Luria and Vygotsky are engaged with the history of
cognition at two levels, (i) on the ‘paleo-psychological’ level of physical environment
and instincts and (ii) on the ‘historical’ level of intellectual abstraction and representa-
tion. Their fundamental problem is to link these two levels together within the context
of historical psychology. How can this be achieved? Can Collingwood’s method of re-
enactment serve as a mediating framework for the transition from the instinctive domain
of the natural and empirical to the criteriological domain of the abstract and normative?
This is a pertinent question, on the answer of which depends to a prominent degree the
usefulness of Collingwood’s method as an instrument of discovery.
Let us go back to the basic ingredients of Collingwood’s approach. He says that historical
questions are questions in which one tries to understand what somebody was doing on
certain occasion. A necessary condition of this is that one understands what sort of occa-
sion it was: “for every action arises out of the situation in which it is done, and there is
no understanding the action unless one understands the situation.” [Collingwood (1940),
191]14 The fundamental criterion of success, so Collingwood insists, “is to study the back-
ground”. [ibid.] The investigator strives to embed the actions which are the object of his
study within a particular situation. The stance towards the thoughts determining the
act is therefore situated rather than mentalist. The ultimate ground of the re-enactment
is a contextual evaluation of the background in which the act and the thought which
determined it (the intentional act) took place. Reconstructing the concrete presuppo-
13As an example of the level of specificity at which Luria and Vygotsky elaborate on the history of the
development of different cognitive skills, consider their account of the development of memory: “The his-
torical development of memory begins from the point at which man first shifts from using memory, as a
natural force, to dominating it. This dominion, like any dominion over a natural force, simply means that at
certain stage of his development man accumulates sufficient experience – in this case psychological experi-
ence – and sufficient knowledge of the laws governing operations of memory, and then shifts to the actual
use of those laws. This process of accumulation of psychological experience leading to control of behaviour
should not be viewed as a process of conscious experience, the deliberate accumulation of knowledge and
theoretical research. This experience should be called “naı̈ve psychology”. [Luria & Vygotsky(1992), 56]
14Italics added.
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sitions of acts enables one to determine elements that constitute intentions underlying
conscious acts in particular situations. One can go further and look for the presuppo-
sitions of presuppositions, and presuppositions of presuppositions of presuppositions.
Does this sequence terminate? According to Collingwood, it does. The terminal points
of these sequences he calls absolute presuppositions. The radical insight of Collingwood is
to conceive metaphysics as the study of absolute presuppositions. Its method is essen-
tially historical, as was clearly stated by Collingwood: “metaphysics can set its house in
order by living up to its proper character as an historical science.” [Collingwood (1940),
81] The idea was, as is well known, fiercely attacked by A.J. Ayer who, inspired by the
anti-metaphysical spirit of the Vienna Circle, attempted to devise a put-down argument
against the possibility of metaphysics. The argument Ayer presents in his classic Lan-
guage, Truth and Logic effectively takes the form of the following syllogism:
(1) Any proposition which cannot be verified by appeal to
observed facts is a pseudo-proposition.
(2) Metaphysical propositions cannot be verified by appeal to
observed facts
∴ Metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions, and
therefore nonsense.
What makes the whole account problematic, according to Collingwood, is the error of
mistaking suppositions for propositions, essentially an error in logic, having its root in
the way of thinking that logical efficacy, or the pragmatic feature of causing questions to
arise, belongs exclusively to propositions. “Mr. Ayer, true to the positivistic tradition,
does not possess the idea of supposing, and a fortiori not the idea of an absolute presup-
position.” [ibid.] Collingwood finishes his description of Ayer’s main error with char-
acteristically cogent statement “Any statement of an absolute presupposition which he
encounters in the course of his reading, therefore, he regards as a statement of a proposi-
tion; and for the metaphysical question ‘Was this presupposition made on a certain occa-
sion or not?’ he substitutes the pseudo-metaphysical question ‘Is this proposition true?’ ”
[ibid.] One conspicuous feature of the positivists’ rejection of metaphysics is their thesis15
that metaphysics might somehow be ‘malicious’ towards science (an expression of San-
tayana), and consequently the fear that unless the unruly entrophication of metaphysics
is impeded, and the whole discipline ultimately dispensed with, it will destroy science.
This thought is equally seen to rest on a mistake. Indeed, there is no controversy between
metaphysics, properly conceived, and natural science, as Collingwood emphasizes: “No
one is trying, or has tried within living memory, to tyrannize over natural science in the
name of metaphysics. From metaphysics properly so called, the attempt to ascertain the
absolute presuppositions of thought, a natural science that does its work conscientiously
can have nothing to fear.” [ibid., 168] The whole issue is, in the end, decided with brittle
sarcasm:
15One should not ignore the possibility of its having its roots in ratiomorphic processes.
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But this positivistic terror that metaphysics may injure natural science is, after
all, not without a sort of lunatic foundation. If metaphysics were what the
positivists mistake it for, if it were an attempt to provide empirical justification
for the presuppositions of science, it might certainly, though without malice
aforethought, prove detrimental to science itself, not by its success but by its
inevitable failure; for when the discovery was made that no justification of
this kind is to be had, the positivistic belief that it is nevertheless necessary
might lead to the false conclusion that the whole fabric of scientific though is
rotten at the core. Thus understood, we may think of the positivists as, in a
way, right to fear metaphysics as he does; but what he fears is not metaphysics
as it really is, but metaphysics as he misconceives it; and further, what he fears
is not this phantom itself, but the frightful consequences which, as he falsely
imagines, would ensue upon its failure to do what he thinks to be its proper
work: a work which in fact does not need doing and cannot be done. Such
fears are a proper subject of study to the psycho-pathologist. [ibid., 169]
Of course, the positivists were not alone with their one-sided, even prejudiced, concep-
tion about metaphysics. The markedly anti-metaphysical attitude was an axis around
which a prominent part of the scholarly philosophy in England had revolved from the
time of Hobbes on. The antimetaphysical and naturalist16 spirit has been especially
linked with the tradition of natural philosophy that stems from the work of Isaac New-
ton, Edmond Halley, Robert Hooke and Robert Boyle. The positivist philosophies that
emerged in the nineteenth century are direct descendants of this tradition in natural phi-
losophy. Elements of this basic attitude were then mediated to the logical positivists by
Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius on the continent as well as by Bertrand Russell and
G.E Moore in Britain. But even such a deep, and occasionally mystical, thinker as Alfred
North Whitehead who later became known for his metaphysical writings (especially for
his ‘process philosophy’ expounded in Process and Reality) remarked once that “having
recourse to metaphysics is like throwing a match in a powder magazine — it blows out
the whole arena.” [Whitehead (1920)] The specifically anti-metaphysical attitude was
thus something that was very much a part of English intellectual culture. Against this
background, Collingwood’s detailed analysis of the significance of metaphysics and the
scope of its applications is a remarkable and rare instance of intellectual courage. Indeed,
conceived as an inquiry about the conditions of possibility of a theory of absolute pre-
suppositions, Collingwood’s work constitutes one of the most important contributions
of British philosophy in the twentieth century along the achievements of Russell and
Moore. Furthermore, it provides for the historian of any discipline, and the philosopher
in particular, the possibility of dispensing with the peculiarly cross-sectional and timeless
accounts of phenomena which in reality engage persons with a history and a historically
16Naturalism, as intended here, refers to an historical intellectual orientation dating back to the Renais-
sance which is very much different from what is referred to as naturalism in contemporary philosophy. The
former is the view that areas that had traditionally been believed to require supernatural explanation should
in fact be subsumed under natural explanation. But even this variant of naturalism is taken with the under-
standing of requiring that certain capacities and powers are incorporated into nature which modern forms
of naturalism have been quick to dispense with. Modern variants of naturalism resemble more closely the
reductionist forms of corpuscularianism that emerged in the seventeenth century with Hobbes, for example.
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developed sense of self and morality. Thus, Collingwod’s method can be extremely help-
ful for an axiological assessment of human action in general.
Historical explanations as narratives
It is well known that both Croce and Collingwood were severely critical of the earlier
theorists’ attempts to model historical explanations after the explanatory models used in
the natural sciences. The idea that there might be universal laws governing the course of
historical events they both regarded as a gross error. Nevertheless, with Carl G. Hempel’s
deductive-nomological, or “covering law”, model of explanation introduced in the late
1940s, there emerged a concrete tool for constructing even historical explanations on the
model of lawlike regularities, a method that had proven so successful in the study of
inanimate nature. The apology for the D-N model of explanation in history pleaded to
the claim that explaining a given historical occurrence in terms of some other event or
set of events necessarily involves an appeal – which need not be more than tacit – to
laws or general propositions correlating events of the type to be explained with those of the
kind cited as its causes or conditions. The debate concerning the proper methodology
of historiography reached its apogee in the dichotomy between erklären and verstehen, on
the former side of which were historians and philosophers sceptical about the existence
of a specific method for investigating human culture and on the latter side of which were
historians and philosophers advocating a complete autonomy for definite categories and
procedures for human studies.
In as much as this methodological debate has had any effect on the historiographical
speculations of philosophers, it has mainly resulted in skepticism about the existence of
lawlike regularities. Against this background it would indeed be courageous to try to de-
fend the idea of universal historical laws within historiography. Let us see to what extent
the idea of lawlike historical regularities is plausible and how one could accommodate
the idea of historical laws within one’s conception of historiography.
Without delving into the many dangers and pitfalls of historical explanations17 we
should concentrate on the most perspicuous concern of any historian, viz.: the role of
narratives. In as much as the majority of historical texts are written in a form of a narra-
tive, narratives should be seen as constituting a particular form of historical explanation.
Now, what kind of support can be lent for such a view? If narratives are in effect stories,
what kind of conditions must be imposed on them in order to render them as instances
of explanation?
An important feature of all historical explanations is that they concern a change (in an
individual or in a situation, generally). A natural restriction pertaining to such explana-
tions is that they should concern a given, singular individual or situation. Moreover, they
17Among these pitfalls could be mentioned the use of temporal language and related temporal scepticism,
evidence and historical relativism, the dichotomy between history vs. chronicle, the meaning and epistemic
status of narrative sentences, the future – and past – contingencies, as well as the problem of general laws in
history.
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should pertain to individuals (or situations, structures, etc.) for which clear and distinct
criteria of unity of identity can be stated. These are ontological criteria for the identification
of which strict and procedural epistemic rules have to be provided. Quite generally, it
is natural to require of historical explanations (or any explanations, for that matter) that
they conform to the principle of the unity of the subject.18 There is an immensely challeng-
ing problem here concerning historical ontology, namely, the one of deciding what are
the elements which persist through a change. To make a decision with regard to a single
individual might be unproblematic (historically speaking), but once we start to consider
wider and more complex historical agencies, such as feudalism, nationalism etc., we im-
mediately realize the difficulty of this decision problem. It is therefore for the sake of
mere practical feasibility that we have to satisfy ourselves with the task of explicating a
model of historical explanation in the form which accommodates only individuals. Now,
consider the following example of a concrete historical event which might interest histo-
rians:
By September 1941, the international situation looked quite bleak for the
world but quite positive for Germany. As is noted in the play [Copenhagen
written by Michael Frayn], by this time the Reich had reached its greatest ex-
tent. Most of continental Europe was under Nazi occupation, German panzer
divisions were plunging into Soviet Russia, and the United States was still
officially neutral. Heisenberg had learned from his German coworkers that
an atomic bomb was not just a theoretical possibility but that it could indeed
become a practical reality. Whether the war ended with the German army in
place, or bogged down in a protracted conflict reminiscent of World War I,
it was easy to suppose that the United States would have enough time and
resources to catch up with German researchers and build a nuclear weapon,
which they might well use or threaten to use on Germany. In a memoir, Elisa-
beth Heisenberg wrote that throughout the war her husband “constantly tor-
tured himself” with the thought that the better equipped Allies might build
the bomb and use it on Germany.
At the same time, Heisenberg probably knew or strongly suspected that Bohr
was in contact with Allied scientists through underground sources. So, what
was Heisenberg trying to tell Bohr during this meeting, and what did he want
from Bohr? The broader historical setting and a fuller appreciation of Heisen-
berg’s outlook and relationship to the war and to fission research strongly
suggest that he wanted to convince Bohr that the seemingly inevitable Ger-
man victory would not be so bad for Europe after all. The alternative, as
Heisenberg later noted to his horrified Dutch colleagues, was a Europe ruled
by the Soviet Union. Having witnessed a traumatic Soviet revolution in
Bavaria as a teenager, Heisenberg always considered Soviet domination an
18This is, at least, a position that we take here for the purposes of analysis. We could envisage explanations
that accommodate more general and complex explananda that feature multi-agent constituents, such as
collectives (featuring collective intentionality), structures, cultures, etc. Prima facie, the criteria of unity of
identity for such entities would considerably differ from the ones for individuals. The essential idea of the
explanatory schema remains, however, the same.
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even worse evil than Nazi domination. What he apparently wanted from
Bohr was for Bohr to use his influence to prevent Allied scientists, who were
surely far behind the Germans, from working toward building a bomb that
could be used against Germany. [Cassidy (2000), 32]
Given the historical significance of the events alluded to, several pertinent questions
arise. Let us concentrate on the question: what was Heisenberg’s motivation for meeting
Bohr in 1941? From the point of view of historical interest, the most important presuppo-
sition of this question is that before 1941 there did not exist for Heisenberg the kind of mo-
tive for meeting Bohr that suddenly emerged in 1941. What brought about this change?
Using this event as an exemplar of a historical explanation pertaining to a change (here
a change in Heisenberg’s motivation), we may represent the form of an explanandum in
historical explanation schemes as follows (I draw here on the systematic exposition of
[Danto (1965)]):
E: x is F at t1 and x is G at t3.19 [Cf. ibid., 236]
An essential part in devising an explanation, according to this account, is looking for a
mediating factor, an event, the reference to which is required by the explanation. The
missing component in the schema above is a symbolic presentation of a unique event,
a presentation that encodes the occasion of something happening to x at t2. This event
may be of any degree of complexity as long as it functions as a relevant factor (causal or
intentional) in the explanation (effectively bringing about the change in x). One kind of
model of historical explanation could then be formulated as follows:
(S)
(1) x is F at t1.
(2) H happens to x at t2.
(3) x is G at t3. [ibid.]
Now, the search for a mediating element is essentially a matter of historical investigation.
We cannot have any a priori reasons for deciding which particular event is to account for
the change that we want to explain. For example, if the explanatory model that we prefer
to apply in the case of the Werner Heisenberg changing his mind is of the type above, we
could not decide out of hand, without recourse to historical facts, which events or features in
the surroundings of Heisenberg account for him changing his mind. To make it explicit,
in the case of this example we could present an explanation of the following kind:
19Thus the explanation situation given in the example quoted above can be represented as: “E: Heisenberg
is indifferent to (or perhaps skeptical about) the political significance of the Allied fission research at t1 and
E: Heisenberg sees the immense political significance of the Allied fission research at t3”. [ibid.]
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(1) Heisenberg is indifferent to (or perhaps skeptical about) the political significance of
the Allied fission research at t1 .
(2) Heisenberg learns at t2 from his German coworkers that an atomic bomb is not just a
theoretical possibility but that it could indeed become a practical reality. Heisen-
berg concedes that whether the war ended with the German army in place, or
bogged down in a protracted conflict reminiscent of World War I, it is easy to sup-
pose that the United States would have enough time and resources to catch up
with German researchers and build a nuclear weapon, which they might well use
or threaten to use on Germany.
(3) Heisenberg sees the immense political significance of the Allied fission research at t3.
This example is artificial, of course. Nevertheless, it captures some of the features of the
alleged mediating factor that accounts for the change in the Heisenberg’s mind. Other
possibilities might as well have been imagined, and they could equally well have ac-
counted for the required transition in the state of mind of Heisenberg. What this situa-
tion illustrates is the singularity of the explanatory instantiations of the general schema
above. To reiterate, we cannot on the basis of the general schema alone predict what
should happen in the problem situation characterized by the clauses (1) and (3). Histori-
cal investigation is necessary to account for the item (2).
Apart from these considerations, the schema draws our attention to another important
feature: it is already in a form of a narrative, or a story, that has a beginning (1), a middle
(2), and an end (3). It is this general form of the explanations we might subscribe to that
justifies the talk about narratives as explanatory vehicles in history. Danto, who has ad-
vocated this schema as a model of historical explanation even goes so far as to allude to a
certain resemblance between this model and the alleged dialectical pattern propounded
by Hegel which permeates the structure of history and is exhibited everywhere in the
historical evolution of societies at large.20 It is possible even to confer a valid sense to the
Hegelian claim that the thesis in a certain sense ‘contains’ the antithesis and synthesis.
A detailed development of this analogy and the assessment how far it could be pressed
have to be left for a different occasion, however. There is a clear demarcation between
the forms of deductive and historical explanatory schemes, respectively, as Danto has
rightly emphasized. In the first place, what historians are usually interested in are tem-
poral wholes consisting of a variety of changes of the kind exhibited above. This means
that the ultimate goal of historical explanation is to give an account of a complex event
having a composite structure the parts of which could be treated according to the general
schema (S). To illustrate this, we have to consider Heisenberg’s case from a wider point
of view. Using the metaphor of the uncertainty principle, we can narrow the breadth
of uncertainty regarding the seemingly mysterious circumstances of Heisenberg’s visit
20A dialectial explanation having in general a tripartite structure consisting of a thesis, antithesis and
synthesis. (This common picture perpetuated in general histories of philosophy, as has been argued by some
Hegel scholars (e.g. [Forster (1993)] and [Beiser (2005)]), is misleading, or oversimplifying. Notwithstanding
these criticisms, the common picture seems to me to be destitute of any significant information value, to say
the least.)
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to Copenhagen by expanding the focus of the historical spotlight concentrated on the
singular event alone.
Indeed, the change in Heisenberg’s attitude – a story in itself – is part of the middle in a
larger story: the story of the progress of “Jewish physics” in Germany, a necessary con-
dition of the spectacular development of nuclear physics and fission research.21 This, in
turn, is part of the middle of a yet larger story, the change in the attitudes of the patriotic
non-Jewish Germans among artistic, academic, and military circles who wanted Ger-
many to win the war (without wanting Hitler or the Nazi regime to win). This, in turn,
is part of the middle in a further story, the change in the prospects of German culture
surviving until better times, within the story of the change in United States’s position
towards the Nazi occupation in the continental Europe, and this in another story, the
change in the power relations between European states and United States of America
. . . and so on. [Cf. ibid., 241]
These different explanatory tasks at various levels of complexity form a nested sequence





· · · ((((())))) · · ·
This, however is an oversimplified view of the general situation. More complicated struc-
tures of mutual dependence/independence might figure in more realistic cases, such as
(()()())
which is intended to illustrate the possibility of multiple causation or overdetermination
[ibid.], and cases like
(()(())())
where some kind of overlaps are featured. [ibid.] As these examples appertain to ques-
tions about causality which from the point of view of illustrating the form of historical
explanations is a secondary problem, I will revert to the primary question of analysing
the differences between the deductive-nomological explanations of Hempel and the his-
torical or narrative explanations of Danto. This is the most crucial question regarding the
21As Cassidy explains, it “provided a splendid opportunity for the scientists to gain the protection of
the German army through a sustained project that might produce a powerful new weapon for the German
arsenal – or at least a new and plentiful source of energy to power German ships and the German economy.”
[ibid., 31] Heisenberg later put it as follows: “The official slogan of the government was: ‘We must make use
of physics for warfare.’ We turned it around for our slogan: ‘We must make use of warfare for physics.’ ”
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model of Danto who also regards the problem of causality as secondary. In as much as it
is a useful concept at all, I take it that is is not an insurmountable obstacle for historical
explanations in general.
To compare the accounts of Hempel and Danto it is expedient to consider the most sim-
ple case of explanation in the Hempelian scheme, namely the one containing an inference
utilizing the rule of modus ponens. In this we follow the exposition of Danto, who regards
this procedure as the most fruitful in distinguishing the conceptual differences between
the models. In effect we attempt to make explicit the apparent excluders22 of the scheme
of explanation provided by Danto to see whether it could be developed into a coher-
ent model of historical explanation, and to see whether the excluders themselves can be
circumvented by devising such a theory.
Consider the simplest case that satisfies Hempel’s criteria for explanation, namely the
following scheme:
(1) (x)(F(x) ⊃ G(x)),
(2) Fa,
(3) Ga.
In this scheme (3) is the explanandum (effectively a sentence describing a singular occur-
rence containing a reference to a single individual “a”) and (1) and (2) jointly constitute
the explanans ((1) being a general law and (2) an initial condition). This account clearly
complies with the criteria of Hempel, (3) being thought to follow from (1) and (2) with
(and only with) logical necessity. Danto, however, is dissatisfied with the given form of
Hempelian account with regard to at least one crucial point, namely, that the transition
“Fa− Ga” is a change, and that it is this change that we most often want an explanation
for. The main point is that these changes might not always be governed by general laws,
although some combination of a change of the prescribed type and an assigned cause for
the change can be so governed. Furthermore, the scheme does not admit of the type of ex-
planations that contain different predicates in the premisses and in the conclusion. Such
an inference would be generally invalid. But in history we might easily conceive of situa-
tions where the explanation does not fully conform to the simplified Hempelian scheme
but which, nevertheless, are considered as explanations. For example, consider a case
where we insert an additional constituent to the conclusion (3), such as “Ha” and take
the conjunction of “Ga&Ha” as the new conclusion. This conclusion does not anymore
follow logically from the premisses, but a scheme where this conclusion is substituted for
22A term coined by Robert Nozick in his Philosophical Explanations [Nozick (1981)], where the following
definition is given: “The form of these [philosophical] questions is: how is one thing possible, given (or
supposing) certain other things? Some statements r1, . . . rn are assumed or accepted or taken for granted,
and there is a tension between these statements and another statement p; they appear to exclude p’s holding
true. Let us term the ris apparent excluders (of p). Since the statement p also is accepted, we face the question
of how p is possible, given its apparent excluders. [*] Note that the question is not: given p, how are the
apparent excluders possible? Tension and incompatibility are symmetrical relations among statements, yet
typically philosophical problems focus on the possibility only of some statements on one side of the relation.
It is an interesting issue, what determines in which direction the question is salient.” [ibid., 9]
20
“Ga” it could still represent a perfectly relevant explanation in history. Another example
is provided by the case where we add a constituent consisting of a monadic predicate
as a new premiss, e.g. “Ea”. From a logical point of view such a premiss is redundant,
playing no role in the deductive inference. But historical explanations often contain such
superfluous and deductively inert components. Although an ideal historical explanation
might be pruned from such elements by the principle of paucity, there are no a priori rea-
sons for considering them as detrimental to the explanatory force of the explanation as a
whole. Indeed, many narrative accounts contain such inert elements, and their function
might be conceived as enhancing their readability and comprehensibility.
What about narrative unity? If the logical considerations above give some clue as to the
extent and nature of information contained in a historical explanation, what can be said
of the underlying ontological requirements concerning the identifiability of the individ-
ual that the explanation is about? More precisely, what are the necessary conditions for
narrative unity? Danto gives the following criteria:“ If N is a narrative, then N lacks
unity unless (A) N is about the same subject, (B) N adequately explains the change in
that subject which is covered by the explanandum, and (C) N contains only so much in-
formation as is required by (B) and no more.” [Danto (1984), 251] These criteria should
be scrutinized carefully, especially the criterion (C): it is possible to devise a set of other
criteria that explicitly conflict with (C). It in no way contributes towards the obscurity of
a narrative if it contains some carefully selected ‘extraneous’ material. Although Danto
does not deny this, he is not in a position to tackle this question in full as his main focus
is on the question of the rôle of narratives. Indeed, an uncharted territory lies here for
philosophers interested in the pragmatic aspects of formulating historical explanations.
So far we have only illustrated the most simple case of a narrative, a form that Danto calls
an atomic narrative having the structure (S). The change depicted by such a scheme may
not be governed by a general law, but once an allusion to a causal episode H23 is made,
then some general law is appealed to.24 The general structure of such an atomic narrative
is depicted graphically as follows [Danto (1984), 251]:
F G
/ · /
In this presentation the strokes represent the termini of a change while the dot represents
the cause of the change. Moreover, historians usually have recourse to more complicated
narratives than this, i.e. they have to devise what Danto calls molecular narratives of the
form [ibid., 252]:
23The symbols for general episodes are used autonomously, i.e. we do not label the objects of the language
(the ‘episode-language’) and their names separately.
24For instance, in accordance with the simplified scheme above, this kind of law could be tantamount to a
statement that H-like things cause a-like things to change from F to G.
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F G H I
/ · / · / · /
In this scheme each unit / · / is covered by a general law, but there need not exist a law
that covers the entire range of the full process of change from F to I. It might be argued
that recourse to the general scheme of molecular narratives is essential for historians (in
addition to the atomic narrative form), because historians are, on the whole, ultimately
interested in the large change F − I that is constituted by the atomic narratives F − G,
G− H, etc. It is just because the actual subject of interest is the entire process of change
that we can not cling to the atomic case, for example the atomic part H − I in the ex-
planation. Moreover, the analogy between deductive arguments and narratives breaks
down even at the level of form. Supposing we could model the transition from F to H
by a Hempelian scheme, we should introduce a new law of the form (x)(G(x) ⊃ H(x))
which, indeed, accounts for the overall change together with the law (x)(F(x) ⊃ G(x)).
But this amounts to the following discrepancy. It is a valid principle of inference in
first-order predicate logic that from (x)F(x) ⊃ G(x) and (x)(G(x) ⊃ H(x)) we can
deduce (x)(F(x) ⊃ H(x)). But then the original two laws collapse into one, namely
(x)(F(x) ⊃ H(x)). This kind of an elimination is not, however, always possible in valid
narratives, as Danto correctly enunciates. [ibid., 253] The upshot of this examination is
that a valid narrative often requires more than one cause to account for a large-scale
change.
Indeed, we might even have laws in which the required initial conditions are
to be satisfied in sequence, for example, (x)(F(x)t1 .G(x)t2 . ⊃ .H(x)), where
the subscripts indicate the order in which the initial conditions are to be satis-
fied. We might term such laws historical laws. Then, with the aid of historical
laws, together with a specification of temporally distinct initial conditions,
we could indeed deduce our conclusion. Such laws would, in fact, enable us
to make predictions, or better, qualified predictions. For since the two forms
(p · q) ⊃ r and p ⊃ (q ⊃ r) are demonstrably equivalent, it follows that we
have an historical law of the form(
C0t0 .C
1





and, if C0 occurs at t0, we can predict that E will take place if C1, . . . Cn take
place in the required temporal order. [ibid., 254]25
On the basis of this analysis, there could very well be historical laws. The existence of
such laws does not, however, exclude the possibility of a compatibilist basic attitude
towards the lawlike features of the world as against a fully deterministic outlook of re-
ality. Indeed, Danto correctly notes that the existence of such laws would not entitle us
to conclude that there is historical inevitability any more than the existence of natural
25Italics in the original.
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laws entitles us to entertain the view that there is inevitability in nature.26 There remain,
then, some fundamental problems concerning the nature of narratives and general laws
in history. In the first place, it could be contested whether we can transform every molec-
ular narrative into a deductive argument. Even if some historical laws were discovered,
it would remain uncertain whether such laws could be applied to each molecular narra-
tive, or answering this question in the negative, whether for each such narrative a general
historical law might be found. [ibid.] In the second place, it might be claimed that the ex-
planatory force of narratives is weakened by such considerations pertaining to general
laws. This, however, is contingent on the supposition that the recourse to general laws
is a necessary condition of narratives. This is seen to be a mistake. It is an intrinsic fea-
ture of molecular narratives that they do not have to be based on general laws that cover
the entire range of a change that is the object of explanation. It is enough that its atoms
conform to this pattern. Therefore, the existence of general laws might well be sufficient
for historical explanation, not necessary, and thus the absence of a general law that ac-
commodates a whole process of change of interest does not jeopardize the explanatory
task of history. To sum up, historical narratives are applied to accommodate for changes,
often large-scale changes spanning vast periods of time. In Danto’s words, “it is the job
of history to reveal to us these changes, to organize the past into temporal wholes, and to
explain these changes at the same time as they tell what happened – albeit with the aid
of the sort of temporal perspective linguistically reflected in narrative sentences.” [ibid.,
255]
1.3 Structural Explanations in History
It is a general contention that historical inquiry is necessarily based on a particular point
of view determined by definite presuppositions without which the inquiry would be in-
conceivable. For example, in historiography it is obvious that one has to assume that
there exists a past out of which the present emerged and that out of its traces in the
present we can construct a picture of the past. But apart from this least common denomi-
nator there are numerous constituents comprising a point of view that may vary: (i) what
constitutes evidence in a historical enquiry is relative to the historian and her capability
of forming appropriate questions and her faculty of discernment; (ii) principles of interpre-
tation are known to change over time and with the acquisition of new knowledge; also
the influence of fashion should not be underestimated; (iii) organizing categories and con-
cepts will evolve and their valuation and significance will depend on the general course
of intellectual life; (iv) explanatory theories often change and develop along the categories
and concepts related to them; they are also affected by the refinement of methodological
practices used to evaluate them and by the kind of evidence that is taken to bear on them.
All in all: “[. . . ] given the multiple kinds of viewpoint and the many places they enter
a historical discourse, one might accede to F. R. Ankersmit’s proposition that it is only
by taking a point of view that historians create in the first place historical narrative or
26I will come back to the issue of determinism in natural science in the subsection 4.9.1.
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interpretation as such”.27
This conclusion does not have to entail acquiescence to relativism. There is ample evi-
dence for the thesis that it is possible to reach a satisfactory degree of commensurability
among the perspectives represented by different historians. This presupposes, first of all,
that there is at least a partial overlap between the objects of their study. Secondly, it pre-
supposes that one is prepared to write the particular narrative or interpret the available
evidence according to the interests and demands of the point of view, or perspective,
in question. In setting up these criteria, a thorough analysis of the logical and episte-
mological aspects of situatedness (concerning, in general, situated agents and situated
activities within specific contexts) is one possible option to make our historical inquiries
more rigorous. Is it possible to establish the intersubjective validity of historical accounts
by embedding the situatedness of agents within particular structures? Let us see to what
extent the ideal of structural objectivity can be maintained within historiography by fol-
lowing this idea.
Structurism
To set up a framework for explicating the event/structure distinction, I will briefly con-
sider the general methodological desiderata of structural explanations in historiography.
The structurist conception of history that is here taken under scrutiny may be regarded as
a variant of structural realism exemplifed in the general outlook that history as a science
should deal principally with the problem of the history of social structures and not with
the history of events and actions. Christopher Lloyd, one of the advocates of structurism,
describes the general character of his programmatic approach as follows: “A central con-
tention herein will be that institutionalized ‘disciplines’ of economic history, social his-
tory, historical political economy, and historical sociology should be considered together
as one domain of enquiry — the domain of social structural history.” [Lloyd (1993), 6]
It should come as no surprise that advocates of structurism emphasize the inadequacy
of ‘common sense’ to grasp the macro structures of economies and societies, as well as
the causal mechanisms of their formation. Regarding the complexity of the phenomena
concerned, it is nothing short of a tautology to state that “only a form of analysis and a
mode of understanding that penetrates the obscured structural relations and imperatives
of economies and societies can begin to reveal and explain the real history and powers of
the organizational basis of social life.” [ibid., 1]
From a methodological point of view it is necessary for structurism to make a distinction
between the study of events and the study of structures.28 Indeed, the event/structure
distinction is seen to be both ontologically and epistemologically justified, providing a
rational basis for the theoretical constructs of structurism. This is reflected in the non-
conservative ontic commitments regarding the fundamental entities of Lloyd’s theory:
27Berkhofer, R. (1995): “A Point of View on Viewpoints in Historical Practice”, in F.R. Ankersmit and H.
Kellner (eds.) A New Philosophy of History, Reaktion Books, London.
28Structures include, according to Lloyd, at least the following entities: political systems, mentalities, and
cultures as much as economic and social systems. [ibid., 6]
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“I shall argue that social structures (including economies) are neither patterns of events,
actions, and behaviour nor reducible to social phenomena, but have a form of structural
existence that is at once relatively autonomous but not separate from the totality of phe-
nomena that occur within them. Nor are structures holistic or completely autonomous.”
[ibid., 6]29 The ambitious program of structurist explanation in history attempts to vindi-
cate the following theses:
1. There can be formulated a scientific domain of social structural history.
2. Structurism is the most appropriate basic methodology for the domain of structural
history explanation.
3. Structurist methodology and structurist theory are mutually reinforcing.
4. Structurism and realism are the proper foundations for a science of structural his-
tory.
5. Structural history should be part of methodologically unified socio-historical sci-
ence. [ibid., 9]
In order to establish such theses it is necessary to have a clear sense of the interrela-
tionship between philosophy, methodology and theory in scientific (historical) explana-
tion.30 In the first place, one should pay attention to the methodological and philosoph-
ical presuppositions of a theory. Knowledge of them enables one to gauge the relative
strengths and weaknesses of alternative explanatory models; if the corresponding pre-
suppositions have not been exposed, it becomes impossible to compare the theories and
explanations entertained within a particular domain. What do these presuppositions
consist in? Lloyd provides a comprehensive list of them: “Frameworks [particular aggre-
gates of philosophical and methodological presuppositions] contain metaphysical beliefs
(often well founded), general concepts about the nature of the objects of enquiry within
the domain, general methodological principles, and a collection of linguistic explanatory
29Italics added.
30This criterion is admirably fulfilled in the first chapter of [Lloyd (1993)], where he distinguishes between
three different problem types: “(a) Philosophical problems, which concern issues about existence and explana-
tion — i.e. very general ontological and epistemological issues that remain tacit for most of the time and are
only analysed by explicitly philosophical enquiry. (b) Methodological problems, which are more concrete in
that they concern the delineation of domains and the actual explanatory practices and forms of reasoning of
particular sciences and disciplines. Methodological issues have a more general currency than philosophical
ones, particularly in times of crisis. (c) Scientific theories, which are concepts, models, and statements of a
general kind about the structural mechanisms, powers, and causal relationships between types, kinds, and
classes of entities, events, and processes within a domain. Theories are used directly to explain particular
events and processes. We should distinguish general theories, which attempt to encompass all the main
structures, mechanisms, relationships and phenomena in a whole domain (e.g., general relativity, quantum
thermodynamics, plate tectonics, Darwinian evolution, neo-classical economic equilibrium theory, historical
materialist class theory, Freudian psychoanalysis) from theories of more particular events and processes. The
latter are formulated employing general theories, concepts, and linguistic devices such as analogies, similes,
and models, but they are evaluated by bringing them into direct confrontation with empirical evidence, a
procedure that may force changes in both the theory and the organization, character, and meaning of the
evidence.” [ibid., 30]
25
tools, such as metaphors, analogies, similes, and source models. Scientific theories em-
ploy these beliefs, principles, tools, and models to construct putative causal explanations
of types of phenomena and processes so that particular phenomena and processes can be
explained.” [ibid., 28]
In the second place, one should establish criteria which regulate the introduction of the-
oretical terms of the language L of the theory. In other words, one should delineate the
subject-matter and a body of other claims, which Dudley Shapere has referred to as “do-
mains” and “background information”.31
An important role in the process of domain constitution is played by what Shapere
calls “relevance-relations”. Lloyd interprets these relations as “structural causal rela-
tions that should be naturally delineated”. [Lloyd (1993), 36] How, then, are the domain-
constituting activities coördinated? In short, by the iterative procedure of devising ap-
propriate methodologies and theories on which discoveries are dependent and which in
turn disclose the ways in which the world is naturally structured. These discoveries of
‘natural structure’ then constitute the boundary conditions for domain construction and
development. Through implementing multiple cycles of this iterative process, domains
are charted which correspond ever more accurately to the part of nature or phenomena
under investigation. Furthermore, “the appropriateness [of the methodology] can only be
determined historically ex post facto and thus methodologies and theories are contingent.
The methodology of the domain is dependent upon the subject-matter of the domain,
for it must be appropriate for making compositional and evolutionary discoveries at the
level of the particular subject-matter”. [ibid.] However, there do not seem to occur such
revolutionary transitions from ‘old’ methodologies to ‘new’ ones as Kuhn envisaged. A
more moderate dynamics seems to correspond more accurately to the scientific practice:
Incremental stages of long-term progress can be observed within sciences,
with the occasional change of direction and unification of separate domains.
New understanding and knowledge within science are able to incorporate
and interpret older understanding and knowledge, so that contemporary the-
ories and explanations can be seen as genetically related to earlier ones. [ibid.,
37]
31Lloyd’s conception of the development of the rationality of science is constituted by the formation of
these two features. Here he follows Shapere who elaborates on this theme as follows: “The development
of science thus consists in a gradual discovery, sharpening, and organization of relevance-relations, and
thus in a gradual separation of the objects of its investigations and what is directly relevant thereto from
what is irrelevant to those investigations: a gradual demarcation, that is, of the scientific from the non-
scientific. Indeed, to the extent that an area of human activity manifests the sorts of developments I have
been describing, to that extent the area is considered pragmatically scientific. In other words, this is what we
have come to call ‘scientific’. In that development, science aims at becoming, as far as possible, autonomous,
self-sufficient, in its organization, description, and treatment of its subject-matter – at becoming able to
delineate its domains of investigation and the background information relevant thereto, to formulate its
problems, to lay out methods of approaching those problems, to determine a range of possible solutions,
and to establish criteria of what to count as an acceptable solution, all in terms solely of the domain under
consideration and the other successful and doubt-free beliefs which have been found to be relevant to that domain; that
is, to make its reasoning in all respects wholly self-sufficient.” [Shapere (1984), xxii–xxiii] (Italics in the original.)
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Notwithstanding considerations of the constitution of methodological principles on the
basis of empirical discoveries, there is an essential tension in the methodology of the so-
cial sciences that Lloyd’s overall approach to historiography aims to release. It is the
tension between the explanatory roles of events vs. structures. In the social sciences, in
particular, what ought to be an event/structure duality has “long and pervasively been
considered a dichotomy”. [ibid., 44] The complementary attitudes exemplified in the at-
tention given either to the decisions and activities of persons or to the determining pow-
ers of social entities, have given rise to two main competing explanatory methodologies –
individualism and holism. These have to a large extent determined the theoretical possi-
bilities within the field of historiography, according to Lloyd: “While these are not neces-
sarily consciously or coherently adopted they can still be found strongly influencing the
explanations of many or most practitioners in the socio-historical sciences. Fortunately,
there is a third possibility – structurism – which attempts to transcend this dichotomy.”
[ibid., 44] Without delving into the details of these three approaches, let us take a look
at a summary that discloses the presuppositions determining each one of them. The fol-
lowing table illustrates the differences between the three approaches with respect to their
ontological and methodological commitments . [ibid., 47]
Ontology Methodology
Individualism Only individual events and Aggregative — builds up an
people and their actions and analysis of society by
beliefs are real. Society is an studying individuals and their
aggregate of individuals. The motivations for action.
term ‘society’ is only
instrumental.
Holism Society is a closed, supra- Conceptualizes and studies
individual system with the whole as a totality that
powers of self-regulation. structures everything within
It dominates individuals who it. Searches for the internal
receive their life-courses determining mechanisms
and beliefs from the whole, and/or essential meaning of
which acts through them. structural evolution.
Structurism Society is a real structure Conceptualizes and studies the
of rules, roles, relations structuring process over time
and meanings that has to be by examining the causal
produced, reproduced, and interactions of individuals,
transformed by individuals groups, classes, and their
while causally conditioning structuring social conditions,
individual actions, beliefs, beliefs, and intentions.
and intentions.
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A summary like this does not enable us to critically evaluate the explanatory power of
each approach, let alone decide which of them would be the most appropriate one for a
particular need. Indeed, each can be seen to be completely dependent on the other, but
for explanatory purposes one can – and it is often necessary to – use a methodology of
socio-historical inquiry that emphasizes one or the other according to the needs of the
explanatory task at hand. What, then, makes the structurist approach more appealing
than an event-based one? Lloyd, on the basis of ontological considerations, ends up with
the following diatribe for structurism:
Structures have a superhuman, non-phenomenal existence through time,
even for centuries, and they are the context and object of events, actions, be-
haviour, and thought. Structures can be conceived as the systems of social
rules, roles, relations, and symbols in which events, actions, and thought oc-
cur and lives are lived. But structures have to be reproduced continually in
thought and through action and cannot exist apart from collective thought
and behaviour. The division of labour in their study should be within a
methodological structurist explanatory framework that emphasizes the sym-
biotic duality of event/structure rather than a dichotomy. [ibid., 48]
Even if the philosophical foundations of structurism are not without problems of their
own, it would surely benefit historians to have an abstract overall account of the ‘ideal
type’ of relational-structurist approach in the socio-historical studies. This is precisely
what Lloyd delivers. The scheme intends to capture the features that all explanations
falling under a specific designation collectively contain (or which is implicit in most of
their theoretical content). According to Lloyd, “this is a pure type from which they all
deviate in various particulars”. [ibid., 193] This ideal type consists of the following:
1. A structurist ontology and epistemology, which implies a structurist methodology,
that is, explanations of any moment or part of the social totality presuppose or
imply explanations of all the others. In order to explain any moment or part it must
be situated in its total structural context. This is because society is a non-reducible
macroscopic structure in which there is a dynamic interaction, rather than a holistic
determinism, between the parts. No part is necessarily dominant over the others,
but only humans have structuring power within the social structure. Structures as
such do not have any autonomy.
2. A realist-relational concept of social structure. Structure is seen as relatively au-
tonomous of individual actions and understandings but not of the structuring
power of collective action over time. Structures consist of real sets of enduring
social relations, rules, and roles that organize action and behaviour.
3. An abstract ‘levels’ model of the totality along the lines of the economy/politics/
ideology/culture set of ‘levels’ or ‘spheres’ of social reality, or something similar.
But the reality and the relationships between the ‘levels’ are major points of debate
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with considerable variation in the theorization and roles assigned to these ‘levels’
and the hierarchical relations, if any, between them.
4. A model of persons as social agents, having self-activating powers of intentionality,
rationality, reflexivity, and choice in a context of social and cultural constraint. It
is people who are theorized as the makers of history but always within particular
enabling and disabling social and cultural situations.
5. An important place is given to concepts of mentality and ideology. While the tra-
dition accords a central place to systems of ideas in forming understandings of
reality, it usually holds that ideas, actions and social structures can be out of phase
with each other. Mentalities and ideas have to be studied for their social conse-
quences because of their formation of understandings and motivational effects and
criticized for their adequacy as articulations of social structures.
6. An important place is given to the theorization and study of social hierarchies as
organizers of consciousness and loyalties, but simple class models and theories are
ruled out.
7. Unintended consequences of action and unrealized results of intentions are seen as
highly significant for social change. If ideas, action and structures are not mutu-
ally reinforcing then gradual social change happens irrespective of the desires of
individual actors and regardless of what other forces be at work.
8. This leads to the final component — the idea that all societies are inherently chang-
ing and therefore fundamentally historical. The basic structurist idea — that soci-
ety is continually being structured by agential actors, partly as a consequence of
their intentions but also unintentionally, behind their own backs, as it were — is
subscribed to by historians in this tradition. They therefore see the fundamental
moments of the historical process, all of which have to be analysed, as being:
a given structural and cultural circumstances that motivate, enable, and constrain
action and thought;
b action that is historically significant for its structuring consequences; and
c the intended and unintended consequences of action that turn into the objective
structural conditions that motivate, enable, and constrain action and thought,
and which often appear to be unalterable. [ibid., 193–194]
What is the result of these considerations? The constructive import of Lloyd’s method-
ological approach is a unified vision of historical explanation, accommodating both the
explanatory/causal role of social structures as well as individuals and singular events.
The strategic possibilities of explanation are thus considerably increased. To have elu-
cidated the importance of taking the structural point of view seriously is something for
which Lloyd deserves credit. However, the full implications of the structurist view re-
main regrettably uncharted in Lloyd’s book and an analysis of the intriguing relation-
ship between the structural and event-based explanations is left wanting. Indeed, these
questions would merit a careful treatment of their own. There seems to me to be much
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worthy of explication and further development in Lloyd’s work, especially as regards the
compelling idea of the dialectic between structural and event-based inquiries. A detailed
account of such a dialectic would provide an immensely powerful tool for investigating
the dynamics of knowledge acquisition and systematization within the scientific enter-
prise. Although the post-Kuhnian empirical inquiry of empirical inquiry has resulted in
the desultory organisation of the science studies, there is no reason to believe that this
domain of investigation could not be set in order through a process of clarification iden-
tical to ones that form a part and parcel of Carnap’s ideal of explication. Indeed, Lloyd’s
overall approach would ideally suit such a task of clarification. However, concrete ex-
amples are missing from his account. A formulation of a theoretical framework in which
structurist and intentionalist components work in tandem, and which provides concrete
models of the processes of human action within structural contexts is thus a desideratum
for serious historiography. With this goal in view, let us take a look at a constructive
suggestion to relate the domains of intention and structure within the field of ‘collective
cognition’.
1.4 Collective Cognition and Modeling of the Agent/Structure
Interface
“It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure
with loss of vehicle and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in
100,000. The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures
from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement?
Since 1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years
expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask ‘What is the cause of management’s
fantastic faith in the machinery?’ ” – Richard Feynman, in Rogers Commission Report,
1986
I will concentrate here on the collective aspects of human cognition and decision making
which can be regarded as an important part of a putative theoretical framework address-
ing the structurist and intentionalist aspects of human action in general. The study of
collective cognition refers to a wide array of theoretical approaches – some of them of
quite recent origin – intended to capture explanatory strategies capable of clarifying the
complex phenomenon of collective action and its basis in decision processes that involve
a (very) large number of individuals. It is characteristic of humans that they coördinate
their actions to accomplish objectives which it would be very hard for them to attain in-
dividually. This was of course emphasized already by the ancients, e.g. by Aristotle in
his well-known six-part division of ranks in Politics.32 Ranks or classes are groups whose
members develop common interests (in material and immaterial goods) as well as com-
mon values. Aristotle correctly observed that ranks can also be formed by groups of
people who exercise no specific economic function (but for instance a military, political
or religious one). The study of actions and decision processes within such ranks is of
321328b ff.
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course an extremely relevant part of an integrated general history. An important step
in this direction was taken during the Enlightenment when the philosophes realized that
thinking could be seen as a collective action too – a process conducted and amplified
by social groups. A demonstration of this line of thought can be found, for example,
in d’Alembert’s preliminary discourse to the Encyclopédie. Although the importance of
coördinated collective action and decision making has become more and more evident
towards the Modern era – the modern scientific enterprise being the most pertinent ex-
ample – the theoretical explanation of their conditions of possibility and their remarkable
effectiveness has remained a unattainable goal. At present, we are short of having a good
theory about how collective action and cognition work. We are equally puzzled by prag-
matic questions such as: when and why do collective action and cognition work, how
they can be made to work better, why they fail, what they can and cannot accomplish,
etc. Interesting work on these themes has been done on a wide spectrum of disciplines
by investigators ranging from historians and sociologists of science to cognitive psychol-
ogists, economists and theoretical physicists. It should not come as a surprise, then, that
the field is characterized by a variety of technical tools and methodological approaches.
In the following I will briefly introduce one specific model of collective cognition which
is relevant for the development of themes to be handled in the rest of the dissertation.
The following synopsis of David Wolpert’s general model of collective intelligence serves
only the purpose of providing a concrete exemplar of models that appertain to the more
general questions of intellectual and moral formation adduced in the following chapters
of this dissertation.
1.4.1 Collective intelligence
The central question of collective cognition is: given a particular objective for group ac-
tion, how does the group performance depend on the individual performances of its
participants, and the ways they communicate? The traditional approach within psychol-
ogy and the cognitive sciences has been dominated by the idea that the key element in
the performance of a group is the isolated cognition in any individual. The (exogenous)
effect of the group is then taken into account by assuming that the individuals are in a
constant interaction with their social environment. More recent approaches to collective
cognition contest this traditional ‘Cartesian’ approach and emphasize the importance of
constant coördination and integration of cognitive and physical abilities within a group.
These modern theoretical approaches are often referred to as distributed cognition or ex-
tended cognition. They are based on a variety of technical models most common of which
are game-theoretical models of team or corporate action. The efficiency and explanatory
power of these models is assessed by a comparison of the predicted performance of a
group to the predicted individual performance. The raison d’être of these models is that
they propose mechanisms which “explain” why co-operation can be beneficial, even in
case of an extremely simple task. The rich variety of models reflects the various pos-
sible assumptions that can be made about the nature of the within-group interactions
during the decision-making process. Examples of these include theoretical relationships
between the parameters of members’ functions (psychometric functions such as ‘intelli-
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gence’) and the parameters of the group function, and models of decision making. The
essential criterion is that these can be tested against empirical data.
Let us now turn to the model of collective intelligence introduced by one of the leading
exponents in the field, David H. Wolpert. His approach is methodological in the sense
that he presents completely general formal criteria for any model building activity. He is
especially interested in the mathematics of the design of collectives. I will now adduce
the main ideas of his approach presented in [Wolpert (2003)].
Collectives
The basic constitutive idea of a collective behind Wolpert’s construction is that “many
systems of self-interested agents have an associated performance criterion that rates the dy-
namic behaviour of the overall system”. [ibid., 1]33 The idea is to explain theoretically
how a system of self-interested agents can co-operate to achieve high “world-utility”,
i.e. a result that ‘satisfies’ both the needs of the individuals and the group as a whole.
Collectives can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 Collectives ≡ Systems having the following characteristics:
• (i) the system must contain N ≥ 1 agents each of which are viewed as trying to maximize
an associated private utility
• (ii) the system must have an associated world utility function that rates the possible
behaviours of the overall system.
In practice, collectives are often very large, distributed and support little if any central-
ized communication. An example is a human economy in which N ∼ 1, 000, 000, the
agents are human individuals and their private rewards and the world utility function
can be taken to be the time average of the gross domestic product. An important pre-
supposition of the model is that the agents avoid working at cross-purposes in order to
achieve high world utility.34 The concrete implementation of this condition is achieved
by modifying agents’ utility functions to be ‘aligned’ with the world utility. An exam-
ple of such boundary conditions are the anti-trust regulations of economies designed to
break up existing monopolies and prevent the formation of new monopolies. The model
is such that it can be viewed in a way that makes it seem as if agents were trying to maxi-
mize their private utilities (this is not a built-in presupposition of the model). In a system
which is viewed in this way, both the world utility and all of the private utilities are at a
(local) maxima at equilibrium.
33Italics added.
34If this necessary condition is not fulfilled, phenomena like liquidity traps (a situation in which the short-




Now that we have some idea of what a collective is, let us turn to the methodological
issues underlying the mathematical design of collectives (more precisely, mathematical
design of models of collectives). A necessary prerequisite of such modeling is to be clear
about the types of problems to be solved. In his paper Wolpert presents the two central
problems in the science of collectives, the latter of which is more important, and much
more difficult:
The ‘Forward’ Problem : How the precise configuration of the system – including in
particular the private utilities of the agents – affects the ensuing behaviour, and
therefore affects the value of the world utility?
The Inverse Problem : How should one initialize/update the private utility functions of
the individual agents so that the ensuing behaviour of the entire collective achieves
large values of the provided world utility? [ibid., 3]
Since the complexity of truly large systems involving a huge number of individuals pre-
cludes any detailed modeling, it is necessary to find a method to solve these problems
that does not have recourse to such modeling. How can this be done? As Wolpert
notes, this is a very general problem type appearing within a variety of areas: multi-agent
systems (MAS’s), computational economics, mechanism design, reinforcement learning,
statistical mechanics, computational ecologies, (partially observable) Markov decision
processes game theory. “However, none of these fields is both applicable in large prob-
lems, and directly addresses the general inverse problem, rather than a special instance
of it.”[ibid., 3] This calls for a new, more extensive framework for addressing these prob-
lems. To many, it might seem surprising that the most popular framework of modeling
collective action and decision making, viz. theory of team-games, is ruled out by Wolpert.
The reason, as Wolpert points out very clearly, is that even if the subfield of game the-
ory known as mechanism design might at first glance provide us techniques for solving
the general inverse problem, it is, however, “almost exclusively concerned with collec-
tives that are at (a suitable refinement of) Nash equilibrium. . . . That means that every
agent is assumed to be performing as well as is theoretically possible, given the behavior of
the rest of the system.” [ibid.]3536 How, then, is the intuitive requirement of having the
private utilities of a collective ‘aligned’ with the world utility satisfied? In other words,
how is the model to be set up, without having recourse to the theory of team-games, so
that modifications an agent might make that would increase its private utility, also must
35Italics in the original.
36A detailed list of the shortcomings of the mechanism design approach includes the following: (i) it
ignores all statistical issues related to how well the agents can be expected to perform for various candidate
private utilities, (ii) enforced stabilization of an agent’s actions will often hurt the performance of agent ρ
(“How best to trade off the performance of one agent against that of other agents, or more generally, how best
to trade off the degree of rationality of one agent against that of another agent?”), (iii) to have the analysis
be non-trivial, restrictions like those that apply to the private utilities of human beings are needed, and (iv)
it does not allow for run-time adaptive design. [ibid., 4]
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increase world utility? Wolpert’s answer is: “Fortunately the equivalence class of such
utilities extend well beyond team-game utilities.” [ibid., 5]
The mathematical basics of designing collectives
The mathematical theory of collectives comprises the following elements:
• individual agents are prefixed, being players in multi-stage non-cooperative
games, with their moves at any single stage in no a priori way restricted by their
moves at other times or by the moves of the other players
• dynamic reassignments of how the various subsets of the variables comprising the
collective across all space and time are assigned to players
• modification of the player’s information sets (i.e. modification of inter-player com-
munication)
• an arbitrary vector space Z whose elements ζ give the joint move of all players in
the collective in some stage
• we wish to search for the ζ that maximize the provided world utility G(ζ)
• private utility functions {gη}, one such function for each variable/player η
• η̂ ≡ all players other than η
• a standardization of some arbitrary function U for player η is called “the intelligence
for η at ζ with respect to U”





where the Heaviside function Θ is defined to equal 1 when its argument is greater than
or equal to 0, and equal to 0 otherwise, and where the subscript on the (normalized)
measure dµ indicates it is restricted to ζ ′ sharing the same non-η components as ζ. The
model is not deterministic: uncertainty concerning the overall behaviour of the system is
reflected in a probability distribution over Z. The ability to control the system is built into
the model with the possibility of setting the value of some characteristic of the collective,
a global coordinate s. Then it is possible to formulate the central equation of for the






where~εg ≡ (εη1,gη1 (ζ), εη2,gη2 (ζ), . . .) is the vector of the intelligences of the players with
respect to their associated private utility functions, and~εG ≡ (εη1,G(ζ), εη2,G(ζ), . . .) is the
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vector of the intelligences of the players with respect to G. The criterion εη,gη (ζ) = 1
means that player η is fully rational at ζ in the sense that its move maximizes the value
of its utility, given the moves of the players. A welcome feature of Wolpert’s model is
that consideration of points ζ at which not all intelligences equal 1, provides a basis for a
model-independent formalization of bounded rationality game theory. [ibid., 6n6] A point
ζ at which all components of~εG = 1 is a local maximum of G (a critical point of the G(ζ)
surface). Let us summarize the meaning of the decomposition of P(G|s) provided in the
formalization:
• if we can choose s so that the third conditional probability in the integrand is peaked
around vector ~εg all of whose components are close to 1, then we have likely in-
duced large (private utility function) intelligences
• if we can also choose s so that the second term is peaked about~εG equal to~εg, then
~εG will also be large
• finally, if the first term in the integrand is peaked about high G when ~εG is large,
then our choice of s will likely result in high G, as desired. [ibid.]
It is not necessary for our purposes to delve into the details of Wolpert’s model or its
applications in particular situations. The applications require an implementation of an
algorithm that optimizes the signal/noise ratio reflected in the third term in the decom-
position of P(G|s). The signal/noise ratio signifies the uncertainty associated with a
single player η who is trying to discern how its actions affect its utility gη = G. The large
number of other players and their action on G dilute η’s effect on its own private utility
function. Various algorithms optimize this ratio in different ways. The crucial point is
that Wolpert’s model of designing collectives has been tested in many different experi-
ments. Moreover, not only have these tests “clearly validated it”, but have often resulted
in “performance up to orders of magnitude superior to traditional techniques from the
fields of multi-agent systems and economics/mechanism design.” [ibid., 12] The reason
for the superior performance is clearly stated by Wolpert:
Intuitively, that superiority lies in the fact that these alternative approaches
completely ignore the issue of how an agent’s ability to maximize a candidate
private utility will vary with changes in that private utility. This issue is es-
pecially crucial in large systems, in which each agent will face an extremely
difficult signal-to-noise term in discerning the effects of its actions on its util-
ity unless that utility is carefully crafted. [ibid.]
Wolpert’s model of collective design provides a convincing vindication of the idea of
combining the agent-based and structural aspects of action and decision-making within
one coherent framework. It delivers precisely what was set as a general desideratum
above, viz. a concrete model for making explicit the interactions between a single agent
and the social structure within which its actions take place. The intentions of the agents
are reflected in the private utility functions gη and the structural boundary conditions in
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the world utility function G. The domain of applicability of Wolpert’s ideas is impressive,
ranging from network packet routing, the problem of controlling communication across
a constellation of satellites to setting the states of the spins in a spin glass to minimize
energy, the conventional bin-packing problem of computer science, and a model of hu-
man agents connected in a small-world network who have to synchronize their purchase
decisions. Given the encouraging results of the mathematical testing of the model, it is
likely that more interesting applications will soon emerge. It would certainly be very
interesting to see, for example, whether Wolpert’s model could be used for studying the
selection of scientific hypotheses within a given discipline. However, the scope of this
dissertation does not allow us to tackle with this question, although it is one that has a
very intimate connection with the main themes of this work. The science of COllective
INtelligence (COIN) is very young and it is too early to make any definite assessments
about its significance for the study of collective cognition in general and about its impli-
cations for philosophical and sociological study of science in particular, including specific
questions about theory choice within a scientific community. However, in as much as de-
cision theory and game theory are arguably indispensable ingredients of a full-fledged
theory of ethics, it is likely that the COIN framework will also have an important role in
such a theory.
In the next chapter we turn to the discussion of the moral dimension of the formation of
a scientist (or more particularly, a science-technology generalist, to use John Archibald
Wheeler’s apt phrase). We will discuss the significance of the interaction between the in-
tellectual and moral dimensions of scholar’s work and show how considerations of ethics
(and especially ethics of ethics) have an important part to play within a unified concep-
tion of science. Furthermore, we will discuss the relevance of the historical dimension of
morality – and this partly justifies the lengthy survey we have provided in the present
chapter – for the transformation of the moral. Two important issues emerge within this
context, viz. (i) the parallel development of valuative and theoretical thought as well as
the corresponding institutional contextual conditions, and (ii) the different scales of the
phylogenesis of human moral consciousness on the one hand, and the moral develop-
ment of a single person, on the other. All these phenomena presuppose the distinction
between the genesis and validity of ethical ideas, and the most important issue in the re-
lationship between morals and history is to understand why socially valid norms deviate
from ideal norms. It turns out that the dimensions of moral and scientific are inextricably
linked and this to a large extent explains the deviations in question but also poses the






2.1 Concepts of the Moral and Concepts of the Scientific
Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ [‘Wissenschaft als Beruf ’] [Weber (1919a)] is the locus
classicus of the idea that science – if it is to deliver on the promise to provide the sole
method of acquiring objective knowledge – must be value free.1 The criterion of value-
neutrality then became an intellectual rallying point for a large part of the European
intelligentsia who vowed to the name of objectivity, fully convinced that it was not only
possible but necessary to dispose of the influence of any kind of talk about values (ex-
cept possibly purely epistemic ones) in scientific contexts. But however ethically neutral
science and technical knowledge in general were thought to be, it cannot be denied that
they critically depended on a forma mentis whose basic characteristic was a high capacity
for abstraction that could be conducive to, not only scientific and technical knowledge,
but universalist principles of ethics. In this sense the criterion of value-neutrality which
often was advocated with a fully conscious, but inherently contradictory combination
of modern technical knowledge and formal-universal law with anti-universalist moral
ideas, can be seen as an empty deontic principle, a tautology that on the one hand does
not provide any significant insight into the formal structure of experimental science and
on the other hand ignores the highly relevant, albeit complex and entangled, interac-
tion between technical rationality and moral rationality in the processes of application
of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for nurturing
a maximal capacity of technical rationality (a value in itself) that it implicitly poses as
a goal. The critics of the thesis of value-neutrality (for example Hilary Putnam) have
stressed the fact that all attempts to solve the problem of theory selection without the no-
tion of epistemic values have failed. These considerations alone show that the domains of
1Weber was, of course, mainly concerned with sociology, but his conception was naturally intended to be
deployed across other disciplines as well.
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formal-universal knowledge and ideal validity have a much more intricate relationship
than is often thought in the scientific context.
The task before us is to describe the relation between descriptive analysis and analysis of
values. In as much as our modern scientific world conception and the general, essentially
human, consciousness of the domain of validity seem to be in a fundamental conflict, a
philosophical clarification of the issues that turn on this fundamental distinction has to
begin with a preliminary definition of concepts. For that purpose I will briefly sketch the
contours of the complementary classes of the concepts of the scientific and the moral. The
emphasis is on the intension of these concepts as we understand them on a criteriologi-
cal basis, i.e., we will be mainly interested in the questions of validity although genetic
insights will be needed later, when we study exemplars of important moral concepts.
Indeed, it is necessary to acknowledge – with respect to both scientific knowledge and
moral positions – that the issues of genesis and validity have little in common. Both the
image of nature, built upon the masses of scientific and technological knowledge gath-
ered, and the modern conceptions of the moral have developed in the course of history.
The lesson that historicism can teach us is the possibility to adopt a symmetrical attitude
with respect to the status of the questions of genesis and validity within these (very dif-
ferent) domains. This symmetric attitude enables us to see that the validity of a theory
or position (in science or in moral philosophy) cannot depend on the diachronic aspects
of its genesis. Rather, it is precisely the case that the late appearance of certain scientific
theories and certain moral positions is an index that they are complex and presuppose a
great deal genetically, and this is seen to be a common feature of all good theories.
The point of departure for my discussion is that the terms “moral” or “morals” are used
to denote strictly normative concepts. Therefore, when focusing on the diverse objects of
philosophical inquiry such as acts, institutions, emotions, or expressions of will, we say
that they are moral when they are as they ought to be. We have to distinguish from this,
primary, meaning of “moral” the meaning “related to morals”. The latter meaning is used
when, for example, we investigate moral arguments that are not themselves instances of
what should be but rather instruments that enable us to discover that what should be.
The same goes for “moral feeling”. On a more general level, if we are investigating types
of behaviour, then the “morals” of these types are related to the quintessence of what they
should be. The discipline that is concerned with the normative questions about human
acts of will, feelings, actions and institutions, is called “practical philosophy”. It is usu-
ally divided into the subdisciplines of individual ethics and political philosophy. We are
here mainly concerned with individual ethics, but then in a very special context, viz., the
community of scientists. It is evident that the political dimension – which is by definition
the range of phenomena related to cratics, i.e., the study of the different uses and distri-
butions of power – cannot be completely ignored in studies of the scientific enterprise
and its ethics, in as much as the scientific enterprise itself is explicitly regulated by cratic
factors, such as science policy and the decision-making procedures of both national and
international funding corporations. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this dissertation, it
is not necessary to delve into the details of the political aspects of ethics as my focus will
be on the intellectual and moral formation of an individual scientist and the importance
of an ethical self-image of scholar’s vocation.
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The normative dimension of practical philosophy is reflected in the view that it alone can
make well-founded assertions concerning the moral nature of an action or an institution.
However, a purely normative approach to ethics would not proceed very far if it did not
acknowledge the practical significance of the descriptive psychological and sociological
concepts that are related to people’s actual ideas of of what they consider valid. In dealing
with this dichotomy, we should distinguish between the notions of “ideally valid”, “in-
dividually valid” and “socially valid”. These terms are used in connection with different
values of preferences. Individually valid or socially valid values/preferences are the sub-
ject matters of empirical moral psychology and sociology of mores.2 As the statements
of moral psychology and sociology of mores are descriptive – they fulfill the minimal
criterion of value-neutrality in this sense – they are ethically neutral. This makes it pos-
sible for a philosophical analysis to discern the purely contingent features of the values
of individual cultures and widespread moral feelings from the features that have ideal
validity. It may well emerge from a philosophical process of justification that some such
collections of values or emotions have no well-established claim to validity at all. It is
thus necessary to pay attention to the qualitative difference between the assertions of fact
and pure validity; the former are a necessary condition of a scientifically grounded ethics,
but only the latter can constitute and express the hierarchy of values that is the absolute
presupposition of a purely normative discipline. To see the difference, consider the fol-
lowing example. It is possible to distance oneself from one’s own moral feelings, when it
is seen that the guilt that one feels (for example) because of the incriminating talk of a su-
perior is only a result of an unfortunate socialization and has no objective ground in itself.
Moreover, such a situation provides also an example of a category mistake which is com-
mitted when the mechanism of emotion formation is exploited to someone’s advantage
(in this example, for the superior’s advantage) without an appeal to moral arguments.
These kind of category mistakes (when they are intentional) may be considered deeply
immoral. From the point of view of ethics, the straightforward identification of the purely
descriptive statement of moral convictions with a normative statement is an instance of
extreme intuitionism. As Vittorio Hösle has observed, “[i]n European intellectual his-
tory it was the French moralists who first conceived the psychology of morals as a new
discipline distinct from ethics. However, these early moralists still recognized absolute
moral norms on the basis of which they criticized the mechanisms of moral pychology.
This changed only with Nietzsche, who is best interpreted as a moralist without morals.”
[Hösle (2004), 72]
To make the central idea of the above discussion explicit, to claim that the normative
dimension could be captured by descriptive theories, for example by maintaining that
ethical theories could be fundamentally formulated as theories of sociology, must be con-
2The notion of “mores” is here adopted from Vittorio Hösle who describes the related Hegelian concepts
of “morality” and “mores” as follows: “The Hegelian concepts of ‘morality’ (Moralität) and ‘mores’ (Sit-
tlichkeit) are also used [. . . ] as descriptive concepts. What I understand by the ‘mores of a culture’ is its ethos,
that is, all its central, socially valid values, on one hand, and on the other the feeling of collective identity in
particular; the latter springs from the general confidence that everyone recognizes these values. By ‘moral-
ity’ I understand the isolation of the individual from the concrete values of his mores, on one hand, and
on the other in particular from the collective identity that springs from mores. Because these terms are used
purely descriptively, we can speak of the mores of Nazi Germany or of the morality of anarchistic terrorists.”
[Hösle (2004), 73]
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sidered a fallacy. An analogy with two different types of analysis of a given copy of a
book, say Darwin’s The Origin of Species, may be illuminating. From a purely descrip-
tive point of view, a phenomenological analysis of the given book might result in the
statement that it is nothing but a physical object of certain weight consisting of hard cov-
ers and pages made of ink, paper, parchment, or other materials and fastened together
to hinge at one side, etc. A sophisticated physical analysis might provide more accu-
rate information about the detailed properties of the materials out of which the book
is made. While it is incontestable that a book can be described in these terms and that
it might even be cognitively meaningful to look at the book in this way (for example
for the purposes of developing more durable and environmentally friendly materials for
book-binding industry), it is obvious to us that the essence of the book is not exhausted
by such an analysis. Just as the dimension of meaning encoded in the physical signs
goes beyond the domain of physical being, the normative dimension transcends that of
‘ordinary’ meaning. The Husserlian concepts of noesis and noema can be used here to clar-
ify the issue philosophically (abstracted from their original context within philosophy of
consciousness). Hösle makes the point admirably: “Noesis is the act of consciousness in
which a subject grasps (‘intends’) something, and the noema is the object of this act, what
is grasped (‘intended’). Similarly, an ethical theory must be distinguished from what the
theory is about. The theory itself belongs to the empirical social world and can be inves-
tigated in terms of the latter’s categories. On the other hand, the theory’s noema belongs
to a world of pure validities, and it is with this world that ethical theory is concerned.
Only the theory itself, and not its noema, can be sociologically objectivized.” [ibid., 74]
We have now made clear what we, in general terms, mean by the normative dimension
of ethics. However, it would be erroneous to think that we have thus emancipated ethics
from the domain of empirical sciences in the sense that, for example, the sociological
analysis of moral behaviour becomes redundant as soon as the normative framework for
the analysis of the validity of moral judgements is established. On the contrary, the de-
scriptive and normative dimensions are seen to be complementary to each other; to try
to understand the world in terms of only one of them is seriously incomplete. The rela-
tionship between ethics and sociology has, according to Hösle, “extensive analogies with
Spinoza’s parallelist solution to the mind-body problem. According to Spinoza, interac-
tion between the physical and the psychic does not occur; the physical can be causally
explained only the by the physical, and the psychic only by the psychic; however, it
is incomplete to consider the world in terms of a single attribute.” [ibid., 74–75] Hösle
thinks that the purely ethical and purely sociological approaches are each incomplete,
notwithstanding the fact they both deal with closed systems (within different domains).
It is conceivable that ethical arguments are used as instruments (this is possible because
they are social facts) to promote partisan interests in a power struggle, but this does not
in the least touch upon the question about their validity; we are not allowed to make
judgements in the positive or in the negative whether the argument is valid. Conversely,
given a theoretical analysis of the validity of arguments, we are not allowed to draw
any conclusions about the effectiveness of those arguments in the social world: “for pure
validities justify other validities, but they do not cause anything real.” [ibid.]
From the complementarity of the descriptive and the normative approaches emerges the
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appropriate role of philosophy as the discipline which seeks to combine wisdom and sci-
ence. In other words, confronted with various presentations provided by the sciences of
partial areas of reality which they describe with great clarity as if they were the whole
reality, philosophy tries to accommodate within the picture of reality that has been dis-
tillated from the alembic of science the notion about the reality of the psychic and the
insight that the psychic element in humans historically has its center in the recognition
of values that are something more than psychic or social facts. From a philosophical
point of view, it can be argued that ethically neutral sociology (or science in general) com-
mits an abstractive fallacy in neglecting the normative dimension. Behaviorism famously
committed an analogous abstractive fallacy by neglecting the psychic. But whatever the
causes of these historical facts are, it could still be maintained that neither ethically neu-
tral sociology nor behaviorism has any material gaps in their explanatory apparatus. To
reiterate Hösle’s remark, “ethical reasons can produce no changes in the world as expe-
rienced.” [ibid., 76] In the case of sociology, then, it is reasonable to build theories on the
basis of the assumption that only real psychic insights (social facts) into ethical reasons
can act as causes and have tangible effects in the social world; and similarly in the case
of behaviorism, it is reasonable to assume that every physical event related to a human
body (including movements of the body) is caused by either an outer physical process
or the brain state that accompanies that particular event. But apart from the material
adequacy of these disciplines with respect to their explanatory capacity, they manage to
provide only a partial account of reality, and thus fall short of delivering the ingredients
of a world-view that satisfies the genuinely human yearning for wisdom and an intuitive
sense of the world as a whole, which the archaic people seemed to possess to a far greater
degree than the moderns. Though science is the most precious and wonderful achieve-
ment of modern culture, the thesis of value-neutrality and the accompanying conception
of technical rationality that seem to underlie its self-image is detrimental to the develop-
ment of human culture in general and science in particular. For science can be pursued
successfully – and I suppose no-one contends this – only if one has an intellectual goal
that guides one’s work. The selection of goals is an axiological process to be sure, and
to be able to work effectively, every scientist has to engage in such a process. Accord-
ing to the received view of value-neutrality of science (à la Weber) that was canonized in
a particularly idiosyncratic manner in the philosophical work of the logical empiricists,
foremost in the works of Carnap and Neurath, the selection process is at the outset rel-
egated to the set of those practical questions that are external to the scientific research
process per se. Carnap, who formulated a pragmatic distinction between questions that
are internal to a scientific theory, or more generally, to a well-delineated scientific dis-
course, and those that are external to it, explicitly delimited questions concerning prag-
matic goals outside rational scientific discourse. From the point of view of scientific ethics
and general methodology of science, this was a move that had substantial reverberations
for philosophy of science and philosophy in general. The distinction itself is not the crux
of the problem; one could very well construct a language LEv (different from the object
language LTh of the theory) in which the goals of the research process can be coordinated
and evaluated (comprising, say, a decision- or game-theoretical vernacular). The prob-
lem is that the values themselves would still have to be incorporated from outside of this
formal framework, and thus a further language LVal for expressing axiological content
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would have to be introduced. (Such languages, of course, are habitually used by moral
philosophers.) From Carnap’s point of view, rational discourse about values cannot be
accommodated within scientific philosophy. Thus, he also abstained from developing a
systematic theory of ethics.3 As the second part of this dissertation concentrates on the
details of the development of Carnap’s philosophical position during the first half of the
twentieth century, it is not necessary to go deeper into these issues here. Nevertheless, it
can be said that Carnap is an important and interesting example of a philosopher-scientist
precisely because a genetic analysis of his philosophical thought clearly points towards
a tendency to gradually bring ever larger spheres of reality under the purview of ratio-
nal deliberation. And this raises the question why, despite this general tendency and the
growing influence of pragmatism on his thought, he never conceived the possibility of
a fully elaborated ethics. The answer to this question lies, so I will argue, in the evolv-
ing conceptions of scientific self and the fundamental elements of what can be called the
intellectual and moral formation of a scientist (or science-technology generalist of which
Carnap constitutes an eminent example).
In the following section I will provide a brief historical survey of the emergence and
development of the forma mentis that underlies the scientific world conception that is
characteristic of our modern culture and then adduce in a little more detail the evolution
and significance of the different notions of scientific self that exemplify the particular
modes of thought that are properly called scientific. After this discussion we will be in
a position to weave the threads of the moral and the scientific into a more organized
pattern.
2.2 The Emergence and Development of the forma mentis of
Universalism
The notion of universalism is so important for the development of Western culture, both
in terms of scientific knowledge and moral insight, that it would be impossible to form a
balanced picture of the relationship between the concepts of the scientific and the moral
without an analysis of the genealogy of this notion. It is therefore necessary to present,
at least in rough outline, the most important aspects of the historical developments that
have led to the modern conception of science and the ideal of ethical universalism. The
universalism of the formal-universal laws of science has its roots already in the antiquity,
but it was first articulated as a general philosophical principle in the Enlightenment. It
is no coincidence that in the same era the notion was also deployed in the domain of
validity and thus the Western world witnessed the emergence of the first great systems
of moral universalism such as Spinoza’s Ethics.
3Of course, this does not imply that Carnap’s attitude to life and his character could be evaluated on
the basis of this fact. Carnap had a refined moral character and he possessed moral virtues that many
of his colleagues lacked. However, from a philosophical point of view, because of his idiosyncratic attitude
towards moral philosophy he did not possess ethical virtue, i.e., an ability to defend the virtues he exemplified
in his practical life in the framework of an ethical theory.
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I will begin with a sketch of the history of the conception of formal and scientific knowl-
edge and its presuppositions as they were conceived by the early Enlightenment philoso-
phers and scientists. As a word of motivation for readers who have reservations about the
utility of a genetic approach to philosophical problems I would like to point out that, in
general, an examination of the historical proposals for explicating a given concept, which
constitute a space of possibilities for determining the intension of the concept (in this
case the concept of universalism), opens up conceptual possibilities relevant for contem-
porary explicative tasks within the same domain. Such historically informed inquiries
are next of kin in spirit to Ernst Mach’s historico-critical studies in the history of science.
The utility of historically informed studies of the conceptual foundations of a science
were clearly underlined in Mach’s Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung — historisch-kritisch
dargestellt:
the historical investigation of the development of a science is most needful,
less the principles treasured up in it become a system of half-understood pre-
cepts, or worse, a system of prejudices. Historical investigation not only pro-
motes the understanding of that which now is but also brings new possibil-
ities before us by showing that which exists to be in great measure conven-
tional and accidental. From the higher point of view at which different paths of
thought converge we may look down upon us with freer vision and discover
routes before unknown.4 [Mach (1963) [1933], 278–279]
This approach to enquiry encompasses both technical sophistication and acute historical
awareness. Thus, from the point of view of a historian of science, the historical and sys-
tematic aspects of enquiry are inextricably related. The Machian historico-critical method
performs a role similar to the practice of polishing the optical surfaces in a Schmidt-
Cassegrain telescope; when the polishing is done with care, the telescope provides an
extensive and nearly flawless visual field for observation. The analogy is singularly ex-
act. The quality of the performance of any idea depends in equal measure on the refining
analyses of the historians and philosophers that use an idea for different purposes, as
the quality of the telescope depends on the conscientiousness of the mirror-polishers.
Consider the following sketch as just such a polishing of an optical surface.
The mathematical and methodological background of the advance of sciences in the
Enlightenment
Within history of ideas, the history of mathematics has a pride of place. Studying
the evolution of mathematical ideas and assessing their relevance for particular (non-
mathematical) conceptual issues under investigation often provide a fruitful point of
departure for enquiry. The mathematically informed mind is usually able to disclose
non-articulated semantical underpinnings and possible residual meanings of given no-
tions that could otherwise remain unnoticed. Alfred North Whitehead has expressed the
4Italics in the original.
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importance of the history of mathematics for the history of ideas eloquently in the form
of a wonderful simile (This is a passage from his Lowell Lectures of 1925):
Even now there is a wavering grasp of the true position of mathematics as an
element in the history of thought. I will not go so far as to say that to construct
a history of thought without a profound study of the mathematical ideas of
successive epochs is like omitting Hamlet from the play which is named after
him. That would be claiming too much. But it is certainly analogous to cutting
out the part of Ophelia. This simile is singularly exact. For Ophelia is quite
essential to the play, she is very charming — and a little mad. Let us grant that
the pursuit of mathematics is a divine madness of the human spirit, a refuge
from the goading urgency of contingent happenings. [Whitehead (1946), 26-
27]
Thus, following Whitehead, we can convince ourselves that it is important to take note
of the insights of a mathematically informed history of ideas. There are many reasons
for this, but I mention only the most important one, which perhaps is also the most
obvious. The formal language of mathematics provides an incredibly efficient frame-
work for formulating concepts in a way that allows an exact analysis of their intension.
In other words, the importance of mathematics is tantamount to its capacity to act as a
medium for explicating concepts, both in terms of their content as well as their inferential
role. The process of mathematical theory construction – along with the invention of new
mathematical concepts – is a paradigmatic exemplar within the class of strategic activi-
ties associated with meaning constitution. Its strict criteria for definability, requirement
of consistency and pragmatic restrictions upon the meaning-conferring acts with respect
to novel concepts gives mathematics a unique place among the social practises of man.
Thus, history of mathematics provides a general background framework against which
the development of ideas in general can be observed, and their logical and semantical
properties analyzed.
The importance of mathematically informed history of ideas is of course pronounced
in the case of Enlightenment. It would be very difficult to make sense of the radical
and vast conceptual transformations of that era without taking into account the exuber-
ant progress of the mathematical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
According to d’Alembert, one of the most distinguished and brilliant harbingers of En-
lightenment, the eighteenth century is most aptly viewed as “the century of philosophy
par excellence”.5 [d’Alembert (1965)[1759], 9] In fact, this statement conveys much more
than a mere rhetorical point. It was a realistic assessment of the state of science and of
the opportunities ahead. d’Alembert’s excitement is palpable in the nearly ecstatic ob-
servations about the state of the sciences and the extent of knowledge exemplified by
eighteenth century intellectual culture at large:
[. . . ] If one considers without bias the present state of our knowledge, one
cannot deny that philosophy among us has shown progress. Natural science
5“Notre siécle s’est donc appelé par excellence le sieclé de la philosophie [. . . ]”
44
from day to day accumulates new riches. Geometry, by extending its limits,
has borne its torch into the regions of physical science which lay nearest at
hand. The true system of the world has been recognized, developed, and
perfected . . . In short, from the Earth to Saturn, from the history of the heavens
to that of insects, natural philosophy has been revolutionized; and nearly all
other fields of knowledge have assumed new forms . . . 6 [ibid., 9–10]
Whereas d’Alembert is justifiably the main representative of the Cosmopolitan Repub-
lic of Letters, the progress, which by any measure had been considerable, was mainly
due to the labours of two great men who had lived and made their lasting contributions
to science in the previous century. Without Descartes and Newton the victories which
d’Alembert so exuberantly announced would have been inconceivable.
What, in particular, can be said about Descartes’s and Newton’s contributions with
respect to the notion of universalism? In the first place, they were the most promi-
nent methodologists of their time and virtually determined the foundations of scientific
methodology for centuries to come. Their contributions constitute a significant part of the
modern conception of the universalism of formal empirical science. Nevertheless, in spite
of the shared universal tendency, they differed in their methodological thinking with re-
gard to many substantial issues. Cassirer points out a significant distinction between the
methodological approaches of Newton and Descartes that underlies the differences in
the many characteristic ways of tackling philosophical and scientific problems in the En-
lightenment. Newton’s ‘Rules of Philosophizing’ (as explicated in Principia and Optics)
and Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode (and equally, his Regulæ ad directionem ingenii) had
an enormous influence on the methodological orientation of individual thinkers and sci-
entist of that era. Firstly, we may consider the peculiarities of Newton’s method, which
only recently have received the careful attention they really deserve. Newton, as is well
known, used a certain variant of the method of analysis in carrying out his investigations
in the natural sciences. Until quite recently, the constituents of this method remained to
a large extent uncharted. Already Cassirer notes how idiosyncratic the notion of “phe-
nomenon” is in Newton’s philosophical vocabulary: for Newton, phenomena are the
data of experience. [Cassirer (1951), 7] But important as the observation is, it is only
a starting point for a more adequate description of the notion.7 The important insight
with respect to the Newtonian notion of “phenomenon” is that the data of experience
must be structured in a determinate manner, i.e., (1) they must be acquired by means of
6“Si on examine sans prévention l’état actuel de nos connoissances, on ne peus disconvenir des progrés
de la philosophie parmi nous. La science de la natur acquiert de jour nouvelles richesses; la géométrie en
reculant ses limites, a porté son flambeau dans les parties de la physique qui se trouvoient les plus prés
d’elle; le vrai syst ème du monde a été connu, développé et perfectionné; [la même sagacit é qui s’êtoit
assujetti les mouvements des corps cêleste, s’est portêe sur les corps qui nous environment; en appliquant la
gêomêtrie à l’étude des ces corps, ou en essayant de l’y appliquer, on a su apercevoir et fixer les avantages
et les abus de cet emploi;] en un mot depuis la terre jusqu’ à Saturne, depuis l’histoire des cieux jusqu’à celle
des insectes, la physique a changé de face. Avec elle presque toutes les autres sciences ont pris une nouvelle
forme, [et elles le devoient en effect. Quelques réflexions vont nous en convaincre.]”
7The most important references in this respect are [Harper (2002)], [Hintikka (1992)], [Smith (2002)] and
[Stein (1991)].
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a controlled experiment, and (2) they have to be taken as a whole, or more precisely, as a
structured aggregate governed by functional relationships.8
It is well known that Newton was not explicit about his methodology in the Principia.
Although there is a famous passage right at the beginning of the book that eloquently
describes the goal of the treatise in terms of laying the basis for a completely new form
of natural philosophy, the actual development and elaboration of these ideas remains
curiously scant in the main body of the book itself.9 The goal of Newton’s investigations,
the end point of analysis, is constituted by the discovery and formulation of the principles
of the particular science under consideration. The reversed order of the investigation
with respect to the logical order of things derives from the epistemologically unique point
de vue of ours: if the latter (principles of science) are first according to nature (prìteron
tù fÔsei), then the former (phenomena) must always be first to us (prìteron prìc mc).
[Cassirer (1956), 7]
The covert methodological principles rehearsed by Newton in the physical sciences
which he refrained from making explicit, have been, as mentioned above, a subject of
heated debate during the last twenty years or so. Another, equally contested subject has
been the relation of Newton’s discoveries in the differential and integral calculus to mod-
ern concepts of mathematical analysis. Both cases demonstrate that it is recommendable
to adhere to the golden rule of history of science: always study the methodology of a sci-
entist in the first place directly from his scientific works, and not from his methodological
pronouncements. This rule is indispensable when one studies works of scientists whose
contributions have radically changed the intellectual scene of their respective fields of
specialty. As far as Newton’s mathematical discoveries are concerned, we can acquire
an enhanced view of the whole process of conceptual growth and change during the En-
lightenment and its far-reaching consequences, if we dwell in some more detail on New-
ton’s fundamental ideas about the differential and integral calculus. In the first place, we
will see how Newton is surprisingly close to Leibniz regarding his opinions about the
philosophical import of the radically new techniques of calculus. This fact is related to
8One cannot but admire the hermeneutic abilities of the most prominent historians of science in disclosing
the depths of certain important ‘seed conceptions’ of scientists that have been obscurely communicated in
the original publications or writings. Such pieces of detective work are a constant source of inspiration. In
this respect the insight that essential to Newton’s method of analysis is that the data of experience must not
be conceived as distinct, atomic instances of the observables, but as a structured whole, seems to me to be
not only exceptionally creative, but also materially correct. (In Principia, the heuristic role of Kepler’s laws
in this structuring process were crucial, as Newton himself made clear.) Cf. especially [Smith (2002)].
9The famous prefatory remarks read: “And therefore our present work sets forth mathematical principles
of natural philosophy. For the whole difficulty of philosophy seems to be to find the forces of nature from the
phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces. It is to these ends
that the general propositions in Books 1 and 2 are directed, while in Book 3 our explanation of the system
of the universe illustrates these propositions . . . If only we could derive the other phenomena of nature from
mechanical principles by the same kind of reasoning! For many things lead me to have a suspicion that all
phenomena may depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes yet unknown, either
are impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled from one another and recede.
Since these forces are unknown, philosophers have hitherto made trial of nature in vain. But I hope that
the principles set down here will shed some light on either this mode of philosophizing or some truer one.”
[Newton (1999), 382f.]
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the gradual deterioration of purely speculative philosophical elements in the exact sci-
ences in the 18th century, and hence to the increasing importance of the purely formal
universalism within the methodology of science. Indeed, as both eschew the notion of
a ‘real differential’ and explicitly reject a metaphysical interpretation of the techniques
of analysis, mathematical physics is relieved of the redundant metaphysical packaging
which still characterizes the work of Descartes. In the second place, the formulation of
the basic concepts of calculus demonstrate clearly what kind of standards of rigor the
mathematicians of Newton’s time advocated. This is important both from the point of
view of seeing the development of mathematics as an important background framework
for cultural evolution at large, and from the point of view of the internal development of
mathematics itself and the processes of explication rehearsed under its purview.
The differential calculus emerged in a gradual process of evolution in which Newton and
Leibniz played the chief roles. Both grounded their work on the achievements of such
prominent mathematicians of previous generations as Kepler, Cavalieri, Descartes and
Fermat. Proclaiming the merit of the actual discovery of the calculus to both Newton and
Leibniz is not ungrounded, however, since they first reduced the solution of the cornu-
copia of problems their predecessors tackled by methods of analysis of infinitesimals, to
a systematic use of the two mutually inverse operations of differentiation and integra-
tion. As far as matters of priority are concerned, in the sense of printed publication the
honour belongs to Leibniz, who is known to have given a comprehensive account of the
fundamental problems and methods of the new calculus in a series of papers published
in the journal Acta Eruditorum between 1682–1686. Nevertheless, Newton had come up
with his formulation of the fundamental ideas earlier in the unpublished papers (1) De
analysi aequationes numero terminorum infinitas in 1665; (2) Methodus fluxionum et serierum
infinitarum, after the De analysi per aequationes, but before 1671; and (3) De quadratura cur-
varum, the main text in 1665–1666. These works were not published until (1) in 1711; (2)
after Newton’s death in 1736; and (3) in 1704 as an appendix to Optics.
It is expedient to make clear the difference between their approaches to settle the first
issue concerning their different opinions about the philosophical implications of calculus.
Alekseĭ Nikolaevich Krylov, a Russian naval engineer and applied mathematician, and
the first author to translate Newton’s Principia into Russian, has described this difference
with characteristic clarity:
Netwon discovered and gave the bases for the calculus of infinitesimals by
starting from mechanical and geometric concepts. In his arguments he al-
ways applied geometric notions and was absolutely rigorous in them and
absolutely precise in language and expressions. Therefore, he first establishes
the concept of the limit of a variable quantity, the concept used today, and
all his teaching about “fluxions”, or “derivatives” in modern terminology, is
based on finding the limits of ratios of two infinitesimal quantities that are
in a definite mutual dependence and that vary jointly. Posing as the basic
problem of integral calculus the determination of a “fluent” from its given
“fluxion”, that is, of a primitive function from its given derivative, he con-
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stantly employs geometric notions, and his tract itself is called De quadratura
curvarum.
Leibniz proceeded in a different way. He introduced the new term “infinites-
imal” instead of an increment of a variable or a function of it that vanishes in
the limit. He did not give this concept a precise and rigorous mathematical
definition, and in some of his explanations he seemingly did not distinguish
between the mathematical concepts of “infinitely small” and “very small”,
nor between “infinitely large” and “very large”, likening, for example, the
one to a speck of dust and the other to the Earth. Moreover, he connected the
concept of an infinitesimal with the philosophical concepts of “finite or infi-
nite divisibility of matter”, of an “indivisible atom”, of a “monad”, and so on,
concepts very far from pure mathematics, which has to do not with the quan-
tities themselves but with numbers serving as a measure of them. [Krylov
(1933), 16]
Although this description captures some of the essential differences between Newton
and Leibniz, it tends to make the distinction between them too sharp. In the first place,
Newton and Leibniz very much share the fundamental presuppositions of the then cur-
rent mathematics, and their calculi are strongly embedded in the culture of their own
times. Two points suffice to illustrate this. (i) Neither Newton’s nor Leibniz’s calculi are
about “functions” which should be evident because the notion of function emerged only
later, particularly in the work of Euler and Cauchy. Instead of “functions” Newton and
Leibniz talk about “quantities”, and the references they make to these quantities, their
rates of change, their differences, etc., are always accompanied with specific geometric
constructions or entities (typically curves). (ii) The notion of continuum that we habit-
ually associate with calculus, the continuum of the real numbers, is not employed by
Newton and Leibniz. Rather, they rely on a geometrical or kinematical notion of a con-
tinuum. Referring to an intuitive geometrical or kinematical continuum, they are able to
develop their limit procedures needed in analysis. From a philosophical point of view,
one of the most important foundational questions of mathematics in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was the question concerning the referential content of mathemati-
cal symbolism. The question “Do differentials exist?”, that is commonly taken to be the
demarcation criterion between the conceptions of analysis of Newton and Leibniz, turns
out to be, on closer analysis, a question to which both Newton and Leibniz reply in the
negative. For, as Niccolò Guicciardini has remarked: “they both stated that (a) actual in-
finitesimals do not exist; they are useful fictions employed to abbreviate proofs, (b) infinitesimals
should be defined rather as varying quantities in a state of approaching zero, (c) infinitesimals can
be completely avoided by limit-based proofs, which constitute the rigorous formulation of calculus,
(d) limit-based proofs are a direct version of and are thus equivalent to the indirect, ad absur-
dum, Archimedean method of exhaustion.” [Guicciardini (2003) [Jahnke (2003), 97]] What
distinguishes Leibniz’s view from Newton’s is the philosophical justification that Leibniz
provides for the application of infinitesimal quantities as “well-founded fictions”.10 Es-
pecially in his later writings Leibniz argued that differentials are well-founded, since they
are symbolic abbreviations for limit-procedures. On one occasion he wrote:
10Drawing essentially on his general philosophical conception of phenomena bene fundata.
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In fact, instead of the infinite or the infinitely small, one can take magnitudes
that are so large or so small that the error will be less than the given error, so
that one differs from the style of Archimedes only in the expressions, which
are, in our method, more direct and more apt for the art of discovery. [Leibniz
(1701), 350]11
These considerations express concisely the dialectic between the conceptions of two of
the most remarkable natural philosophers of the seventeenth century. The important
point is not the dispute that raged between these two men about the priority of the in-
vention of the differential and integral calculus, but the simultaneous assessment of two
qualitatively different proposals for the basic system of differential calculus. The central
contributions of both men comprise three aspects of mathematical discovery: problem-
reduction, the calculation of areas by inversion of the process for calculating tangents,
and the creation of algorithms. Observing the issue from our modern point of view, it is
now clear that aspects of both men’s contributions have been axiomatic for the develop-
ment of mathematics. The invention of infinitesimal calculus constituted the first great
technical revolution in the course of the development of formal-universal laws; it was the
language in which the laws of Newton in particular and the laws of classical physics in
general were most naturally expressed.
Apart from the strictly technical work relating to pure mathematics, the most spirited
methodological debate concerning the justifiable procedures of knowledge acquisition in
science ignited between the ideas of Descartes and Newton. Newton’s method we have
already briefly sketched above. It is necessary to supplement this description with a brief
account of Descartes’ methodological principles.
Descartes, as is well known, dedicated a considerable part of his early career to studying
methodological questions. The first attempt in this vein is the famous Regulæ ad direc-
tionem ingenii which Descartes never finished. It had apparently been written in 1628,
though it was published only posthumously. It comprises twenty-one so-called rules,
but it is probable that a number of other rules were also premeditated as can be deduced
from other textual evidence. The essentials of the Regulæ consist of principles that gov-
ern the use of the two most important mental operations that men have recourse to in
their cogitations, i.e., deduction and intuition. The method consists in rules for employing
aright these two mental operations, and it is said above all to consist in order.
In the fifth of the rules of the Regulæ Descartes gives a summary of his method: “Method
consists wholly in the ordering and disposing (literally, in the order and disposition) of
those objects to which the attention of the mind must be directed if we are to discover any
truth. We shall observe this method exactly if we reduce involved and obscure proposi-
tions step by step to those which are simpler, and if we then start with the intuitive ap-
prehension of the simplest propositions and try by retracing our path through the same
steps to ascend to the knowledge of all the others.” [Regulæ ad directionem ingenii, §5; AT
X, 379] Although it may not be immediately clear, a little reflection shows that Descartes
11Translated in [ibid., 98].
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is in fact talking here about the method of analysis. The desiderata of this method are
related to the two precepts that Descartes introduced in his Discours de la Méthode. The
first part of the method is that we should reduce involved and obscure propositions step
by step to those which are simpler. And this injunction is generally said to correspond
to the second precept of the Discours: “The second (precept) was to divide up each of
the difficulties which I was to examine into as many parts as possible and as seemed
requisite.” [Discours de la Méthode, 2; AT VI, 18] This method has become to be known
by the names of analysis or resolution. It is a contested issue whether Descartes always
used the term “analysis” in precisely the same sense, but the sense conferred to it here
consists in breaking down, as it were, the multiple data of knowledge into their sim-
plest elements or element. Needless to say, Descartes was very much influenced by the
ideas he had encountered in mathematics in scrutinizing the concept of analysis. Indeed,
the work that Descartes did in analytic geometry was in large part inspired by the de-
sire to re-evaluate and refine the notion of exactness in mathematics through acquiring a
deeper understanding of what was involved in the classical conception of analysis that
the ancient Greek geometers had recourse to in their work. Especially important was the
relationship between the idea of analysis and the notion of construction. But according
to Descartes, Euclidean geometry, for example, had a serious drawback, namely, that the
axioms and first principles are not ‘justified’. That is to say, the geometer does not show
how his first principles are reached. The upshot of the methodological investigations of
Descartes is that using the method of analysis or resolution, one can ‘justify’ the first prin-
ciples of science. This is accomplished by making it clear in a systematic manner (this is
precisely the underlying purpose of the method) how they are reached and why they are
asserted. This makes it clear that analysis is in a sense a logic of discovery. I will touch
upon this particular issue in the next chapter.
The second part of the method that is summarized in the fifth Rule in Discours de la
Méthode insists that we should “start with the intuitive apprehension of the simplest
propositions and try by retracing our path through the same steps to ascend to the knowl-
edge of all the others.” This is essentially an account of the method of synthesis or com-
position. We thus see how the two ‘directions’ of inference are related. Analysis can
most naturally be seen as a method for discovery, whereas synthesis is best suited for
demonstrating what is already known. The dialectic of these two methods constitutes
actually one method the proper functioning of which essentially depends on the ordered
and systematic application of both the ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ modes of inference
represented by analysis and synthesis. As we have seen, Newton’s argumentation in
both mathematics and physics exemplifies the critical importance of these methods. It is
therefore apt to conclude that these two men, Descartes and Newton, were the two great
analysts of the seventeenth century.
The ideological roots of Enlightenment
I. Say first, of God above, or man below,
What can we reason, but from what we know?
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Of man what see we, but his station here, From which to reason, or to which
refer?
Through worlds unnumber’d though the God be known,
’Tis ours to trace him only in our own.
He, who through vast immensity can pierce,
See worlds on worlds compose one universe,
Observe how system into system runs,
What other planets circle other suns,
What varied being peoples ev’ry star,
May tell why Heav’n has made us as we are.
But of this frame the bearings, and the ties,
The strong connections, nice dependencies,
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul
Look’d through? or can a part contain the whole?
— Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, Epistle I
Enlightenment historiography typically draws on rhetorical phrases like “an illustrious
age of reason” when describing the characteristics of Enlightenment thought. This is
admittedly a succinct way of stressing the importance of the methodology of natural phi-
losophy (as science was then called) in bringing forth a heightened capacity of technical
rationality which made possible all the progress in the technical infrastructure as well
as in the administrative and economic systems of Western societies. Furthermore, these
accounts regard the so-called ‘Scientific Revolution’ as a significant catalyst in the overall
ideological development during this era, accelerating the ‘plate tectonics’ of the various
strata of philosophical thought in statu nascendi. Although this portrait of Enlightenment
certainly captures an important aspect of its essential character, it is only a partial truth.
The situation was more complicated than this standard picture makes it seem. The com-
plexities derive from at least three different sources: (i) the ‘Scientific Revolution’12 was
only one of the background influences of the intellectual transformation that largely took
place during the half-century between 1670 and 1720 (Indeed, the ‘Scientific Revolution’,
having taken place, roughly, between Galileo and Newton, was already over by that
time.); (ii) the notion of revolution that came to play such a prominent role in the Enlight-
enment thought had already been associated with an earlier major intellectual influence,
Cartesianism; it was not, thus, as is usually argued in contemporary Enlightenment his-
toriography, a product of the political surges culminating in the French Revolution in
1789; (iii) there were, right from the beginning, two enlightenments, not one; the dialectic
between the conservative and the radical forms of enlightenment comprises one of the
most important chapters in the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought.
Let us elaborate on these aspects in a little more detail.
¶In the first place, it is contested among a number of historians of science that there
ever was a sharply defined and unambiguously identifiable ‘Scientific Revolution’ en-
compassing a radical change in the theoretical tools, experimental techniques and means
12An anachronistic expression, because the discipline under the purview of which the radical intellectual
shift took place was not known as “science”, but rather as “natural philosophy”.
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of communication between colleagues within natural philosophy. What these sceptical
evaluations of the status of the ‘revolution’ have in common is the tendency to point
out scholars, mostly from the Medieval era, that already, not only anticipated, but put to
concrete use the methodological tools and techniques that according to the common view
were only developed during the period from Galileo to Newton. Although there certainly
is a sense in which it is justifiable to talk about some exceptionally foresighted individuals
who devised tools the subsequent development of which led to the widely adopted forms
of mathematical presentation and techniques of calculation (Nicole Oresme’s (1320–1382)
use of graphs to illustrate the dependencies between variable magnitudes is an example),
experimental procedures, modes of presentation, etc., it is a well-established fact that the
work of such scientists as Galileo, Kepler and Newton would have been inconceivable
without the radical change in the two fundamental disciplines that underpin the ‘rev-
olution’, viz., geometry, and the theory of free fall and compounded motion. On the
one hand, the redefinition of the notion of exactness in mathematics is largely due to
Descartes’ transformation of the early modern concept of geometrical construction. This
work underlies the development of analysis in the works of Newton and Leibniz, to
which we have had occasion to refer above. The significance of mathematical analysis
for the study of physics and its rapid development is, of course, beyond question. On the
other hand, the investigations of free fall and compounded motion by Descartes, Beeck-
man and Galileo constitute the background for the subsequent development of mechan-
ics. It is mostly because of their pioneering efforts in “exploring the limits of preclassical
mechanics” [Damerow et al. (2004)] that the theoretical discoveries of Huyghens and
Newton were made possible in the seventeenth century. There are, then, strong system-
atic reasons for maintaining that the Scientific Revolution was a phenomenon confined to
a specific, identifiable historical period. Descartes made the necessary preparations and
Galileo implemented the new ideas stemming from the study of motion, presenting the
first coherent formulation of the laws of free fall and compounded motion. In addition to
the systematic reasons, there is historical evidence that the revolution was, indeed, a fact.
Modern historiography would be at pains to explain the systematic references to a “Sci-
entific Revolution” in the literature of the early eighteenth century, if there was no factual
transformation of the modes of thought in the seventeenth-century natural philosophy.
As Jonathan Israel has put it: “[T]he recent trend among the historians of science to ques-
tion whether there really was a ‘Scientific Revolution’ of discoveries, new procedures,
and instruments which fundamentally changed the substance of scientific debate in the
seventeenth century leaves untouched the vast influence of the early eighteenth-century
perception of ‘Scientific Revolution’. Indeed, it would seem to strengthen the argument
[that the modern concept of ‘revolution’ is specifically a product of the Early Enlighten-
ment] that it is precisely in the ‘displacement of the conceptual network through which
scientists view the world’ by an essentially new paradigm, a change in categories and
ideas, a philosophical transformation in other words, that one finds the really significant
difference between what is pre-modern and what is ‘modern’.” [Israel (2006), 6]
¶In the second place, the notion of “revolution”, in the sense of a principled, general
discarding of authority and traditional premisses, was largely instigated in Europe by
the advent of the mechanistic world-view of Descartes. Cartesianism, which triumphed
widely in the later seventeenth century, marked a great shift in basic concepts (in phi-
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losophy and mathematics alike, as we have seen), thereby changing western civilization
profoundly, and, as noted above, among innumerable other changes, transforming the
meaning of the word “revolution” itself. Descartes advocated a reformation of the whole
system of knowledge, embarking on a transformation that was aptly called by Turgot
in 1748, “une révolution totale.” This description was wholly justified in as much as
Descartes’ notion of “revolution” means, as Jonathan Israel has put it, “not just linear,
fundamental, and irreversible change, and not just auto-emancipation from the intellec-
tual and cultural shackles of the past, but also, as Turgot’s remark indicates, something
that changes everything.” [ibid., 5]
¶In the third place, it is essential to emphasize the importance of the intellectual import
of the radical enlightenment as compared to the contributions of the conservative one.
Although the dichotomy between radical and conservative Enlightenment – or moderate
mainstream Enlightenment, as Jonathan Israel likes to call it when dwelling upon this
contrast – has been contested by some scholars, there are compelling reasons to accept
it as a correct description of the intellectual situation in Europe between 1670 and 1720.
To see this, it is sufficient to point out its strategic significance in historical studies that
stress the importance of intellectual impulses as a relevant category of the explanatory
apparatus along with cultural, social and material factors. What, then, is the difference
between “radical Enlightenment” and “moderate mainstream Enlightenment”? Jonathan
Israel’s seminal monographs, Radical Enlightenmet [Israel (2001)] and Enlightenment Con-
tested [Israel (2006)], which provide a remarkably comprehensive analysis of the various
dimensions of Enlightenment and present a sustained argument for the relevance of the
“two enlightenments” for general history of ideas, are not alone responsible for the cur-
rency of the line of Enlightenment historiography which makes the contrast between
radical and conservative enlightenments its central explanatory and heuristic template.
Neither does the phrase “radical Enlightenment” derive from Israel. The significance of
the so-called ‘radical’ wing of Enlightenment had already been emphasized by Margaret
C. Jacob in the early 1980s, albeit from a slightly different perspective. In the light of his-
torical evidence it is incontestable that there were several strands or varieties of “radical
Enlightenment” and that most of them were intellectually secluded from one another in
terms of direct communication or cultural influence. Nevertheless, they had quite a few
characteristics in common. In the most general terms, one may associate these varieties
of radical Enlightenment with a critical attitude towards the thought of French Enlight-
enment philosophes – particularly that of Voltaire and d’Alembert:
The radicals were intellectual dissenters, men, and possibly a very few
women, often with a Protestant refugee background, who could not share the
willingness of the major philosophes like Voltaire and d’Alembert, or liberal
churchmen like the Newtonians in England, to put their faith in enlightened
monarchy. They sought, therefore, through a variety of methods, propaganda
as well as intrigue, to establish a republican ideal, if not always a republican
reality, worthy of European-wide imitation. Predictably they, like the moder-
ates, were the intellectual heirs of the mid-century English Revolution, only
unlike the moderates they sided more with the radical sectaries, that is, with
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the losers rather than the winners of that first major European revolution. In
Continental Europe many intellectual legacies were at work in the later sev-
enteenth century – Cartesian, Spinozist, Grotian to be sure – but the great
revolution across the Channel must also be acknowledged for the inspiration
that the discontent and the angry drew from it. [Jacob (1981/2003), ix]
The division of the advocates of Enlightenment values into different camps resulted from
different basic attitudes towards the application of the criteria of rationality. Few sought
to apply the new criteria to everything. Indeed, as Jonathan Israel has noted: “[j]ust
as Descartes with his two-substance dualism created a reserved area of spirits, angels,
demons and miracles, and Boyle and Locke with their emphatic empiricism similarly
ring-fenced miracles, spirits and the core Christian ‘mysteries’, so the intellectual elites
of Europe mostly sought one or another intellectual expedient for having it both ways
– that is reconciling the new mechanistic criteria of rationality not just with religion and
theological doctrines but also with social norms and notions of education, society and
politics based on custom, usage, and existing laws as well as social-hierarchical princi-
ples.” [Israel (2006), 10] This was, then, the fundamental demarcation criterion between
the two variants of enlightenment: whether reason alone reigns supreme in human life
or whether philosophy’s scope must be limited and reason reconciled with faith and tra-
dition.
From the outset then, in the late seventeenth century, there were always two
enlightenments. Neither the historian nor the philosopher is likely to get very
far with discussing ‘modernity’ unless he or she starts by differentiating Rad-
ical Enlightenment from conservative [. . . ] moderate mainstream Enlighten-
ment. For the difference between reason alone and reason combined with
faith and tradition was a ubiquitous and absolute difference. Philosophically,
‘modernity’ conceived as an abstract package of basic values – toleration, per-
sonal freedom, democracy, equality racial and sexual, freedom of expression,
sexual emancipation, and the universal right to knowledge and ‘enlighten-
ment’ – derives [. . . ] from just one of these two, namely, the Radical Enlight-
enment; historically, however, ‘modernity’ is the richly nuanced brew which
arose as a result of the ongoing conflict not just between these two enlight-
enments but also (or still more) between both enlightenments, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the successive counter-enlightenments, beginning
with Bossuet and culminating in Postmodernism, rejecting all these principles
and seeking to overthrow both streams of Enlightenment. Rousseau, initially
in the late 1740s and early 1750s an ally of Diderot and radical philosophe, sub-
sequently, in the 1760s, rebelled against both branches of Enlightenment, be-
coming the moral ‘prophet’ as it were of one form of Counter-Enlightenment.
Of the two enlightenments, the moderate mainstream was without doubt
overwhelmingly dominant in terms of support, official approval, and prestige
practically everywhere except for several decades in France from the 1740s
onwards. Nevertheless, in a deeper sense, and in the long run, it proved
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to be much the less important of the two enlightenments. For it was al-
ways fatally hampered by its Achilles heel, namely that all its philosophi-
cal recipes for blending theological and traditional categories with the new
critical-mathematical rationality proved flawed in practice, not to say highly
problematic and shot through with contradiction. Cartesian dualism, Lock-
ean empiricism, Leibnizian monads, Malebranche’s occasionalism, Bishop
Huet’s fideism, the London Boyle Lectures, Newtonian physico-theology,
Thomasian eclecticism, German and Swedish Wolffianism, all the method-
ologies of compromise presented insuperable disjunctions and difficulties,
rendering the whole philosophico-scientific-scholarly arena after 1650 exceed-
ingly fraught and unstable. [ibid., 11]
Surely, the division between “radical” and “conservative” Enlightenment (as pepetuated
by Israel and Jacob) is an idealization and therefore considerably simplifies the complex
and nested hierarchy of interrelated facts and impulses that constituted the cultural en-
vironment of Enlightenment, but then, this qualification could be presented with respect
to most heuristic divisions in the history of ideas. If our goal was purely historiographi-
cal and confined solely to the history of Enlightenment thought, we would be obliged to
delve more deeply into the details of historical evidence and definite presuppositions of
the interpretative framework provided by Israel and Jacob. The intention here, however,
is not to explicate the content and complexity of the notion of Enlightenment in toto, but
rather to bring forth selectively such heuristic insights into the notion of Enlightenment
and its history that amend and supplement the somewhat one-sided view of Enlighten-
ment that the conventional Enlightenment historiography presents us with. The division
of Israel and Jacob is not to be accepted dogmatically, but rather as a working hypothesis
which sheds some light upon the important differences between the basic philosophi-
cal presuppositions and stances of the numerous thinkers that are usually collected un-
der the umbrella term “Enlightenment philosophers”. Moreover, as far as Spinoza and
spinozism are concerned, the division of Israel and Jacob seems to be highly relevant in
the context of the debate on tolerance that involved Locke and Spinoza in the late 1680s.
We shall have occasion to return to this debate in section 2.4 where we study the contours
of the development of moral universalism.
In as much as the purpose of this historical discussion is to dwell especially upon the ge-
nealogy of certain important philosophical notions – in particular, the notion of univer-
salism in scientific and ethical thought, and epistemic virtues such as objectivity, truth-
to-nature and trained judgement on the one hand, and moral virtues such as forbearance,
permissiveness, mutual respect and tolerance on the other – the emphasis upon intellec-
tual impulses cannot possibly be regarded as an epistemic vice. Neither is it a retreat to
an “old-fashioned” variety of historiography.13 A consensus among historians seems to
be that the explanatory basis of history must primarily consist in economic and social
13Although some references mentioned in the text date back to the early 1900s, it is neither substantially
correct nor moral to criticize the intellectually oriented approach to history as “old-fashioned”. Grounding
these judgements solely on chronological characterizations alluding to the year of publication of a literary
source miss the crucial distinction between genesis and validity. That certain research strategies are able to
maintain their currency for long periods of time is an expression of the fact that questions of validity cannot
55
structures, or other well-defined social and cultural factors the dynamics of which can be
made explicit. Investigations that focus on the intellectual dimension of a significant his-
torical change are often regarded with skepticism or deemed “old-fashioned” right out
of hand. This is an ideological presupposition that does not bear much methodological
weight. Indeed, the trend of playing down the importance of ideas in the course of his-
torical change has resulted in a desultory state of historiography, as Israel has correctly
stressed: “If, moreover, in recent decades most historians of both Enlightenment and the
French Revolution have repudiated interpretations emphasizing the role of ideas, claim-
ing the revolutionary movements were primarily social and cultural phenomena best
understood by focusing on social relations and material factors, there remain formidable
unresolved difficulties with this conception. No one has been able to specify what the
allegedly profound social changes which lay behind the Enlightenment and Revolution
actually were or even how shifts in social structure, given their reality, could broadly and
spontaneously translate into popularly driven ‘universal revolution’ designed to trans-
form the core principles upon which society and politics rest.” [Israel (2006), x] However,
there are not just negative reasons for abandoning the conventional presuppositions of
historiography. Much more is at stake. The “controversialist” approach to intellectual
history advocated by Israel, fusing the advantages and shedding the disadvantages of
both the conventional social, cultural and political history, and intellectual history, will –
so Israel claims – amount to a unique cultural phenomenon of considerable importance
to a wide class of scholars and lay readers, including not only historians, but also philoso-
phers, social theorists and political analysts. The task is not an easy one. As Israel puts
it: “To integrate intellectual history effectively with social, cultural and political history,
then, it seems likely that what is really needed is nothing like ‘cultural sociology’ but
rather a new, reformed intellectual history presiding over a two-way traffic, or dialectic
of ideas and social reality, and focusing less on finished theories [. . . ] than the ‘reconstruc-
tion of polemical, frequently unresolved arguments’, a new intellectual history in which
the major theorists of the past still figure prominently, though the ranking between them
may be greatly altered, but in which the chief emphasis is less on thinkers and theories
than on ‘thinking’ and debates.” [ibid., 23]
Universalism and the challenge for Enlightenment reason
If there exists a class of qualities that deserve the name of cardinal intellectual virtues
of Enlightenment the following ones, which Isaiah Berlin found the most representative,
are bound to be included: intellectual power, honesty, lucidity, courage and disinterested
love of truth. [Berlin (1956), 29] Accommodating these virtues under its moral firma-
ment, the eighteenth century was pointing the way towards the future, in the hope of
establishing a universal, or cosmopolitan republic of letters. The characteristic princi-
be judged on the basis of genetic analysis. A case in point is Cassirer’s multi-volume study on the history of
the problem of knowledge (Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. (Band 1:
1906; Band 2: 1907; Band 3: Die nachkantischen Systeme, 1920; Band 4: Von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart (1832–
1932), 1957) [Cassirer (1950)]) which still is one of the best accounts of the history of ideas in the modern
era
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ple that formed its central ideological core was the notion of the sovereignty of reason.
Indeed, the radical philosophes of the Early Enlightenment – Bayle, Fontenelle, Boulainvil-
liers, Meslier, Fréret, Boreau-Deslanders, Tyssot de Patot, Du Marsais, Rousset de Missy,
La Beaumelle, Lévesque de Burigny, Mably, Morelly, Diderot, d’Alembert, Helvetius, the
marquis d’Argens and the pre-1754 Rousseau – contended that reason teaches that hu-
man society should be based on personal liberty, equality, and freedom of thought and
expression. In the atmosphere enlivened by these ideals alone, it is understandable that
science and philosophy experienced their greatest victories so far in history. In the culti-
vation of the “enlightenment virtues”, the great thinkers and teachers of the eighteenth
century remain surely unparalleled. However, these virtues presupposed a forma mentis
that was to pose the greatest challenge to the ideal of Enlightenment rationality in the fol-
lowing historical era. This mode of thought is closely related to the idea of universalism.
We have been gradually unfolding the elements out of which the idea of universalism
eventually emerges as a full-fledged regulative principle of both scientific and ethical
thought. Some of these elements were crucial, not only in bringing forth more clearly
the underlying idea of universalism, but also in bringing about circumstances in which
the Enlightenment idea of rationality was challenged from two sides: from within the
Enlightenment ideas themselves as well as from outside through the ideas of counter-
enlightenment. The characteristic feature of Enlightenment thought which organically
bound it to the idea of universalism and exposed it to the two-sided challenge was the
idea of criticism. Not only historians have characterized the Enlightenment in these
terms, but contemporaries also envisaged their times as the ‘age of criticism’. Immanuel
Kant defined the essential characteristics of the age in the preface to the first edition of
his Kritik der Reinen Vernunft:
Our age is, to a pre-eminent degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism ev-
erything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and the state through its
majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they arouse just suspi-
cion against themselves, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason
gives only to that which sustains the test of free and open examination. [A
xii]
However critical the Enlightenment philosophes strove to be in their intellectual analy-
ses of man, state, religion and science, they could not escape some severe philosophical
problems that undermined the plausibility of their ideal of rationality. In addressing the
relation of the general outlook of the logical empiricists to the ideals of Enlightenment
André Carus presents two fundamental problems that the Enlightenment thought was
not able to solve satisfactorily (thereby setting a challenge to modern philosophy and sci-
ence which the members of the Vienna Circle found to define the content of their overall
philosophical agenda). The main problems were, according to Carus, (1) the first obstacle
to Enlightenment: no criterion for knowledge, (2) the second obstacle to Enlightenment:
knowledge and the practical realm. [Carus (2007), 12–31] What do these problems actu-
ally consist in, and what is their relation with the tradition of Enlightenment in particu-
lar?
57
¶The first question boils down to this: What is the ‘knowledge’ that the Enlightenment
regarded as so critical to individual autonomy and social improvement? Can it be de-
fined in practical terms? What were the criteria that the philosophes set for knowledge,
i.e., what qualifies as knowledge? Furthermore, given the compendium of everything that
qualifies as knowledge, how does it fit together? This problem is very important, given
that one of the most important methodological motives of Enlightenment is to build a
system of knowledge. Thus, we are interested in the principles that provide a basis for
cognitive systematization. In addition to these questions, one can finally ask: what con-
stitutes important knowledge? It is this question that posed insuperable obstacles to the
Enlightenment philosophers.
¶The second question concerns the tension created by the apparent blindness of scientific
(and especially theoretical) knowledge – which occupied an exemplary place in the En-
lightenment canon – to the moral and affective context of knowledge. An often presented
complaint among the Romantics was that giving science such priority as the Enlighten-
ment outlook supposed would degrade our subjective perceptions to the status of ‘mere
appearances’, while impersonal scientific formulas specify the ‘underlying reality’.
How did these challenges shape the philosophical atmosphere of the Enlightenment?
What were the reasons for the failure of the Enlightenment philosophers in addressing
these challenges? In Carus’s view:
The Lockean or Baconian empiricism of the Encyclopèdistes could not provide
an adequate criterion of knowledge for the [following] reason [. . . ]: it was un-
able to account for mathematics, or for the central importance of mathematics
in scientific knowledge. Moreover, it put the burden of fitting all of knowl-
edge together on a speculative taxonomy of human cognitive faculties or on
the mechanical programme, which had to be accounted equally speculative as
it could not be applied to any actual knowledge. The effort to overcome these
problems by Enlightenment-minded thinkers over the next century took two
main forms: the ‘positivist’ tradition following Comte and Mill, and the Kan-
tian tradition. [ibid., 12]
Carus implies that the essential difficulty in the proposed ideal of knowledge in the En-
lightenment tradition was the impossibility of accounting for the abstract and univer-
sal nature of mathematical knowledge with the conceptual tools and presuppositions of
the empiricist tradition on which the main representatives of Enlightenment philosophy
leaned on. Although the attempts at meeting the difficulty made by Comte and Mill
on the one hand, and Kant on the other, were genuine improvements over the pursuits
of Enlightenment philosophers, they nevertheless fell short of their attested objectives.
Even Kant, who is suggested to have come closest to an adequate solution, failed be-
cause of a fundamental dualism that was built into his system. Indeed, Carus evaluates
Kant’s contribution in this respect as follows: “Whatever his intentions, Kant’s legacy in
the nineteenth century (especially in German idealism and historicism) had been to split
knowledge into two sectors: the natural sciences, based on a priori mathematical princi-
ples and justified by perceptual evidence, and the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)
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based on entirely different principles, such as the freedom of human action and the ex-
istence of cultures or communities of shared action-guiding values. The enlightenment
emphasis on the unity of knowledge – the cognitive as the conscience of the practical – was
thus lost.” [ibid., 12–13] The whole purpose of Carus’ discussion is to set the following
idea in a historical context: it is through the combined efforts of the logical empiricists,
and particularly Rudolf Carnap’s, in the early twentieth century that these Enlightenment
problems are finally solved in tandem. This solution is made possible by the conceptual
tools of the ‘new’ mathematical logic and the completely novel conception of philosophy
as a form of ‘language engineering’ (the roots of which Carus traces to the “engineer-
ing and revolutionary spirit of the Ecole Polytechnique in the early nineteenth century
[. . . ] and was elaborated in the works of Condorcet, Saint-Simon, and especially Comte.”
[ibid., 14]). The gist of Carus’ view is that motivated by Enlightenment ideals, the log-
ical empiricists, and foremost Carnap, are finally able to meet the objections presented
against the classical conception of knowledge and its value that underpinned the sys-
tems of Locke, Kant and Comte, for example. For the first time in the history of thought,
the two problems of knowledge can be adequately addressed and solved!
Although I agree with many of Carus’ views about the unique character of Carnap’s so-
lution, I hesitate to render it the philosophical and ideological status that Carus does.
Indeed, it is precisely because Carus fails to see the difference and delicate relationship
between the domains of formal-universal laws and axiological validity that his recon-
struction of Carnap’s solution is not a solution of the two-fold problem of Enlighten-
ment thought. The idea of universalism that Carus alludes to with the locution “unity
of knowledge” is only a limited variety of universalism, universalism solely in the sense
of formal-universal laws, that seeks to conflate the domains of fact and value. This is,
as we have already shown above, a philosophical mistake. What Carus’ account pre-
cisely lacks is the explicit reference to the all-important influence of the tradition of in-
tellectual virtues upon the gradual evolution of the problem of knowledge, and more
generally, the regulating role of the ideal of universal validity in determining the rela-
tionship of different values to each other. It is not solely through formal considerations
such as dwelling on the indisputably deductive nature of mathematical knowledge that
the background of the problem is set up. The main point is, as I believe Lorraine Das-
ton and Peter Galison have convincingly shown [Daston & Galison (2007), passim], that
the intellectual virtues (such as truth-to-nature, objectivity and trained judgement) consti-
tute important boundary conditions for addressing the problem of knowledge in the first
place. The ethico-epistemological virtues and the conception of knowledge are (and have
been throughout the history of science) in a dialectical relationship where the two-way
traffic between them continuously changes the conceptual landscape in which the prob-
lem of knowledge is addressed. Central to the examination of the universalistic ideas
about moral virtues and knowledge is the idea of epistemic values associated with the
concept of scientific self. In the next section I will examine the notion of scientific self in its
relationship with objectivity and the ideal of universalism.
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2.3 Universalism and the Idea of Scientific Self
2.3.1 Epistemic virtues and pre-social virtues
The idea that reference to epistemic virtues is not solely a metaphorical façon de parler
but an indication that they are literally moral virtues can be seen to derive already from
Plato and Aristotle. Although their ethical views were very different, they both shared
the idea that human dignity consists in the fact that a man must make himself what
he ought to be. The drama of human life is reflected in the fact that a man can either
fail or succeed in doing so. Virtues and vices, great and small, are the prerogatives of
humans and the boundary conditions of that inalienable dignity that belongs to each
person; man can either choose to act virtuously or let his actions be determined by vices.
If we define virtue as a disposition (or trait) to promote human good and flourishing,
then we have several types of virtues (behavioural dispositions) depending on which
part of human life they relate to. Indeed, from the first-person/third-person point of
view there definitely can be said to exist both pre-social and social virtues, because moral
is not exclusively a group phenomenon.14 The term pre-social is misleading in so far as
all virtues, whether pre-social or social, are important for the whole community and can
develop in it. I will nevertheless stick with this terminology, because it highlights the
importance of the individual dimension of morality that is relevant for the notion of self
in general, and scientific self in particular.
What is the actual constitution of the system of virtues and vices? How are they related
to the nature of man? In order to make sense of the notion of epistemic virtue, we have
to place it in the larger theoretical structure of virtues simpliciter. This was seen already
by Plato. For example, regarding wisdom, one of Plato’s cardinal virtues, as an epistemic
virtue, already presupposes a total system of virtues, because Plato identified (at least) six
different forms of wisdom: (1) craft wisdom, as in the wise physician, (2) personal wisdom,
as codified in the maxim “Know thyself” (gnÀji seautìn), (3) the wisdom of counsel, (4)
social wisdom, (5) theoretical or esoteric wisdom, and (6) wisdom as the meta-virtue, the virtue
which rules the other virtues. Following the platonic idea of a system of virtues (an idea
which Aristotle adopted in his Nicomachean Ethics), we provide a brief synopsis of the
pre-social virtues that underpin the idea of epistemic virtue.
The system of pre-social virtues
From a general point of view, life is undoubtedly the basis of personality, and person’s
life taken as the totality of conditions for self-actualization is the most elementary good.15
Indeed, if the person’s life is destroyed, he can enjoy no other goods. But then, in the hier-
archy of goods life constitutes only a basic good and there are goods that are qualitatively
higher than the purely vital values. The significance of life as a value derives from the
14The distinction is due to Hösle [Hösle (2004), 281].
15In this section I follow the lucid presentation of Vittorio Hösle [Hösle (2004), 281–304].
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ontogenetic fact that only through it can forms of life and Lebensgefühle develop that tran-
scend the vital per se and allow the emergence of that which is truly human in human
beings, i.e., that which transcends the state of being of humans as mere organisms. There
is a peculiar asymmetry in the degree of the sanctity of life depending on whether the life
of a person is examined from the point of view of others or the person himself; juridical
systems around the world almost universally sanction others’ attacks on a person’s life as
the greatest crime, but from the point of view of the person, risking his own life may be a
personal duty that enables him to become fully worthy of it in the highest, moral, sense.
The primacy of vital values is manifest in law, where all other goods are subordinate to
life.16 From a personal point of view, on the other hand, life can be considered fulfilled
only if in the course of it the person is able to complete its process of self-actualization, in
short, if the I is able to realize its self.17 What, then, is the character of the higher good that
alone conveys life its meaning? Although we have to forego here a fully elaborated meta-
physics of man (comprising in essence an answer to the question “What is man?”), it is
pertinent to provide some hints as to what the highest coordinating principle of morality
could be. One answer that makes the distinction between basic goods and higher goods
in the most candid manner is provided by Vittorio Hösle:
The spirit is what first gives life – the basis of spirit – its true meaning. In
ethics, the complex relationship between life and intellect – which is so com-
plex because life is the real presupposition of intellect, and the intellect the
ideal presupposition of life – results in many difficulties that would not arise
if we had a one-dimensional hierarchy of values; however, this mutuality,
which is grounded in the dialectic of the ideal and the real, contributes a lot
to the intellectually fascinating beauty of the moral. Even if not every person
is asked to risk his life, relinquishing for the sake of intellectual values some
of one’s own vital values, which are bound up with the self-enjoyment of the
living being qua living being, is profoundly human. [Hösle (2004), 281]
It can be asserted that the precedence of intellectual over vital values is a central norm
for any individual person, even if one does not subscribe to the idealistic articulation of
the distinction given by Hösle. For clearly, there is a sense in which the idea of the pri-
ority of intellectual values can be rendered intelligible in the social context as well. For
example, a scientific theory or theoretical insight concerning a specific domain can be
shared and utilized by several people without any loss of information value, provided
that everyone is sufficiently prepared and skilled enough to benefit from the theory (or
insight). On the other hand, one cannot share a physical source in the same manner,
for example a cake cannot be eaten whole by several people. Furthermore, even a book
which contains a description of the theory in question cannot be used by several peo-
ple at the same time.18 Therefore, the distinction between abundant and scarce resources
16These other goods include: (i) the inviolability of the body and formal self-determination; (ii) property and
fortune through which a person can carry out his more complex plans and (iii) personal honour as the medium
in which a person must operate socially.
17I will touch upon the human identity problem and its relevance for the dimension of morality and moral
action in the Chapter 3.
18These examples are due to Hösle. [ibid.]
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constitutes a demarcation between goods that can be shared freely, allocating basically
similar utilities to everyone involved, i.e., ideally the same utility to everyone regardless
of the fact how many people are sharing the good, and goods that cannot be so shared.
The goods belonging to the latter category are the subject of the theoretical sphere of eco-
nomics. To reiterate this distinction and its significance for the notion of the social, Hösle
writes: “The noema of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony rises above the circle of economics,
but the individual concert performances of it, which cannot be heard by everyone, do
not. The intellectual person is thus, ceteris paribus, more social than one who pursues
material pleasures; if two people are interested in the same intellectual insight, the latter
constitutes a kind of bond; if, on the other hand, two people would like to have the same
piece of land, conflicts are likely to arise. And yet the term ‘pre-social’ is meaningful: it
is intended to suggest that, in contrast to social virtues, these virtues could exist even if
only a single person survived.” [ibid., 282]
The first of the pre-social virtues in the system of virtues that we are here trying to ex-
plicate and that underlies the notion of epistemic virtues, is temperance.19 We mean here
the notion of temperance in its broadest sense that refers to the ability to forego immedi-
ate satisfaction of needs, whether these are of a general biological nature or specifically
human. Certain reservations are, however, in order here. Although one could use the
demarcation between biological and genuinely human needs to sort out varieties of tem-
perance, referring in the first case to moderation and in the second case to temperance in
a narrower sense, there are at least two necessary qualifications to be made with respect
to temperance as a virtue. First, the distinction between speciously virtuous individ-
uals and genuinely virtuous individuals can explain the skepticism with which some
regard the virtue of temperance. Some people may well exemplify remarkable temper-
ance which objectively amounts to little more than resisting pleasure for the sake of some
illusory good. Those who have made this virtue their pride seldom realize the functional
role of temperance within the system of virtues. Indeed, as Hösle has remarked, “[e]ven
if moderation can be expected if everyone, it rises to asceticism in only a few – although
admiration for these view is general. Even an ascetic can be intemperate in a narrower
sense of the word: if ascetic behaviour becomes compulsive, if the ascetic is not able to
limit his habits when the circumstances demand that he do so, a loss of autonomy occurs.
[. . . ] To torment oneself pointlessly is in any case contrary to duty. Asceticism is most
meaningful when vital values are sacrificed to intellectual values.” [ibid., 284] Needless
to say, (false) pride in the exercise of a virtue usually is a mark of a speciously virtuous in-
dividual, and this generalizes to the exercise of all virtues, not only temperance. Genuine
or true pride is intrinsic, having its measure in the individual himself, and is thus not
in need of others’ homage. Second, some cause of conceptual confusion may well have
resulted from the imprecise translation of Aristotle’s swfrosÔnh and Aquinas’ temperan-
tia, which have been conventionally translated as temperance. This is quite unfortunate
because serious philosophical misunderstandings supervene here on philological inaccu-
racies. The most important of these is the conception that temperance is (philosophically)
synonymous to both moderation and self-control. This is, in broad outline, also Hösle’s
19I will largely draw on Hösle’s inclusive classification.
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view.20 It was both Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ conviction that moderation and self-control
are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for temperance (while it can definitely be said
that they constitute the core intension of temperance21). Whereas moderation is usually
associated with asceticism and (unnatural) suppression (along the lines of Hösle’s defi-
nition), temperance should be associated with reason, harmony and human flourishing.
Furthermore, Aristotle does not identify self-control, or continence, with temperance in
its genuine sense. For Aristotle, continence and incontinence do not yet qualify as virtue
and vice respectively. This is a stringent condition; for Aristotle only habitual forms of be-
haviour that have been deeply ingrained in the individual’s character through systematic
practise can be regarded as genuine expressions of virtue.22 On this account, an inconti-
nent person can perform a virtuous act – in most cases only through an experience of inner
conflict, willing to control his appetites – but cannot be virtuous. Of course, such experi-
ences of inner conflict and overcoming the personal weaknesses through genuine acts of
will are necessary for obtaining moral autonomy; they constitute acts of self-abnegation
through which I-ness is first constituted. Only through such practise can persons become
“unified in motivation and deliberation” which is a true mark of a virtuous person. Tem-
perance, which usually is concerned with the regulation of behaviour related to human
metabolism and reproductivity, has been enculturated in all societies throughout history.
As Hösle remarks,
Notwithstanding all the differences between individual cultures, there is no
society that did not in some way transform metabolism and especially re-
productivity. Among humans, eating and drinking are not mere biological
processes,23 and hence in German even their names differ from those of the
corresponding processes among animals. Hunger is not the only thing that
may determine when we will eat; for instance, sacrifice before eating is an
expression of forbearance whose manifest function is a propitiation of the di-
vinity, but it is in reality an end in itself, to be precise, a confirmation of the
partial autonomy of humans with regard to their drives – a confirmation that
is also served, for instance, by periodic fasts. Much the same holds for the sex
drive. [Hösle (2004), 283]
Aristotle and Aquinas, the two architects of the virtue of temperance, do not reject food,
alcohol and sex as intrinsically bad, something that would be beneath humans as rational
and spiritual beings. Rather, they invite us to appreciate the goodness of these pleasures
rationally and moderately. The significance of temperance consists in the fact that it is not
20Nothing very serious hinges on this, however, as Hösle’s classification of virtues includes higher virtues
the characteristics of which coincide with the Aristotelean conception of temperance. The important point is
that no single virtue can be fully developed and exercised in isolation from the others.
21The core intension of a concept can be defined as Icore(C) = {P1, P2 . . . Pn}, where the P1, P2 . . . Pn are the
relations and properties subsumed under the concept. They are necessary and sufficient for the unequivocal
distinction between C and any other concept, but do not constitute a complete characterization of C.
22The intentionalism of Hösle’s ethical theory is in consonance with this aspect of Aristotle’s ethics.
23Cf. Sidney W. Mintz & Christine M. Du Bois (2002): “The Anthropology of Food and Eating”, Annu.
Rev. Anthropol. 2002. 31: 99–l19: “Like all culturally defined material substances used in the creation and
maintenance of social relationships, food serves both to solidify group membership and to set groups apart.”
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oppressive but liberating in that it is necessary not only for the health of body and mind,
but also for eÎdaimonÐa, that is, (Aristotelean) happiness or human flourishing. Aquinas
is absolutely right in his statement of the initially paradoxical contention that it is only
through temperance that pleasures can be truly appreciated. Indeed, controlling drives
can be said to have intrinsic value, because it increases the power of personhood. [ibid.]
In connection with epistemic virtues, temperance in a broader sense may be defined to
include the systematic training of thought. One might here consider the Habermasian
domains of formal rationality – (1) cognitive-instrumental reason; (2) moral-practical rea-
son; and (3) aesthetic-expressive reason – in order to pinpoint the nature and scope of the
thinking capacity that is being trained, but only with the proviso that it is not solely
an instrumental reason that we are here concerned with in the sense that temperance is
needed in order to perform some other tasks that are morally obligatory. The criterion of
objectivity is a significant regulative principle also with regard to temperance: the effort
to be objective in one’s knowledge acquisition tasks, broadly conceived in the sense of
attempting to grasp the structures underlying reality, “what truly is”, definitely has in-
trinsic value. There is also a distinction with respect to the ability to know the universal,
for example the (formal-universal) laws relating to a certain phenomenon, and the ability
of concrete subsumption; it is intrinsically more valuable to know the general mecha-
nism of a disease, for example the demonstration of the nature of the genetic defects in
cystic fibrosis, than to be able to apply this knowledge to a single case;24 the ability of
concrete subsumption is temperance in a narrower sense. Furthermore, there is a sense
in which one can evaluate temperance also on the basis of the value of the thing known;
if one rises above the examination of concrete sphere of empirical reality to the sphere of
(formal-universal) laws, as in the contemplation of the mathematical structure of a theory
or the conceptual content of a theoretical insight, one is involved in activity that has high
intrinsic value in itself especially if in so doing one grasps the value of his (inner) activity
and realizes that the activity of reflection has become for him an end in itself. A well-
known example of this distinction is the traditional division between pure and applied
mathematics; for a theoretical spirit (as well as for a universalist) it is more noble ceteris
paribus to seek to acquire mathematical knowledge for its own sake, than to seek it only
in order to increase the sphere of utilities. The famous British mathematician G.H. Hardy
used to refer to practical applications of mathematics as “glorified plumbing”, and did
not hasten to add that “[j]udged by all practical standards, the value of my mathematical
life is nil . . . .” However indifferent this sounds from the point of view of human action
and poietic virtues, it nonetheless brings forth the contrast between a contemplative and
prudent attitude towards theoretical knowledge; Hardy was still deeply ingrained with
the idea that the knowledge of the universal has intrinsic value in itself.
Philosophically it is interesting to note that the characteristics of wisdom – here defined
as a pre-social virtue – have been taken by classical philosophers as the basis for deter-
mining the scope of philosophy. Although the philosophers of the Antiquity from Plato
on took sofÐa as the qualifying characteristic of the sofìc towards which the filìsofoc
aspired, the reading of wisdom as the ability to interpret the individual on the basis of
24This is not to say that a realization of concrete goals in reality, e.g. treating patients efficiently, does not
have intrinsic value; the contrast here is epistemic.
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the whole emerged only gradually in Western thought. R.G. Collingwood set the task
of philosophy precisely in terms of holism; as we saw in Chapter 1, according to him
philosophy is first and foremost an attempt to grasp a subject in its totality and in terms
of its relation to the whole. For an individual, the possession of wisdom means that
one is able to envision one’s life and the rich textures of the experienced Lebenswelt as a
whole, extending the attitude of wholeness also to one’s own misfortunes which thereby
can be understood and accepted in their necessity and taken as a possibility for personal
growth. As Hösle beautifully puts it, “there is no purer and more unconquerable source
of happiness, that is, of reconciliation with the world, than wisdom.” [ibid., 285] From a
historical point of view it may be noted that it was mainly in the context of religious life
that the virtues of ascesis and contemplation were rehearsed and in which they achieved a
qualitatively superior state of refinement with respect to the common ethical life of the
early cultures. The fundamental division between people who possessed these virtues to
a prominent degree and those who did not was the basis for a religious subsystem that
conferred positions of power and leadership to the individuals in whom these virtues
were associated through religious training. Although the prudential aspect of the exer-
cise of these two virtues still plays a role in contemporary religious communities, a major
evolutionary step was taken when prudence was differentiated into the subsystem of
science which then completely emancipated itself from religion.
We have already alluded to the domain of human action and its significance for the moral.
Vittorio Hösle calls poetic virtues those that have to do with the realization of goals in re-
ality. There are three kinds of poetic virtues, all of which are relevant for the framework
of human action; they are historically determined by the tradition of craftmanship under
whose purview they once were united, and only later differentiated to the characteristic
virtues of modern science, technology and art. The tradition of craftmanship is impor-
tant also in the additional sense of having provided the motivation for the philosophical
analyses of ‘poetic rationality’ in the early modern philosophical literature.25 What, then,
are the three poetic virtues, and what does their significance consist in? The importance
of action for the domain of the moral is clearly outlined by Hösle along with the charac-
teristics of the three virtues:
Not only knowledge, but also action ennobles man; imposing one’s own goals
on nature is a sign of the elevation of the intellect over nature and should be
considered positive if the values of nature [. . . ] are not violated. The latter is
in no way necessarily the case; traditional agriculture even increased the di-
versity of species. Although intellectual values rank higher than vital values,
the intellectual man must also live in actual reality: satisfying moderate needs
through one’s own industrious labour, bringing production and consumption
25The history of the inception of the works of Descartes is a case in point. D. was in a close contact with
many craftsmen and scholars of his time the most prominent of which were Isaac Beeckman (1588–1637), a
Dutch philosopher and scientist who was considered to be one of the most educated men in Europe, and
Johann Faulhaber (1580–1635), a German mathematician who was trained as a weaver and later took the role
of a surveyor of the city of Ulm. He collaborated with Johannes Kepler and Ludolph van Ceulen. Besides his
work on the fortifications of cities (notably Basel and Frankfurt), Faulhaber built water wheels in his home
town and geometrical instruments for the military.
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into balance, making the most out of the least, being sparing with resources
and at the same time operating without meanness in this subordinate sphere
are all elements of economic virtue. The essence of technological virtue is disci-
plining oneself in such a way that one deals with the demands of the object
and succeeds in becoming adequate to it, even creating new structures that
did not previously exist and increasing the stock of reality by adding artifacts
to it. If at the same time a sense for beauty is not lacking and the artifacts are
given a form that is not merely useful but also refers through the sensible to
ideal relationships, one speaks of aesthetic virtue. [ibid.]
The importance of aesthetic virtue for the person’s life in general, but also for the scien-
tist’s life and work in particular, is an especially interesting issue which we can barely
touch upon here. If one considers the historically evolved conceptions of scientific self
that build on different epistemic virtues as the ideal constitution of a scientist’s character,
it is clear that the dimension of the aesthetic also plays a prominent role in the formation
of a scientist. Important as this subject is, we cannot unfortunately delve into the matter
in this dissertation; the subject would surely merit its own treatment in a separate trea-
tise.26 To relate the aesthetic dimension to the dimension of the epistemic, we can say
that through its realization of inner values art is in its highest forms akin to contempla-
tion and approaches the sphere of ideal validities, because like contemplation, it rises to
the ‘first world’ but yet makes it accessible to the senses through material representations
that everyone can appreciate.
There is one more pre-social virtue, one of the classical cardinal virtues, without which
the classification would be incomplete. Whereas the temperate person foregoes, as we
saw above, the satisfaction of a few vital needs to increase the power of personhood, he
does not risk life itself in the pursuit of this control over himself. Courage is precisely
the virtue that constitutes the readiness to put life at stake, the “actual advancing toward
death.” [Hösle, 285] The relation between these two virtues is interesting, as already
Plato noted. As Hösle writes, “[o]n one hand, temperance and courage both involve an
overcoming of immediate vital instincts; on the other, the instincts that are overcome are
very different: In the case of temperance it is a matter of pleasure, and in that of courage
it is a matter of fear – in its early forms, the fear of disadvantages in general and, in
26Another topic related to the aesthetic dimension of science is the notion of intuition in the context of
scientific discovery. Although philosophers of science have been conditioned to be critical of the notion of
intuition, it is a sociological fact that many scientists – most prominently mathematicians – constantly refer
to their intuitions as an important vehicle for discovery and scientific communication. For example, Alexan-
dre Grothendieck (1928–), the central figure behind the creation of the modern theory of algebraic geometry,
relates how he was deeply impressed by Jean-Pierre Serre’s (1926–) ability to communicate something akin
to intuition: “The essential thing was that Serre each time strongly sensed the rich meaning behind a state-
ment that, on the page, would doubtless have left me neither hot nor cold-and that he could ‘transmit’ this
perception of a rich, tangible, and mysterious substance – this perception that is at the same time the desire
to understand this substance, to penetrate it.” [Récoltes et Semailles, 556] Of course, it is a completely different
matter to explicate the precise cognitive processes and mechanisms behind such intuitions, but the task of
explication is not facilitated in the least by the kind of negligence that is shown towards the myriad phe-
nomenological reports of intuition among scientists. A phenomenology of creativity remains a desideratum
within the psychology of creativity.
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its most advanced form, fear of death [. . . ]” [ibid.] The polar opposition of the virtues
of temperance and courage can be put succinctly: temperance inhibits, courage sets in
motion. The scope of courage is not, of course, restricted solely to the defiance that one
exhibits upon facing death or natural forces; it can equally be exercised in contexts where
one’s acts of courage are directed against enemies of the group or one’s own group. The
scale of difficulty and, one would be inclined to say, nobility with respect to the varieties
of courage runs from the battle with the natural forces through the conflict with foreign
conspecifics to the opposing of those to whom one is bound by collective identity.27 Al-
though the latter does not often involve any risk to body and life, but only social isolation,
it is most difficult precisely because it demands what is aptly called “the courage of one’s
convictions” within a group which has played a prominent role in the formation of one’s
self-conception. Therefore the self-renunciation required in defending a new theory in a
hostile scientific community, for example, is a mark of greater courage than the battle to
survive in the severe physical circumstances of a mountain range. However, this form of
courage is not inclusive and, as Hösle correctly annunciates, “neither is it possessed by
every person who does not shy away from death at the hands of an enemy, nor need a
person who is endowed with it be able to look death in the eye without blinking.” [ibid.,
286] The “courage of one’s convictions” figures prominently in many scientific debates
and it comprises a genuine mark of a developed self-conception of a scientist. We will
come across examples where this kind of courage has a peculiarly important role, espe-
cially in pointing the direction for future research in disciplines where the established
forms of thought are unable to solve some outstanding open problems. In the follow-
ing section we will see how epistemic virtues that constitute the background framework
for the cognitive and moral conduct of a scientist, are related to the overall system of
pre-social virtues we have sketched above.
2.3.2 The notion of scientific self within the history of science
As we mentioned in the preceding section, the idea of epistemic virtues was already
central to the classical philosophers from Plato and Aristotle on. In the Enlightenment the
idea of epistemic virtue was developed further in the context of natural philosophy when
the philosophes, who took up the science of the preceding age and helped to establish it as
the dominant force in the Western societies, started to ponder over what it was that made
science so successful in describing the world and producing technical applications on the
basis of the knowledge of the formal laws of nature. The insight that it was not so much
the science itself but the new method, as rehearsed by Bacon, Descartes and Newton,
which seemed so potent and successful, prepared the way for the concrete evaluations of
practices that were conducive to truth, i.e., epistemic virtues.
27The necessary conditions for collective identity are that human beings sharing a collective identity all
have (1) common contents of consciousness; they must (2) know that they have common contents of con-
sciousness, and they must even (3) know that all know that they have common contents of consciousness.
These requirements resemble the conditions for common knowledge provided in the literature on microeco-
nomics. The concept was first introduced in the philosophical literature by David Kellogg Lewis in his study
Convention (1969).
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What, then, are the so-called epistemic virtues? Daston and Galison define them as
“norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal to ethical values, as well as to prag-
matic efficacy in securing knowledge”. [Daston & Galison (2007), 40] Here we have an
explicit statement by respected modern historians and philosophers of science that epis-
temic virtues have their grounding in a system of ethical values, and this is certainly
right from a historical point of view. However, the relationship of these values to the
requirement of pragmatic efficacy is precisely the question of interest: which particular
values underpin the epistemic practices of scientists and how do they facilitate pragmatic
efficacy in securing knowledge? The strategy of Daston and Galison is to show that the
epistemic virtues have a history – just as mores and morality have a history – and that
different conceptions of epistemic virtue derive their legitimacy from the different re-
quirements of pragmatic efficacy which are connected with the conception of knowledge
that determines the possible methodology of science. In particular, the notion of objec-
tivity the history of which Daston and Galison survey in considerable detail, is seen to
be a fundamental coordinative concept around which the different ideas about epistemic
virtues and the notion of scientific self are wound. One of the first ideas about objectivity
in the early nineteenth century was that in order to represent a scientific object faithfully
one had to eliminate all subjective interferences in the process of inquiry (we are speaking
here about the experimental context of course): “to be objective is to aspire to knowledge
that bears no trace of the knower – knowledge unmarked by prejudice or skill, fantasy
or judgment, wishing or striving. Objectivity is blind sight, seeing without inference,
interpretation, or intelligence” [ibid., 17]
Up to the early nineteenth century, the dominant view about ‘objectivity’ had been some-
thing completely different. The epistemic virtues characteristic of the age of Enlighten-
ment and eighteenth century were exemplified most clearly in the works of naturalists;
in their survey of the botanical works of that era, Daston and Galison show that the ob-
jects which an eighteenth-century botanic atlas sought to represent was not an array of
specimens, a comprehensive catalogue of individual plants – unique in their singularity
– but, rather the ideal form, the type of each species. The preparation of such atlases was
concomitant to the attempts to “tame Nature’s variability”. These projects found expres-
sion, inter alia, in the intellectual and practical conduct of the makers of such atlases who,
whether they were interested in things as diverse as plants, bones or crystals, shared a
common aspiration to see past the surfaces of their objects of investigation and grasp
their underlying forms. In order to grasp such a primary form, the naturalist was fig-
uratively involved in a process of ‘platonic purification’: they created strictly regulated
forms and techniques of seeing to produce images that best would represent “what truly
is”. Indeed, through tenacious and tireless observation, the naturalists strove to discard
everything they judged inessential and accidental; in order to extract the universal from
the particular one had to subjugate oneself to strict rules of conduct that required regular
practise and quieting of the will. It is evident that this kind of protocol for scientific obser-
vation was far from passive; the naturalist had to exercise his intelligence and willpower
actively in order to abstract the perfect form from the chaos of multiplicity. Quite appro-
priately, Daston and Galison call this particular epistemic virtue truth-to-nature.
One particular influence that cannot be passed over in silence in an examination of the
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formative currents in the development of the notion of truth-to-nature is the formidable
impact of the personality of Goethe. His influence manifested itself most clearly in associ-
ation with the contrast between the classical idea of culture conceived as a self-contained
whole and the clear breaks and discontinuities in the understanding of culture with re-
spect to nature. In a sense, Goethe’s Weltanschauung was a reflection of his overarching
attempt to reconcile these conflicting aspects of German culture. This conflict was most
forcefully experienced in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. In
Germany, the concept of nature has often been included in the concept of culture. Kant
had been talking about a natural plan, to which the development of the human species
was subject. The aim of development was a “state with a cosmopolitan purpose”. For
Herder, it is God’s imprint in nature that can be deciphered from the development of
culture, as if from a book. Goethe saw nature as culture’s primordial image and model.
For him the development of culture should be inspired by a deep and pure experience of
nature, the essentials of which he once related in connection with his account of his dis-
cussion with Schiller. Goethe tells of a conversation that once unfolded between Schiller
and himself after both had attended a meeting of the society of natural research in Jena.
Schiller showed himself little satisfied with what had been presented in the meeting. A
fragmented way of looking at nature had met him there and he remarked that such a way
could not appeal at all to laymen. Goethe replied that it would perhaps remain strange
even to the initiated themselves and that there could still be another way of presenting
nature, not as something separated and isolated but rather as working and alive, as striv-
ing from the whole to the parts. He sketched “with many a characteristic pen-stroke, a
symbolic plant” before Schiller’s eyes. It was meant to show the successive becoming
of the individual plant parts, their emerging from each other, and their relatedness to
each other. About this symbolic plant shape Goethe, on April 17, 1787 in Palermo, wrote
down the words, “There must after all be such a one! How would I otherwise know
that this or that formation is a plant, if they were not all formed according to the same
model.” Schiller’s reaction to Goethe’s account of the basic ideas of his plant morphology
was skeptical; he informed Goethe that the leaf he had symbolically sketched on paper
was “no experience” [keine Erfrahrung] but “an idea” [eine Idee]. To this Goethe replied
that “Then it is clear that I see my ideas with my eyes”. [LA, I, 9, 81]28This is one of
the most beautiful illustrations of the unique character of Goethe’s approach to natural
phenomena; it is a paradigmatic exemplar of truth-to-nature coördinating scientific inves-
tigation.29
28The reference here is to the “Morphological Notebooks” of Goethe contained in the Leopoldina (LA)
series. [Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft. Vollständige mit Erläuterungen verse-
hene Ausgabe herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina. 2 pts,
11 vols. Ed. Rupprecht Matthaei, Wihelm Troll and K. Lothar Wolf. Weimar: Böhlau (1947–) Pt. I, Texte; Pt.
II, Ergänzungen und Erläuterungen.]
29The novelty of Goethe’s approach was perhaps most clearly exemplified in the realm of optics; the con-
troversy between Newton’s and Goethe’s theory of colors is well known. Goethe’s scientific project, hugely
influential in the nineteenth century, epitomizes the influence of romanticism in science. To comprehend
nature one has to abandon the abstract and fragmentary concepts of Newtonian science; instead a keen and
pertinacious sense observation made possible by self-discipline and the habituated practice of quieting the
will constitute a basis for a science that is simultaneously veridical and edifying. To make it explicit, for
Goethe a world of ideas which does not permeate the things of nature, which does not bring forth their
appearing and disappearing, their becoming and growing, is a powerless web of thoughts. The logical spin-
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To return back to the issue of the general reception of the ideal of truth-to-nature, it was
characteristic of the forma mentis of the early naturalists that the ideal engaged them in
aesthetic and ontological judgements that were bound to general philosophical ideas then
current in the intellectual circles. Through time this inevitably led to a situation where
these judgements were questioned on the basis of a new notion of objectivity. How-
ever, later when the ideal of objectivity emerged as a new intellectual virtue (in the early
nineteenth century as was mentioned above) the earlier ideal of truth-to-nature was not
entirely suppressed. On the contrary, the problem of variability that had formed the
point of departure for tackling the question about the possibility of scientific knowledge,
remained an important reference point for later philosophies of nature as well. From a
general historical vantage point it can be seen that the problem of variability/invariance
persists throughout the development of science in the modern period, up until the twen-
tieth century. Characteristic of this development is that the response to the problem of
variability is dependent upon the intellectual (and ethical) conduct of scientists. This is
succinctly pointed out by Daston and Galison: “[D]ifferent epistemic ways of life made
for different diagnoses of the sources of variability. Eighteenth-century savants tended
to locate variability in the objects themselves – in the accidental, the singular, the mon-
strous. By the mid-nineteenth century, the chief source of variability had shifted inward,
to the multiple subjective viewpoints that shattered a single object into a kaleidoscope of
images. The earlier naturalists had attempted actively to select and to shape both their
objects and their illustrators, whereas later naturalists aspired to hands-off passivity. The
meaning of the images changed accordingly.” [Daston & Galison (2007), 113]
What were the next important steps in the development of the ideal of objectivity? For the
German idealist philosophers, most prominently Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, objectivity
was ontologically and epistemologically a product of thinking subjectivity (ob-jectum), a
refined interpretation of the Parmenidean conception that “what is . . . is identical with the
thought that recognizes it”. Through the misinterpretations of Fichte’s natural philoso-
phy there arose a peculiar conception about the Fichtean “I” as antithetical to science. To
counterbalance this pervasiveness and intrusiveness of the “I”, the regulations of scien-
tific conduct that guided the nineteenth-century scientist included commendations to be
as passive and ‘absent’ as possible: this was taken to be a necessary condition for prepar-
ing circumstances in which the object could emerge in its purity. Obviously, an immedi-
ate consequence of this was that it would be best to let oneself be replaced by a machine.
Machines capable of recording observational data (such as the photographic camera and
phonograph, and later physical instruments such as the cloud chambers modeled after
Aitken’s dust chamber of 1888) were explicitly designed to record phenomena without
human intervention, if not actually capable of accomplishing this. The link between ob-
jectivity and photography was, however, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for the emerging idea of mechanical objectivity; as Daston and Galison remark: “nonin-
ning out of lines of thought, without descending into the real life and creative activity of nature seem to
him unfruitful. For he feels himself intimately intertwined with nature. This is an explicit rendering of the
essentially Romantic spirit of Goethe’s naturalism. His influence at the turn of the century was immense. In
a sense he epitomized the inner yearning of those who, disappointed with the cold and rational outlook of
life brought about and nourished by the industrial society, rehabilitated the romantic ideals that had held
sway in the early nineteenth century.
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tervention – not verisimilitude – lay at the heart of mechanical objectivity”. [ibid., 187]
The apogee of Daston’s and Galison’s narrative is reached when we come to the twen-
tieth century; this is the epoch of trained judgment, the final member within the triad of
cardinal epistemic virtues. Interestingly enough, the extreme forms of self-renunciation
that were the hallmark of mechanical objectivity, led to a reaction in the beginning of
twentieth century on the part of scientists who now insisted on the importance of intu-
ition, judgment, and the capacity to interpret. These mental capacities were cultivated
and the training of them was encouraged equally in the processes of knowledge acqui-
sition leading to scientific discoveries and in the criteria that regulate the production of
scientific images. Apart from the modes of inquiry that were characteristic of the ear-
lier epistemic virtues – looking for the ideal forms hidden under the “Veil of Isis”, i.e.
the formal-universal regularities behind appearances (truth-to-nature), or quieting their
own will and sacrificing their capacity for judgement (objectivity) – scientists now aspired
to something that might be called “physiognomic sight”: “a capacity of both maker and
user of atlas images to synthesize, highlight, and grasp relationships in ways that are not
reducible to mechanical procedure, as in the recognition of family resemblance” [ibid.,
314]. The ‘natural’ and ‘simple’ image, such as a photograph of a singular and unique
scientific object (a crystal, a snowflake, a plant, an animal, a human organ), that played
a prominent methodological and technical role under the purview of objectivity, turned
out to be as enigmatic and impenetrable as the nature it promised to represent [ibid., 357];
scientists soon acquiesced to the necessity of “reasoned images” that were drawn by an
expert with a trained eye, and that were designed to train and instruct other eyes.
The above sketch of the development of the three cardinal epistemic virtues of scientific
practise provides some important insights into the dynamics of the self-formation of the
scientist. As was remarked in the beginning of this section, the epistemic virtues were in-
ternalized and enforced by appeal to ethical values and pragmatic efficacy. The issue of
pragmatic efficacy has already been touched upon. We now turn to the question: what are
the ethical values that underpin this conception of the development of epistemic virtues?
The question is, then, what principles shaped the “epistemic ways of life” that in their
turn determined the stance towards the problem of variability? It seems evident that the
principles that are at play here are genuinely ethico-epistemological in the sense that the
conduct of a scientist in the interrogative context in which he attempts to acquire knowl-
edge is dictated by the goals (securing knowledge, grasping universal truths, formation
of justified (true) beliefs, etc.) he sets for himself. The ethical dimension of the situation
involves two distinct but interrelated aspects: (i) the prescribed goals of the investigator
that derive from explicitly axiological considerations (“What do I find valuable or wor-
thy of pursuing?”) and (ii) the consideration of the appropriate means of attaining these
goals (“What do I have to do in order to realize the goals I have set myself?”), including
the personal requirements set for the investigator (“What particular characteristics do I
have to possess in order to realize these goals?”). These aspects reflect the extent to which
the character of the investigator is entwined with the interrogative process. It is precisely
the inextricable link between the ethical and epistemological dimensions of enquiry that
made the eighteenth-century philosophes and naturalists as well as nineteenth-century sci-
entists aware of the need to cultivate what could be called a scientific self. The severe de-
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mands of scientific practice challenged scientists to develop in themselves qualities that
are generally associated with virtuous men in the traditional sense. They had to learn to
educate their wills to develop in themselves the necessary skills of “training the senses
in scientific observation, keeping lab notebooks, drawing specimens, habitually moni-
toring one’s own beliefs and hypotheses, quieting the will and channeling the attention”.
[ibid.] These different skills exemplify what Michel Foucault has aptly described as “tech-
niques of the self” [Foucault (1989), 134] They are practices of the mind and body (most
often the two in tandem) that mold and maintain a certain kind of self. The ‘self’ which
manifests itself in these practices during the period under consideration is not uniform.
Unlike Foucault, we can here see a veritable menagerie of different ‘selves’, both artistic
and scientific, that are developed side by side, often developing in diametrically opposed
ways. It is this pluralism of the techniques of the self – even within the purview of natural
science – that calls for a systematic way to conduct scientific dialogue between various
points of view.
The focal points of the discussion concerning “scientific self” are the concepts of sub-
jectivity and objectivity. They constitute the background opposition against which the
various conceptions of self, and especially of scientific self, can be evaluated. For ex-
ample, regarding the different views on what comprises the essence of man’s “being-in-
the-world”, the emphasis on subjectivity or objectivity dictates the way in which artistic
and scientific selves are conceived and trained in the nineteenth-century. The interplay
between subjective art and objective science, diametrically opposed as they were in the
mid-nineteenth century, gave birth to a new conception of the role of subject in the pro-
cess of observation: art and science ultimately converged in the dissolution of the self
into its object. Nietzsche, for example, who was not a keen friend of scientific objectiv-
ity, nevertheless conceived a particular form of objectivity that was common to the best
art and science: “There is required above all great artistic facility, creative vision, loving
absorption in the empirical data, the capacity to imagine the further development of a
given type — in any event objectivity is required, but as a positive quality. So often objec-
tivity is only a phrase. Instead of the outwardly tranquil but inwardly flashing eye of the
artist there is the affectation of tranquility; just as the lack of feeling and moral strength
is accustomed to disguise itself as incisive coldness and detachment.” [Nietzsche (1874)
[Breazeale (1983), 93]] Nietzsche’s proposal to put back together the two halves of the self
– subjective and objective, active and passive, will and world – was counterproductive
for a long time. It neither helped to reorient the practical conduct of the scientist in the
laboratory nor to change the attitude of the artist depicting nature. The depth and extent
of the problem was, however, now felt more fully. As Daston and Galison make clear:
However illusory Nietzsche’s “positive” objectivity may have been for both
artists and scientists, it was proposed as a solution to a deep problem. Objec-
tivity and the scientific self that practiced it were intrinsically unstable. Ob-
jectivity demanded that the self split into active experimenter and passive
observer and that types of scientific objects be defined by atlas images of indi-
vidual specimens too particularized to be typical. Nietzsche smelled the acrid
odor of burnt sacrifice when the ascetic turned will against will: the objective
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man of science stood accused of inauthenticity, of self divided against itself.
These were ethical reproaches. There were also epistemological objections to
objectivity: How could an individual stand for a class without idealization or
even selection? How could a universally valid working object be extracted
from a particular depicted with all its flaws and accidents? [Daston & Galison
(2007), 250]
It is clear that Nietzsche’s criticism of the notion of scientific objectivity and the adjoining
notion of scientific self helped to raise to general consciousness philosophical issues that
had been passed over in silence in spite of their importance. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s
acute observations on the particulars of the history of morality (not history of the moral,
as the title of his famous book Zur Genealogie der Moral speciously suggests) could not,
precisely because of his dismissal of the domain of ideal validity, make him appreciate
the distinction between genesis and validity which is crucial for the constitution of the
concept of the scientific self. We will now turn to study one prominent attempt to de-
lineate the universal features of scientific self, i.e., that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In his
work we can observe the seeds of the notion that the formation of a scientist is parallel
with the moral formation of a self.
Fichte’s Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten
Fichte, who arrived in Jena in May 1794 after a decade of employment as an itinerant
tutor, a decade marked by personal uncertainties, professional frustrations and constant
financial insecurity, was determined to make a contribution to philosophy on a national
scale with the intention of having a direct effect on the entire university community. To
this end he enthusiastically seized the opportunity to realize his ambitions with the pos-
sibility of providing a course of “public lectures” that he was expected to deliver during
his first semester. In spite of other engagements, most notably the elaboration of his
systematic thought exposited in the Wissenschaftslehre, he was able to devote some time
to preparing the lectures to be held in Reinhold’s former lecture hall. By midspring he
had his topic ready: “Morality for Scholars”.30 In the summary of the lecture series with
which he began the first public lecture of the winter semester, a second round of the se-
ries (the first having initially commenced on May 23), Fichte spoke about the broad aims
of his lectures:
As most of you already know, the subject of my lectures is the scholar’s vo-
cation. The vocation of man as such is infinite self-improvement. This is also
the final aim of all the social bonds between men. The scholar’s vocation is to
30In the university catalog for the summer semester of 1794 the lectures are referred to with the different
title de officiis eruditorum (“Concerning the Scholar’s Duties”) which was the title under which they were
announced in the April 12, 1794 number of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (“Die Lehre von der Pflichten der
Gelehrten”).
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supervise this progress of culture in human society – to promote and to give
it direction. [AA II: 3, 357]31
The impact of the lectures on the young scholarly audience was immense and Fichte be-
came a celebrity overnight. In a letter to his wife he relates how “people were standing
on tables, benches and each others’ heads”. What was it that was so special in these lec-
tures, and why do they still merit closer inspection two hundred years after they were
first delivered? In the first place, the success of the lectures was in no small part due
to the fact that Fichte was an eloquent and absorbing lecturer; as Breazeale remarks, “in
both content and style, Fichte’s public lectures were perfectly calculated to impress and
overwhelm his audience. With their exquisite balance between confidential flattery of
the audience, philosophical analysis, social criticism and moral exortation, these lectures
bear striking witness to Fichte’s public ambitions and talents.” [Breazeale (1988), 142] In
the second place, the lectures addressed a topical philosophical question that was inter-
twined with the most pressing social questions of the time. Similar considerations render
Fichte’s lectures relevant for our time and culture as well. Let us have a close look at
these issues.
Although Fichte’s lectures contain nothing that is conceptually obscure or unintelligible
from the modern point of view, there are some issues concerning the title of the lectures
that merit further scrutiny. We can concentrate on the two German terms Bestimmung and
Gelehrter which present some difficulties for the translator. Let us consider the latter first.
What is a Gelehrter? It is usually translated as “scholar” but a more proper translation
would be “an educated person”, for the intension of scholar is usually taken to be some-
thing of the sort “narrow professional occupation with texts and editions”. Moreover, as
Fichte stresses in his fourth lecture, a Gelehrter is not only an educated person; he is also
one who “dedicates his life” to the acquisition of knowledge. In Breazele’s words, “the
true ‘scholar’ is not merely a researcher and teacher; he values knowledge precisely for
its vital contribution to the advancement of mankind. Thus it is the special responsibility
of the scholar to supervise and to regulate human progress towards perfection, and in
order to do this he must at least strive to be ‘the ethically best man of his time’.” [ibid.,
141] How about Bestimmung, then? It is usually translated quite properly as “vocation”,
but again the English counterpart does have a significantly narrower meaning than the
German one. If we look at the corresponding verb bestimmen, whose meanings are cap-
tured by “to specify” or “to determine”, we see that Bestimmung then suggests that in the
schema “die Bestimmung des x” we are talking about the “determination of x” or “the spe-
cific nature of x”, and in a more general sense about its “characteristic” or “determining
feature”. [ibid., 141n] Fichte is therefore interested in the question what it means to be an
academic (in a broad sense).
Fichte’s lectures are important precisely because they are not solely concerned with some
special question about the vocation of academics but rather embed the discussion about
31The reference is to J.G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe des Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Reinhard
Lauth, Hans Jacob and Hand Gliwitsky (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1964–) [Henceforth
AA].
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the duties of a scholar to a broader framework of philosophical anthropology; Fichte asks
what is the nature or “vocation” of man as such. The discussion is inextricably linked
with social and political philosophy. In the second lecture Fichte proposes an ingenious
account of man’s social nature and presents his idea about “a fundamental drive” toward
society and social improvement. Only the fourth lecture is explicitly concerned with
the question of “the scholar’s vocation”. I will mainly concentrate here on the theses
developed in this lecture, because the ethical and social context of morality per se have
already been extensively discussed above and Fichte’s account of these matters does not
significantly add to the ideas we have exposited earlier.
Fichte grounds his discussion of the scholar’s vocation on the account of social classes he
has developed in the earlier lectures. The equality of the different classes of the society is
the fundamentum of his conception of the role of scholars and he stresses most adamantly
that
[. . . ] every class is necessary and deserves our respect, that an individual is
not determined by the class to which he belongs, but rather by the way he
fulfills his role as a member of that class. For every person deserves to be
honored only insofar as he approximates to fulfilling his role completely. For this
reason, the scholar has reason to be the humblest person of all: since the goal
which is set for him must always remain very distant, and since he has to
achieve a very lofty ideal – one from which he normally remains very distant.
[ibid., 170 [AA VI, 324]]32
This passage makes evident how deeply Ficte was influenced by the flourishing Enlight-
enment ideals (remember that the great French revolution had taken place just a few
years earlier). The social dimension of his thought was determined by the idea that the
division of labour is a natural requirement for a just society; “within society every indi-
vidual quite legitimately selects his own special branch of general education, leaving the
other branches to his fellow members of society in the expectation that they will share
the benefits of their education with him, just as he will share the benefits of his with them.”
[ibid.] The basic idea behind the division of classes is that a specific class can be fully ded-
icated to the cultivation of each specific talent that characterize men. These talents can be
co-ordinated with each man’s natural needs and it is the satisfaction of these needs that
is the task of each specific class. Of course, there is a hierarchy of these needs modeled on
the scale of goods that determines the formation of the life-plan of an individual person;
as we insisted in the previous section, vital needs may be sacrificed – and it can even
become a duty to sacrifice them – for higher needs, such as intellectual goods. According
to Fichte, a perfect society is one where all needs are cared for, and where they all are
developed and satisfied equally. Society is perfect qua society when it is so organized that
“it would necessarily have to approximate more and more closely to its goal.” [ibid.] How
is the society to reach its goal and how does the class of scholars in particular contribute
towards the task of reaching this goal? Fichte distinguishes three necessary presupposi-
tions for seeing to the equal development of all of man’s talents: (1) a scientific knowledge of
32Italics added.
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all of his drives and needs, a complete survey of his entire nature (“What is man?”), (2) the scien-
tific knowledge of how to develop and satisfy them (“What must man do?”) and (3) knowledge
of the particular cultural level of one’s society at a particular time and the events of former ages
that have led to this particular stage of development (“Whence did man come from?”). These
three types of knowledge constitute what is called “learning”: “the person who dedicates
his life to the acquisition of such knowledge is called a ‘scholar’.” [ibid., 172] It is obvi-
ous that every individual scholar could not – and should not – take as his occupation the
entire field of human knowledge, and a fortiori not in all three of the aspects mentioned
above. The division of labour is a valid principle also within the confines of science and
individual scholars can stake out for themselves individual portions of the domain of
knowledge, but then “in his own area each person should cultivate all three: philosophical
and philosophical-historical, as well as purely historical knowledge.” [ibid.]33 Fichte then
proceeds to the high point of his lecture where the true vocation of the scholarly class is
indicated:
[T]he study of a properly grounded philosophy does not make it superfluous
to acquire empirical knowledge – not, at least, if such knowledge is thorough.
On the contrary, such a philosophy demonstrates in the most convincing man-
ner the indispensability of empirical knowledge. We have already shown that
the purpose of all human knowledge is to see to the equal, continuous, and
progressive development of all human talents. It follows from this that the
true vocation of the scholarly class is the supervision of the actual progress of the
human race in general and the unceasing promotion of this progress. [ibid.]
This passage is remarkable in that it is completely in consonance with the Enlightenment
idea of ‘social engineering’ and the ideal of the progress of mankind that is facilitated
by a thorough knowledge of the sciences. Contrary to the unfortunately common mis-
informed readings of Fichte, we can here see an explicit commitment to the significance
of the empirical. It is no coincidence that the Fichtean ideal is deeply ingrained with the
idea that “[t]he whole progress of the human race depends directly upon the progress
of science”. Indeed, the Kantian roots of Fichte’s systematic philosophy are well-known
and the political circumstances of the society in which he developed his ideas were highly
conducive to the kind of utopian elements that were characteristic of the Enlightenment
political philosophy.
From the modern point of view the requirement that the scholar is supposed to “super-
vise and promote the progress of the other classes” may seem a lofty and unrealistic idea.
There is, however, something intrinsically valid in the idea that must be brought to light
and considered seriously: the scholar is in a unique position because he is, so to speak,
“especially destined for society”. As Fichte remarks, “More than any other class, his
class, insofar as he is a scholar, properly exists only through and for society. Accordingly,
it is his particular duty to cultivate to the highest degree within himself the social tal-
ents of receptivity and the art of communication.” [ibid., 173] Here we encounter what, once
33Italics added. The three types of knowledge correspond, naturally, to the three presuppositions above;
(1) philosophical, (2) philosophical-historical and (3) historical, respectively.
76
again, could be accommodated within a system of virtues. Although these talents are not
strictly speaking epistemic virtues, they can be said to be necessary conditions for exer-
cising such virtues. The requirement of communicative rationality that is conveyed by
Fichte’s remarks, is in excellent agreement with the narrative of the tradition of epistemic
virtues provided by Daston and Galison. Especially noteworthy are Fichte’s comments
on the virtue of (intellectual) tolerance that he sets as a basic desideratum for every scholar;
a scholar “should be familiar with his scientific predecessors. And this familiarity cannot
have been produced merely by rational reflection, but has to have been learned through
oral or written instruction. By constantly learning something new he should preserve his
receptivity and try to guard against that total lack of openness to foreign opinions and ways of
thinking which one often encounters, occasionally even among excellent and independent
thinkers. For no one is so well instructed that he could not always learn something new
and occasionally something essential.” [ibid., 173–174]34 In addition to the communica-
tive skills, a scholar should develop a sense for what is true.35 In as much as all men share
this fundamental capacity at least to some degree, it is not sufficient in itself. Indeed, “[i]t
has to be developed, scrutinized and purified, and this is precisely the scholar’s task.”
[ibid.] But most remarkable of all is Fichte’s conception of the scholar as “the teacher
of the human race”. Apart from making men generally acquainted with their needs and
means for satisfying them, and directing their attention to the needs which confront them
as well as the specific means for achieving each purpose, the scholar also sees the direc-
tion in which human race must proceed. In his role as the educator of mankind, “the
scholar is subject to the ethical law, which commands harmony with oneself.” [ibid.] In
consonance with the final aim of every individual person, the scholar must strive to work
for the “ethical improvement of the whole person”, always keeping this ideal in his view,
taking it as a guideline in everything that he does in the society, because “no one who is
not himself a good man can work successfully for ethical improvement”. Fichte clearly
perceives the truth that the importance of moral examples goes beyond the elaboration of
ethical theories, and this can be generalized. Personal role models do not provide the jus-
tification for the validity of moral judgements but they are important precisely because
they motivate people to act morally, and often in a significantly deeper way than any (even
most complete) ethical grounding ever could. As Fichte remarks, “[e]veryone who lives
in society owes it to society to set a good example, because the power of example origi-
nates only through our life in society.” [ibid.]36 We have already seen some implications
of these ideas to the broader panorama of the ethics of science. Fichte’s lectures can be
conceived as a courageous elaboration of the theme of “scientific self”, the notion whose
importance we have stressed above. Nevertheless, Fichte’s ideas on the scholar’s voca-
tion go significantly beyond the cornucopia of different selves that Daston and Galison
associated with the different techniques of the self which have their origin in the various
epistemic practices of science. These views do not contradict each other, however. The
Fichtean idea that the penultimate duty of a scholar is to strive to be the “ethically best
34Italics added.
35Fichte later developed further the notion of Wahrheitsgefühl, or the “feeling” or “sense of truth” in his
(unpublished) lectures.
36In this connection Fichte quotes the words of the founder of Christianity, which apply quite aptly also to
the scholars: “Ye are the salt of the earth, but if the salt has lost its savor wherewith shall it be salted?” [Matt.
5:13]
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man of his time” is nothing but an expression of the formal function of self-attribution,
i.e., it posits the normative requirement of self-determination. The specific characteristic
of I is that it can enjoy a plurality of selves, hence also different “scientific selves”. The
Fichtean idea is understood correctly if it is seen as operating on a meta-level where one
confronts one’s descriptive self-image with a normative self-image. Vittorio Hösle’s remarks
about these notions are especially relevant here:
The I not only entertains assumptions regarding what it is, but also regard-
ing what it ought to become. The I can only accept its self if the descriptive
self-image corresponds to the normative self-image; however, this harmony
is justified only if both self-images are also truly rational, that is, if the I re-
ally knows its self and if its normative self-image is appropriate. [. . . ] on one
hand, the I must recognize some values that are general or at least transcend
it; on the other hand, the recognition of general values in no way resolves the
question of what normative self-image I should have of myself. I may well
recognize that I should become a useful member of the society, but what line
of work I should go into remains undetermined. For that, I need information
about myself [. . . ] [Hösle (2004), 247–248]
Completely in agreement with the Fichtean point of view (and the articulation of the
meaning of the process of self-attribution given by Hösle), Daston and Galison stress
that “the mastery of scientific practices is inevitably linked to self-mastery, the assiduous
cultivation of a certain kind of self”. [Daston & Galison (2007), 40] Furthermore, they
explicitly bring forth the relationship between epistemic practices and traditional, philo-
sophical and religious forms of self-cultivation: “objectivity is to epistemology what ex-
treme asceticism is to morality. [. . . ] The demands it makes on the knower outstrip even
the most strenuous forms of self-cultivation, to the brink of self-destruction. [. . . ] It is
a sacrifice.” [ibid., 374]. This passage, along with the references to Hadot’s work on the
philosophy of antiquity, are reminiscent of the words – quoted by Hadot himself – of
the Christian monk Dorotheos of Gaza (6th century CE): “He who has no will of his own
always does what he wishes. For since he has no will of his own, everything that hap-
pens satisfies him. He finds himself doing as he wills all the time, for he does not want
things to be as he wills them, but he wills that they be just as they are.” The requirements
posited for the scholar, remarkably similar in spirit to the moral maxims of contemplative
and religious practise, are thus extremely stringent. But then, they are posited as ideals
that are regulative rather than coercive; they are posited in order to direct the practise and
moral conduct of scientists in ways that, to paraphrase Daston and Galison, facilitate the
internalization and enforcement of norms that are critical in securing knowledge. It is a
truism hardly meriting an explicit statement that ideals cannot be actualized in the real
world. Still, the fact remains that for the improvement of the human condition it is of
utmost importance to realize that reality must be judged in accordance with ideals and
modified by men who feel themselves capable of doing so. Fundamentally, the problem
of the realization of ideal validities can be traced back to the distinction between Is and
Ought which is so crucial for the elaboration of the many questions of theoretical and
practical ethics. These dualisms, although in many ways different, are connected and
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their dynamic interaction in the course of the historical development of science is one of
the most crucial elements of any philosophically respectable account of the progress of
science in the twentieth century.
In this section we have seen how the Fichtean conception of the scholar’s vocation dove-
tails with the tradition of epistemic virtues in the history of science. We have also seen
how, in surprising agreement with the Enlightenment ideals that underpin Carnap’s
work, Fichte stressed the significance of the virtue of tolerance for the scholar. Since
the notion of tolerance constitutes an essential part of the system of virtues, and since
it also figures prominently in the philosophical thought of Carnap, it is appropriate to
devote a separate section to the Principle of Tolerance and its position within the history
of morality. This is the subject of the following section.
2.4 Universalism and the Principle of Tolerance
“Reason is the special embodiment in us of the disciplined counter-agency which saves
the world” — A. N. Whitehead, Function and Reason, Ch. I
It is well known that the notion of tolerance, understood as a philosophical concept per-
taining to morals and politics, has its intellectual origins in the philosophical debates of
the seventeenth century. It first surfaces in the philosophical works of Locke and Spinoza.
These two thinkers differ considerably according to their evaluation of the systematic im-
portance and general significance of the concept. The tensions between them exemplify
in an interesting way the fundamental cleavage between the conservative and radical
forms of Enlightenment. The historical significance of the principle is reflected in the
manner in which it paves the way for the modern concept of individuality. In Spinoza’s
thinking tolerance is promoted to the status of a regulative principle that constitutes an
important part of the framework in which power structures and forms of political ac-
tion are legitimated. Furthermore, its scope comprises not only the domain of morals
and politics, but also the domain of theoretical thought taken in its most general sense of
reflecting formal-universal laws. Indeed, the “Principle of Tolerance” is most naturally
conceived as a vehicle for increasing intellectual freedom within the society, an idea that
is inextricably entwined with Spinoza’s political ideal of promoting democracy as the
rationally legitimated form of constitution.
As Spinoza’s philosophy may be argued to comprise the intellectual backbone of the
movement of Radical Enlightenment – as Jonathan Israel has attempted to demonstrate
[Israel (2001), passim.] — his formulation of the Principle of Tolerance constitutes, then,
a natural point of departure for any historical survey attempting to shed light on the
different philosophical concepts centered around the Enlightenment concept of intellec-
tual virtues. In this section I will primarily concentrate on the notion of tolerance and
its central philosophical importance in the thought of Spinoza. The issues he takes into
consideration are completely novel, as we will see. Before 1670s, the term “tolerance”
had a much more restricted sense. In Latin it was associated with the virtue of fortitude.
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It had both a literal and a moral meaning. In a moral sense it meant steadfastness. In the
most literal sense it referred to physical endurance. Indeed, taken in its physical sense,
to tolerate something quite literally is to bear something. And analogously, in the moral
case, tolerance is steadfastness or endurance in the face of some evil or hardship. In the
seventeenth century the notion of tolerance becomes markedly an object of political and
religious discourse, the shift being largely bred by the tumultuous climate of religious
conflicts brought about by the Reformation. Political battles abounded, not to mention
wars and revelries. A significant occasion was the twenty-fourth of May in 1689 when the
British Parliament passed the Toleration Act that allowed dissenting Protestants freedom
of worship. The parting shot for the philosophical debate on tolerance was the publica-
tion of the first volume of John Locke’s Epistula de Tolerantia in 1689. The interpretation
of tolerance which it propounded was in a glaring opposition to the radical conception
of Spinoza. For a long time, though, Spinoza’s sustained arguments for adopting a broad
conception of the content of “tolerance” and for propounding the significance of toler-
ation in his Theologico-Political Treatise (published in 1670) were counterproductive. As
W.N.A. Klever puts it, the work “neither helped to reduce the influence of theological
prejudices among philosophically-minded readers nor furthered the freedom required
for the enlightened citizen. In fact, the Theologico-Political Treatise did not at all prepare
the way for the publication and reception of Spinoza’s overall philosophy. Its publi-
cation, on the contrary, aggravated the situation by unchaining a series of devastating
refutations and defamations.” [Klever (1996) [Garrett (1996), 39]] Thus, initially the con-
structive influence of Spinoza’s ideas was limited to a small circle of intellectual radicals.
The situation did not improve very much in the eighteenth century which was dom-
inated largely by a moderate version of Enlightenment. Ironically, it is perhaps mostly
due to the vindication of Spinoza by Hegel, whose philosophy of objective idealism is the
epitome of German Romantic thought, that Spinoza’s philosophical contributions were
more and more appreciated in the nineteenth century. Indeed, as is familiar from pop-
ular accounts of history of philosophy, Hegel famously articulated the choice imposed
upon any philosopher: either Spinozism or no philosophy at all. However, in spite of
Spinoza’s Ehrenrettung by Hegel, the road of Spinozism in Western thought was a rocky
one, consisting of many twists and turns; from the historian’s viewpoint the reception
history of Spinozism is complex, having a myriad of subplots, and it is not easy to form
a coherent narrative of its growing influence in Europe.37 I cannot, then, if only because
of limitations of space, delve into this particular topic in any detail.
A somewhat surprisingly neglected issue in the history of ideas is the constitutive func-
tion of the notion of tolerance within the domain of formal-universal thought from the
seventeenth century on (we mean here its significance for theoretical and speculative
thought in general, and for the exact sciences in particular). The extension of the scope of
the Principle of Tolerance from the exclusively ethical and political questions, primarily
pertaining to social welfare and equality, to the epistemic questions of science, concern-
ing the receptivity to novel and unfamiliar modes of thinking as well as evaluation of dif-
ferent technical language systems, e.g. the evaluation of the Newtonian and Leibnizian
37For a comprehensive presentation of the history of Spinozism in the Enlightenment, see Jonathan Israel’s
splendid book Enlightenment Contested [Israel (2006)].
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systems of differential and integral calculus, marks an important shift in the development
of epistemic virtues in European thought. It is precisely the fusion of two qualitatively
different kinds of discourses, the ethical and the epistemic, that makes Spinoza’s phi-
losophy a paradigmatic exemplar of Radical Enlightenment thought. However, Spinoza
never made explicit the full ramifications of his notion of tolerance, and it has largely
remained a task for later generations to develop his ideas further. In this respect the no-
tion of tolerance – and one of the goals of this work is to adduce this more clearly and
render it plausible – constitutes one of the regrettably neglected concepts in the history
of ideas with regard to its philosophical significance. The radical shift in the meaning
of this notion is epitomized by the historical dialectic between the ideas of Locke and
Spinoza, as noted above. However, due to the influence of moderate interpretations of
Enlightenment (“moderate mainstream Enlightenment”, as Jonathan Israel likes to call
it) and movements of Counter-Enlightenment, the central issues, including the essential
interplay between ethical and epistemological aspects of tolerance, as well as the more
general interplay between epistemic and moral virtues, failed to come across in modern
philosophy up until the turn of the twentieth-century (or, depending on which philoso-
phers one concentrates on, even the twenty-first century). Until quite recently, the neglect
of the study of the history of intellectual virtues in general has also contributed towards
this desultory state of affairs. Fortunately, recent work by some scholars (notably Lor-
raine Daston and Peter Galison) in the history of science has, once again, opened up the
subject for more detailed and systematic discussion. The tradition of intellectual virtues
is closely linked with the modern history of science, the emancipation of the scientific self
and the ethics of knowledge, as we have seen above. The Principle of Tolerance is an
inextricable part of these general developments.
2.4.1 Spinoza on tolerance
The following is a famous passage from Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise:
How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead of
passing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love virtue and
the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too small to harbour men
of talent. What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived than that hon-
ourable men should be sent like criminals into exile, because they hold di-
verse opinions which they cannot disguise? What, I say, can be more hurtful
than that men that have committed no crime or wickedness should, simply
because they are enlightened, be treated as enemies and put to death, and that
the scaffold, the terror of evil-doers, should become the arena where the high-
est examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the
marks of ignominy that authority can devise?
He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a criminal, and
shrinks from no punishment; his mind is not wrung with remorse for any dis-
graceful deed: he holds that death in good cause is no punishment, but an
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honour, and that death for freedom is glory.
What purpose then is served by the death of such men, what example is pro-
claimed? the cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the foolish,
hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The only lesson we can draw
from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to imitate the victim.
If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if governments
are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled to yield to agi-
tators, it is imperative that freedom of judgement should be granted, so that
men may live together in harmony, however diverse, or even openly contra-
dictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that such is the best system
of government and open to the fewest objections, since it is the one most in
harmony with human nature. In a democracy (the most natural form of gov-
ernment [. . .]) everyone submits to the control of the authority over his ac-
tions, but not over his judgement and reason; that is, seeing that all cannot
think alike, the voice of the majority has the force of law, subject to repeal if
circumstances bring about a change of opinion. In proportion as the power of
free judgement is withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind,
and consequently the government becomes more tyrannical. [Spinoza: TTP
xx [PT (1951), 263–264]]38
Spinoza’s exhortation, mainly aimed at those in possession of political power and capable
of passing decrees, to keep constantly in mind men’s irrevocable right to freedom of
judgement, is one of the very first expressions of the content of the notion of tolerance that
is the hallmark of Radical Enlightenment. The exhortation is a serious one: the personal
situation in which Spinoza found himself in Amsterdam in 1670, notwithstanding the fact
that he lived in one of the most liberal of the European states, was awkward. Until the
late 1660s Spinoza had seen Amsterdam as a quite positive example of arranging public
life: “In this most flourishing republic and excellent town people of all nations and sects
live together with highest unanimity.” [TTP xx.40] While Spinoza belonged to a group of
political refugees, the minority of Portugese Jews (Sephardic Jews), he had not had any
notably bad experiences with state authorities and their judicial system. This situation
was not to last, however:
As Spinoza was writing his treatise, the situation worsened because of a se-
rious economic malaise and the political isolation of the Dutch Republic. In-
tolerance was aggravated also, and came very close to Spinoza himself. To
the circle of his friends and followers belonged a certain Adriaan Koerbagh,
who had studied medicine and law in Utrecht and Leiden. He had (with his
brother Johan) become persuaded by Spinoza’s naturalism, and was also ac-
quainted with Franciscus van den Enden. This man, only two years younger
than Spinoza, started to spread all the essentials of the Spinozistic theory from
1665 onward, and published them in 1668, in plain Dutch. His main work, Een
ligt, was on many pages more open about Spinoza’s esoteric doctrine than the
38Italics added.
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Theological-Political Treatise. God is defined as “the essence of all modes of
existence, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each one is infinite in its
kind.” The work as a whole may be considered as a parallel to the Theological-
Political Treatise, with chapters on Essence (God is consequently called “We-
sen”!), the Savior (Jesus), the Holy Spirit (reason), good and evil, religion, the
Bible, heretics, heaven, miracles, and so on. Nowhere in the book is Spinoza’s
name mentioned, but his doctrine is elaborated on many pages. The author
was, however, much less prudent than Spinoza himself, and launched strong
attacks on the preachers and theologians. When he was arrested, he con-
fessed at his trial to his relations with Spinoza and Van den Enden. He was
sentenced, in the free town of Amsterdam, to ten years in the house of cor-
rection (truchthuis), ten years exile afterward, and a fine of 6,000 guildens. He
was thrown into the Rasphuis, a prison with very bad circumstances, in which
he died a year later (in 1669). [Klever (1996), 38–39]
Instigated by this incidence, which must have made a deep impression on him, Spinoza,
who was occupied writing his Theological-Political Treatise, included in the book a passage,
probably referring to the fate of his friend: “Following this example of the Pharisees [hav-
ing accused The Sadducees of impiety] the vilest hypocrites, agitated by the same frenzy
(rabie agitati) which they call zeal by divine right, have always persecuted men distin-
guished by their honesty and their virtue and therefore envied by the mob; they do this
by publicly despising their opinions and inflaming the anger of the furious multitude
against them.” [TTP xviii.24] Against this background it is clear that Spinoza’s political
writings, most prominently the Theological-Political Treatise, were not mere theoretical ex-
ercises, i.e., mere philosophical conclusions derivable from his system. Nay, they were
very much born through practical considerations, stemming largely from his personal
experiences. In this sense, the distinction between moral virtue and ethical virtue is a rele-
vant one; Spinoza, deeply shocked by the train of events, exemplified not only genuine
sympathy for the sufferings experienced by Koerbagh, but raised the moral feelings of
sympathy to the communicative form of ethical insights that he included in his treatise.
On a more general level, it can be said that the significance of moral feelings consists
precisely in their unique capacity to induce mental qualities of intensity that the purely
theoretical thought is vainly longing for. In any case, genuine sympathy can be said to
be an exceptionally complex intentional act, because it operates, so to speak, on a meta-
level; in contradistinction to other (moral) feelings it is directed to the pain simpliciter
experienced by another person, and not to the cause of that pain. Its operation is based
on the I’s capacity for abstraction which enables it to consider the other selves as being
of equal value with itself. Therefore, the transcendental dimension of morality is clearly
operative in instances of genuine sympathy.
What else can be distillated from the passage quoted above? The lines concerning the ne-
cessity of granting freedom of judgement to every citizen of a state, accompanied with the
passing mention about tolerance, hint at yet another important dimension of Spinoza’s
political thought, viz., the necessity of submitting to the control of the authority in mat-
ters of action. This constitutes a notable tension in Spinoza’s account. Prima facie, it would
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seem that if “the voice of the majority has the force of law”, there is not much room for
the radical liberalism that is advocated by Spinoza in the very same passage. The appear-
ance of a contradiction evaporates, however, as soon as one recognizes the background
framework influencing Spinoza’s thought. As is well known, Spinoza derived much of
the philosophical content of his system from Radical Cartesianism. An important ex-
ample is the Radical Cartesian doctrine of self-interest about which Spinoza provided a
metaphysical understanding. According to Spinoza, all things, including humans, strive
to persevere in their existence. In order to survive, humans must come together and form
a society. Without mutual aid, people would not have the time and skill to support and
preserve themselves to the greatest possible extent. [TTP v.73/13] And so people come
together, giving up the rights that they have in the state of nature, and agree to obey the
laws of the state. If people only desired what is prescribed by true reason, the society
would need no laws:
Nothing would be required to teach men true moral doctrine, and they would
then act to their true advantage of their own accord, wholeheartedly and
freely. But human nature is far differently constituted. All men do, indeed,
seek their own advantage, but by no means from the dictates of sound reason.
For the most part the objectives they seek and judge to be beneficial are de-
termined only by fleshy desire, and they are carried away by their emotions,
which take no account of the future or of other considerations. [TTP v.74/31]
In this sense society needs governance and coercion; it needs laws to control and restrain
the people’s lusts and urges [ibid.] The laws must be set up in a way that, whether they
will it or not, people act in the interests of the common welfare. The state must not
depend on human virtue (presumably short of the strictures of true reason), but rather,
cause human virtue through necessity. Spinoza’s conception about the constitution as
“the soul of the state” is made more comprehensible by the following passage:
It is not, I repeat, the purpose of the state to transform men from rational be-
ings into beasts or puppets, but rather to enable them to develop their mental
and physical faculties in safety, to use their reason without restraint and to
refrain from the strife and vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by hatred,
anger, or deceit. Thus the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom. [TTP
xx.241/3]
Whereas men are obligated to frame their decisions for action according to the (positive)
laws and orders devised by the local legislative bodies and authorized by the local gov-
ernment, they are guided in their expectations of future by the regulative principles of
thought; principles that are articulated and embodied in the current practices of science
(including the generally accepted conventions of presentation, communication and criti-
cism of ideas). The basis for evaluation of the adequacy of these two spheres, the sphere
of social practice and the sphere of knowledge, resides in the force of the freedom of
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judgement. This freedom, in turn, depends on the requirement of rationality that com-
prises the most general conditions upon thought and action. While it is not plausible to
assume that the judicial and legislative practices could account for the more general and
universal principles of rationality and ideal validity in all of their aspects, it is mandatory
– if just to abstain from anarchy – to conform to the prevailing laws and customs. This
compromise is accepted with the hope of gradually improving and revising the legisla-
tive practices so as to make them more compatible with the strictures of Reason, i.e. the
domain of pure validities.
Spinoza’s conception of rationality strikes us today as surprisingly modern. Spinoza
took reason to be a cognitive and effectively inferential process that was applied in order
to derive adequate knowledge from some other piece of adequate knowledge. Clearly,
such a conception, although superficially stated in terms similar to deductive reasoning,
comprised a large variety of inferential processes, clearly outnumbering the ‘merely’ de-
ductive ones. Included among the tasks of (practical) reason are, according to Spinoza,
guidance of action (ex ducto rationis), counsel offering (consilium rationis), providing pre-
cepts (præceptum rationis), rules (præscriptum rationis), and ‘dictates’ (dictamen rationis).
One is immediately struck by the resemblance of this scheme to ideas that comprise the
core of modern cognitive science: in the first place, Spinoza distinguishes between nu-
merous different functions of reason (the different cognitive capacities of man), and in the
second place, he emphasizes the fallibility of human reason (the restrictions of information
processing in the human brain). Of course, there are many more aspects to the intricate
relations between Spinoza’s thought and modern cognitive psychology, but these are the
most important.39 The essence of the doctrine of reason in Spinoza is that in order for
it to act within the sphere of morality, it must have motivational force. How is Spinoza
able to explain the sources of this motivational force? The sources relate to the basis of
rational life which Spinoza thinks is the ultimate characteristic of humanity in its highest
form. But man alone could not conduct his life according to the demands of rationality if
there was not a motivational force that sprang from a much more powerful source:
But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shap-
ing to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear
with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of
our own advantage, so long as we are conscious that, we have done our duty,
and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable to protect our-
selves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and
that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of
this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words
the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in
such acquiescence will endeavor to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent
beings, we cannot desire anything save to that which is true: wherefore, in
39One interesting contemporary attempt to link Spinoza’s philosophy to modern cognitive science is An-
tonio Damasio’s Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain [Damasio (2003)], where the Spinozist
account of affects is linked with modern neurobiological research on emotions.
85
so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavor of the
better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole. [E
iv.p.xxxii]
Another important dimension of the Principle of Tolerance advocated by Spinoza, inex-
tricably entwined with the one sorted out above, relates to historiography and interpre-
tation of texts. The views of Spinoza on this topic had their origin in the assessment of
the function of hermeneutics in Spinoza’s overall philosophy. Indeed, the interpretation
of various religious and historical texts constituted according to Spinoza a necessary re-
quirement in an epistemic endeavor to acquire better and more reliable knowledge about
nature and man. The hermeneutic approach constituted an important stage in the middle
of an individual’s emancipation from false beliefs and rigid authorities. As Spinoza put
it:
If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives, or is
written in a very obscure style, and if we know nothing of its author, nor of the
time or occasion of its being written, we shall vainly endeavour to gain any
certain knowledge of its true meaning. For being in ignorance of these points
we cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of the author; if we are fully
informed, we so order our thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either
in ascribing to the author or him for whom the author wrote either more or
less than his meaning, and we only take into consideration what the author
may have had in his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded . . . It
often happens that in different books we read histories in themselves simi-
lar, but which we judge very differently, according to the opinions we have
formed of the authors . . . Thus it is evidently necessary to know something
of the authors of writings which are obscure or unintelligible, if we would in-
terpret their meaning; and for the same reason, in order to choose the proper
reading from among a great variety, we ought to have information as to the
versions in which the differences are found, and as to the possibility of other
readings having been discovered by persons of greater authority. [TTP vii [PT
(1951), 111-112]]
It is tempting to interpret this passage as an early modern formulation of the principle of
charity the central significance of which Donald Davidson has emphasized for the theory
of argumentation. Occasionally referring to it also as the principle of rational accommoda-
tion, he has summarized its content as follows: “We make maximum sense of the words
and thoughts of others when we interpret them in a way that optimises agreement.”
[Davidson (1974)]40 It is fascinating to see that this essential aspect of modern (linguistic)
pragmatics is clearly anticipated in Spinoza’s writings concerning hermeneutics.
In order to render the picture of Spinoza’s notion of tolerance complete, it is essential
to give a summary view of the differences of the interpretations of it provided by him
40Davidson, Donald (1984) [1974]: “Ch. 13: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
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and Locke. The two men differed radically on their opinions about the meaning and
implications of tolerance. Giving an account of these differences is illuminating, for it
illustrates the two entirely different stances that these gentlemen, the most illustrious
harbingers of Enlightenment, took in regard to the notion that was to have fundamental
repercussion in philosophy in the next few hundred years. I will first give a general
outline of Locke’s moral philosophy.
Essay, Book II, Chapter XXVIII, §§7–14
In the beginning of the section §7, Locke represents a division of laws which he thinks
people generally refer their actions to. This division amounts to the following:
1. The divine law.
2. The civil law.
3. The law of opinion or reputation.
The first type of law is the standard for ‘sins, or duties’, the second for ‘criminal, or in-
nocent’ actions, the third for ‘virtues and vices’. [Leibniz, New Essays, Book II, Chapter
xxviii, §7] There are some very interesting issues that pertain to the classification of laws
in this manner. To start with the most perspicuous ones, we may raise the points that
Leibniz already made in his famous commentary to Locke’s Essay. [ibid.] Firstly, a seman-
tical distinction with respect to sins and duties amounts really to a distinction between
dispositions (which Leibniz termed habitudes*41) and actions. Secondly, issues pertaining
to virtue and vice do not usually depend on general opinion. On the contrary, within
the context of Christian ethics in which the discussions between Locke and Leibniz are
embedded, the concepts of virtue and vice are predominantly defined by theology, i.e.
overtly by the divine law, and covertly by the ecclesiastical authorities. They are thus to
be understood as strictly deontological notions. This is, understandably, congruent with
Leibniz’s theism. Thirdly, there are two sorts of divine law: natural and positive.42 Civil
law is positive. Fourthly, the ‘law of reputation’ cannot properly be called a law unless
it is included in the natural law — as one might speak of the ‘law of health’, ‘the law of
business’, in areas where one’s actions naturally bring various goods and evils, such as
the approval of others, health, monetary gain.
41The commentary by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (in NE) explicates this concept in the following
way: “This can mean ‘habit’, ‘custom’, ‘character-trait’, ‘tendency’, ‘general disposition’. In most occurrences
‘disposition’ seems right; but where ‘disposition’ is also present we render ‘habitude’ by ‘tendency’ instead.
Sometimes [. . . ] ‘habitude’ is used to contrast not dispositional with actual, but rather general with particular,
within the realm of actual behavior. In these contexts we use ‘habit’, or ‘practice’, or, once, ‘regularity of
conduct’.”
42Hobbes gives an account of this distinction: “[. . . ] Natural are those which have been laws form all
eternity, and are called not only natural, but moral laws . . . Positive are those which . . . have been made laws
by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over others . . . Divine positive laws . . . are . . . the com-
mandments of God, not from all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to certain people,
or to certain persons”. [Leviathan II.26]
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In the Draft B for the Essay Locke gives a very interesting account of the ways in which
we acquire moral ideas, i.e. ideas of virtues & vices:
[. . . ] But these Ideas of virtues & vices being of transient actions noe where
permanent but only the Ideas conceived in our minds to examine & denom-
inate our actions by we cannot by the immediate information of our senses
conversant about reall things get a notion of them & therefor must attein them
one of these 2 following way(s)
§157 1◦ Either by the common consent & usage of the country & those men
whose language we speake. For if there were noe law, noe punishment noe
obligation humane or divine yet there must & would be in the Societys of
men notions of virtues & vices Justice Temperance & Fortitude &c consisting
in certain collection of simple Ideas without which notions all those words
which expresse morall things would in all languages be perfect jargon & in-
significant. But all the knowledge of particular virtues & vices which a man
atteined to this way would amount to noe more then taking the definitions or
significations of the words of any language either from the men|skilled
According to Locke’s friend James Tyrrell, the idea for the Essay originated in a discussion
about ‘the principles of morality and revealed religion’. Contrary to popular accounts of
Locke, his philosophy is not to be described as plainly empiricist (whatever that means).
By contrast, if rationalism is taken to imply that knowledge par excellence forms a de-
ductive system, then Locke is a rationalist as much as any other seventeenth-century
philosopher. Indeed, paradoxically it is Locke, not Leibniz, who maintains that all gen-
uine knowledge is of a priori truths.43 Locke’s conception of moral relations amounts to
this:
For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of
our ideas and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement
by the intervention of other ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as
mathematical, being archetypes themselves and so adequate and complete
ideas; all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will
produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figure. [Essay, IV, iv, 7]
I do not intend to investigate the detailed arguments that Leibinz presented in his
Noveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain, the extensive commentary to Locke’s Essay, as a
criticism of Locke’s position. Suffice it to say that the weakness in the theoretical basis
of Locke’s moral philosophy was destined to radiate into issues concerning the appli-
cations of that philosophy. It is therefore no wonder that Locke’s concept of tolerance
became, ultimately, equally an issue of controversy. Locke’s Epistula de Tolerantia (Letter
43According to Locke, knowledge about the external world is an ‘assurance that deserves the name of Knowl-
edge’. [Essay, IV, xi, 3]
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Concerning Toleration) was a defense of conventional, ecclesiastical views, which could
not accommodate the sort of radical interpretation of tolerance that compromised the
overall legitimating power of one privileged religious creed. Spinoza’s interpretation,
on the contrary, was of an all-encompassing and universal variety; strictly ecclesiastic is-
sues would no longer be the primary concern of tolerant, rational discourse. Let me now
briefly describe the contents of the controversy.
2.4.2 Locke, Spinoza and the philosophical debate on toleration
Locke wrote his Letter in November and December 1685 during the period of his most
intensive involvement with his Arminian friends — as well as with the Jewish contro-
versialist Isaac Orobio de Castro — and the time of the international furore surrounding
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the persecution of the Huguenots in France.
Locke’s notion of toleration can be characterized briefly as being primarily concerned
with freedom of worship, of religious practice, as an extension of freedom of conscience,
rather than with freedom of thought, speech and of the press. This is the main point of
disagreement with Spinoza. Moreover, Locke’s conception of toleration includes a curi-
ous mixture of biased attitude and theoretical thought. Indeed, Locke is grudging about
extending toleration to certain groups and positively hostile to toleration of certain oth-
ers. [Redwood (1976), 83] In particular, there can be discerned three limitations to Locke’s
notion of toleration that are noteworthy, as has been shown by Jonathan Israel:
Firstly, because his toleration is essentially what one scholar has called a ‘priv-
ilege’ and ‘immunity’ exempting religious dissenters from the church other-
wise prescribed and generally obligatory for the whole people — the state
church established by crown and Parliament — toleration can only formally
and expressly be granted to categories of the population possessing an or-
ganized, publicly acknowledged and constituted form of worship for which
immunity can be claimed, Protestant dissenters in the first instance but po-
tentially at least also Catholics, Jews and Muslims. Persons subscribing to no
recognized church or sect, by contrast, be they agnostics, sceptics, deists or
‘Indifferenti’ while not specifically excluded are left in a vague limbo without
any precise status or acknowledged freedom. [. . . ] Secondly, there is Locke’s
well known reluctance to accord toleration to Catholics. Strictly speaking, be-
ing a defined confession and organized church, there should be no difficulty
about extending toleration to Catholics, and indeed Episcopius and, some-
what later, also Uyttenbogaert do so explicitly. But on this point, adhering
to the view he had held for many years, Locke is at the very least grudging
if not positively intolerant. [. . . ] A third important respect in which Locke’s
toleration is limited is his emphatic and absolute exclusion of atheists. Since
they do not believe in a providential God and belong to no recognized form
of worship, and are not seeking to save their souls, by definition they are not
entitled to toleration. [Israel (1999), 9–11]
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This passage makes evident the contrast between Spinoza’s and Lockes’s theories of tol-
eration. First of all, Spinoza’s account stands out within the intellectual fervent of the
early Enlightenment as not being built on any theological foundations at all. It is truly a
libertas philosophandi. For Spinoza, freedom of religion and religious practice are at most
a secondary issue. This fact is betrayed by the fact that in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
in which the notion of tolerance is discussed, freedom of exercise of one or another faith
is not dealt with at all. Second, in Spinoza, toleration is overridingly about individual
freedom and emphatically not the ‘freedom’ of ecclesiastical structures to confessional-
ize and claim authority over individuals. As Jonathan Israel has succinctly pointed out,
“[t]he most fundamental difference between Spinoza’s and Locke’s theories of toleration
lies precisely in the relegation of freedom of worship, freedom to express religious doc-
trines, and freedom to organize churches to the periphery of the debate, the emphasis,
in other words, is on obviating the formation of powerful ecclesiastical hierarchies and
authority. In this respect, Spinoza’s concept of toleration forms a part of the wider Dutch
republican political thought tradition, a drive to weaken the power of the clergy for the
good of society [. . . ] ” [ibid., 13] I have already alluded to the more detailed contents of
Spinoza’s notion of tolerance above. What is important to notice here is the social and
political context in which that notion emerged and to what a great extent it signified a
radical shift in the habitudes of thought that prevailed in the early Enlightenment. It is of
utmost importance to realize the significance of Spinoza’s thinking in this respect for the
development of theoretical thought in the sciences. Although it is not immediately clear
to his contemporaries that the implications of the notion of tolerance have drastic effects
in the sphere of theoretical thought, including natural science, a necessary prerequisite
for realizing the true significance of the principle of tolerance is, nevertheless, fulfilled; it
is understood that tolerance is not exclusively, not even primarily, an ecclesiastical issue.
The overwhelming importance of the conflict between the views of Locke and Spinoza is
therefore captured in the following words of Jonathan Israel:
The shift from the quest for religious freedom to the quest for philosophical
freedom which begins with Spinoza’s critically important theory of tolera-
tion is, in fact, one of the most characteristic features of the early Enlighten-
ment, the period down to around 1750 when the real business of breaking
the confessional structure of ancien regime European thought and culture was
undertaken. The historical, as distinct from the philosophical, importance of
Spinoza’s theory of toleration, especially in its contrast with Locke, can hardly
be overstated. In the early eighteenth century radical writers in Europe no
longer complained about the lack of religious freedom. Suddenly, the brunt
of their complaint became the lack of intellectual freedom. [ibid., 19]
Within the confines of Western philosophy and science, reviewing the development of
the three hundred years after Spinoza, toleration must be seen mainly as a vehicle for in-
creasing intellectual freedom. That the notion was first primarily associated with purely
ecclesiastical and political issues renders it particularly hard to grasp how the notion of
tolerance became to have the completely different role in twentieth-century philosophy.
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The history of intellectual virtues provides the answer to this question, but this history is
closely linked with the history of the self, as we have seen. What is Spinoza’s contribution
to this discussion? The essential content of Spinoza’s political writings, as I have tried to
demonstrate, is inextricably linked with the program of Radical Enlightenment. The Rad-
ical Enlightenment, one of the harbingers of which Spinoza definitively is, and the core
ideas of which he very much helped to create in his writings (though of course not under
that name), conceived as a package of basic concepts and values, may be summarized
in eight cardinal points, as Jonathan Israel has argued [Israel (2006), 866]: (1) adoption
of philosophical (mathematical-historical) reason as the only and exclusive criterion of
what is true; (2) rejection of all supernatural agency, magic, disembodied spirits, and di-
vine providence; (3) equality of all mankind (racial and sexual); (4) secular ‘universalism’
in ethics anchored in equality and chiefly stressing equity, justice and charity; (5) com-
prehensive toleration and freedom of thought based on independent critical thinking; (6)
personal liberty of lifestyle and sexual conduct between consenting adults, safeguarding
the dignity and freedom of the unmarried and the homosexuals; (7) freedom of expres-
sion, political criticism and the press, in the public sphere; (8) democratic republicanism
as the most most legitimate form of politics. These are all relevant for he subsequent de-
velopment of the idea of the modern self, the seeds of which are to be found in Spinoza’s
thought. They figure prominently in the history of morality and they are pertinent issues




THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A Priori AND
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE IN ETHICS
AND SCIENCE
Throughout the previous chapter we have stressed the importance of the insight, one that
already Kant conceived as one of the most important axioms of moral philosophy, that
normative judgements (and in an analogous way, value judgements) belong to the class of
a priori synthetic judgements and thus cannot be either grounded (proved) or falsified by
reference to a posteriori judgements. The moral maxim of “Act in such a way as to treat hu-
manity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never
merely as a means” is not affected by considerations about socio-psychological facts or
statistical data about human trafficking, for example. However, the negligence which
Kant showed towards the empirical in questions of morality is nonetheless detrimental
to his system of moral philosophy. Even such a prominent figure as Max Scheler, who
built his theory of value judgements on the basis of the notion of substantive a priori, un-
derestimated the value of experience and empirical knowledge in ethics. Notwithstand-
ing their important contributions to ethical theory, Kant and Scheler both lack a sense of
the importance of experience and empirical judgements in deriving more concrete norms
from the system of values. It is clear that on the level of practical action and practical
ethics, such knowledge is necessary. The importance of the empirical is grounded on two
fundamentally different levels that may be referred to as the level of subsumption and the
level of means and ends. The first concerns, in essence, the question whether a concrete
being with respect to which we have to frame our moral decision, is a person. This is both
historically and systematically relevant question, because many fundamentally moral is-
sues (in history as well as at present) depend upon the answer to it. As Vittorio Hösle
correctly observes, “[o]ne reason the answer to the question whether an adult human
being is a person is difficult is that the interior dimension of others is not immediately
accessible to us. Whether someone has an interior dimension (obviously necessary but
not a sufficient condition for being a person) is not so easy to figure out as the question
of whether an object has a specific length; without a theory of the experience of other minds
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this question cannot be fundamentally answered.” [Hösle (2004), 122]1 Furthermore, his re-
mark on the importance of the process of recognition has significant reverberations for
the problem of tolerance as well: “In adult humans the acknowledgment that another is
a person is usually connected with the process of recognition (Anerkennung) [. . . ] Physi-
cal and cultural alterity are barriers to this process of acknowledgment, and overcoming
these barriers is a particularly affirmative achievement from a moral point of view.” [ibid.,
122–123] In summary, then, the importance of the subsumption problem consists in the
fact that to be able to answer the question as to what characteristics a (spiritual) being
possesses, what features are essential to it in the sense that we will be able to recognize it,
and so on, it is necessary to have at our disposal a (non-normative) theory. The possibility
of such a theory is, of course, a matter of the scientific maturity of the disciplines that are
considered to be relevant for answering the question in the first place. The second level
concerns the more familiar question about the necessary means to ends that are concerned
with the protection or realization of goods that men find important. Knowledge about
the possible (and ethical) means is naturally empirical, and thus it is quite obvious that
a concrete ethics without experiential knowledge is impossible. However, the goals in
themselves are not sufficient for evaluating the course of action to be taken; every action
has consequences the significance of which it is also necessary to assess, and then, this is
to be done as extensively as is practically possible. It is a moral duty to foresee as many
of the practically relevant consequences of action, but this sets a requirement in the ful-
fillment of which we quickly encounter limits. The tragic dimension of this issue is aptly
described by Hösle:
It is precisely modern technology’s spectacular expansion of the consequences
of our action in space and time that makes this duty particularly urgent, and
it fundamentally changes the overall ethical situation in comparison with the
model proposed by Kant – who, because of his intentionalism, could still as-
sume that common sense was sufficient to understand our duties. The loss of
the feeling that one’s common sense suffices, together with insight into moral
principles, in order to arrive at morally defensible decisions is perhaps the
most demoralizing and humiliating trait of the age of technology – a trait that
probably best explains the growth of ethical nihilism in an age that is least
able to afford it. [ibid., 124]
Notwithstanding the great challenge posed by both of these aspects of the ethically rel-
evant dimensions of empirical knowledge, it is obvious that science has made great
progress in developing means to cope with the tremendous complexity of the empirical
and social world that directly bears on the two morally relevant methodological levels
of the problem of subsumption and the problem of means and ends. To the extent that the
domain of a priori knowledge is relevant for both science and ethics, it is only natural, and
it is certainly wise, to discuss briefly the nature and role of the a priori in the history of
epistemology. In as much as Carnap’s philosophical project is underpinned by the con-
cept of the a priori and its relevance for the problem of means and ends, it is apt to delve in
1Italics added.
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some detail into the history of this notion. Let us begin with the notion of analysis that is
closely linked with the theme of a priori knowledge.
3.1 The Problem of Analysis and a priori knowledge
“The long concatenations of simple and easy reasoning which geometricians use in
achieving their most difficult demonstrations gave me occasion to imagine that all mat-
ters which may enter the human mind were interrelated in the same fashion.” — René
Descartes
3.1.1 The tradition of analysis
The first systematic uses of analysis as a scientific method we find in ancient Greece. It is
well known that the Greek geometers used a method they called analysis (nlusic) to pro-
ceed from a statement of a given theorem to the premisses (and, ultimately, the axioms)
from which it could be proved. In these inquiries the method of construction played a
significant role. The point of departure was often an auxiliary diagram drawn to include
all the given data of the problem together with a sketch of its solution.2 Analysing these
diagrams and the components within them the Greeks were able to extract information
out of them pertaining to the conditions and presuppositions for the solution of the prob-
lem. This was done in a systematic, step-by-step manner. The first explicit mention of
this methodology in a general level can be found in Pappus’ works. The famous passage
reads:
The so-called Treasury of Analysis, my dear Hermodorus, is, in short, a spe-
cial body of doctrines furnished for the use of those who, after going through
the usual elements, wish to obtain the power of solving theoretical problems,
which are set to them, and for this purpose only is it useful. It is the work of
three men, Euclid the author of the Elements, Apollonius of Perga, and Aris-
taeus the Elder, and proceeds by the method of analysis and synthesis. Now
analysis is the way from what is sought — as if it were admitted — through its
concomitants [the usual translation reads: consequences]3 in order to some-
thing admitted in synthesis. For in analysis we suppose that which is sought
to be already done, and we inquire from what it results, and again what is the
antecedent of the latter, until we on our backward way light upon something
already known and being first in order. And we call such a method analysis,
as being a solution backwards. In synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose
that which was reached last in analysis to be already done, and arranging in
their natural order as consequents the former antecedents and linking them
2This aspect of the method has been emphasized and adduced in detail in [Hintikka & Remes 1974].
3A comment by Hintikka & Remes.
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one with another, we in the end arrive at the construction of the thing sought.
And this we call synthesis. Now analysis is of two kinds. One seeks the truth,
being called theoretical. The other serves to carry out what was desired to
do, and this is called problematical. In the theoretical kind we suppose the
thing sought as being and as being as true, and then we pass through its con-
comitants [consequences]4 in order, as though they were true and existent by
hypothesis, to something admitted; then, if that which is admitted be true, the
thing sought is true, too, and the proof will be the reverse of analysis. But if
we come upon something false to admit, the thing sought will be false, too. In
the problematical kind we suppose the desired thing to be known, and then
we pass through its concomitants [consequences]5 in order, as though they
were true, up to something admitted. If the thing admitted is possible or can
be done, that is, if it is what the mathematicians call given, the desired thing
will also be possible. The proof will again be the reverse of analysis. But if we
come upon something impossible to admit, the problems will also be impos-
sible.
So much of analysis and synthesis. This is the order of the books in the Trea-
sury of Analysis: Euclid’s Data, one book, Apollonios’ Cutting-off a Ratio, two
books, Determinate Section, two books, Euclid’s Porisms, three books, Apollo-
nios’ Vergings, two books, his Plane Loci, two books, Conics, eight books, Aris-
taeus’ Solidi Loci, five books, Euclid’s Surface Loci, two books, Eratosthenes’ On
Means, two books. In all there are thirty-three books . . . [Hintikka & Remes
(1974), 8–10]
This conception of analysis that was transmitted from the Greeks to the early mod-
ern mathematicians constituted the most important methodological guideline for doing
mathematics. First of all, it enabled mathematicians to define concepts such as proof,
truth and exactness. The last one of these notions has especially intrigued mathemati-
cians since ancient times. Throughout history mathematicians have repeatedly raised
the question: what does exactness mean? In attempting to provide an answer mathe-
maticians have constantly reshaped their science to meet more appropriate and higher
standards of exactness. Perhaps most successful of these attempts has been the Greek
proposal the intellectual integrity and rigor of which is impressive even today. One of
the most pertinent questions relating to the issue of exactness was: what it means for a
mathematical entity to be ‘known’ or ‘given’; and moreover: what it means for a problem
to be ‘solved’, and its solution to be ‘found’? Classical geometry provided an answer to
these questions: geometrical figures were ‘known’ or ‘given’ if they could be constructed
starting from elements that were considered given at the outset; similarly, a problem was
considered solved if the required configuration was geometrically constructed.
What were the geometrical constructions like and what was their correspondence with




tween numbers and the operations acting on them. [Bos (2001), 123] (N.B. Numbers:
natural or rational positive numbers, and irrational positive numbers in as far as they
were used at the time in numerical context.)
Operation Modern Exact Change of Analogous
notation kind or operation(s) on
dimension geometrical
magnitude
Adding two numbers + Yes No Joining
Subtracting a (smaller) − Yes No Cutting off
number from a number
Multiplying two numbers × Yes No Making a rectangle
Dividing two numbers / or ÷ Yes No Forming a ratio;
applying a rectangle
Extracting the square root
√
· No No Taking the mean
of a number proportional
Solving a quadratic No Plane constructions
equation with numerical
coefficients
Extracting a higher-order k
√
· No No Taking several (k− 1)
root of a number mean proportionals
Solving cubic and No Solid or higher-order
higher-order equations with constructions
numerical coefficients
Forming the ratio of two : Yes Forming a ratio
numbers
Besides purely mathematical considerations, the Greek idea of analysis used in geometry
touched other issues as well and undulated into areas of non-technical theorizing. Espe-
cially remarkable is the analogy of geometrical analysis to dialectical reasoning noted by
Aristotle. In his Topics he explains this as follows:
There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult to bring, and
easy to stand up to, an argument. Such, e.g., are those things which stand first
and those which stand last in the order of nature. For the former require defi-
nition, while the latter have to be arrived at through many steps if one wishes
to secure a continuous proof from first principles, or else all discussion about
them wears the air of mere sophistry; for to prove anything is impossible un-
less one begins with the appropriate principles, and connects inference with
inference till the last are reached. Now to define first principles is just what
answerers do not care to do, nor do they pay any attention if the questioner
makes a definition: and yet until it is clear what it is that is proposed, it is not
easy to discuss it. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of first
principles (arkhē): for while the other propositions are shown through these,
these cannot be shown through anything else: we are obliged to understand
every item of that sort by definition. The inferences, too, that lie too close
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to the first principles are hard to treat in argument. [. . . ] The hardest, how-
ever, of all definitions to treat in argument are those that employ terms about
which, in the first place, it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense
or in several, and, further, whether they are used literally or metaphorically
by the definer. For because of their obscurity, it is impossible to argue upon
such terms; and because of the impossibility of saying whether this obscurity
is due to their being used metaphorically, it is impossible to refute them. [. . . ]
It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing a given
position because the definition has not been correctly rendered. [. . . ] In math-
ematics, too, some things would seem to be not easily proved for want of a
definition, e.g. that the straight line parallel to the side, which cuts a plane
figure divides similarly (homoiōs) both the line and the area. But once the def-
inition is stated, the said property is immediately manifest: for the areas and
the lines have the same antanairesis and this is the definition of the same ratio.
[. . . ] But if the definitions of the principles are not laid down, it is difficult,
and may be quite impossible, to apply them. There is a close resemblance
between dialectical and geometrical processes. [Topics, VIII 3, 158a31–159a2]
These observations about method are impeccable. They constitute a surprisingly mod-
ern account of features that are essential to the ‘analytic method’ that is the hallmark
of twentieth-century philosophy: (i) to avoid sophistry you must define your terms un-
ambiguously and connect inference to inference up to your conclusion; (ii) providing
examples from specific sciences. It is therefore not a coincidence that the analytic move-
ment in philosophy emerged in the process of evaluating the forms of rationality and
inference deriving from Aristotle. Up to Kant the Aristotelean conception of logic was
taken as canonical, and only gradually the limitations of syllogistic were beginning to
be made apparent. The impressive development of logic from Bolzano on prepared the
ground for a thoroughgoing transformation in the style of philosophizing and the goals
that philosophy would set for itself.
Analysis in context: mathematics in the 18th and 19th centuries
The birth of analytic philosophy is often associated with the arousal of interest at the end
of nineteenth century of many philosophers and scientists in the considerable develop-
ments that took place in mathematics, logic and physics. Perhaps the most important
determining factor shaping theoretical thought in the first place was the almost simulta-
neous maturation of algebraic logic and mathematical analysis. Although this develop-
ment did not immediately lead to philosophical considerations of substantial content, it
prepared the stage for accommodating such considerations as a vital part of investigat-
ing the foundational questions in mathematics. The story begins to unfold in France in
connection with mathematics and philosophy in the late eighteenth century. The names
of Condillac and Condorcet figure here prominently, whose semiotic ‘logique’ marked
an important attempt to systematise the ideas pertaining to the semiotic character of lan-
guage in general and discourse in particular. Condillac’s central tenet presented in his
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La logique was that “the origin and generation both of ideas and of the faculties of the
soul are explained according to this method.” [Condillac (1780), title of pt. 1] The gist of
this method was the “analysis” of our ideas as originating in simple sensory experiences.
These ideas were then to be reconstructed in the process of “synthesis” in such a way that
the relations between them were clearly revealed. This conception has its unmistakable
precursor in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The doctrines of Condillac
do not constitute a system of logic in a sense of defining a set of inference rules and logi-
cal operations. Rather, they are to be thought of as a programmatic expression of a novel
approach to studying language and its usage. Indeed, Condillac’s work might be con-
ceived as a pioneering work in semiotics, as Grattan-Guinness has remarked. [Grattan-
Guinness (2000), 15] Condillac is squarely within the tradition of Port-Royal logic and
Enlightenment philosophy, laying great emphasis on language. Condillac’s aim seems
to have been to specify general rules for language-making that would ensure that the
proposed language and the signs that constitute the meaning-carrying elements of that
language are defined as precisely as possible in order that ideas could be clearly and un-
ambiguously stated or expressed. He maintained that “the art of reasoning is [thereby]
reduced.” [Condillac (1780), title of pt. 2, ch. 5] Moreover, he thought that the rules of
inference were to be defined separately for each particular language. This makes it un-
derstandable why he abstained from presenting syllogistic logic (the only known system
of deductive inference at the time) in his book. Indeed, the syllogistic form of reason-
ing represented for him a paradigmatic example of a system of inference rules that was
supposed to govern reasoning independently of the given language in which such rea-
sonings were to be expressed. Such an independence was, then, a feature that Condillac
thought could not be attained given the complexity and multiplicity of different systems
of language.
The clarity for which Condillac and Condorcet were aiming at with their semiotic
“logique” was manifested in mathematics, generally considered as a true apotheosis of
clear science. Among the brilliant mathematicians that had brought their science to a
considerable level of sophistication, Lagrange perhaps deserves the pride of place. He
had immersed himself in the studies of mathematics in his youth, preferring the alge-
braic formulations of mathematical theories the most important one of which was math-
ematical analysis. His investigations in analysis were to a considerable degree catalyzed
by the congenial philosophical atmosphere in which he found himself, leading to the
formulation of the Principle of Least Action, for example, that reflected Lagrange’s meta-
physical aspirations as much as his aptitude for mathematical concept formation. The
metaphysical motivation derived in part from the philosophy of Leibniz according to
whom our actual world is the best of all possible worlds. Therefore, thought Lagrange,
elaborating the thought of Leibniz a little further, the laws of nature can be described in
terms of extremal principles. The mathematical theory under which the principle found
its proper domain of application was calculus of variations. The algebraic formulation of
this branch of mathematics was one of the most important mathematical achievements
of Lagrange. It is illuminating to give a more exact account of the underlying principle
in mathematical terms.
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Principle of Least Action Let us consider a dynamical system (a conservative holonomic
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exists. Supposing AB to be part of a trajectory and CD to be part of any adjacent arc,
to the successive points of which values of the time are so correlated as to satisfy an
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If therefore we suppose that C coincides with A and D coincides with B, and that























dt has a stationary value for any part
of an actual trajectory, as compared with neighbouring paths between the same
termini for which the time is correlated to the coordinates is such a way as to sat-







dt being called the Action.6
The concept of “action” associated with the Principle of Least Action is an abstract one,
not amenable to direct measurement. Its significance in modern physics as a fundamental
6The Principle of Least Action originated in Maupertuis’ attempt (Mem. de l’Acad., 1744, p. 417) to obtain
for the corpuscular theory of light a theorem analogous to Fermat’s ‘Principle of Least Time’. Maupertuis’
principle was established by Euler (Addit. II, p. 309 of his Methodus inveniendi lineas curvas, 1744) for the case
of a singular particle under a central force, and by Lagrange (Miscell. Taurin. II (1760–1), Œuvres, I, p. 365)
for much more general problems.
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tool of concept formation and theory construction cannot be exaggerated.7 To have en-
visaged such an abstract concept on a basis of metaphysical speculation is a remarkable
feat of imaginative thinking on the part of Lagrange. Moreover, these bold theoretical
developments inevitably led towards a situation in which the dreaded questions of “lim-
its” and “infinitesimals” could not anymore be avoided. Hence, Lagrange must be seen
as one of the most important harbingers of modern mathematics, having incorporated
substantial novelties into mathematics in terms of concepts, calculation techniques, and
theories in the first place, but also as representing such a radical approach to mathemat-
ics that instigated developments that necessitated the foundational inquiries that were to
form such a significant part of the mathematics of nineteenth century.
Lagrange himself did not foresee all of these developments, of course. The general
concepts of “function”, “continuous function” and “analytic function” only gradually
emerged in the eighteenth century from the writings of Euler and Lagrange, and they
seldom defined these concepts with precision, even failing occasionally to distinguish
between them. The reaction of Lagrange against the Newtonian treatment of differen-
tial calculus is symptomatic of the level of mathematical rigour at the time. In Théorie
des fonctions analytiques (1797) he goes on to lament that Newton’s method of ultimate
ratios, “like that of limits . . . which is just its algebraic translation [has] the great incon-
venience of considering quantities . . . when they cease to be quantities.” This passage
betrays the fact that even the fundamental notion of derivative, the concept that was
central to the investigations of Lagrange, remained controversial. The mathematician
that most forcefully set a change in motion with regard to these issues was Augustin
Louis Cauchy (1789–1857). His work in the foundations of analysis is characterized by
an aspiration to give rigorous definitions to the fundamental concepts. The whole edifice
of analysis is constructed synthetically from some basic assumptions together with the
definitions. Consequently, he takes the notion of limit as the point of departure for his
enquiries. In Analyse algébraique (1821) he defined the notions of limit and continuous
function in a form in which they were used until Weierstrass and Heine presented the
modern ε− δ definition around 1880.8 Grattan-Guinness has summarized the import of
7Indeed, the most efficient applications of the principle may be found in Quantum Mechanics. Especially
notable is Richard Feynman’s brilliant use of the notion in his path integral approach to Quantum Mechan-
ics which essentially utilizes a stationary-action principle. Another context in which the action principle is
required is the derivation of laws regulating various physical symmetries. A famous example is Noether’s
Theorem which states that to every continuous symmetry in a physical system there corresponds a conser-
vation law (and conversely).
8Cauchy’s definitions were as follows: [limit]: When the values successively attributed to the same vari-
able approach indefinitely a fixed value, eventually differing from it by as little as one could wish, that fixed
value is called the limit of all the others. When the successive absolute values of a variable decrease indef-
initely, in such a way as to become less than any given quantity, that variable becomes what is called an
infinitesimal. Such a variable has zero for its limit. [continuous function]: Let f (x) be a function of [the real]
variable x and suppose that this function . . . has a unique and finite value for each value of x in a given
interval. If, to a value of x in this interval, one adds an infinitesimal increment h, the function itself increases
by the difference f (x + h)− f (x); this depends both on the new variable h and the value of x. Given this, the
function f (x) will be a continuous function of the variable x in the interval when, for each value of x in the in-
terval, the magnitude of the difference f (x + h)− f (x) decreases indefinitely with that of h. In other words,
the function f (x) will remain continuous relative to x in a given interval if [in this interval] an infinitesimal
increment in the variable always produces an infinitesimal increment in the function itself. [Birkhoff (1973),
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Cauchy’s elaborations in four items: (1) One of the main theorems of analysis was Tay-
lor’s,9 for the related series of which Cauchy defined the forms of the remainder term,
explicating thereby the conditions of its convergence. (2) Presenting theorems in terms
of sufficient and/or necessary conditions; in general, stating conditions for the validity
of the standard procedures of analysis. (3) The status of logic was raised because of just
such conditions as mentioned in (2). Cauchy did not, however, adopt any specific theory
of logic. (4) The terminological novelty of calling the subject “mathematical analysis”.
This must be seen as an unfortunate confusion in terms, because the mathematics was
mostly developed by synthetic proofs. [Grattan-Guinness (2000), 67]
How are these developments in the mathematical field reflected in the philosophical
thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? There is a tendency to assimilate the
mathematical results into a system of concepts that encompasses a wide range of issues
ranging from metaphysics to epistemology, from political thought to ethics and more.
Two characters especially distinguish themselves in this respect. Kant and Bolzano are
two of the most important philosophers whose ideas can in a certain sense be conceived
as having prepared the stage for the analytic turn in philosophy. Bolzano in particular
holds a special place within the pre-history of the analytic tradition for he anticipated
many of the thoughts that Frege propounded in his logical investigations decades later.
Husserl went so far as to call this philanthropic Praguese mathematician and philoso-
pher as “einen der Größten Logiker aller Zeiten.” [Husserl (1900), §225] Many have
shared Husserl’s opinion. Indeed, the main achievements of this man are nothing short
of miraculous:
Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) was a Catholic priest, a professor of the doctrine
of Catholic religion at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Prague,
an outstanding mathematician and one of the greatest logicians or even (as
some would have it) the greatest logician who lived in the long stretch of time
between Leibniz and Frege. As far as logic is concerned, Bolzano anticipated
almost exactly 100 years before Tarski and Carnap their semantic definitions
of logical truth and logical consequence; and in mathematics he is not only
known for his famous Paradoxes of the Infinite, but also for certain results
that have become and still are standard in textbooks of mathematics such as
the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem. Bolzano also made important contributions
to other fields of knowledge in and outside of philosophy. Due to the versa-
tility of his talents and the various fields to which he made substantial con-
2]
9“Theorems of Maclaurin and Taylor: When, in some interval and for values of θ satisfying 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
[‘inférieurs à l’unité’], one of the [two] expressions (1) xn f (n)(θx)/n!, (2) xn(1 − θ)n−1 f (n)(θx)/(n − 1)!
tends to zero [‘décroit indéfiniment’] as n increases, then, setting n = ∞ in equation [. . . ] one finds that
(3) f (x) = f (0) + x f ′(0) + x2 f ′′(0)/2! + x3 f ′′′(0)/3! + . . .. Therefore . . . the [infinite] series whose general
term is the product xn f (n)(0)/n! is convergent in the given interval, and its sum is f (x). This is Maclaurin’s
Theorem.” [Birkhoff (1973), 6] Maclaurin’s Theorem is a special case of Taylor’s Theorem which concerns the
approximation of a function f with a series analogous to Maclaurin’s evaluated in the neighbourhood of a






tributions he became one of the last great polymaths in the history of ideas.
[SEP: “Bernard Bolzano” [Morscher (2007)]]10
From the point of view of philosophy, Bolzano’s contributions are a veritable treasury
of fruitful ideas. But it would be erroneous to associate his significance only with some
isolated, albeit very interesting, results in different areas of logic, epistemology and meta-
physics. Indeed, much more is seen to be at stake. Some researchers, most notably Al-
berto Coffa, attribute to Bolzano a role in the development of analytic philosophy that
stands second to none when observed from the point of view of the central issues that
have defined the character of the modern analytic movement, namely, philosophy of
language and semantics. As Coffa writes: “Bolzano was the first to recognize that tran-
scendental philosophy and its idealist sequel were a reductio ad absurdum of the semantics
of modern philosophy. He was also the first to see that the proper prolegomena to any
future metaphysics was a study not of transcendental considerations but of what we say
and its laws, and that consequently the prima philosophia was not metaphysics or ontology
but semantics. The development of these ideas in his monumental Wissenschaftslehre and
in a variety of other writings established Bolzano as the founder of the semantic tradi-
tion.” [Coffa (1991), 23] This is, indeed, a line of interpretation which most clearly makes
explicit Bolzano’s significance for modern philosophy. Moreover, in Bolzano’s thought
the method of analysis and the idea of analyticity come fascinatingly together. In Wis-
senschaftslehre he gives the following explanation:
[. . . ] daß es Sätze gibt, die ihrer ganzen Art nach wahr oder falsch sind, wenn
man gewisse Teile derselben als veränderlich annimmt; daß aber derselbe
Satz, dem diese Beschaffenheit zukommt, wenn es nur eben die Vorstellun-
gen i, j, . . . sind, die man in ihm als veränderlich annimmt, sie nicht auch dann
noch behalte, wenn man andere oder mehr Vorstellungen als veränderlich vo-
raussetzt. Insonderheit ist leicht zu begreifen, daß kein Satz so gebildet sein
könne, daß ihm die Beschaffenheit, von der wir jetzt sprechen, bliebe, auch
wenn wir alle Vorstellungen, aus denen er bestehet, als veränderlich ansehen
wollten. Denn dürften wir alle in einem Satze befindliche Vorstellungen nach
Belieben abändern: so könnten wir ihn in jeden beliebigen andern verwan-
deln, und folglich gewiß bald einen wahren, bald einen falschen Satz aus ihm
machen. Wenn es aber auch nur ein einzige Vorstellung in einem Satze gibt,
welche sind willkürlich abändern läßt, ohne die Wahr- oder Falschheit dessel-
ben zu stören; d. h. wenn alle Sätze, die durch den Austausch dieser Vorstel-
lung mit beliebigen andern zum Vorscheine kommen, entweder insgesamt
wahr oder insgesamt falsch sind, vorausgesezt, daß sie nur Gegenständlich-
keit haben: so ist schon diese Beschaffenheit des Satzes merkwürdig genug,
um ihn von allen, bei denen dies nicht der Fall ist, zu unterscheiden. Ich er-
laube mir also, Sätze dieser Art mit einem von Kant entlehnten Ausdrucke
analytische, alle übrigen aber, d. h. bei denen es nicht eine einzige Vorstellung
10The acronym “SEP” refers to the internet portal Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, this particular refer-
ence being to http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bolzano/, retrieved on September 26, 2009.
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gibt, die sich ihrer Wahr- oder Falschheit unbeschadet willkürlich abändern
ließe, synthetische Sätze zu nennen. [Bolzano (1963), 230–231]11
These very ideas will figure prominently in the philosophical discussions of the next cen-
tury. The notion of analyticity that then emerges is not, however, a direct descendant of
Bolzano’s idea. Rather, some of Bolzano’s underlying assumptions are then by-passed
as confusing or unintelligible. Only quite recently a deeper insight into the fundamental
logical ideas of Bolzano has been gained through the work of such scholars as Jan Berg
and Edgar Morscher. Bolzano’s impact on the analytic tradition in philosophy is there-
fore mainly of a programmatic nature, but it has an indirect systematic influence upon it
through the work of Frege and Husserl. It is now apt to investigate in more detail what
analysis is thought to consist in. I will do this by concentrating on three main senses of
analysis that have figured in modern philosophy.
Three senses of analysis
In the first chapter of his My Philosophical Development [Russell (1959)], Bertrand Russell
presents his readers the following confession, a sort of philosophical credo: “Ever since I
abandoned the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, I have sought solutions of philosophical
problems by means of analysis, and I remain firmly persuaded, in spite of some mod-
ern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analysing is progress possible.” [ibid., XX]
Russell’s statement is generally regarded as an expression of the fundamental stricture
of so-called analytic philosophy. But in addition to mere sentimental associations, this
statement does not tell us much about what analytic philosophy is supposed to consist
in. Indeed, during the last few decades there has been a growing concern about what
analytic philosophy is, or what it is supposed to be. Nevertheless, a general contention
seems to be that its main sources can be unambiguously identified. In such a classifica-
tion the following names constitute a minimal set: Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), Bertrand
Russell (1872–1970), G.E. Moore (1873–1958) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). The
work of these men roughly within the period 1880–1920 is considered as the canon of
11“[. . . ] that there are propositions which are generically true or false when certain parts of them are
allowed to vary; but that the same proposition itself which possesses this quality when the only ideas that
are allowed to vary are i, j, . . ., would not retain it when other additional ideas are presupposed to vary. It
is particularly easy to comprehend that no proposition can be constituted in such a way that it maintains
the quality that we are currently talking about when we regard all the ideas of which it consists as variable.
For if we could modify all the existing ideas of a proposition as we think proper: we could make such a
transformation in each arbitrary case, and consequently turn it into a certain proposition that is sometimes
true, sometimes false. When there exists a unique idea in such a proposition that allows arbitrary variation
without interfering with the truth or falsity itself; i.e. when all the propositions in which an exchange of
these ideas with arbitrary ones is made, are brought forth that are either all together true or all together false,
presupposing only that they have denotation: then already is such a character of a proposition, strikingly
enough, distinguishable from those in which this is not the case. May I be permitted, then, to call the
propositions of this species, by an expression derived from Kant, analytic, and all the remaining ones, i.e.
those in which there is not a single idea that could be arbitrarily varied without detriment to their truth or
falsity, synthetic propositions.” My translation.
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analytic philosophy (the time limits set by the occasions of publication of two very influ-
ential books, Frege’s Begriffschrift in 1879 and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in 1921). Topically
the emergence of analytic philosophy relates to the rebellion of Russell and Moore against
the tradition of British Idealism, the main ideas of which essentially derived from Hegel’s
philosophy. But as the ideas of Russell and Moore developed beyond the point of being
mere consequences of a reaction against idealist philosophy, the importance of the writ-
ings of Frege became more evident. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus can most naturally be seen
as an outgrowth of a reaction, on its part, to Frege’s and Russell’s ideas with which it
critically engages.
Now, central among all these developments, foremost in connection with Russell’s and
Moore’s reaction against idealism is the emphasis placed on the idea of analysis. But,
as is clear to anyone who attempts to acquire an understanding of what that idea con-
sisted in, or what the so-called method of analysis was supposed to be, the writings of
Moore and Russell provide no straightforward answers. In fact, they were notoriously
unclear as to the meaning of “analysis” in general. Nevertheless, a certain feature in
their methodology was conspicuous and can be made explicit within a general scheme of
classification that Michael Beaney has introduced.12 In the philosophical work of Moore
and Russell, the decompositional conception was undoubtedly dominant. What does this
characterization signify? Simply put, it means that analysis was somehow conceived as
a process of decomposing something into its constituent parts. A representative example
of this style of analysis can be found in Moore’s early paper “The Nature of Judgement”
(1899). In this paper Moore still advocates a naı̈ve realist conception according to which
the world is composed of ‘concepts’ which are then synthesized to propositions. Both
of these entities are independent of us. The essence of Moorean analysis is summarized
as: “A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts.”
[ibid, 8] Russell adopted both Moore’s commitment to naı̈ve realism and his method of
decompositional analysis. But as was soon becoming evident for Russell, the simplis-
tic approach of Moore could not hold water. The resulting philosophical problems lead
Russell quickly to switch positions and finally to introduce a position he called logical
atomism. Underlying this atomism was a train of ideas deriving from his involvement
for some time with the idea of denotation and denoting concepts which notoriously led
to some recalcitrant problems. Around the time that Russell presented his views of this
“logical atomism”, Wittgenstein had already arrived at similar conclusions about the na-
ture of language and its relationship with the world. It was, in fact, Wittgenstein who
influenced Russell in his adoption of atomism the ingredients of which Russell picked
up in a personal communication with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus advocated
a logical atomism that was, however, in many respects different from the one presented
by Russell. It might seem like the atomistic philosophy of these two titans of the ana-
lytic school was something entirely new. Such is not the case, however. The essentials of
the atomistic idea of constitution of things was already present in Leibniz’s philosophy.
Indeed, his idea of the characteristica universalis together with the elaborate metaphysics
of Monadology can be seen as a form of atomism par excellence (although these tendencies
were counterbalanced by more organicist and holistic ideas). Furthermore, decompo-
12I will present this classification shortly.
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Figure 3.1: Daniell’s Pile. c©Agustin E. Bolzan. Source: LaTeX-Community.org.
sitional methodology in philosophy figured prominently in the work of Descartes and
Locke, for example, and the classical definition of analyticity provided by Kant remain
a hallmark of its application. One idea that gradually became to be associated with this
mode of analysis related to analogous procedures in a completely different domain. As a
matter of fact, the decompositional variety of analysis bears a conspicuous resemblance
to the methods of analytical chemistry. Indeed, the decomposition of concepts to their
atomic constituents is semiotically very much like the decomposition of chemical elements
in a Daniell pile for example, where the chemical compounds copper(II)sulphate and zinc
sulphate dissolve in an electrolysis. The chemical reaction is
Zn(s) + Cu2+(aq)
 Zn2+(aq) + Cu(s).
This analogy between conceptual analysis and chemical analysis captures succinctly the
fundamental presuppositions underlying decompositional analysis. As we have seen,
this variety of analysis was prominent already in the early modern period within phi-
losophy. It cannot therefore be a unique characteristic of analytic philosophy. So why is
analytic philosophy thought to start with Russell and Moore?
Michael Beaney has answered this question by proposing that it is not the decomposi-
tional mode of analysis alone that characterizes analytic philosophy, not even within the
severely restricted confines of logical atomism during the early 1920s. Indeed, Beaney
suggests that:
[. . . ] the single most significant event in the development of analytic philos-
ophy was not Russell’s and Moore’s rebellion against idealism, but the ap-
pearance in 1905 of Russell’s theory of descriptions. Frank Ramsey rightly
described this theory as a “paradigm of philosophy” [. . . ] [Beaney (2007), 2]
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As Beaney goes on to explain, what is crucial about the theory of descriptions13 is that
it introduced a completely different conception of analysis which Beaney characterizes
as a transformative or explicatory conception. The fundamental feature of the theory is the
rephrasing of a given sentence that is to be analysed into a quite different form. To provide
a time-honoured example, consider the sentence: “The present king of France is bald”.
This sentence is analysed as “There is one and only one king of France, and whatever is
king of France is bald”. What is distinctive about this sort of analysis is the manner in
which it seems to ‘analyse away’ certain concepts or phrases that appear in the analysan-
dum. So it forms a marked contrast to the decompositional variety of analysis where the
constituents of the analysandum are conserved, and indeed, made explicit. Altogether,
the transformative variety of analysis was not new either. It has precursors in ideas of
medieval logic, in Aristotle’s theory of dialectical inference, and ancient Greek geometry.
A particularly illuminating description of the essentials of this idea is provided in the
articulation by Jeremy Bentham of the conception of paraphrasis. In his Essay on Logic,
Bentham wrote:
By the word paraphrasis may be designated that sort of exposition which
may be afforded by transmuting it into a proposition, having for its subject
some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any other than a
fictitious entity. [Bentham (1843), 246]
The context of Bentham’s discussion was the application of the method in ‘analysing
away’ talk of obligations. [ibid., 247] The similarities between Bentham’s and Russell’s
approaches have been pinpointed by John Wisdom in a book that particularly focuses
on this very relationship. [Wisdom (1931)] Now there arises the question: what dis-
tinguishes Frege’s and Russell’s use of transformative analysis from earlier uses? The
answer lies in part in the role attributed to quantificational logic. As is well known, this
variety of logic emerges only with the works of Frege and Peirce. Quantificational logic
provides philosophers with a completely new set of tools to work through their analyses.
In the first place, it provided an unforeseen expressive power, enabling one to represent
propositions and inferences in a form that was both lucid and systematic. The represen-
tations given in quantificational logic provided glimpses to the fine structure of linguistic
expressions, propositions and inferential patterns. These enormously facilitated analysis.
But this mode of representing propositional contents and inferences resulted also in some
severe philosophical difficulties. Foremost among these was the question about the rela-
tionship between ordinary language and formal logic. It now became necessary to find
criteria that governed the ‘correctness’ of a logical formalization. At this early period
philosophers inspired by these new tools were led to ponder over what was preserved
in such transformations. The essential question was: what is preserved and what can be
13In a nutshell, what is involved in Russell’s theory of description is a general scheme for analysing propo-
sitions of the form “G(ιx)(Fx)”. On Russell’s account a proposition of a type which can be expressed by
utterances of the form “F is G” is logically equivalent to the proposition expressed by the conjunction of the
following three clauses: (a) There is at least one F, (b) There is at most one F and (c) Everything that is F is
G. Now, the proposition “G(ιx)(Fx)” is defined as ‘meaning the same as’ “(∃x)((∀y)(Fy ≡ y = x)&Gx)”,
or equivalently, “(∃x)(Fx&(∀y)(Fy ⊃ y = x)&Gx)”.
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allowed to vary? In this novel context such questions could be addressed in a far more
detailed form that before. In particular, the coherence of the representations was now
dependent on the coherence of the logic itself. Thus, the new approach to philosophical
analysis by means of the tools provided by mathematical logic aroused the need to justify
the new logic. It is precisely this issue that gives the so-called analytic turn its philosoph-
ical momentum. It is arguably true that the analytic turn instigated the linguistic turn
that was to become the hallmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Indeed, without the
investigations of Frege and Russell into the possibilities of transformative analysis that
resulted in the varied applications of quantificational logic, the philosophical questions
that have given shape to the analytic tradition at large would largely have remained
unasked. The research line of transformative analysis in philosophy ultimately leads to
the emergence of a completely new conception of analysis, the program of rational re-
construction, largely associated with the Vienna Circle, and Rudolf Carnap in particular.
Rational reconstruction is “the searching out of new definitions for old concepts”, where
the new definitions “should be superior to the old in clarity and exactness, and above all,
should fit into a systematic structure of concepts.” [Carnap (1961), v] It is the develop-
ment of this conception of analysis, that later came to be called “explication”, that forms
one of the focal topics of this dissertation.
We have so far investigated two different senses of analysis, the decompositional and the
transformative senses. These terms have been introduced by Michael Beaney [Beaney
(2007c)] as a part of a classification that comprises three different variants of analysis.
The third, and final one, is called regressive analysis. Why is it not mentioned here in
connection with the developments in analytic philosophy? The answer is that it can be
identified with the idea of analysis that we have already encountered: the analysis of the
ancient Greek geometers. To reiterate, according to Pappus:
In analysis we suppose that which is sought to be already done, and we in-
quire from what it results, and again what is the antecedent of the latter, until
we on our backward way light upon something already known and being
first in order. [Hintikka & Remes (1974), 8]
The conception articulated here has been, and remains today, a core conception of anal-
ysis. We have seen examples of it in Aristotle’s Topics, Descartes’ Regulæ and Newton’s
Principia. It is inextricably intertwined with the issue of inductive inference, as we have
seen in connection with Newton. It has also inspired the notion of abductive inference
introduced by C.S. Peirce. Although it is not often explicitly referred to in contempo-
rary philosophical discourse, it nevertheless remains a fundamental presupposition of
analytic methodology. Let us turn to the historically important relationship between the
notions of a priori, analyticity and the method of analysis.
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3.2 A priori, Analyticity and the Method of Analysis
The question about the nature and origin of the methods of analytic philosophy has been
a constant theme in the philosophical discussions during the last decades. A considerable
amount of scholarly effort has been put into understanding the fundamental problems,
methods and tenets of analytic philosophy. More recently, a historical approach to these
questions has acquired momentum, and the history of analytic philosophy is presently
acknowledged as an important subdiscipline of philosophy (concentrating essentially on
the origins of the analytic movement and its intricate relationship with the continental
traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism).14 Very little, however,
has been done to elucidate the relationship between the method of analysis and the con-
cept of analyticity. The latter has played an important role in philosophy since Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason (1789), although already Leibniz had recourse to it in his distinc-
tion between the truths of reason and the truths of fact. The distinction between analytic
and synthetic, which Kant brought to prominence, has mapped out the whole sphere of
discourse associated with the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological problems
in the last two-hundred years. Depending on the context, the distinction has been re-
garded as “classical” and “vast”,15 or, in a more critical vein, as the most idiosyncratic
dogma of modern philosophy (Quine and his interlocutors). In any case, philosophers
who have been intrigued by the questions Kant raised, have felt compelled, in one way or
another, to define their position with respect to analyticity. The so-called “semantic tradi-
tion” from Kant to Carnap, as meritoriously depicted by J. Alberto Coffa [Coffa (1991)],
comprises a group of thinkers the works of whom represent a gradual evolution of some
of the most important concepts of modern philosophy, including meaning, truth, logi-
cal consequence, etc. The notion of analyticity plays a crucial role in this development.
Historically the notions of analysis and analytic sentence are intimately related, although
this conceptual affinity is not always consciously appreciated among earlier thinkers. A
hint of this affinity can already be perceived within the work of such figures as Wolff,
Baumgarten and Crusius, and it is even more apparent in the detailed and critical elab-
orations of Locke and Hume. But it is not until Kant makes the famous distinction that
the full implications of the connection start to unfold and become gradually disclosed.
The connection between the classical method of analysis and analytic sentences (propo-
sitions, judgements, arguments) is still very much alive in Kant’s treatment of analyticity.
Originally analytic sentences were truths which could be established solely by means
of analysis. There is ample textual evidence that Kant was familiar with the traditional
method of analysis. This is reflected in the manner in which the terms “analysis” and
14A cornucopia of treatises have been devoted to these issues, the most prominent of which are [Dummett
(1993)], [Hacker (1996)], [Stroll (2000)], [Baldwin (2001)] and [Soames (2003)]. More detailed presentations
of specific aspects of analytic philosophy are [Hylton (1990)], [Stadler (1997)], and [Hanna (2001)]. The
most recent monograph combining the enquiry of thematic and historical problems is [Glock (2008)]. More-
over, several collections of essays on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, for example, [Bell
& Cooper (1990)], [Monk & Palmer (1996)], [Glock (1997)], [Tait (1997)], [Biletzki & Matar (1998)] and [Reck
(2002)]. Philosophers permeated with Spenglerian spirits might find it appropriate to refer in this connection
to Hegel’s famous dictum that the owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk. If so, analytic philosophers are
chasing after gaunt specters.
15Prolegomena, §§3, 5 (pp. 270 and 276 of volume 4 of the Academy Edition of Kant’s Works).
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“synthesis” appear in his critical writings earlier than the corresponding adjectives, as
well as in his feeling the need to explain them in some detail. [Hintikka (1973), 124]
The conceptual background of analyticity
Joëlle Proust starts his lucid treatise Questions of Form by quoting Eberhard: “The distinc-
tion between synthetic and analytic judgements is not new; it has been known for a long
time”.16 [Proust (1989), xi] Proust is drawing our attention to the way in which Eber-
hard tries to downplay the originality of Kant’s distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason
by keeping it in the traditional setting of dogmatic metaphysics. But this is a serious
mistake. Although the distinction was made by others before Kant — by Leibniz, Wolff
and Baumgarten among others — they did not consider it important enough to highlight
it. Kant was able to bring about entirely new problems with his distinction. He revised
drastically the conceptual background and elucidated the presuppositions on the basis of
which new questions became possible. This was his notable accomplishment. But what
is the dichotomy actually about? What was novel in Kant’s way of formulating the dis-
tinction? Let us start by looking at the answer given by Kant himself. In Prolegomena, §2
he says:
[(A)] Metaphysical knowledge must contain nothing but judgments a priori;
this is required by what is peculiar to its sources. But whatever the origin of
judgments and whatever the kind of their logical form, there is a difference
between them as to their content, according to which they are either explana-
tory and add nothing to the content of knowledge, or enlarging in that they
increase the given knowledge; the former can be called analytic judgments,
the latter synthetic judgments.
In the next paragraph Kant elaborates the distinction further:
[(B)] Analytic judgments say nothing in the predicate that was not already
thought in the concept of the subject, though not so clearly and with equal
consciousness.
This latter remark has often been taken as the explicit definition of analyticity. Especially
Quine seems to think in this vein in the “Two Dogmas”, where the sole characteristic
of analyticity, as traditionally conceived, is claimed to be the one given in (B). But this
is a grave misunderstanding at best, and an irresponsible misrepresentation at worst.
The essential features of the distinction are given in the passage (A). What needs to be
emphasized here is that the definition (A) can be applied to any kind of assertions irre-
spective of their logical form, whereas the latter quite explicitly hinges on the presuppo-
sitions of Aristotelean logic according to which the structure of propositions is ultimately
16Proust is quoting Eberhard (Philosopohisches Magazin (Halle) I–III).
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analysable in the subject-predicate form. Strictly speaking, the analysis depending on
the Aristotelean approach should not even budge from the inference patterns built into
the logical theory, thereby imposing severe restriction also on the relations of analytic
propositions (sentences). This feature is crucial if one attempts to elucidate issues such
as the analyticity of logical truths, or better yet, define analyticity in terms of inferential
relations. Indeed, Aristotelean syllogistics consists effectively of a theory of inference
patterns among quantified sentences being generally of the form QXY, where X and Y
are universal terms (usually 1-term predicates) and Q is a quantifier belonging to the set
{all, some, no, not all}. The syllogisms that Aristotle presented as part of his Organon













Kant notoriously tried to defend in an essay of 1762, Von der falschen Spitzfindigkeit der
vier syllogistischen Formen, the thesis that all syllogistic reasoning depends on the single
principle Nota notae est nota rei ipsius.17 But the attempt to found logic on a single rule
of inference was fraught with difficulties as already Aristotle had observed. In such an
attempt it would be necessary to give an account of the procedure of reduction. Such an
17“The mark of a mark is a mark of the thing itself.” A scholastic principle which C.S. Peirce, for instance,
found as representative of what he called ‘leading principles’. The basic idea is that on inferential contexts
where one presents what Aristotle called an ánjÔmhma (enthymēma), that is, a non-valid syllogism (confer-
ring the conclusion some probability rather than certainty), then one can always make it valid by adding a
premise. Peirce’s example is:
Enoch was a man.
Enoch died.
Now, by incorporating the principle “Nota notae est nota rei ipsius” we can construct the following (valid)
syllogism:
111
account had been elaborated by Aristotle but Kant seems to have remained ignorant of
this. In a later compilation of his lecture notes on logic, edited by B.G. Jäsche and pub-
lished under the name Logik, Kant is not able to say much of interest about the syllogistic
or its application. Furthermore, he shows little understanding towards efforts to improve
upon the legacy of Aristotle. Of his predecessors work in this direction he was conspic-
uously doubtful. For example, of Lambert’s work in particular he says that it contains
nothing but useless subtleties. [Kneale & Kneale (1962), 354] Kant’s only motivation to
discuss formal logic in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft seems to be the attempt to distin-
guish it from the transcendental logic that formed such a central part of the whole of his
philosophical program. In fact, a curious tension is built between Kant’s general view on
logic that he adduces in the Preface to the second edition of the KdRV and his practice of
applying logical notions in the body of the text itself. Perhaps this is made clearer if we
quote a passage from the mentioned Preface:
That logic from the earliest times has followed this sure path [of a science]
may be seen from the fact that since Aristotle it has not had to retrace a sin-
gle step, unless we choose to consider as improvements the removal of some
unnecessary subtleties or the clearer exposition of its doctrine, both of which
refer to the elegance rather than to the solidity of the science. It is remark-
able also, that to the present day it has not been able to advance a step and
is thus to all appearance complete and perfect. If some modern philosophers
have thought to enlarge, by introducing psychological chapters on the different
faculties of knowledge, . . . , metaphysical chapters on the origin of knowledge
or the different kinds of certainty according to the differences in the objects,
. . . , or anthropological chapters on prejudices, their causes and remedies, this
could only arise from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science.
. . . The limits of logic are quite precisely determined: it is a science concerned
solely with the exhaustive exposition and strict proof of the formal rules of all
thought. [Kant (1929) [1787], viii]
In the light of the developments in the body of KdRV, this is indeed a remarkable state-
ment. For the modus operandi of the whole of Kant’s magnum opus is the application of
Nota notae est nota rei ipsius
Mortality is a mark of humanity, which is a mark of Enoch
Mortality is a mark of Enoch.
But this seems to run counter to the distinction between Merkmalen and Eigenschaften that Frege advocated
in his Foundations of Arithmetic, §53. Indeed, as seems prima facie plausible, the marks of a concept (such as
“humanity” in our example) are properties of the objects that fall under the first-order concept in question.
Therefore Enoch has the marks of “mortality” (such as “of biological origin”, “dependent on a steady supply of
energy”, etc.) as his properties. But, in contradistinction, the marks themselves are not properties of the
concept “mortality”, they are its conceptual constituents. In sum, mortality is a mark of humanity, but not a
mark of Enoch. It is a property of Enoch. Therefore the scholastic principle “Nota notae est nota rei ipsius” is
false. It should read instead “Nota notae NON est nota rei ipsius”. This observation makes many of the Kantian
arguments presented in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft dubious (the ontological proof of God’s existence being
the most obvious example).
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the distinction between general vs. transcendental logic. Simply put, logic as a pure sci-
ence concerns either the general or special use of the understanding. Giorgio Tonelli
elaborates on this: “The first use contains all absolute and necessary rules of thinking in
general, disregarding the differences between the various objects of thought, and can be
termed elementary logic (Elementarlogik). The second concerns the rules for thinking cor-
rectly about a certain kind of object, and can be termed the organon of this or that science.”
[Tonelli (1994), 60] One thing that is worth noting at this stage is that Kant does not seem
to conceive the organons of specific sciences as anything more than instruments for ver-
ifying and correcting knowledge. The idea of logic as an instrument (or of the organons
as instruments) for extending knowledge does not yet appear in the 1781 edition of the
KdRV. A more productive task is ascribed to the organons only later, in 1790. A further
distinction within general logic is between general pure logic and general applied logic. The
former is solely concerned with principles a priori and is conceived as the canon of the
understanding and of reason. This is, however, to be understood as pertaining to the
formal aspects of their use only. It is a doctrine more geometrico demonstrata and as such
completely a priori (cf. the purely formal aspects of Aristotelean syllogistic alluded to
above). The latter is concerned with the rules for the use of understanding under sub-
jective empirical conditions. These empirical conditions that are imposed on this use are
determined by empirical psychology. These rules do not make a distinction between the
objects of the understanding, thus failing to fall under either the canon of the understand-
ing (in the former sense) or an organon of any specific science. Kant regards such rules
as a compendium of common sense (gemeiner Verstand). Kant goes on to enumerate the
objects that the class of these rules accommodates. These objects include attention, the
origin of error, the state of doubt, of scruple [Scrupel] of conviction and so on. [A 52–55; B
77-79] Kant compares the presuppositions of applied logic to the those of practical ethics
“which considers these [moral] laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations
and passions to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish us
with a true and demonstrated science, because it, as well as applied logic, requires em-
pirical and psychological principles.” [ibid.]
There are marks of convergence of Kant’s views on logic towards the end of the 1780s.
Hence, his overall conception of logic seemed to have acquired a solidity that reflected a
clear comprehension of the different parts of logic on the whole. In the Logic lectures of
1789 (Logik Bauch) Kant gave the following characterization of the scope of logic:
Anmerkung
¶1. Die Logik ist eine Doctrin, allein deswegen ist sie noch nicht practisch, sie
ist vollkommen nach Gestezen des Verstandes und der Vernunft. Eine Erkent-
nis, die dies Merkmal an sich hat, heißt vollkommen.
2. Die Logik ist eine Kritik, sie enthält nur Gründe einer Dejudication, nicht
der Construction; sie urtheilt; ob etwas den Gesetzen des Verstandes und der
Vernunft gemäß ist.
3. – propadevtisch heißt alles, was zur Vorübung gehört. Logik iste keine




b. als ein Theil der Philosophie.|
Die Logik ist der Uebergang der gemeinen Erkentnis zur Philosophie.
Philosophische Erkentnis ist Vernunfterkentnis. Man braucht nicht
α) seine Sinne zum philosophieren
β) nicht seine Imagination schwärmen zu lassen. Schwärmen heißt: seine
Kraft ohne Regeln in Bewegung setzen.
Das Denken der Philosophie, ist das Bewustseyn der Gründe.18 [Kant (1998),
17–18]
Summing up the discussion of Kant’s conception of logic so far, we can state the common
(supposedly valid) opinion that general logic disregards all content (Inhalt) of knowl-
edge (propositions), and is concerned solely with the logical form of the relationship of
the parts of knowledge (propositions) to each other. The kind of logic that does not ab-
stract from all content of knowledge and considers also the origins of our knowledge of
objects is in polar opposition to the general logic outlined above. The underlying mo-
tivation for such a logic would be to discern what in our knowledge is transcendental
apart from what is empirical, and would thus constitute an essential core of the critique
of knowledge, the pure science of the conditions of its possibility. This, of course, is
Kant’s central agenda in taking up the notion of transcendental logic. The central issue
under consideration here, namely, analyticity, does not hinge on the intricacies of Kant’s
transcendental program, however.19 The major issues here concern the expressive force
of formal logic and the inferential relations between propositions. Indeed, even within
the confines of Kant’s general logic there arises the possibility of conceiving some logical
laws as synthetic, as Jaakko Hintikka has shown. [Hintikka (1973), passim.] I do think,
however, that in the end the Kantian division of logic would have to be accommodated,
contra Hintikka, within any enquiry on analyticity that builds on the presuppositions of
Hintikka. This pertains especially to the question of logical truths.20
Let me now revert to the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
It is arguably one of the most important discoveries in the history of philosophy. Yet the
distinction would not amount to anything important, had Kant not in his critical work
18“Remark – ¶1. Logic is a doctrine, for which reason alone it is yet not practical; it is complete with
respect to the rules of the understanding and reason. Knowledge that is marked by these features is called
complete. 2. Logic is a [form of] critique, it consists solely of the foundations for justification, not of those
for construction; it makes a judgement; whether something is in conformity with the rules of the under-
standing and reason. 3. – Everything that belongs to preparatory practice is called propadeutic. Logic is
not a propadeutic of common sense, but belongs to philosophy in a double sense. a. as a propadeutic b. as
a part of philosophy.| Logic is a bridge from common knowledge to philosophy. Philosophical knowledge
is knowledge by reason. Man need not α) philosophize over its meaning β) let one’s imagination wander.
To wander means: to set the force of [imagination] in motion without rules. The thought of philosophy is
consciousness of the foundations.” My translation.
19This is not self-evident. Although many analytic philosophers would discard the Kantian division as
irrelevant for the question of analyticity, this contention is not universal. It may be argued that the Kantian
division must be retained to make sense of analyticity (the mode of representation of the distinction being,
naturally, along with the question about its meaning, a moot point).
20The issues relating to the analyticity of logical truths are tackled in [Hintikka (1973), ch.VII].
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— especially in the Critique of Pure Reason — tried to disclose the background opposition
against which the distinction could be appreciated. As a purely formal distinction per-
taining to formal logic, the distinction would be useless. This is because in logic objects
are considered in the abstract, without reference to the sources of knowledge about them.
The distinction becomes essential in the transcendental realm, or in transcendental logic,
because this discipline alone can elucidate the role of the different modes of predication,
or modes of acquiring concepts. [Proust (1989), 28] It is this transcendental interest in
the distinction that plays the prominent part in Kant’s motivations to introduce it in the
first place. But of what use is the notion of analyticity, then, if it pertains only to the way
in which “the connection between subject and predicate is conceived by identity”? Are
we forced to admit that the philosophical import of analytic judgements is encapsulated
by the trivial character Locke gave to “trifling propositions”? Not at all. To see this it is
essential to note how intimately Kant’s thought was still in keeping with the traditional
modes of analysis, as practiced in the medieval and renaissance philosophy. Kant very
explicitly coordinated his notion of analyticity with these traditional modes. I allude here
to the conception that he already held in his Inaugural dissertation. In it there’s a passage
in which he says:
Analysis, taken in the first sense, is a regress from consequence to ground,
but, in the second sense, it is a regress from a whole to its possible or mediate
parts, i.e., the parts of its parts. Both terms, synthesis and analysis, we here
use in the second sense. [D, I, §1, note.]21
The distinction between these two modes of analysis is sometimes alluded to by the no-
tions of qualitative and quantitative modes of analysis. [Proust (1989), 28.] I think this ter-
minology is misleading. In associating the Greek mathematicians’ nlusic solely with
the qualitative aspects of looking for the premisses of a given judgement or assertion in a
sense of an ‘upstream’ procedure in a direction contrary to that of logical or causal impli-
cations, one is overlooking the complementary, equally important aspects of the method.
In the Greek geometers’ nlusic the demonstrative or synthetic movement proceeding
‘downstream’ was at least as important as the nondemonstrative procedure. Moreover,
the various constructions employed in their proofs contained qualitative as well as quan-
titative aspects; for example, a typical proof in Euclid’s Elements invariably makes use of
a definite sort of construction which explicitly draws on a reductive analysis of a geomet-
rical figure into its composite parts; at the same time, however, the proof is of course also
logically built on the axiomatic structure of the whole exposition, deriving new theorems
from already proven theorems and axioms. So, in contradistinction to the complemen-
tarity of the method of analysis among Greek geometers, the mode of analysis that Kant
relied on in his philosophy was that of the resolutive type. In general, analysis may be
perceived as going from the conditioned back to the condition, a rationato ad rationem,
but what Kant mainly retained was the conception of analysis as a toto ad partes. [ibid.]
What counts is a progress in distinction. This means a transition from a state of ‘con-
fused’ knowledge to that of ‘distinct’ knowledge marking an increase in knowledge, as
21Italics added.
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Proust puts it, not materialiter, but formaliter.22 [ibid., 29] A final remark about Kant’s
overall conception of analytic judgements: in a sense, for Kant, analytic judgements are
reduced to formal identities. But they are not explicit identities in the way that the “tri-
fling propositions” of Locke are explicit identities. These are merely formal tautologies
without any informative content. Kant is not adducing his distinction with such propo-
sitions in mind. He thinks that analytic propositions are implicit identities. They are not
simple identities. Somehow the resolution of the original concept to its components con-
veys information about the original, ‘global’ concept that was not available before the act
of resolution. This conception of analyticity has gained some momentum in the twen-
tieth century, most notably in the attempts of Hintikka to approach analyticity with the
conceptual tools of information theory,23 but on the whole it has not been the most pop-
ular account of analyticity. For most modern philosophers analytic propositions are still
a trifling business.
Kant’s notion of analyticity cannot be properly understood without grasping its relation
to the notion of a priori. Therefore, something must be said of that notion, even if the
clarification that can be provided here is bound to be a rough sketch. I will draw on
the succinct characterization of a priori by C.D. Broad. The notion emerges in association
with the famous problem that Kant presents in the beginning of Prolegomena, i.e. “How
is synthetic knowledge a priori possible?” C.D. Broad offers a straightforward solution
to the Kantian problem [Broad (1978), 3-8].24 He maintains that in answering the ques-
tion “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” Kant had recourse to a completely
different sense of a priori than the one endorsed by his most notable precursors, videlicet:
Leibniz, Locke and Hume. These three philosophers understood “a priori” in terms of
what Broad calls absolute a priori. This is nothing other than the traditional conception
according to which one’s knowledge of p is a priori if and only if one can see that p is nec-
essary. Furthermore, one can come to recognise that p is necessary either directly through
inspecting its terms and analysing their meaning relations or indirectly by showing that p
is a logical consequence of other propositions each of which one can see by direct inspec-
tion to be necessary. However, Kant formulated another sense of a priori, which Broad
calls the transcendental a priori, that was meant to vindicate judgments that are both syn-
thetic and a priori. Broad describes the meaning of this determinant (transcendentally a
priori judgment) succinctly:
It is a judgment which asserts, with regard to all objects of possible human
sense-perception, that they must have certain characteristics, because the lat-
ter are entailed by certain very general facts about the way in which human
minds work. Kant’s transcendentally a priori judgments are not judgments
of intrinsically necessary propositions. If Kant is right, they are judgments of
propositions which are necessary consequences of certain facts about the human
mind; but these facts are contingent and so are their consequences. [ibid., 7.]
22Proust refers to Kants Logik, §36.
23The notions of surface information and depth information providing, in effect, a criterion for distinguishing
between simple and implicit identities referred to above. See [Hintikka (1973)] and [Rantala (1987)].
24This solution is controversial, and I believe, still one of the debated points of Kant’s philosophy among
most Kant scholars quite independently of Broad’s arguments. See for example [Guyer (2006), passim.].
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The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements has, of course, mapped out
the whole sphere of theoretical thought in the post-Kantian era. This is especially so with
respect to mathematics. The literature on the foundations of mathematical knowledge
(where the distinction has figured prominently) is formidable and much of it derives its
main thrust from the seminal studies of both Frege and Russell. Not all philosophers (or
mathematicians, for that matter), however, have considered the point of view provided
by Kant as even an acceptable point of departure for their technical discussion. Hermann
Weyl, for instance, regarded the Kantian distinction a confusion, much to the detriment
of the subject of mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics:
Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements (Critique of Pure
Reason, Introduction) is so obscurely phrased as to render a comparison with
the precise concepts of formal validity in mathematical logic almost impossi-
ble. [Weyl (1949), 18]
In contradistinction, Weyl very much appreciated the unique and refined analyses of
Husserl in the latter’s Logische Untersuchungen and gave credit to the definition provided
by Husserl:
Analytic laws are unconditionally universal propositions containing no con-
cepts other than formal. As opposed to the analytical laws we have their par-
ticular instances, which arise through the introduction of material concepts or
of ideas positing individual existence. And as particular cases of laws always
yield necessities, so particular cases of analytic laws yield analytic necessities.
[Husserl: Logische Untersuchungen II, p.254]
Many mathematicians (and philosophers) have felt similarly about the Kantian distinc-
tion and have turned to other philosophical sources for clarification of the notion ana-
lyticity. Indeed, it has remained a constant theme of interest in modern philosophy. The
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements (similarly, between a priori and
a posteriori knowledge) acquires a very important function in the philosophy of Rudolf
Carnap, as will become evident in the chapters to come. Carnap’s attempts to theoret-
ically demarcate the notions of analytic and synthetic knowledge becomes one of the
leading lights in his journey from ‘quasi-analysis’ to ‘explication’. Quine’s highly critical
remarks about the analytic-synthetic distinction are seen to lose much of their philosoph-
ical weight through the fact that they are very much directed at a position that was sup-
posedly Carnap’s but which Carnap, by the time Quine’s “Two Dogmas” appeared, in
fact had already abandoned two decades before. The philosophical positions of Carnap
and Quine in the 1950s were closer to one another than Quine was prepared to admit
(then and afterwards). This hints at the underlying pragmatic presuppositions of Car-
nap’s philosophy that gradually worked their way to the surface and became clearly
manifest in the method of explication introduced in The Logical Foundations of Probability
in 1950.
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In this section I have provided a concise account of the notion of analysis in its historical
context and hinted at the importance of the method of analysis for modern philosophy.
Moreover, I have elucidated the historical relationship between the method of analysis
and the concept of analyticity. These issues will be investigated in more depth in the
second part of the dissertation, when we concentrate on Carnap’s philosophical devel-
opment and the systematic questions that he tried to answer within the confines of the
analytic tradition of philosophy. We still have to examine briefly the significance of a pri-
ori knowledge for ethics. Then, to round out the chapter, we survey briefly the cultural
developments that were conducive to the dissociation of the moral from the domain of ra-
tional scientific discourse. This phenomenon constitutes the akme of post-modern moral-
ity.
3.3 A priori Knowledge in Ethics
To revert back to the topic of ethics, it is pertinent to take a closer look at the two fun-
damental questions, viz. the problem of subsumption and the problem of means and
ends, which render the knowledge of empirical necessary for a comprehensive ethical
theory. We shall mainly concentrate on the issues raised by the latter, and hence the
problem of subsumption shall not be given too much weight in the remainder of this
chapter. However, it will be a prominent undercurrent in the second part of the dis-
sertation, where Carnap’s method of explication and its relevance for the task of social
engineering will be examined from a systematic point of view. Although the traditional
question of philosophical anthropology, “What is a person?” is not one that belongs to
the ambit of Carnap’s explicit philosophical interests, it nevertheless – as we shall see
in due time – constitutes an essential ingredient of the more comprehensive program of
explication, at least as it is conceived by André Carus.
Let us begin with a question concerning the relationship between a priori knowledge and
ethics which has played a prominent role since Aristotle, viz. “What is the logical rela-
tionship between Is and Ought?”25 If we acquiesce to Hume’s Law, traditionally given
the formulation “purely normative propositions do not follow from descriptive propo-
sitions”,26 we can answer that surely, there is an evident discontinuity between Is and
Ought, but this does not exclude the possibility of mixed syllogisms which allow a deriva-
tion of a normative proposition from a descriptive proposition and another normative
proposition. For example, providing a schematic form of such a syllogism, from the nor-
mative proposition, “x ought to realize value V” and the descriptive (empirical) proposi-
tion “Under conditions C, means M is necessary in order to realize V” logically follows
the obligation “x should use means M under conditions C”. There is an analogy between
25On the Aristotelean conception of practical syllogism, see for example De Anima 434a16 ff., De motu
animalium 701a7 ff., Nicomachean Ethics 1144a31 ff., 1146b36 ff., and on the concept of means toward an end,
Metaphysics 1032b6 f. Noteworthy about the Aristotelean syllogism is that the conclusion is not a proposition
but an action.
26As is well known, Hume was the first philosopher to formulate this idea clearly in A Treatise of Human
Nature III 1,1.
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the relationship of the normative and descriptive components in ethics and in substantial
descriptive theories of the sciences; whereas the former combines the knowledge from
the two distinct sources of the normative and empirical sphere, the latter combines the
knowledge of the logical and empirical elements. The necessity of combining the two
resources of knowledge is aptly remarked on by Hösle:
Even if we were to follow Kant in assuming that these two items of knowl-
edge have no common origin, we would not be able to deny that knowledge
in the full sense of the word first emerges fro their collaboration. Analogously,
every responsible decision presupposes a combination of normative and de-
scriptive knowledge, and no social science that wants to provide a basis for
such decisions can balk at this kind of combination – while being aware that
the normative element has to be provided by philosophy. [Hösle (2004), 125]27
Immediately following this passage, Hösle stresses the significance of the concept of a
mixed syllogism for even the clarification of the opposition between ethical absolutism
and relativism, and rightly so. It is precisely the complementarity of the major premises
and conclusions of the syllogism that enable us to distinguish them, and partly explain
the mechanism by which they are come by in the first place. According to the universalist
conception of ethics, the major premises of an ethical (mixed) syllogism “are valid, like
mathematical truths, always and everywhere (naturally, this does not mean that they are
acknowledged in every culture, and still less that people everywhere act in accord with
them – though neither of these qualifications puts their validity in question).” [ibid.] The
alluded complementarity resides in the fact that “conclusions of a mixed syllogism are
neither always nor everywhere valid: their validity presupposes the truth not only of the
normative major premise but also that of the descriptive minor premise, and the latter
may well depend on the circumstances.” [ibid.] The distinction between general moral
principles and concrete norms is relevant here; the former are known only within the do-
main of pure validities, and it is not realistic to assume that many people succeed in rising
to the level of their contemplation; concrete norms, on the other hand, “follow from the
principles and the descriptive minor premises, are more comprehensible, and so people
will stubbornly cling to them even after the situation has changed. This is one of the great
dangers of abstract absolutism.” [ibid.] The danger of moral relativism, however, is even
greater, because “for it both principles and norms change, so that people are left with
nothing stable to which they can cling.” [ibid.] Whereas absolutism causes, according
to Hösle less damage than relativism, because its mistakes reside solely within the intel-
lectual realm, “relativism misses the dimension of value that is the heart of the moral.”
[ibid.] We have already seen how the ideals of technical, strategic and communicative
rationality characterize the sphere of practical ethics; they embody what can be broadly
called means-ends rationality. Whereas technical rationality is grounded in the natural
27Hösle makes the additional remark that “[t]he fact that the minor premise is descriptive does not imply
that it has to be a posteriori. There are also theoretical a priori synthetic propositions, for example, philo-
sophical social science seeks to derive some characteristics of social systems and their developments from
their concepts.” [ibid.]
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sciences, providing answers in the realm of subject-object relationships, strategic rational-
ity is grounded in the social sciences, providing answers in the realm of subject-subject
relationships. A paradigmatic example of a discipline that mediates between these forms
of rationality is medicine, “since it is concerned with a natural object of a very special
kind, the human body; and the transformation of medicine into a pure natural science
at the expense of folk psychological knowledge does not do justice to this intermediate
position.” [ibid.]
One particularly relevant sphere of a priori knowledge that has to be taken into account
with respect to ethical theory is the dyad consisting of decision theory and game theory.
Although it is impossible to delve into details concerning these disciplines or their sig-
nificance for ethics, we can make a couple of general remarks about the specific character
of the kind of questions that are involved. In the first place, given the general problem
of means-ends analysis within a concrete situation, the question about the legitimacy of
a given means in a concrete situations is significantly aggravated by the uncertainty as-
sociated with the means, i.e. in situations in which the means will entail the preferred
consequence with only a certain degree of probability or in situations in which the nega-
tive consequences of the means are realized with a certain probability. In the latter case
one is dealing with the analysis of risk. In the second place, decision theory is completely
amoral, i.e. it is solely concerned with the criteria of rational decision without taking into
account elements of practical reason taken in its Kantian sense; a decision is understood
‘rational’ if it selects among possible alternative actions (including the omission of any
action) the one that is subjectively best for the person concerned. Generally, one speaks
of “decision under uncertainty” when the person (“agent” in the characteristically value-
neutral language of decision theory) framing his decisions does not know (exactly) what
will happen and is not in the position to assign a subjective probability to each of the
possible outcomes of his action. In decisions involving risk, the assignment of subjec-
tive probabilities to each of the possible outcomes is, in contradistinction to the former
case, an essential ingredient of the model. To conclude our short remarks about decision
theory and game theory, we may mention some qualifications that are necessary in the
application of them under the purview of ethics. Vittorio Hösle brings forth four impor-
tant restrictions: (1) “for ethics, only a moral assessment of the various circumstances is
relevant”; (2) “the concept of subjective probability is no less problematic than that of sub-
jective preference”; (3) “for decision theory, omission is only one form of action among
others, whereas traditional ethics has always recommended that morally risky actions be
avoided in case of doubt, even if the risk of not acting is greater than the risk involved in
the action, because one is less responsible for the outcome when one does not do some-
thing than when one does it”; and (4) “decision theory [. . . ] greatly overestimates human
capabilities of calculation”. [ibid., 136–146] It is interesting to note that Rudolf Carnap
devoted the last two decades of his career to theoretical issues related decision theory,
inductive logic and probability. This is a topic which we, however, cannot go deep into
in this dissertation.
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3.4 The Roots of Ethical Nihilism
3.4.1 The cultural foundations of modernism in Central Europe
To illustrate the continuity and connectedness of some of the most prominent intellec-
tual trends and ideas that defined the cultural milieu of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century Central Europe, especially Germany and Austria, and to see how these
trends gradually led to the growth of ethical nihilism, it is essential to notice how this
particular historical era was shaped by two contrary influences. These influences were
inextricably linked to the traditions of Enlightenment and Romanticism. Their intricate
dialectic in the fin-de-siècle Germany (and Austria) constitutes the spiritual force field
in which modernism took shape. The modernism that we identify with the impressive
cultural achievements of the Middle-European nations was very much defined by the
fervent activity in the German speaking countries and their major cities, most notably
Vienna, the cultural ‘hot-house’ of the turn of the century. There the vigor of spiritual ac-
tivity and the richness of its resources found expression in fields as diverse as architecture
(Adolf Loos), music (Arnold Schönberg), literature (Robert Musil), philosophy (Ludwig
Wittgenstein), logic (Kurt Gödel), mathematics (Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Richard von
Mises), physics (Ludwig Boltzmann, Ernst Mach, Philipp Frank, Hans Thirring), eco-
nomics (Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises), to name the most important examples. It was
under these unique circumstances that the philosophy of logical positivism was born.
On the background of our theme lurks the question of what one means by culture. Ac-
cording to a succinct definition, culture is “a historically derived system of explicit and im-
plicit designs for living, which tends to be shared by all or specially designated members of the
group.”28 Not to put too much emphasis on this point, I take culture to be an indepen-
dent part of a three-fold social order, along with several social theorists. Jürgen Haber-
mas, for instance, speaks of a society that consists of three subsystems: (i) socio-cultural,
(ii) political-administrative, and (iii) economic. The preference for a three-fold division is
shared with other social theorists, for example the sociologists Daniel Bell, Johann Arna-
son and Nicholas Perlas. One can even find this division as a theoretical background as-
sumption in the artistic and social theory of Josef Beyus. What these different approaches
have in common is the ascription of an independent role to the cultural sphere. This
implies that society is not viewed as a homogeneous entity characterized by a unified
structure and organized according to universal principles. Indeed, a heterogeneous pic-
ture of society emerges in which the different spheres identified in the three-fold division
comprise various complex and interconnected parts, and their interaction is governed by
the intricate dynamics characterized by the fact that the different spheres often develop
at their own rate, independently of the other spheres, and this is likely to cause friction
in the overall development and functioning of the society. As Bell writes:
Against the holistic view of society, I find it more useful to think of contempo-
rary society . . . as three distinct realms, each of which is obedient to a different
28See [Kluckhohn & Kelly (1945), 98].
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axial principle. I divide society, analytically, into the techno-economic structure,
the polity, and the culture. These are not congruent with one another and have
different rhythms of change; they follow different norms which legitimate dif-
ferent, and even contrasting, types of behavior. It is the discordances between
these realms which are responsible for the various contradictions within soci-
ety. [Bell (1976), 10]
This three-fold division is a quite recent invention. The first writer to have systematically
developed this idea is Jakob Burkhardt (1818–1897). Burkhardt, professor in the Basel
University, spoke emblematically of the three “Potenzen”, three historically influential
powers, that he identified with state, religion and culture. As a mirror of the times and
the prevailing habits of thought, this division betrays the fact that economy was not yet
considered as an important factor in the development of a society. In contrast, religion
was still seen as possessing an indisputable role in shaping the lives of the citizens to
justify its separation from the broadly conceived sphere of cultural influences. Of course,
this has all changed now, and one of the characteristic features of the cultural develop-
ment that we call modernism is the conspicuous transition from an ecclesiastical culture
to a secular one. What essentially happened in the turn of the century, in the transition
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, was that the notion of culture became far
more flexible than what it had been in the times of Burkhardt. To take one notable exam-
ple, consider the very influential writings, the novels as well as the theoretical cultural es-
says, of Robert Musil (1880–1942). There is a conspicuous dualism in Musil’s conception
about culture. On the one hand, he draws on a classical conception of culture conceived
as a regulative ideal that governs those practices of men that lead to technological, artistic
and social achievements, i.e., a conception that defines culture as a totality. On the other
hand, he draws on a clearly modern conception which focuses on the conflict between
culture and nature, a theme that appeared already at the times of Burkhardt, but that sur-
faces really only in the twentieth century, characterizing in a dramatic way the essential
tensions in the modernistic society that ultimately deform its structure and undermine
its established frameworks for creative activity and spirituality. In the 1920s and 1930s
when Musil wrote his most influential works – especially the insuperable documentary
of the fin-de-siécle Zeitgeist, the novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften – he was well ahead
of his time, seeing culture as a part of society that stands in opposition to the economic
and political spheres.29 Musil was not alone, however, in defending the autonomy of the
strictly cultural. Indeed, Alfred Weber (1868–1958), in addition to advocating a variant of
29Another characteristic of Musil’s original thought – and one that brings it surprisingly close to Carnap’s –
was a vision of a kind of a ‘science of possibilities’ or Möglichkeitswissenschaft in the The Man without Qualities.
This vision builds on the distinction between the “sense of reality” and “the sense of possibilities”. The latter
is attributable to people who are able to “consider what could just as well have been the case, and not to take
what is more seriously than what is not.” [Musil (1931), 16] (Italics added.) Furthermore,
[t]he consequences of such a creative tendency can be remarkable, of course. Unfortunately
it often makes what people admire seem wrong, what they prohibit seem permissible, or
both seem indifferent. Such possibility-people [Möglichkeitsmenschen] are enfolded, it is said,
in a gossameer cocoon of mist, imagination, dreaminess, and subjunctives . . . When they are
praised, these fools are sometimes called idealists, but this obviously covers only the weaker
variant of the species that has no grasp of reality to begin with or sulkily avoids it — the variant
in which the missing sense of reality, in other words, is actually a shortcoming. But the possi-
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the tripartite division of historical and spiritual influences, maintained that culture repre-
sents the “seelische” and emotional sides of humanity, “seine eigentliche Wesenssphäre”,
of which everything else in life is an expression, a form, a materialization, an image, or a
symbol. Weber denied the possibility of a linear development of culture. Instead, draw-
ing on a conception of Kulturbewegung, he conceived culture as the history of forms of
expression and the search for transcendence.
Broadly speaking, the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century can be seen
as an intense battle of differentiation, and even fragmentation, the cultural sphere at-
tempting to emancipate from the political and economical spheres that undergo a drastic
development themselves, finally leading to the overwhelming importance of these two
spheres in the modern society. In the first decades of twentieth century there is a bewil-
dering interplay between the three spheres, making the distinction of sharp boundaries
between them very difficult, if not impossible. The national socialists, for example, based
their activity in part on the strategy of associating the spheres of culture and politics,
doing away with their difference. At the other extreme, illusions that politics could be
kept out of culture led to the multifaceted aspirations manifested in the Sportvereine and
sport movements including the establishment of the Olympic Games and the World Cup
in football and of the Wandervogel movement (in which Carnap participated during his
student years in Jena).30 These movements had a profound influence on contemporary
youth culture and attracted also many adults. The different conceptions of culture that
formed the basis for the practical activities of these various cultural movements had to
defend themselves against competing views of culture. The greatest challenge for the
conception of culture as a subsystem of society — effectively underlying many of the
modern conceptions of culture in the beginning of the twentieth century — came, per-
haps most prominently, from the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). His En-
lightenment view of culture as an autonomous and all-embracing totality was one of the
most important normative conceptions of culture that influenced the discourse in this
vein in the German-speaking countries. But it surely was not the only influential one. In-
deed, within this period different conceptions of culture abounded. Perhaps in no other
period in history has there been as exuberant collective evaluation among the general
public about the meaning of culture and its importance for the society at large. Every-
body knew something about it, everybody played a part in it, and everybody took part
in it.
One of the most important categorical divisions in the evaluation of the significance of
culture and its autonomy within the society was the distinction between Zivilisation and
Kultur. In a first approximation, the first might be characterized as something constructed
and artificial, whereas the latter refers to qualities describable as inner, deep and authen-
tic.31 Already Kant had drawn attention to this difference:
ble extends beyond the dreams of mentally deficient persons. It extends also to the aspirations
of God that have yet to awaken [die noch erwachten Absichten Gottes]. [ibid.]
30I allude to the significance of this movement for Carnap’s development in Chapter 4.
31Thomas Mann constantly draws on this contrast, which by 1918 had already become a cliché, in his
Betrachtungen über eines Unpolitischen.
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We are civilized to the point of excess in all kinds of social courtesies and pro-
prieties. But we are still a long way from the point where we could consider
ourselves morally mature. For while the idea of morality is indeed present in
our culture, an application of this idea which only extends to the semblances
of morality, and is in love of honour and outward propriety, amounts merely
to civilization. [Kant (1970) [1784], 49]
The idea of culture as something more subtle than civilization, indeed, as something more
closely connected with our inner beings was a fundamental tenet of German spiritual life
in the late nineteenth century. Culture was understood in Germany as as the true expres-
sion of feeling and self, as the individual’s inner values, the Bildung32 of its humanity,
for which the individual had to struggle in a way that was true to its inner being. Ac-
cording to Humboldt, while requiring education, culture is “etwas zugleich Höheres und
mehr Innerliches, nämlich die Sinnesart, die sich aus der Erkenntnis und dem Gefühle
des gesamten geistigen und sittlichen Strebens harmonisch auf die Empfindung und der
Charakter ergiesst.” The most important quality that has to be discerned in this state-
ment is the emphasis put on the significance of the education of the individual; national
differences play no part. It is this cosmopolitan quality that figures prominently in the
educational and philosophical ideas of modernism that can truly be said to derive from
Humboldt and his Enlightenment predecessors.
Alongside with the cultural influences the social circumstances prevailing in the early
twentieth century Germany and Austria played a prominent part in the shaping of the
modern mind. In a sense, the outward developments helped to steer the intellectual and
moral development in a definite direction. As Voltaire had already remarked, the link
between the importance and growth of civilization to the establishment and expansion
of town and city was not accidental. The extreme urban growth that Germany and Aus-
tria witnessed in the nineteenth century was a necessary condition of the emergence of
modernism. Some towns doubled their population between 1820 and 1850 or, even like
Berlin, trebled it by 1880. Although the trend was general, it was above all the larger
towns which increased disproportionately in size; between 1871 and 1910 the population
grew about 50% whereas in the larger towns this figure reached 300%. [Vasold (1996), 47]
Indeed, the growth in population was strongly correlated with the flourishing of culture,
especially in the so-called cities of modernism such as Berlin and Vienna. The fast growth
of the city and its multicoloured and bewildering mixture of civilization and culture, of
industry, technology, mass rallies, new art forms, and new means of communication were
effects that could not easily be understood by the categories and concepts provided by
the philosophies of the past. The urban man was born, and in his wake, modern modes
of thought, getting their expression in varieties of symbols that signified to many critics
the “Zeitalter der Nervösität”.
To provide one important example, a prominent force in the overall constitution of the
German intellectual and cultural life was the school of German historical economists
32The notion of Bildung which is essential for the description of the German culture is also a very promi-
nent feature in Carnap’s development. I will therefore postpone a more detailed discussion of it until Chap-
ter 4.
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which had a powerful influence on German nationalism, economic and social policy,
and social thought generally. This influence was coördinated and enhanced through the
Verein für Social Politik, a society established to incorporate the theoretical ideas of its
members in the concrete political practices of the Prussian government.33 In regard to
influence, the political economists centered around the Verein were far more important
in shaping the socio-political mind-set of enlightened individuals than Marx and Engels,
whose ideas were still comparably unknown at the time. Their fate was to remain as
marginalized outcasts for most of their lives, a state of affairs that was perhaps in no small
measure dependent on the fact that their political pamphleteering and explicitly tenden-
tial journalism that were known only to a small minority of similarly oriented revolu-
tionaries obfuscated the more solid and serious philosophical ideas on social structure,
economics and history, the celebrated advocates of which they would only later become.
The situation changed drastically after the Social Democratic Party became a prominent
force in the German Society in 1870. As is well known, they derived their inspiration
from the writings of Hegel on dialectics of history, of Adam Smith on economics, and of
Niebur and Maine on the history of ancient societies. In methodological terms they were
opposed to empiricism, holism, and evolutionary theories of historical change.
Compared with continental Europe the intellectual atmosphere in Britain in the first third
of the twentieth-century was much more moderate. There was not a discernible tendency
to follow certain fashionable currents of thought among the literate and the intellectual
atmosphere in general was tolerant of diverse ideas and ideologies. The exuberant dis-
cussions and debates about novel ideas in philosophy enlivening the café salons of Paris
or the Cafeterias of Vienna were alien to Britain. Indeed, one could not name any singu-
lar thinker whose influence on the public at large was especially notable. Even in the
academia new ideas were received with calm and only few exceptions exemplified the
panache of the intellectual occupations reminiscent of continental Europe. Isaiah Berlin
depicts the situation in Oxford in the 1930s:
I do not quite know what [is meant] by “intellectual currents”. I do not think
that one can identify currents of this sort — in effect philosophies of life, dom-
inant ideas, crisscrossing with other ideas, as happened in continental and
certainly in Russian universities before the Revolution. I do not think that
animateurs des idées are a typical English phenomenon. [. . . ] There was no
philosopher in England who exercised a general influence on the public in the
way that Bergson did in France, or Croce in Italy. There were no philosophers
33The general purpose and inception of the Verein is succinctly described by Arthur Mitzman: “To prevent
the impoverishment of the traditional middle class, to give the workers some legitimate role in the political
and social life of the nation, and to keep them from the agonies of applied Manchesterism, in October 1872 an
important group of political economists formed the Verein für Social Politik. The group hoped to accomplish
its aims by preparing detailed studies of the social problems raised by the new economic era, and by lobbying
among economic conservatives and in the government for reform proposals based on its studies. They
thus attempted to substitute themselves for social forces that were the outcome of successful revolutions in
England and France, and in so doing they continued a long tradition of academic involvement in the affairs
of the Prussian state.”[Mitzman (1986), 137]
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whose lectures were attended by fashionable ladies.34 [Berlin & Jahanbegloo
(1991), 6-8]
In addition, in contradistinction to the intellectual atmosphere in Germany, evolution-
ism and holism, rather than materialism and realism, constituted the dominant forces in
the thought of major English evolutionary sociologists — most notable among them be-
ing perhaps Herbert Spencer, Sir Henry James Sumner Maine, Sir Edward Burnett Tylor
and Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse. They embraced the idea that society could be compre-
hended as analogous to a holistic organism, deriving their influences most perspicuously
from the positivism and organicism of Auguste Comte, the drastic development of bio-
logical science, the geology of Lyell, and later Darwin’s theory of biological evolution.
Despite these rather considerable differences in the leading ideas of their cultural lives,
both Germany’s and Britain’s achievements in the sphere of culture would crucially de-
pend on a common set of presuppositions.
3.5 The Dissociation of Morals from the Domain of Rational
Discourse: the Case of Tolerance
How did the dissociation of morals from the domain of rational discourse take place? It
is clear that the general cultural trends alone were not a sufficient condition for this turn.
Indeed, intellectual factors played a prominent role in this process. The positivist phi-
losophy of science that emerged in the turn of the twentieth-century, as is well known,
articulated the relationship of the scientific and the moral in terms that greatly aggra-
vated the ‘crisis’ of human reason. We can only make a few comments here regarding
moral non-cognitivism and relativism in particular. A paradigmatic example of the in-
fluence of moral relativism is the change in the interpretation of the notion of tolerance.
Tolerance was one of the constitutive notions of the program of Enlightenment (both in
the ‘radical’ and the ‘moderate mainstream’ sense), as we explained above in Chapter 2.
We pointed out the place of tolerance (or open-mindedness) within the Enlightenment
classification of intellectual virtues and within the broader context of the history of epis-
temic virtues in general. Interestingly enough, there is a hidden connection between the
classical Enlightenment virtues and the epistemic virtues that underpin Carnap’s work.
In the heyday of the Vienna Circle, Carnap advocated structural objectivity as the intel-
lectual virtue that scientists should prescribe to. This position is characteristic especially
of his original and highly idiosyncratic work Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Later, when
the shortcomings of the program of rational reconstruction, a sort of report of which
the Aufbau is, have become fully evident, Carnap turns to a radically different concep-
tion of logical analysis in his Der Logische Syntax der Sprache which relies on explicit log-
ical pluralism which is manifested in the “Principle of Tolerance”. However, the purely
logico-mathematical interpretation of tolerance propounded by Carnap conceals the highly
34Only Thomas Carlyle has had the opportunity to delight in this privilege in Britain, notes Berlin. [ibid.,
8]
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relevant ethical aspects of this notion. As we have seen, the notion of tolerance was orig-
inally very much a notion of practical ethics. It might therefore seem a bit surprising to
see the notion applied in a completely different context of language engineering. There
is, however, a definite connection between these two seemingly very different usages of
the notion of tolerance. The logico-mathematical conception of tolerance is an outgrowth
of a historical process which helped to shape some of our most cherished criteria of epis-
temic (scientific) adequacy. The development of the different senses of “objectivity” in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, largely went hand in hand with
the development of scientific practices and experimental techniques which, in the end,
called for a broad-minded view on what particular methods could be regarded as ‘scien-
tifically acceptable’. Although the criteria of objectivity were transformed in the process,
the proposals that had gone before were never fully discarded. On the contrary, they
retained their well-defined niches in the Pantheon of epistemic practices. These practices
stayed alive because of the various needs of artisans, artists, scientists and other profes-
sionals that formed in parallel with the emergence of new scientific instruments and ex-
perimental techniques, such as photography. The multifarious practices of these different
professions were very much characterized by different “epistemic ways of life”. These,
in turn, were constituted by various techniques of managing, not just the instruments in
the laboratory or in the studio, but also the conduct of the artisan-artist-scientist. Hence
the question about objectivity turns out to have as much to do with the fine details of
epistemology and methodology as with character formation and ethics. The “history of
objectivity” as narrated by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison [Daston & Galison (2007)]
is important precisely because it brings to light the intricate relationship between ethical
and epistemological dimensions of objectivity. However, Carnap’s philosophical views
cannot easily be accommodated within the framework of epistemic virtues taken in the
broad ethico-epistemological sense. His philosophical style already exemplifies the kind of
fragmentation that, for example Husserl warned against in his Die Krisis der europäischen
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, and that was conducive to the kind
of deterioration of ethics that became the hallmark of Anglo-American philosophy in the
twentieth-century. By way of an example, let us see how the notion of tolerance has been
burdened by a semantic inflation within the confines of modern discourse ethics.
3.5.1 The modern dilemma of tolerance: from factual pluralism to an essen-
tially incoherent relativism
Tolerance is a notoriously ambiguous notion. The contemporary philosophical and ethi-
cal discourse in which this notion appears is muddled. It seems that “tolerance” does not
have a definite meaning. This is betrayed by the lack of any general rules or standards
to guide its use within the various contexts in which it is applied. Indeed, the very locu-
tions “X is tolerant”, “to tolerate Y”, “promoting tolerant policy towards Z” etc., have be-
come extremely vague because of their uses as ideological slogans. In folk-psychological
parlance toleration is often associated with an all-around indifference to, or a happy-go-
lucky allowance for actions and intentions that disagree with the (local) socially valid
mores. However, such a view on tolerance can at worst be tantamount to a thoughtless
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democratic blunder: allowing everything entails allowing nothing.35 Obviously, toler-
ance that allows everything amounts to anarchy, and then, as we have seen, we can only
speak about morality, which designates the distance from the collective identity of one’s
own culture. The morality of ‘abstract tolerance’, as such a naı̈ve view of tolerance may
be called, is dangerous and harmful because it has the consequence of isolating the indi-
vidual from the concrete values of his mores, and worse yet, from the collective identity
that springs from mores of the society. Abstract tolerance is an opprobrium of the notion
which, for example, Spinoza propounded and the clarification of which was in the inter-
est of the best minds of the Enlightenment. At worst, the attitude associated with such a
harum-scarum notion could even amount to a reversal of traditional morality (a state of
affairs that Spinoza very clearly abjured and warned about): even if it did not explicitly
urge people to support evil (a not altogether unrealistic possibility), it might accept it and
consent to it. Of course, this has everything to do with the problem of the relativity of
ethical values, an issue which we have become accustomed to; ethical nihilism as a sort of
a state of equilibrium, a status quo, within modern western societies.36 The good has be-
come only one of the options on the scale of values accommodating several equivalents.
The issue of choosing between good and evil has thereby been trivialized. (Whether this
is only an aspect of man’s gradual self-liberation, I leave for the reader to decide. The
detrimental effect of the trivialized rhetoric of ‘tolerance’ has nevertheless, I think, re-
ceived far too little attention from the side of philosophers.) This shows, first of all, that
the notion of tolerance defined in such a vague way cannot be a criterion for constructing
a system of morality; on this interpretation, it is simply inadequate for the background
framework of human action. Indeed, the way that the notion is generally used in ethics
is more accurately defined as being a ‘forcing principle’37 for situations where different
normative frameworks are in conflict (“every opinion is equally respectable”). For exam-
ple, in ethics the ‘principle of tolerance’ enters in a quite vague way as part of arguments
having the following structure:
(i) the recognition of the existence of rival factions, i.e. actual people who do not agree
with each other.
(ii) the recognition of the existence of rival views, i.e. abstract positions which are incom-
patible with each other.
(iii) the positing of a right to respect owed to the holders of the various disputed positions
on a personal basis, i.e. the political and social principle of toleration.
35Or, as Norbert Wiener put it with respect to the liberty of a mathematician constructing new concepts:
“To be free to do anything whatever is to be free to do nothing.” [Wiener (1954), 62]
36The positive effects of such nihilism, like the general tendency to react towards the dogmatic strictures of
traditional organized religions, do not compensate for the moral losses that are suffered by modern men and
societies because of the confusion of the normative and descriptive levels. The liberation from inadequate
mores which is attainable without compromising the autonomy of the moral, is illustrated by the hilarious
anecdote told by T.W. Körner, the Cambridge mathematician: “[. . . ] In Cambridge during the early 19th
century attendance at lectures was not compulsory but attendance at Chapel was. ‘The Choice’, thundered
supporters of compulsory chapel, ‘is between compulsory religion and no religion at all.’ ‘The difference’,
replied the opponent, ‘. . . is too subtle for my grasp.’ ” [T.W. Körner, “In Praise of Lectures”, 2n]
37Cf. the idea used in mathematics, where, intuitively, forcing consists of expanding the set theoretical
universe V to a larger universe V∗.
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(iv) the positing of an equal right to respect for the conflicting views that they hold, i.e. a
position often mistakenly seen as a corollary of (iii). [Almond (1998) [Morscher et
al. (1998), 279–280]]
In this way many arguments are presented in a form that constitutes a progression via
the ‘principle of toleration’ from factual pluralism to an essentially incoherent relativism.
Another type of pluralism emerges in situations where there is no reference to cultural
differences or alternative value-systems. This is a type of pluralism often encountered
(and implicitly assumed) in discussing moral dilemmas.38
What, then, are the prospects of defining tolerance as a respectable epistemic virtue?
One possible line of explicating the notion and rendering it respectable might be the
following. In as much as tolerance is essentially a propositional attitude bearing ex hypothesi
definite logical relations to such deontic notions as permissible, impermissible, obligatory,
gratuitous, optional, ought, etc., it might be possible to explicate it within deontic logic. Such
38Moral dilemmas may be said to arise either when an individual confronts two conflicting obligations,
or when two people have incompatible obligations. First, in the individual case it may be argued that
there are situations in which two incompatible courses of action are each morally binding on one person.
In the second case, two different individuals may each have a moral obligation in a situation in which it
is impossible that both action could be performed. How does this view of moral dilemmas comply with
the traditional Kantian view that “a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable”? Although some
moral philosophers have recently taken the course of arguing that moral dilemmas are possible and that
there is room for a reasonable pluralism that shows the compatibility of moral conflicts and objectivity in
ethics, (For example, Judith Wagner deCew in “Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism”, Ethics, 101, 28–
41.) I think that this line of thought is mistaken. Indeed, as Almond notes, “for while people do indeed
sometimes have difficult choices to make, difficult choices are not genuine moral dilemmas. That is to say,
choosing between options which are not morally equal is not a dilemma; on the other hand, though it may
be emotionally traumatising, choosing between moral obligations that are indisputably of equal weight is
not a moral problem, any more than choosing between two paths of equal length to a desired destination, is
a mathematical problem.” [ibid.] We are reminded here of Buridan’s ass: if it had been capable of grasping
this latter point, it might not have starved to death between two absolutely equal bales of hay. Hence, we are
prevented from pleading on situations usually described as moral dilemmas as justifying a form of ethical
pluralism. If the alleged pluralism entails the necessity of rational differences on matters of morality, what
are the possibilities for rational consensus in the absence of moral dilemmas of the type described above?
Almond elaborates this further: “As a philosophical position the tenet of the possibility of rational consensus
arises simply from the belief that people as independent individual thinkers and agents could reach shared
conclusions on matters of morals. This entails the possibility for arguing for different positions on grounds
that take into account the fact that some positions are better-grounded than others, some conclusions more
suspect than others. This grounding must ultimately lie in a fuller understanding of human nature. This
understanding itself must lie in the deeper appreciation of the links between facts and values — essentially
based on the knowledge of human biology, psychology, history, of political and social organisation, which at
least provide preliminary hints about where the underlying universal human interests might lie, and what
restriction and limitations of action human beings are prepared to accept in pursuing these interests. This
conception of common humanity as a fruitful starting-point for moral and political reflection is not at all new,
of course. It springs from the classical Greek conception of man, comprising essentially of two basic notions:
(i) the perception of moral values as transcendent – as by-passing the particularities of social and political
arrangements, of temporal and geographic locations, and (ii) the principle of the primacy and priority of
the ethical in human affairs. The upshot of this view is that the postulation of an internal ethic for a group
is simply another form of relativism which stands in the way of a self-confident and positive morality.”
[ibid.] It is just because of failing to realize this dimension of universality of the notion of tolerance that the
contemporary analyses of its philosophical import have went astray. It is the task for modern Enlightenment
to rectify this crooked timber of philosophical thinking.
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an approach seems prima facie plausible, because intensional logics provide a wide range
of possibilities for devising the formal semantics of modal notions. But there are reasons
for being skeptical about this possibility. Tolerance is primarily a meta-level concept
regulating the conduct of scientific (ethical) discourse on a very general level. It therefore
seems doubtful that the propositional attitude approach to tolerance would achieve very
much in the way of clarifying the notion of tolerance. Indeed, the importance of the
Principle of Tolerance consists in providing the framework in which various proposals for
a solution of a specific problem, moral or scientific, can be rationally evaluated. We shall
see that Carnap, because of his moral non-cognitivism, articulates merely the scientific
variety of tolerance, and even then, because of the intimate link between the moral and
scientific, fails to convince his colleagues about the significance of the Principle. This is
an example par excellence of the negative consequences of the lack of ethical virtue. As
we will see, in spite of the notable tension between the moral and the scientific, Rudolf
Carnap’s contributions in scientific philosophy are second to none; his most important
work no doubt belongs to the specific areas of philosophical semantics and inductive
logic, but also the architectonic of his thought and the so-called ideal of explication have
significant interest for the modern philosopher. Let us turn to examine the development
of his thought in detail.
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Part II





CARNAP’S EARLY CONCEPTION OF
ANALYSIS: rational reconstruction
4.1 Carnap’s Education: the Jena Years
The years 1890–1914 comprise arguably one of the most significant periods in Germany’s
modern history measured by its cultural, social, economic and political consequences.
During this short interval the German state undergoes a radical transformation from a
loosely connected coalition of 16 Länder1 constituting the monarchic regime led by the
Kaiser to the centrally governed parliamentary monarchy ultimately destined to erode in
the turmoil of world politics. It would be of great interest to chart this development, in
outline at least, because Carnap’s formative years coincide with this tumultuous era of
political and social change. In this dissertation I have to settle, however, with a far more
modest account of these phenomena. I will bring forth issues pertaining to the historical
and political background, in so far as they are relevant for this study, in connection with
the systematic questions whenever they illuminate the problems discussed. In short, I
entertain a principle of economy and refrain from providing too many historical details.
4.1.1 Ideological influences
One of the most original features of German culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, to some extent still visible during Das wilhelminische Vorspiel2 1890–1914 coinciding
1These included, at the turn of the century, the following: Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden,
Thuringia, Hesse, Hamburg, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Bremen, Anhalt, Lippe, Lübeck and
Schaumburg-Lippe.
2This locution derives from [Krockow (1990)]. Christian Graf von Krockow has divided the 100 years of
German history before Unification in 1990 to three periods, each which its own, distinctive character as well
as definite cultural and political significance. [Krockow (1990), passim.] The period from 1890 to 1914 is Das
wilhelminische Vorspiel, the period of gradual abrasion of the monarchic regime and erosion of the inherited,
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with Carnap’s formative years, was a form of intellectual and emotional cultivation re-
ferred to as Bildung. It is very hard to translate this term into English but it conveys ideas
relating to “education”, “educatedness”, “character formation”, “shaping”, “personal de-
velopment”, and “self-cultivation”. Growing organically out of the classical conception
of cultured refinement, or, ‘civilization’, it suggests mainly an idea of mental or spiritual
development. Its most representative advocates in the classical period, with Kant and
Goethe as the fixed stars of the cultural firmament, were Wilhelm von Humboldt and
Friedrich Sleiermacher. Following this tradition there emerged such widely differing
thinkers and writers as Arthur Scopenhauer, Adalbert Stifter, Friedrich Theodor Vischer,
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Theodor Fontane. In the ‘modern’ era its central ideas have
been propounded in a specifically personalized form by Thomas Mann whose renowned
novel Der Zauberberg can be seen as an expression of a modern version of Bildung.3 To
describe the characteristic modes of thought that accompanied the ideal of Bildung, the
following excerpt from Humboldt’s letter to Schiller illuminates some of the essential
ideas advocated:
Everyone must seek out his own individuality and purify it, ridding it of the
classical values of Bildung and Tugend, preparing the stage for Das deutsche Drama, the era of the two World
Wars, 1914–1945. The story of the post-war Germany is denoted by Krockow with the unimaginative title
Die Deutschen seit 1945.
3The question of Bildung is not altogether without interest even within the confines of most recent peda-
gogical discourse in Germany. In his thought-provoking book Bildung im Umbruch, Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines
has enquired the presuppositions and conditions of possibility of devising educational principles suitable
for our modern age along the lines of the classical Bildungsideal. At the end of his book he formulates three
central problem areas or questions that would have to be addressed to proceed further: “1. Man sollte sich
gegenwärtig ernstlich fragen, ob man die Bildung oder die Ausbildung von Menschen vorrangig im Auge
habe. Denn das macht bei der Beurteilung der eigenen Situation einen nicht unerheblichen Unterschied.
Was sich gelegentlich als sogenannte Fortbildungsveranstaltung geltend macht, bleibt doch oftmals weit
hinter dem zurück, was sie erreichen sollte, nämlich Aufklärung über diejenigen Bedingungen und Zwecke
des Handelns, die wir aus guten Gründen für sinnvoll und für vernünftig halten. Die vorrangige Sorge
muß daher darin bestehen, was sich aus einsichtigen und öffentlich vertretbaren Gründen der Zeit gemäß
gemeinsam wissen, wollen und schätzen läßt. 2. Die Frage, ob Harmonie für uns heute noch ein sinnvolles
und notwendiges Bildungsziel sein könne, hängt wesentlich davon ab, was man unter Harmonie versteht.
Dabei sind gemeinhin Erwartungen im Spiel, die man aus geistesgeschichtlichen und aus antropologischen
Gründen erst einmal auf den Prüfstand der Vernunft bringen sollte. Jedenfalls sollten wir uns davor hüten,
an den ‘Träumen eines Geistersehers’ fortzuschreiben, von denen Kant gelegentlich warnte. Ob es da im
Gegenzug Sinn macht, von ‘Konfliktfähigkeit’ als dem eigentlichen Ziel aller Bildung zu sprechen, bezwei-
fle ich. Dieses Bildungsziel legt doch die ebenso irreführende Vermutung nahe, Konflikte gäbe es nun einmal
und sie müßten als Störfälle oder als Fremdkörper beseitigt werden. Es gibt doch gelegentlich Probleme, die
werden nicht gelöst, sondern erkannt und als grund-legend anerkannt. Dazu gehört allemal die conditio
humana, auf die sich vernünftiges Wissen und Handeln durchgehend verpflichtet weiß. 3. Wenn der Begriff
der Harmonie die innere Spannung von Gefügtem und damit zugleich die gegenwendige Bewegung alles
Seienden bedeutet, dann läuft die uns gewihnte Rede von einer ‘harmonischen Bildung’ letzlich auf eine
Selbsttäuschung hinaus. Vernünftiges Reden, Denken und Handeln ist der Austrag einer gegenwendigen
und um sich wissenden Bewegung, die wir als ‘menschliches Leben’ jederzeit wahrnehmen und geltend
machen. Deshalb sollte man in der Vorstellung wie im Denken sehr scharf Harmonie und Symphonie unter-
scheiden. Wer aber sein Leben zu einer Symphonie, zu einem wohltuenden Zusammenklang gleichartiger
Töne gestalten will, wird scheitern. Denn Leben ist in all seinen Formen und Phasen harmos, Wiederstreit
dessen, was sich in der Spannung fügt. Auf eben diese Grundsituation eines um sich wissenden Lebens, das
sich in Kunst und Wissenschaft manifestiert und wiedererkennt, will Bildung aufmerksam machen. Und
von einer solchen Bildung sollte hier Rede sein.” [Pleines (2000), 259–260]
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fortuitous features. It will still be individuality, for a portion of the fortuitous
is inseparable from the make-up of every individual, and cannot an should
not be removed. It is really only in that way that character is possible, and
through character, greatness.4
The core of Humboldt’s conception of individual essence was modeled on the examples
of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Goethe himself. He did not want his character to be
a product of chance, although he was fully aware at the same time that he could never
be, nor did he wish to be, other than himself. In both a symbolic and romantic sense
“Bildung” meant for him the weeding of his mental and emotional garden, resembling
the Ciceronian cultura animi or the classical hellenistic conception of paideia.5 Henri-Irènèe
Marrou has given expression to this same idea in his Histoire de l’education dans l’antiquitè,
paraphrasing the idea of Plotinus’s phrase “modeler sa propre statue” in the following
terms:
Se fair soi-même; dègager de l’enfant qu’on a d’abord ètè, de l’être mal
dègrossi qu’on risque de demeurer, l’homme pleinement homme dont on en-
trevoit la figure idèale, telle est l’oeuvre de toute la vie, l’oeuvre unique á
laquelle cette vie puisee être noblement consacrée. [Marrou (1948)]
This passage is an accurate appraisement of the attitude that Humboldt propounded. In-
deed, Humboldt summed his own views pertaining to conduct and ethics in the follow-
ing ‘maxims’: “The first rule of a true ethical code is ‘Improve yourself’, and ‘Influence
others through what you are’ comes only second.” This kind of an individualism does
not form an easily assimilable attitude to life. This was especially the case in the late eigh-
teenth century (and even more so today), but for Humboldt it was a result of a firm ethical
decision that was to be reinforced later through the influence of his eminent friends like
Schiller, Goethe and Körner. In another letter to Schiller in 1796, Humboldt laid out the
ultimate desiderata of a life built on the notion of Bildung that he had envisaged:
If we imagine a man whose sole aim in life is to cultivate himself, his intel-
lectual activity must finally be concentrated on discovering (a) a priori, the
ideal of humanity, and (b) a posteriori, a clear picture of mankind in reality.
When both are as precise and complete as possible in his mind, he should, by
comparing them, derive from them rules and maxims for action. [ibid., 277f]
4Briefwechseln zwischen Schiller und W. v. Humboldt [1900], 3rd edition, with notes by A. Leitzmann
(Stuttgart), 176.
5Werner Jaeger has elaborated on the manifold meanings and pragmatic reverberations of this notion in
the classical Greek culture. Jaeger argues that through Socrates this notion has come to encompass problems
that are at the very root of our modern ethical outlook, giving emphasis to the notion of “self-mastery”: “Der
Begriff ‘Selbstbeherrschung’ ist durch die Sokratik ein Zentralgedanke unserer ethischen Kultur geworden.
Er faßt das sittliche Handeln bereits als etwas im Innern des Individuums Entspringendes, nicht nur als die
äußere Unterwerfung unter das Gestetz, wie es der herrschende Begriff der Gerechtigkeit forderte. Aber
da das ethische Denken der Griechen von dem Gemeinschaftsleben und von dem politischen Begriff der
Herrschaft ausgeht, so erfaßt es den inneren Vorgang ducrh die Übertragung des Bildes einer wohlregierten
Polis auf die Seele de Menschen.” [Jaeger (1954), 103]
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As much as the overall significance of the classical ideal of Bildung was being mitigated
towards the twentieth century, its central tenets still markedly influenced the generation
of Carnap, and perhaps Carnap himself more than anyone else among his peers, because
the educational ideas behind the Bildungsvollendung were entertained by his maternal
grandfather, the eminent educational thinker, Friedrich Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1824–1893).
Dörpfeld’s daughter Anna, Carnap’s mother, wrote a memoir of his life, and Carnap’s
first reminiscences of literary work relate to the book written by his mother. Carnap
summed up his feelings in 1963 by relating that he was “fascinated by the magical activity
of of putting thought on paper”, seeing in that experience a premonition of his life career,
adding that “I have loved it ever since.” [Carnap (1963), 3]
Carnap and the Bildungsideal
It is essential for the purposes of presenting the main thesis of this work to delve in some
depth to the background of this German cultural context. I will argue that the overall
philosophical worldview of Carnap and his entire philosophical program culminating in
the ideal of explication can be best interpreted as an outgrowth of the particular impulses
stemming from the Bildungsvollendung or Bildungsideal. As will become clear later, Car-
nap considered the thoughts underlying the programme of Vienna Circle as forming a
basis for the attempt to constitute a new comprehensive ideal of civilization. This ideal
was to be presented as an alternative to the inherited German forms of social organiza-
tion that had caused such devastating catastrophes as the total political and social failure
of the Weimar Republic followed by the First World War. This ideal he shared with Otto
Neurath, a zealous advocate of radical ideas of social renewal with leftist political lean-
ings. While Carnap at some point, especially during the World War, promoted the idea
of political involvement in tackling the social problems of the German society, and even
participated in radical politics, he ultimately came to think that such activity remained
inevitably at the surface. To bring about a radical change in society and its structure
in a democratic post-war society, a more robust intellectual framework was needed as
a basis. This basis was effectively, a new Bildungsideal adequate for the modern era. It
is this search for the fundamental ingredients of such an ideal that forms a significant
part of Carnap’s early intellectual strivings. Rather than remaining merely at the level
of an expression of a personally experienced Lebensgefühl, it is an essential component of
Carnap’s philosophical temperament, or as I will argue, an indispensable element in his
construction of his mature philosophical program, the ideal of explication. I will now
delve in more depth to the exemplars of Carnap’s early thought where the Bildungsideal
figures prominently.
Friedrich Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1824–1893) was heavily influenced by the philosophical tra-
dition stemming from Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841). Herbart’s philosophy was in part
characterized by opposition to German idealism in general, and the positions of Fichte
and Hegel in particular which, according to him, left no room for social influences. Iron-
ically, Herbart was originally a member of a group of thinkers which advocated absolute
idealism. In the fervent years of idealism, there was a total of three such groups, each
136
with its own peculiar approach to idealism, but all of them offshoots of early romanti-
cism or what could be called Frühromantik. The first of these groups was the “romantic
circle” in Jena and Berlin consisting of Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), and Friedrich von Hardenburg (1772–1801).6 The second
group was called as Bund der Geister which met in Frankfurt am Homburg, consisting of
a circle of friends comprising Friedrich Hölderlin (1774–1843), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel (1770–1831), Isaak von Sinclair (1775–1815), and Jakob Zwilling (1776–1809). The
third group was called Bund der freien Männer, meeting in Jena and modeled on Fichtean
principles. Its members included August Ludwig Hülsen (1765–1810), Johann Erich von
Berger (1772–1833), Johann Smidt (1773–1857), Johann Georg Rist (1775–1847), Johann
Casimir Böhlendorff (1776–1825), and Johann Friedrich Herbart. In the autumn of 1794
the philosophy of Fichte was coming under heavy criticism in Jena. This criticism was
propounded by those pupils of Reinholdt who had come to question the presuppositions
of foundationalism. Herbart was among those critics. He saw Fichte’s philosophy as
a desperate attempt to rehabilitate an approach to philosophy that was severely under-
mined by the alleged impossibility of creating complete philosophical systems after the
manner of the Wissenschaftslehre. The gist of Herbart’s novel approach, in addition to the
negative import of criticizing Fichte, was his insistence on the social situatedness of man.
The social circumstances surrounding man and the interactions between him and his
social environment were crucial in character formation. Especially the influences assimi-
lated in childhood and early youth were regarded by him as decisive. In another vein, he
stressed that philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular could be put on a solid
foundation solely by giving up the idealistic exaltation characteristic of Kant. Indeed, the
results and knowledge acquired by the natural sciences should be taken as the starting
point of every philosophical enquiry. As a vital part of his overall program Herbart envis-
aged a mathematical psychology that could rigorously analyse the various factors affect-
ing human action and deliberation. In such a psychology the conscious events of human
mind were seen as epiphenomena over the true constituents of mental activity, the ‘re-
als’, envisioned as analogous to the Leibnizian monads, exerting various effects (forms of
‘pressure’) on each other. In accordance with the ideals of Bildung, Herbart thought that
individual self-development implemented through active interest in ‘higher’ knowledge
and art was an absolute good in itself. Thus, as Carus has maintained, Herbart could well
be seen as a representative of the more traditional form of the Enlightenment values in
Germany at a time when the intellectual milieu was far more receptive and conducive to
the romantic ideals advocated by the absolute idealists. [Carus (2007), 43]
Dörpfeld remained attracted to the ideas of Herbart, and in a certain sense promoted
those ideas in his own pedagogical writings and teaching. Moreover, in the field of edu-
cational politics he resisted the bureaucratisation and centralisation of Prussian primary
and secondary education. This was a distinctively Herbartian tenet. As regards his ped-
agogical thinking, he was always aiming at explaining the task of a teacher in a scien-
tific manner, enabling a practising teacher to understand his duty according to reasoned
principles, always asking what, how, and why. Therefore he unceasingly emphasized the
supportive role of philosophy, logic and ethics in the work of teachers. He even con-
6Better known by his pen name Novalis.
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tributed to the first two disciplines, writing on the subjects of thinking and memory, and
on the development of concepts in the context of primary and secondary education. In
the turn of the twentieth century the ideas of Dörpfeld had acquired prominence within
the pedagogical circles. It was widely acknowledged that his writings contained a wealth
of deep and original thoughts. These he developed with characteristic clarity in a literary
style that was always fitting and lively. He was never content with having gained the
acceptance of a colleague or with having refuted an opponent. He wished to reach out
for a wider audience and adduce them the fundamental questions that laid at the basis
of education. Evidently these questions were too important to be left as the property of
a restricted elite only; the educational reform movement of early twentieth century in
Germany was a direct verification of this.
Carnap’s primary education was naturally shaped according to the ideals of his grand-
father. The central principle in Dörpfeld’s didactics was that the pupil understand com-
pletely whatever is taught, and be given ample opportunity to reflect on what had been
learned or discussed. This principle was entertained to enable the pupil to integrate the
new material with what he or she already knew from previous studies or experience.
Thus, after the death of Carnap’s father in 1898, Carnap and his sister were taught at
home by their mother Anna. She had thoroughly assimilated the didactic principles of
her father and applied them systematically in the education of her children. Everything
learned was to be completely understood, digested and connected with other knowl-
edge. This implied that the amount of material taught was restricted to a minimum. The
lessons she conducted took usually only about an hour a day, leaving plenty of time for
the children to think on their own about the taught material and to ‘read around’ the
subject. This method, as emphasised later by Carnap, contributed essentially towards
the development of his faculty of independent judgement and critical thinking: “But she
did not simply feed me ready-made answers; her main aim was rather to help me find
my own explanations. For example, she might just mention a few facts unknown to me
and then say ‘The rest of the answer you can now think out for yourself’.” In addition to
practical didactics, Carnap’s mother took pains to explain to the children the ethical atti-
tude of their father which she shared with him. This had a profound effect on Carnap’s
character formation:
What convictions, including religious beliefs, anybody had, was for her a
morally neutral matter, as long as he would seriously search for the truth and
in the forming of his convictions follow his best his insight. This attitude led
to a high degree of tolerance . . . I think it was chiefly due to this tolerant atti-
tude of my mother that later, when I abandoned my religious beliefs, I could
do so without an internal crisis.7 [UCLA 1957b, A9–A10]
Whereas Carnap’s mother acted as an exemplary model of tolerant thinking in matters
of religion, his father, Johann Sebulon Carnap, represented to him ‘a man of the peo-
ple’, “cheerful, extroverted, sociable and energetic”. In a sense Carnap must have envis-
aged him as a representative of Bodenständigkeit (rootedness in a particular local tradition)
7Cited in [Carus (2007), 47].
138
stemming from the “Bergisches Land”, the former Dukedom of Berg, which had become
part of Prussia in 1815. Carnap relates the characteristics of the socio-cultural atmosphere
in this region as follows:
The men of this region were known as having a strong sense of external and
internal independence. Here the Reformation was not established from above
by the authorities, but was carried through by the people themselves. Un-
til 1813 this meant a permanent struggle and resistance against the Catholic
regime of the region. Therefore the people themselves had to organise both
their church and their school communities and to take care of their own ed-
ucation. For many generations there had been quite a number among the
peasants and craftsmen who eagerly read books on religion, philosophy, sci-
ence, and history, and then gathered in the evening in small groups to discuss
their problems. The vivid interest which these people took in their religion
and their way of life could sometimes not be satisfied by merely accepting the
Lutheran doctrine. The Reformed Church, which was strongly influenced by
Calvinist ideas, had many adherents. About the year 1742 some members of
this church, among them two ancestors of my father, found the worldly life
in the great city of Elberfeld too sinful and intolerable. Eventually a group
comprising about fifty families emigrated to the other side of the mountain
and founded the town of Ronsdorf, which they called their ‘Zion’, devoted to
a new and better life.8 [UCLA 1957b, A5–A6]
This remarkable passage is important, not so much for its documentary import as to the
background of Carnap’s father, but rather as an example of the attitude which Carnap
very much considered to be still a part of his personality: “I believe there is still a trace
[of this impulse] in me, derived from the strivings of these people for the realisation of a
visionary aim, and from their missionary spirit, although [. . . ] transferred to secular aims
and, in accordance with my more contemplative than active temperament, not expressed
in practical activities.” [ibid.] What is to be stressed here is the primacy of a certain state of
mind, or intensity of will, in contradistinction to any particular religious doctrine. What
made the impulse stemming from his rural background so forceful was not its specific
content but rather the intensity of the feeling and urge for a betterment of the living
conditions of the community that accompanied it. As to the abandonment of religious
beliefs, Carnap is very open in his Autobiography:
The transformation of my basic beliefs occurred however not suddenly, but
in a gradual development. First the supernatural features in the doctrines of
religion disappeared. Christ was regarded not as divine, but as a man among
men, distinguished as an important leader in the development of humane
morality. Later the idea of God as a personal, though immaterial being, in-
terfering in the course of nature and history in order to reward and punish,
was abandoned and replaced by a kind of pantheism. This conception had
8Cited in [ibid., 48]
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certain Spinozist features, which came to me less from the works of Spinoza
himself than from those of men like Goethe, whose work, personality, and
Lebensweisheit (wisdom of life) I esteemed very highly. Since my pantheism
was thus more influenced by poetical than by philosophical works, it had
more an ethical than theoretical nature; that is to say, it was more a matter of
the attitude toward the world and fellow human beings than of explicitly for-
mulated doctrines. Later I became more and more convinced that pantheism,
if taken not as an emotional-ethical attitude but as a doctrine, could not be
scientifically grounded, inasmuch as the events in nature, including those in
man and society as a part of nature, can be explained by the scientific method
without the need of any idea of God. [Carnap (1963), 7–8]
In 1909 Carnap and his mother moved to Jena where Carnap was to begin his studies
in the university. The intellectual atmosphere surrounding Carnap widened consider-
ably. He joined a ‘Scientific Club’ where students gave talks and discussed contemporary
topics of science and philosophy. One of the most frequent topics was Ernst Haeckel’s
evolutionary naturalism, firmly rooted in the German tradition of positivism. Far from
being conventional, he was “admired by some of us, hated by others”, as Carnap related.
Most importantly, it was here at Jena that Carnap came first in contact with the tradition
of ideas stemming from Radical Enlightenment. These took first an outlet in the young
Carnap’s mind as definite expressions of political ideals. These ultimately turned Carnap
into a political activist. To these issues I now turn.
Political activity — Jugendbewegung and Serakreis
In his early student days Carnap became associated — at first at an intellectual level,
then in a more concrete way – with the German Youth Movement [Jugendbewegung]. This
had its origins in a distinctively German phenomenon, the Wandervogel movement, that
comprised of social groups of well-off adolescents that rebelled against the inherited and
rigid values of their parents and the mass society at large. It drew heavily on German
Romanticism and idolized the primitive and medieval societies that were structured on
a basis of a feeling of affinity and a conception of simple life. Thus, it was basically
a back-to-nature movement whose principal activities were long walks in the German
countryside by small groups. During such walks they often sang German folk songs or
songs specifically written for the Wandervögel. They stayed overnight in barns or with
peasants, or, if weather permitted, under the sky. They were emotionally inspired by
the heroic ideals and simplicity of bygone ages. Gottfried Gabriel has summed up the
motivational background of this movement in the following way:
The rejection of the ‘bourgeois’ drugs — alcohol, tobacco, and coffee — has
its origin in this movement, and was characteristic of the ‘free German stu-
dents’ [freideutsche Studentenschaft], who saw themselves as an alternative to
the Burschenschaften (conservative fraternities) and similar student groups at
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German universities. And its practice of abstinence expresses not an ascetic
abnegation, but on the contrary an affirmative celebration of the senses, with
the goal of a comprehensive reconstruction of life on a ‘natural’ basis, in the
sense of the Jugendbewegung (youth movement). [Gabriel (2004) [Awodey &
Klein (2004), 8]]
The socialist underpinnings of the leading ideas of this group appealed most strongly to
Carnap who witnessed the gradual growth of bureaucracy, spiritual rigidity and intoler-
ance in the public life and cultural atmosphere of the Weimar Republic. In this environ-
ment, emotionally strained by the tumultuous situation in the global political arena, the
following words of Engels must have rung true for Carnap and his fellow Wandervögel:
The whole sphere of conditions of life which environ man, and which have
hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who
for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of Nature, because he has
now become the master of his own social organization . . . Man’s own social
organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and
history, now becomes the result of his free action. The extraneous objective
forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man him-
self. Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make
his own history . . . It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the
kingdom of freedom.9
Involvement with the group signified a great step for Carnap also at a personal level.
He was able to overcome his shyness, gradually emerging from his shell. He had been a
somewhat introverted, mathematically inclined student, mainly occupied with theoreti-
cal questions but “in Jena he blossomed, found himself not just able to participate as an
equal but even to lead.” [Carus (2007), 54] Extending his serious involvement with the
Jugendbewegung, he soon acquired a leading role in a local group working under the aus-
pices of that movement, called the Serakreis organised by the publisher Eugen Diederichs.
Associated with the Jugendbewegung was also an influential movement of social reform,
more specifically, a movement attempting to renew the educational system of Germany.
Herman Nohl (1879–1960), one of Carnap’s philosophy teachers at Jena, had a leading
role in these developments. He was able to give the educational reform movement a
theoretical basis drawing on Dilthey’s Lebensphilosohie. Georg Geißler has described the
overall significance of Nohl’s contributions in this vein as follows:
Die pädagogischen Reformbestregungen hatten seit der Jahrhundertwende
die Wirklichkeit und das Verständnis der Erziehung grundlegen verändert,
ein Prozeß, der in Nohls Göttinger Anfängen noch mitten im Gange und
mit dem überlieferten Kategorien der Herbartschen Schulpädagogik begrif-
flich nicht zu erfassen war. Es kam darauf an, diese neue Wirklichleit durch
9Friedrich Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific” in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, I I, 140–1.
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Analyse der Einzelphänomene und deren Einordnung in größere geistige
Zusammenhänge verstehbar zu machen und damit in den Griff zu bekom-
men. Dazu hat Nohls Konzeption einer einheitlichen pädagogischen Bewe-
gung wesentlich beigetragen. Aber eine adäquate Beschreibung und Deu-
tung dieser historischen Erscheinungen konnte nur gelingen, wenn Hand in
Hand damit die enstsprechenden systematischen Kategorien entwickelt wur-
den, und zwar “autonom”, aus dem Gegenstandbereich selbst, nich etwa
durch Adaptation oder bloßes Überstulpen fremder Begriffssysteme. Weil
Nohl immer vom Kern des Erzieherischen aus dachte, führen alle seine
Veröffentlichungen auf das Prinzip der pädagogischen Autonomie zurück,
was seinem Werk eine große Einheitlichkeit gibt. Den umfassenden Zusam-
menhang stellt dann die Theorie der Bildung dar, der Versuch einer — im
Vergleich mit Herbart — von Grund auf neuen pädagogischen Systematik.
[Geißler (1979) [Scheuerl, vol. II (1979), 240]]
Carnap held Nohl in high esteem, as we will see later. Indeed, Nohl’s conception of
Lebensphilosophie as well as the integrity of his character constituted a model for Carnap
on which he based some of the most general features of his Weltanschauung. But as impor-
tant as these various social phenomena were to the development of Carnap, they were
completely outweighed by the catastrophe of the war. Indeed, as to the arousal of politi-
cal activity among the youth in Germany at that time, the war made all the difference:
Before the war I, like most of my friends, had been uninterested and ignorant
in political matters. We had some general ideals, including a just, harmo-
nious, and rational organization within the nation and among the nations.
We realized that the existing political and economical order was not in accord
with these ideals, and still less the customary method of settling conflicts of
interest among nations by war. Thus the general trend of our political think-
ing was pacifist, anti-militarist, anti-monarchist, perhaps also socialist. But
we did not think much about the problem of how to implement these ideals
by practical action. The war suddenly destroyed our illusion that everything
was already on the right path of continuous progress. [Carnap (1963), 9]
From then on, the philosophical habitus of Carnap comprised a considerable element of
a scientific ‘engineering attitude’, essentially directed at coördinating the activities of so-
ciety in such a way that they could be removed from the realm of chaotic whim and
subordinated to the goal-oriented reason [der chaotischen Willkür zu entziehen und der ziel-
bewußten Vernunft zu unterwerfen]. [Carus (2007), 63] This theme will recur frequently
in Carnap’s philosophical development and it figures prominently in Carnap’s mature
thought as an essential ingredient of his ideal of explication. But before we can fully
appreciate this ‘political’ element in Carnap’s thought, we must investigate the more fa-
miliar aspects of his philosophy. At the systematic level, one of Carnap’s most important
teachers is Frege. I will now proceed to investigate the overall significance of his philos-
ophy to Carnap’s thinking.
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4.1.2 Frege’s influence on Carnap
According to Carnap’s own words, the strongest influences upon his philosophical think-
ing were Frege and Russell. Carnap listened to Frege’s lectures in logic at the University
of Jena, but was even more influenced by reading his works, mainly after the war. It was
not until 1920 that Carnap read Frege’s main work, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.10 From
Frege Carnap learned “carefulness and clarity in the analysis of concepts and linguistic
expressions, the distinction between expressions and what they stand for, and concerning
the latter what he called ‘Bedeutung’ (denotation or nominatum) and what he called ‘Sinn’
(sense or signification)”. [Carnap (1963), 12] Most importantly, the fundamental tenets of
Frege’s thought that were to shape Carnap’s conception of philosophy throughout his
career were the requirement to formulate the rules of inference in logic without any ref-
erence to meaning (i.e. the conception of logic as calculus), but also the realization of
the significance of meaning analysis (i.e. semantics in a particular sense). Indeed, Car-
nap summarized his philosophical temperament and sources of interest in the following
terms: “I believe that here are the roots of my philosophical interest — on the one hand in
logical syntax, and on the other hand in that part of semantics which may be regarded as
a theory of meaning”. [ibid., 13] I will next briefly adduce the central ideas of Frege’s logic
that influenced Carnap in his student days. He attended Frege’s lecture at the Univer-
sity of Jena during the years 1910–1914. In these lectures Carnap learned about the ‘new’
logic of quantifiers as well as about the central tenets of logicism the aim of which was
to reduce all of mathematics to logic. These ideas were to have massive reverberations in
Carnap’s later philosophy.
Frege’s lectures on logic 1910-1914
The evidence pertaining to the content and style of Frege’s lectures on logic at the Univer-
sity of Jena is quite scarce. The only sources of information seem to be Carnap’s lecture
notes [Reck & Awodey (2004)] and his recollections in his Autobiography, and the re-
ports by Wilhelm Flitner, Gerschom Scholem and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Let us start with
Carnap’s own recollections of the lectures by Frege:
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was at that time, although past 60, only Profes-
sor Extraordinarius (Associate Professor) of mathematics in Jena. His work
was practically unknown in Germany; neither mathematicians nor philoso-
phers paid any attention to it. It was obvious that Frege was deeply disap-
pointed and sometimes bitter about this dead silence. No publishing house
was willing to bring out his main work, the two volumes of Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik; he had it printed at his own expense. In addition, there was the
disappointment over Russell’s discovery of the famous antinomy which oc-
curs both in Frege’s system and in Cantor’s set theory. I do not remember
that he ever discussed in his lectures the problem of this antinomy and the
10Two volumes, 1893 and 1903. [Frege (1893/1903)]
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question of possible modifications of his system in order to eliminate it. But
from the Appendix of the second volume it is clear that he was confident that
a satisfactory way for overcoming the difficulty could be found. He did not
share the pessimism with respect to the “foundation crisis” of mathematics
sometimes expressed by other authors.
In the fall of 1910, I attended Frege’s course “Begriffschrift” (conceptual nota-
tion, idiography), out of curiosity, not knowing anything either of the man or
the subject except for a friend’s remark that somebody had found it interest-
ing. {But the very idea of a symbolic notation for concepts seemed attractive
to us. Thus we went, and}11[W]e found a very small number of students
there. Frege looked old beyond his years. He was of small stature, rather shy,
extremely introverted. He seldom looked at the audience. Ordinarily we saw
only his back, while he drew the strange diagrams of his symbolism on the
blackboard and explained them. The possibility of a discussion seemed to be
out of the question.
Towards the end of the semester Frege indicated that the new logic to which
he had introduced us, could serve for the construction of the whole of math-
ematics. This remark aroused our curiosity. In the summer semester of 1913,
ny friend and I decided to attend Frege’s course “Begriffschrift II”. This time
the entire class consisted of the two of us and a retired major of the army who
studied some of the new ideas in mathematics as a hobby. It was from the ma-
jor that I first heard about Cantor’s set theory, which no professor had ever
mentioned.
[. . . ] In the advanced course on Begriffschrift, Frege explained various appli-
cations, among them some which are not contained in his publications, e.g., a
definition of the continuity of a function, and of the limit of a function, the dis-
tinction between ordinary convergence and uniform convergence. All these
concepts were expressible with the help of the quantifiers, which appear in his
system of logic for the first time. {The last mentioned distinction and some
other ones were shown to be based on the difference in the order in which the
quantifiers appear, which is, of course, well known today.}12 He gave also a
demonstration of the logical mistake in the ontological proof for the existence
of God.
[. . . ] In the summer semester 1914 I attended Frege’s course, Logik in der Math-
ematik. Here he examined critically some of the customary conceptions and
formulations in mathematics. He deplored the fact that mathematicians did
not even seem to aim at the construction of a unified, well-founded system
of mathematics., and therefore showed lack of interest in foundations. He
pointed out a certain looseness in the customary formulation of axioms, def-
initions, and proofs, even in works of the more prominent mathematicians.
As an example he quoted Weierstrass’s definition: “A number is a series of
11Material inserted in curly braces is from the unpublished version of Carnap’s “Intellectual Autobiogra-
phy”. Cited in [Reck & Awodey (2004), 19].
12Cited in [Reck & Awodey (2004), 20].
144
things of the same kind” (“. . . eine Reihe gleichartiger Dinge”). {On this he
commented with an impish smile: “According to this definition, a railroad
train is also a number; this number may then travel from Berlin, pass through
Jena, and go on to Munich.”}13 He criticized in particular the lack of attention
to certain fundamental distinctions, e.g., the distinction between the symbol
and the symbolized, that between a logical concept and a mental image or act,
and that between a function and the value of the function. Unfortunately, his
admonitions go mostly unheeded even today. [Carnap (1963), 4–6]
In addition to this illuminating report of Carnap we have the documentary evidence of
Wilhelm Flitner, a youth movement crony of Carnap and a seminal figure in inaugurating
the foundation of the Jena Volkshochschule, a college for adult and further education, in
1919. Flitner ultimately came a professor and an influential educational thinker. His rem-
iniscences of Frege’s lectures bring further clarification to Carnap’s relation with Frege,
and the influence of Frege on the development of Carnap’s own thinking:
[Carnap’s] interest in logical problems led him to the lectures of an associate
professor [Außenordentliche Professor] who was then almost completely un-
known: Gottlob Frege. Ernst Abbe14 had recommended Frege to the faculty
[to become associate professor] in 1883, pointing to Frege’s excellent logical
investigations; Abbe’s successor Siegfried Czapski had regarded him — as we
know from his children — as the most important thinker at the University of
Jena.
Nevertheless, Frege struggled to even have his lectures take place. “Tres faci-
unt collegium” [“Three makes a collegium”] was then the rule, with the lec-
turer counting as a third person. For several semesters the lecture would
have had to be cancelled had Carnap not found a second hearer. Therefore
he enlisted me, and I attended the extraordinarily fascinating logical lecture
course on “Begriffschrift”; and the following semester Julius Frankenberger’s
brother, who majored in mathematics and physics, played the role of the third
person. For Carnap, these lectures became the foundation of his later philos-
ophy; he saw Frege’s achievements as the most important developments in
logic since Aristotle and Leibniz. [. . . ]
During his time as a student, Carnap never spoke a word with Frege; likewise,
I only exchanged a few insignificant words with him, at his door, when I had
to deliver something. Putside of the university one didn’t dare to address
Frege. In spite of the fact that he was our neighbor on the Forstweg, one
rarely saw the not very tall man, except when he walked over the Forstweg
bridge, looking downwards and a hand on his back, and then disappearing in
his house. In his lectures he rarely glanced at his students; he was exclusively
13Cited in [Reck & Awodey (2004), 21].
14Physicist and professor at the University of Jena, and the founder and owner of the renowned Zeiss
optical works which was famous for its educational program. This program was a kind of an implementation
of the Bildungsideal, providing the employees with opportunities for mental and physical self-improvement.
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concerned with symbols he wrote on the board and explained in a totally
incontroverted manner, thus wholly focused on the subject matter of “logic”.
[Flitner (1986), 126–127]15
These quotations provide a more balanced and richer account of Frege as a teacher, and
his relation with students, than is usually mediated in the literature. At the very least
they demonstrate the enthusiasm and devotion with which Carnap attended the lectures.
The surviving notes that Carnap took in those lectures have subsequently been edited by
Erich Reck and Steve Awodey, and translated into English [Reck & Awodey (2004)].16 The
notes were originally written systematically in the Stolze-Schrey shorthand that Carnap
used in his student years. Of most interest from the point of view of the subsequent de-
velopment of Carnap’s own philosophy are the sections devoted to concepts in “Begriff-
schrift I” and the general remarks about definitions, thought content of sentences, sense
and reference, and functions. The treatment of all these notions was thought-provoking
and profound. Surprisingly, Carnap failed to recall the essentials of Frege’s insights per-
taining to concept symbols and their referents, and erroneously attributed in Meaning and
Necessity to Frege the view according to which the extension of a concept symbol is the
set of objects falling under it.17 This contradicts the very idea documented by Carnap
himself in his notes on Frege’s lectures. [Frege (1910–1914) [Reck & Awodey (2004), 74]]
To make our account of the influence of Frege on Carnap more concrete, it is expedient
to survey briefly the contents of the lectures and the specific notation used in them.
Frege based his exposition in the 1901–1914 lectures on the general framework contained
in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. In this mature work the logical system had already
been crystallized and therefore the mode of expression did not vary much in the Jena
lectures, as is evidenced by Carnap’s notes. The vocabulary of Frege’s logical system
15Translation in [Reck & Awodey (2004), 22].
16An earlier German edition of the notes of the first two lectures is [Frege (1996)], edited by Gottfried
Gabriel.
17“Our pair of concepts [Extension and Intension] is, like Frege’s, intended to serve for the purposes of
semantical meaning analysis. Our two concepts may be regarded, like Frege’s, as representing two com-
ponents of meaning (in a wide sense). The concepts of sense and of intension refer to meaning in a strict
sense, as that which is grasped when we understand an expression without knowing the facts; the concepts
of nominatum and extension refer to the application of the expression, depending upon facts.
A decisive difference between our method and Frege’s consists in the fact that our concepts, in distinction
to Frege’s, are independent of the context. An expression in a well-constructed language system always
has the same extension and the same intention; but in some contexts it has its ordinary nominatum and its
ordinary sense, in other contexts its oblique nominatum and its oblique sense.
Let us, first, compare the extension of an expression with its ordinary nominatum; it seems that these
concepts coincide. With respect to predicators, Frege does not seem to have explained how his concepts are
to be applied; however, I think that Church [. . . ] is in accord with Frege’s intentions when he regards a class as
the (ordinary) nominatum of a predicator (of degree one) — for instance, a common noun — and a property as its
(ordinary) sense. As an example, Church states that the nominatum of ‘unicorn’ is the null class, and its sense
is the property of unicorn-hood. And here the extension is likewise the class in question. With respect to a
sentence, its truth-value is both the ordinary nominatum and the extension. And in the case of an individual
expression the ordinary nominatum and the extension is the individual in question. Thus we have this
result:
[. . . ] For any expression, its ordinary nominatum (in Frege’s method) is the same as its extension (in our
method).” [Carnap (1947 [1956]), 125] My emphasis.
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is very much akin to the usual machinery of predicate logic. Indeed, it comprises the
following classes of symbols:
• Propositional letters: P, Q, . . .
• Individual letters; a, b, . . .
• Predicate letters: F, G, . . .
• Higher-order predicate letters: α, β, . . .
• Function letters: f , g, . . .
• Variables: x, y, . . . , X, Y, . . .
The last class consists of special letters for variables involved in quantification. Further-
more, atomic formulas comprise the following:
P for a propositional letter P
a = b for individual letters a, b
F(a, b, . . .) for a predicate letter F and for individual letters a, b, . . .
α(F, G, . . .) for a higher-order predicate letter α and predicate letter F, G, . . .
A peculiar feature of Frege’s system is the ‘horizontal’ function
—ϕ
which Frege occasionally calls the “content stroke” and that can be applied to any argu-
ment ϕ (proposition or not). It yields the value true if and only if the argument is true,
and false otherwise. Hence, we have, e.g.























where “>” denotes “true” and “⊥” denotes “false”, respectively.
Formulas are built from the atomic formulas applying the horizontal function and the
propositional connectives negation and conditional:
¬ϕ negation
ϕ→ ψ conditional
and the universal quantifiers:
∀xϕ(x) for an individual variable x
∀Xϕ(X) for a predicate variable X
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The other familiar connectives and quantifiers are also often applied:
ϕ&ψ conjunction
∃xϕ(x) existential quantification
The axioms of the Begriffschrift I are based principally on the axioms of Grundgesetze,
but form actually a sort of a hybrid of the axioms presented there and in Frege’s other
published works. Thus, the first three axioms of the Begriffschrift I read:
Axiom I: P→ P
P→ (Q→ P)
Axiom II: ∀xF(x)→ F(a)
∀Xα(X)→ α(F)
Axiom III: g(a = b)→ g(∀X(X(a)→ X(b)))
The last axiom (Axiom III) yields Leibniz’s law as a special case:
a = b→ ∀X(X(a)→ X(b))
which is also known as the law of “indiscernibility of identicals” (not “identity of
indiscernibles” as is sometimes claimed; this is the converse of the former, namely
“∀X(X(a) → X(b)) → a = b”). The functional formulation of the Axiom in Frege’s
system permits its application in any context. It is also known as Frege’s principle: If the
expression B may be derived from expression A by substituting an instance of some sym-
bol contained in A by another symbol that has the same extension, then A and B have the
same extension. In contradistinction to the Grundgesetze, Frege incorporated only three
axioms to his exposition in the Jena lectures. He had dropped Axioms IV, V, and VI that
played a prominent role in the Grundgesetze. These axioms were:
Axiom IV: ¬(P = ¬Q)→ P = Q
Axiom V: {x : ϕ} = {x : ψ} ↔ ∀x(ϕ↔ ψ)
Axiom VI: a = (ιx.x = a)
The first is used in Grundgesetze (§51) to prove “propositional extensionality”, i.e., (P ↔
Q) → P = Q. Russell’s well-known antinomy arises quite directly from the Axiom V
(governing the terms representing the extensions of concepts represented by “ϕ”). In the
Axiom VI Frege introduced a description operator “ιx.ϕ” denoting the unique individ-
ual, if there is one, satisfying the condition expressed by “ϕ”, effectively explicating the
idea of “the x such that ϕ”. The system without these axioms, which formed the basis of
Frege’s lectures on the Begriffschrift, may be described as the ‘inferential part’ of the sys-
tem of Grundgesetze without the constructive machinery for building up logical objects.
[Reck & Awodey (2004), 34]
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The rules of inference fall into two categories: (i) rules involving a single formula as a
premise, and (ii) rules applying two formulas to draw a conclusion. In the first category




which applies equally for any reordering of any number of constituent propositions
P, Q, R, . . .,
P→ Q→ RTransposition
P→ ¬R→ ¬Q
which also applies equally for any other conditional position. The rule for ‘redundant´








where x may not already occur in ϕ(a). This rule holds analogously for function and








P→ Q Q→ R
Cut P→ R
and
P→ Q→ R P→ ¬Q→ RNegation
P→ R
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All these rules can be applied also in the case when there are several conditions present.
This, then, is the skeleton of Frege’s system. I will now proceed to adduce some of the
important results that are demonstrated within it.
It is expedient to give a brief survey of the symbolism of the Begriffschrift. The basic
symbols by means of which the ‘well-formed’ formulas are constructed are the symbol
for a conditional statement “if P then Q”:
Q
P
the symbol for negation “¬P”:
P
and the symbol for universal quantification “∀xϕ”:
x ϕ .
To illustrate the expressive power of the symbolism, consider the following example from
Frege’s correspondence with Russell giving an expression for the Basic Law V of the
Grundgesteze:
(έ f (ε) = άg(α)) = a

f (a) = g(a)
a = έ f (ε)
a = άg(α)

or another expression from Russell’s correspondence with Frege:
T = β́γ́ ' ϕ(β, γ)
β = άέϕ(α, ε)
γ = άέϕ(α, ε)
Frege’s system allowed to define numerical statements about concepts (of the number of
objects falling under them) in the following manner. First, to express the statement The
number of objects falling under the concept is 0 he used the following notation:
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a ϕ(a)
Proceeding in a similar manner, the numerical statement The number of objects falling under
the concept is 1 could be formulated as:




As Carnap wrote in his lecture notes, “[t]he numerical statement concerns the kind of
satisfaction; it is a 2nd level concept indicating the features of a concept.” [Reck & Awodey
(2004), 84] This conception about statements of number was adopted by Carnap in his
later work [Carnap (1930a)], where he effectively defined the notion “the number of the
concept f is two” as “There is an x and there is a y such that x is not identical with y,
x falls under f , y falls under f , and for every z it is the case that if z falls under f , z is
identical with x or with y”. [Carnap (1930a [1959]), 21/141]18 But what goes unmentioned
is Frege’s reservation that this definition (and definitions analogous to it) do not define
the numbers themselves (i.e. 0, 1, 2, etc.), but merely the phrases “the number N belongs
to [the concept F]”. Contextual definitions of this kind do not allow us to distinguish
between individual numbers, such as 0 and 1, for example. Carnap only later noticed the
difference between his position and Frege’s, and made remarks about it accordingly. In
Meaning and Necessity Carnap elaborates on this point:
[Frege takes as his definiens not ‘the property Equinumerous to f ’, but ‘the
extension of the property Equinumerous to f ’ which means the same as ‘the
class equinumerous to f ’. Now it is interesting to see that Frege adds to this
definition a footnote [. . . ] which says: “I believe that instead of ‘extension of
the property’ we might say simply ‘property.’ But two objections would be
raised: . . . I am of the opinion that both of these objections could be removed;
but that might lead here too far.” Thus Frege considers here the simpler pro-
cedure which we now adopt. He seems to regard it as feasible but does not
pursue it any further. In his later work he again defines cardinal number
in the way stated above, without even mentioning an alternative possibility.
His chief reason for regarding cardinal numbers as classes of properties rather
than as properties of properties seems to be his view that cardinal numbers are
independent entities, in combination with his general conception that classes
are independent entities, while properties are not. However, I find his reason-
ing on this question not quite clear and far from convincing.] [Carnap (1947
[1956]), 116]
18The German original reads: “[. . . ] an der Zahl Zwei als Kardinalzahl, d. h. als Anzahl eines Begriffes.
Wir definieren: ‘die Anzahl des Begriffes f ist zwei’ soll bedeuten ‘es gibt ein x und es gibt ein y derart, daß
x nicht identisch mit y ist, x unter f fällt, y unter f fällt, und daß für jedes z gilt: wenn z unter f fällt, so ist z
mit x identisch oder mit y identisch’ ”. [ibid.]
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As Gottfried Gabriel notes, this implies that Carnap does not subscribe to Frege’s catego-
rial distinction between “complete [abgeschlossenen]” objects and “unsaturated [ungesätti-
gen]” concepts. [Gabriel (2007) [Friedman & Creath (2007), 68]] It has been suggested that
Carnap might have misunderstood Frege’s distinction. This is rendered plausible by the
paragraph §33 in the Aufbau where in which Carnap elucidates the notion of “unsatu-
rated” symbols. After stipulating that classes are quasi-objects since they are extensions,
and that the class symbols do not therefore have independent meaning, Carnap goes on
to discuss Frege’s position with respect to classes: “Frege has already shown that exten-
sion symbols, and thus the class symbols, are incomplete symbols. [. . . ] According to Rus-
sell, it is irrelevant for logic whether or not there are actual objects which are designated
by class symbols, since classes are not defined by themselves, but only in the context of
total sentences (‘no class theory’).” [Carnap (1928 [1967]), §33] The misunderstanding or
misinterpretation on Carnap’s side is effectively concealed in the English edition of Auf-
bau by an unfortunate translation of “ungesättig” as “incomplete”. The term “incomplete”
is used here by Carnap in the sense in which Russell applies it in connection with class
symbols, i.e., symbols that do not have an independent meaning in themselves. Follow-
ing Russell we can certainly say that expressions for extensions of concepts are, in the
sense intended, incomplete symbols, but Frege maintained that they are not unsaturated,
because they designate complete objects. [Gabriel (2007) [Friedman & Creath (2007), 69]]
Hence, there does seem to be some evidence for thinking that Carnap failed to grasp
Frege’s distinction in his later writings. This is, of course, congruent with the misrepre-
sentation by Carnap of Frege’s notion of the extension of concept words that we alluded
to earlier.
“Making sense” — What did Carnap carry over from Frege?
One important feature that Carnap adopted from the exposition of Frege was the notion
of logic as a calculus. Although not at all congruent with Frege’s underlying metalogical
convictions (the idea of an uninterpreted calculus was repugnant to Frege), this idea may
nonetheless have been instigated by Frege’s lectures because, as we have seen, Frege had
dropped the last three axioms of his Grundgesetze system out of the logic lectures, leaving
only a skeleton with purely inferential character, with no constructive machinery. This
might also have given Carnap the impression (which he reported in his Autobiography)
that Frege had circumvented the difficulties brought up by Russell’s antinomy (the fa-
mous “set of all sets that are not elements of themselves”).19 Since Frege did not mention
the paradox in his lectures, Carnap was inclined to think that it was no more a problem
for Frege’s system. The true reason for it having been left unmentioned is that the ex-
position of the restricted ‘skeleton’ system did not give rise to questions pertaining to
the logicist program, and hence to the paradox. The resulting system had no domain of
its own but provided inferential apparatus for the study of reasoning in other domains.
Carnap crystallized this idea in 1932, possibly recalling the contents of Frege’s lectures:
19Also known as Russell’s paradox: There is no set S = {X : X /∈ X}. The axiom schema of compre-
hension fails for the formula ϕ(X) interpreted as “X /∈ X”. This is easily seen, if we consider the schema
∀Y : Y ∈ S⇐⇒ Y /∈ Y. Now, substituting S for Y we have S ∈ S⇐⇒ S /∈ S, which is clearly impossible.
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The propositions of logic and mathematics [. . . ] are of great significance for
science, since they aid the transformation of [scientific] propositions. [. . . ]
Logic and mathematics are not sciences with a domain of objects of their own.
[. . . ] The assumption of “formal” or “ideal” objects, as opposed to the “real”
objects of the empirical sciences, is dropped. [Carnap (1932a), 433]20
Carnap, as is well known, held such a view for a relatively long time, at least until the
beginning of his ‘semantical’ period in the mid-1930s. It is difficult to determine the exact
point at which he came to re-evaluate his conception of logicism. On the one hand, he
can be said to have retained a broadly logicist outlook on the foundations of mathemat-
ics throughout his career, but never in the extreme sense of formalism (as propounded
by, for example, Professor J. Thomae, Frege’s colleague at Jena, with whom Frege had
a polemical exchange in the Jahresbericht der deutschen Matematikervereinigung in 1906–
1908). Carnap’s logicism was more in the spirit of Hilbert, as his later writings on the
foundations of mathematics attest.21 Carnap’s adoption of the semantical viewpoint – a
viewpoint taken only later by Alfred Tarski22 who first joined Quine in criticizing Car-
nap’s approach – radically transformed his conception about the content of logicism. This
transformation resulted in a more nuanced and richer conception of mathematics which
squared with Carnap’s fundamental distinction between theoretical and observational
concepts that remained important for him throughout the latter part of his career.
Another feature in Carnap’s thinking that was profoundly influenced by Frege was his
treatment of higher-order logic with simple types (as opposed to the ramified types) in
the late 1920s and early 1930s.23 Indeed, this was an area in which Carnap was to have a
significant role in guiding the development of modern logic in general. It has been argued
that in the light of the relevant evidence, Carnap’s textbook Abriss der Logistik, published
in 1929, but completed and circulated as early as 1927, seems to be the first systematic
treatment of higher-order logic with simple types. [Reck & Awodey (2004), 39] It has
also been remarked that the frequently cited sources of higher-order logic, Leon Chwis-
tek’s “The Theory of Constructive Types I” (1924) and Frank Ramsey’s “Foundations of
Mathematics” (1925) contain much less detail than was already present in Frege’s works.
Most importantly, Carnap’s Abriss and other related works pertaining to the theory of
types were known to Gödel whose revolutionary paper “Über formal unentscheidbare
20Translation by Reck & Awodey.
21One of the most illuminating writings in this respect is [Carnap (1966b)].
22Tarski first developed his variant of model theory as a part of the metatheory of algebra.
23This is not a proper place to provide a technical exposition of the theory of types, but I will say something
in the way of conveying the gist of the theory — as well as the notion of type — and its implications, espe-
cially as concerns its effect on the structuring of the universe into types. Russell defines type as “the range of
significance of a propositional function, that is, as the collection of arguments for which the said function has
values.” [Russell (1908), 163] Climbing up the definitional hierarchy, we begin with the lowest type which is
simply the class of (all) individuals. In [(1908)] Russell characterizes individuals negatively, stating them as
being devoid of logical complexity and hence as different from propositions and propositional functions. In-
cidentally, already this important, albeit simple requirement is tantamount to an exclusion of the possibility
that quantification over individuals might already involve a vicious circle. Type 1 contains all the (definable)
classes of individuals; type 2 all the (definable) classes of classes of individuals; and so on. This iterative
procedure constitutes the essence of the simple theory of types.
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Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I” [Gödel (1931)] is generally
regarded as one of the most important sources of the whole field of modern logical the-
ory. In fact, Carnap devoted about ten odd pages to the Theory of Types in the Abriss
which comprised roughly 110 pages in total. This proportion of material pertaining to
type theory in a book that was intended as an elementary exposition of logic and its appli-
cations, testifies of its importance in the mind of the author. Indeed, as Reck and Awodey
have remarked: “under Frege’s influence, simply-typed higher-order logic was never
just a device for avoiding contradiction for Carnap, but was in the very nature of logic,
lending it an inherent plausibility that other conceptions lacked.” [ibid.] In sum, the par-
ticular way in which Frege had presented his conception of logic in the lecture courses
“Begriffschrift I” and “Begriffschrift II”, made it quite natural for Carnap to adopt two
stances that were unusual at the time: (i) he worked with a higher-order logic based on
simple types and (ii) he used higher-order logic as an inferential framework. [Reck (2007)
[Friedman & Creath (2007), 181]]
The feature in Carnap’s thinking that was perhaps most intensively permeated by
Fregean conceptions was his general account of the domain of semantics. This feature
received its most balanced treatment in Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity. We have already
pointed out some issues that were explicitly discussed by Carnap in connection with
Frege’s ideas. We will return to some of these (along with other issues) in Chapter 5. It
might be pertinent to complete the discussion on Frege with the following statement of
Carnap about the overall significance of Frege on his thinking:
Furthermore, the following conception, which derives essentially from Frege,
seemed to me of paramount importance: It is the task of logic and math-
ematics within the total system of knowledge to supply the forms of con-
cepts, statements, and inferences, forms which are then applicable every-
where, hence also to non-logical knowledge. It follows from these considera-
tions that the nature of logic and mathematics can be clearly understood only
if close attention is given to their application in non-logical fields, especially
in empirical science. [Carnap (1963), 12]
But as much as Carnap was influenced by Frege, there were four fundamental differences
between them: (1) Carnap’s epiricism, (2) Carnap’s view that formal reasoning in logic
(and thus in arithmetic) can be detached from its content, (3) Carnap’s inclusion of ge-
ometry in logicism, following Russell, and (4) Carnap’s dismissal of ontological concerns
as pseudo-questions. [Gabriel (2007) [Friedman & Creath (2007), 77]] Carnap’s deteriora-
tion from the viewpoint of his teacher was, however, quite a complicated process, taking
several years. I will now turn to adduce other influences that proved crucial for Carnap’s
intellectual orientation during his final years at Jena.
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4.1.3 A system of knowledge — science and logic
As a result of his broad and penetrating studies, the thoroughgoing gulf between phi-
losophy and sciences had aroused Carnap’s intellectual uneasiness. Although he had
already in 1916, in a letter to a friend, expressed his dissatisfaction with the level of so-
phistication of philosophical writing on science, relating that “Even a mind as sound as
Mach’s frequently makes me shake my head” [ASP/WF (1916c)],24 by 1920 he had be-
come much more aware of the depressing situation. The discrepancy had come about
largely because of the very fast development of the sciences that proceeded mathemati-
cally (sciences using mathematical tools, methods and models in their explanatory tasks)
and because these sciences were themselves incapable of appraising critically their con-
ceptual foundations and the methods they utilized. Carnap maintained that both the
sciences and philosophy were to blame for this state of affairs:
Part of the blame rests with philosophy, which has often failed to comprehend
the viewpoints of those rapidly developing sciences; on the other hand, part
of the blame goes to the sciences, which were occupied more with conquering
new territories than with securing and carefully integrating what had been
gained. In short, through the fault of both sides a mutual alienation devel-
oped. [ASP (1920d), 1–2]25
He experienced very intensely the differences and discords between the two, but came to
appreciate that the discrepancy was not entirely due to either separately, but was symp-
tomatic of the situation. Carnap makes this clear in a chain letter to the members of
the Sera Kreis, utilizing military metaphors as an expressive device (an understandable
manner of writing at the time):
What happened was unavoidable given the rapidity of an advance in mo-
bile warfare: communications broke down between front and staff. To the
philosophers at headquarters, in the absence of bulletins [from the front], the
situation became less and less clear; it is especially unfortunate that although
Kant was still alive at the time of the first work on the fundamentally impor-
tant non-Euclidean geometries, he received no bulletins about them — which
[if he had received them] might have been of great benefit both to his system
and to those geometries. At the front, the lack of communication could have
been even more damaging if there hadn’t fortuitously been a few leaders who
made up for their lack of strategic schooling with native insight and clear-
sightedness: thanks to men like Gauss and Helmholtz as well as Riemann
and Hertz, among many others, who combined outstanding talent in their
specialties with great system-building powers and sureness of instinct for the
big picture, by and large the right paths were followed. [ASP (1920), 2 ]26




However, the singular cases of individuals of such calibre did not exemplify the prevail-
ing intellectual situation, especially not at the turn of the twentieth century. The process
of gradual alienation of science from philosophy was a fact, and it seemed to accelerate
with increasing rate. Carnap reacted to this acutely:
For some time now in geometry, more recently also in arithmetic and analy-
sis, and now in physics as well, it is becoming clear that at certain point the
bulletins from the front don’t at all fit with the official map at the headquar-
ters. After making do for a while with saying, at the headquarters, ‘they don’t
themselves seem to know where they are!’, and at the front, ‘what do we care
about the outdated map back there!’, the insight is dawning that neither ac-
cusation is altogether unjustified: the exact sciences often work with concepts
(which in some cases turn out to be their most important ones) whose mean-
ing they can’t give precisely; and on the other hand the traditional methods
of philosophy can’t help much with this. [ASP (1920d), 2–3]27
Some scholars had already responded to the drastic and revolutionary situation Carnap
here alludes to. These scholars were working mainly under the disciplines of philosophy,
mathematics and physics. Their aim was to draw a new ‘comprehensive map’ that would
equally satisfy all the parties on the sides of both philosophy and science. Moreover, the
map was required to give an accurate image of the real state of knowledge, constituting
in effect a “system of knowledge” (System der Wissenschaft) that would accommodate all
the relevant theoretical considerations under its purview. Carnap very much wished
to be part of this attempt, maintaining that such a system should be constructed with
“logically consistent foundations and systematic construction of concepts”, a system that
is “capable of comprising all the insights of the special sciences and of presenting them
with the greatest possible simplicity and unity”. [ASP (1920d), 3]28
4.2 The Neo-Kantian Roots of Carnap’s Thought
For the transcendental idealist, the object of knowledge is . . . neither imma-
nent nor transcendentally “given” [“gegeben”], but rather “posed as a prob-
lem” [“aufgegeben”]. — Rickert
(1921)
In the preceding section we examined the evidential support for the influence of Frege
on Carnap, and found it ample. The high esteem in which Carnap held his old master
reflected an emotional attachment and intellectual respect that remained characteristic at-
titudes throughout his life. Undoubtedly Frege was one of the brightest stars in Carnap’s




of other sources of influence that played at least an equally important role in Carnap’s
philosophical development and the process of formulating his central ideas. These ‘hid-
den’ influences derive from neo-Kantianism, the foundational issues related to geometry,
and perhaps most surprisingly, Husserl’s philosophy. They are clearly visible in Car-
nap’s early work and their apparent disappearance in Carnap’s later work is actually
only a consequence of a choice of a new linguistic framework by Carnap that does not
explicitly use the concepts of the earlier constitutional program. This constitutional pro-
gram consisted of a radically new insight into the epistemological questions posed by
the neo-Kantian tradition. In part, it was also a deeply-reflected response to the chal-
lenge to realize the vision of an logicist-empiricist program of philosophy in concreto as
inaugurated by Russell in his Our Knowledge of the External World.
4.2.1 The Kantian legacy
Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft) has been inter-
preted, roughly speaking, along two diametrically opposite lines. The first one takes the
suggestion of Kant about his “Copernican revolution” seriously. The second one inter-
prets it as an instigation to return to an anthropomorphic view of the nature of reality
and cognition, in keeping with the romantic tradition of Naturpilosophie. The first line of
interpretation can be termed “Copernican”, the second one “Anti-Copernican”. But why
the label “Copernican” in the first place? This simile is based on the observation that just
as Copernicus had explained the movements of the stars and planets by suggesting that
their apparent movements are partly due to the state of motion of the observer, so Kant
proposes to explain the application of the a priori principles of the mind to objects by
suggesting that the appearance of objects is due to the mind’s innate constitution and in
so far as the categories of the mind regulate observation, “objects conform to the mind”.
This is Kant’s ‘critical idealism’. It is motivated by the idea that there is a sort of half-way
house between the realism of an intellectus ectypus or passive mind and the idealism of
an intellectus archetypus or creative mind. The essential content of such a characteriza-
tion is made clearer if we consider the status of natural sciences in Kant’s system. Kant’s
main contention is that the fundamental task of natural sciences is to anticipate what we
shall experience. Every scientific judgement with claims of truth, when analysed in full,
is essentially a statement that under such and such circumstances, we will have such
and such experiences. In short, in our scientific judgements we are always making state-
ments about our possible experience (in the sense of both prediction and retrodiction). In
the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant did not intend to presuppose that our
knowledge in the domain of mathematics or metaphysics is synthetic a priori, but instead
proceeded to investigate generally the basic elements of any experience, and then showed
from the results of these investigations that we de facto have a priori cognition, not only in
metaphysics, but also in mathematics and even physical science. The general objective of
his “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding” is both “to demonstrate and
make comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a priori” [A xvi], i.e. to both
prove that we have synthetic a priori cognition in mathematics, science and metaphysics
and then explain how such knowledge is possible. Kant’s method in tackling this double
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task is to try a procedure analogous to the “first thoughts of Copernicus” [B xvi] — hence
the label “Copernican revolution”. In Kant’s own words, just as Copernicus,
when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial mo-
tions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer,
tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer re-
volve and left the stars at rest,
so
in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects.
If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see
how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object
of the senses) has to confirm to the constitution of our faculty of intuition,
then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot
stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer
them as representations to something as their object and determine this object
through them, I can assume that the concepts through which I bring about
this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the
same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else
I assume that these objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which
alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in
which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty. [B xvii]
Hence, the assumption that we can find fundamental conditions of the possibility of our
own experience to which the objects of our experience must conform, is the basis for
Kant’s first claim of autonomy. [Guyer (2006), 50] It comprises the idea that sensibility
and understanding, as two main faculties of the mind, contain “the constitutive princi-
ples a priori for the faculty of cognition (the theoretical cognition of nature).” [CPJ, 5:196]
In the Critique Kant states his position explicitly, making it clear that the claim for auton-
omy must be taken in a very strong sense: “[. . . ] as exaggerated and contradictory as it
may sound to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature [. . . ]
such an assertion is nevertheless correct and appropriate to the object, namely experi-
ence.” [A 127] It is precisely this tenet that instigated a vehement philosophical debate
in the centuries to come, and that resulted, roughly, in the splintering of the Kantian in-
fluence into two rival schools, as I have hinted at above. These developments are far
too entangled to be delved into in the context of this dissertation.The secondary litera-
ture on the reception of Kant’s thought is vast. I settle here for providing a list of the
treatises that I have found most illuminating. [. . . ] I will investigate, in some detail, the
relation of Kantianism to the phenomenon of Lebensphilosophie in Germany in the next
section. Moreover, I will hint at the importance of neo-Kantian influences in Carnap’s
struggle with the philosophical problems of space and time in his early work in the sec-
tions that follow. But overall, I have very little to say about the general significance of
neo-Kantianism and its place in the philosophical tradition of the late nineteenth century
158
and early twentieth century. An interested reader should consult the superb treatises
mentioned in the footnotes.
4.2.2 Lebensphilosophie and Kantianism
In Jena, before the war, one of Carnap’s most influential teachers had been Herman
Nohl, an educator and a Privatdozent (‘a private lecturer’) who was a student of Wilhelm
Dilthey. He represented in a pure form what could be called Lebensphilosophie, a ‘school’,
or rather an intellectual orientation within philosophy, that went against neo-Kantianism
that was prevalent in the German universities at the time. Carnap made very kind re-
marks about Nohl in his Autbiography which hint at the significance that this humble
philanthropist had for Carnap and his philosophical orientation:
I remember with special pleasure and gratitude the seminars of Herman Nohl
(at that time a young instructor in Jena), in philosophy, education, and psy-
chology, even when the topic, for example, Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie, was of-
ten somewhat remote from my main interests. My friends and I were partic-
ularly attracted by Nohl because he took a personal interest in the lives and
thoughts of his students, in contrast to most of the professors in Germany at
that time, and because in his seminars and in private talks he tried to give us
a deeper understanding of philosophers on the basis of their attitude toward
life [Lebensgefühl] and their cultural background. [Carnap (1963), 4]
The essential import of Nohl’s thinking resided in its ability to give the prevailing at-
titudes behind the new social movements (foremost the German Jugendbewegung and
educational reform movements) a theoretical basis. This basis was built on the central
ideas of Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie the most important ingredient of which was the insis-
tence on the primacy of life even in the abstract realm of philosophical theories. [Gabriel
(2004) [Awodey & Klein (2004), 9]] Dilthey’s doctrine of Weltanschauung was the concep-
tual axis around which these aspirations winded. Carnap was very much influenced by
these ideas – a major factor arousing his interest in them being without doubt his inten-
sive engagement with the student movements alluded above. Carnap did not, however,
rest content with the formulations of Dilthey and Nohl. He attempted to sharpen the
conceptual ingredients behind such general philosophy and crystallized them in a form
that suited better his own interests and aspirations. He made a distinction that character-
ized the components of any given “world picture” [Weltbild]. He analysed the content of
any such world picture into elements that expressed values or sentiments [Lebensgefühl]
on the one hand, and elements that were purely cognitive, effectively expressing beliefs
[Anschauungen], on the other. The latter was coincident with what Kant had called the do-
main of (theoretical) judgement, characterized further with the property that its elements
could be either true or false. The former domain of Lebensgefühl was outside meaning-
ful linguistic expression, not being amenable to rational judgement. However, Carnap’s
innermost conviction was that better and more reliable knowledge could fundamentally
159
transform the domain of Lebensgefühl. Hence, the basis of all his philosophical work was
built around the realm of knowledge, focusing on the task of devising better and more
refined concepts, more adequate theoretical constructions, and methods of testing such
theories. This general theme was to remain a fundamental characteristic of all his work
throughout his long career. The contrast between the two domains that Carnap had dis-
tinguished was exemplifying in his mind the fundamental cleavage that exists in our
knowledge acquisition procedures and practices between the intersubjectively describ-
able domain of constructed theoretical knowledge and the subjective domain of experi-
ential content. Hence, according to Carnap, Goethe’s critique of Newton was misguided
in the sense that it illegitimately imposed the domain of Lebensgefühl on the realm of
science, since in physics the aspects of experience that were the focus of Goethe’s in-
vestigations are irrelevant from the point of view of what is “first according to nature”,
prìteron tù fÔsei (proteron te phusei), and thus the former (phenomena) consisting of
colours, sound qualities, tactile sensations, etc. are rather always an issue about being
first to us, prìteron prìc mc (proteron pros ēmas). To conflate these domains (proteron te
phusei and proteron pros ēmas) in the order of nature à la Goethe was to instill a danger-
ously great authority to Lebensgefühl, thereby distorting our picture about what could be
rationally judged. For Carnap the task of science was essentially to liberate us from the
modalities and inexactness of sense perception. In 1921 Carnap wrote about this contrast
between sense perception and physical reality with purity and simplicity:
The total separateness of these two areas cannot be emphasised strongly
enough. The first contains the contents of sensation: colours, sounds, smells,
pressures, sensations of warmth, etc. — none of which is even mentioned
in theoretical physics . . . The epistemological question of the relation between
the two areas is not at issue here. Whether (along phenomenological-realistic
lines) one calls the contents of the first (e.g. the colour blue) ‘mere appear-
ances’ and those of the second (e.g. the corresponding electromagnetic waves)
‘reality’ – or vice versa (along positivist lines) one designates those of the first
‘the real given’ and those of the second ‘mere conceptual complexes’ – about
that question, physics doesn’t need to be concerned . . . physics expresses itself
naturally with the help of purely formal correspondence-relations and leaves
such interpretations to a non-physical investigation.29 [ASP (1921c), 10–12]
It has been suggested by some scholars (Carus and Stein inter alia) that even when the two
domains of cognitively meaningful statements and the class of expressions of Lebensgefühl
were regarded by Carnap as mutually exclusive, he still left room for essentially practi-
cal external principles. [ibid.] These are connected with what Hermann Helmholtz called
“metaphysical hypotheses”, which are applied to provisionally complete the picture pro-
vided by science in order to cover those aspects of reality that are not yet accessible to it.
Moreover, these hypotheses are also necessary as practical guides in life:
These hypotheses are even more essential for practical action [das Handeln]
[than for science itself], because one can’t always wait around for a secure
29Cited in [Carus (2007), 124]
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scientific decision to be reached, but must make a decision, whether accord-
ing to probability or according to aesthetic or moral feeling. In this sense as
well, there can be no more objection to metaphysical hypotheses. [Helmholtz
(1878a) [PT, 360]]
The expression of this attitude of Helmholtz was not restricted to a single lecture, but
was an overarching theme of his philosophy. He was especially interested in the relation
between the physical sciences and the moral sciences, and pondered seriously about the
conceptual underpinnings of both. In such enquiries he critically evaluated the intellec-
tual tradition stemming from Hegel, but rather than rejecting the views brought forth
within it, attempted to discern in them what would be an adequate basis for a reconcil-
iation between the physical and moral sciences which had dishearteningly deteriorated
during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid thinking that an insur-
mountable cleft was still left open between the two domains. As Helmholtz remarked in
his popular lectures on the relation of natural science to general science:
In all branches of those studies, in theology, politics, jurisprudence, æsthetics,
philology, there started up enthusiastic Hegelians, who tried to reform their
several departments in accordance with the doctrine of their master, and, by
the royal road of speculation, to reach at once the promised land and gather in
the harvest, which had hitherto only been approached by long and laborious
study. And so, for some time, a hard and fast line was drawn between the
moral and the physical sciences; in fact, the very name of science was often
denied to the latter.
The feud did not long subsist in its original intensity. The physical sciences
proved conspicuously, by a brilliant series of discoveries and practical appli-
cations, that they contained a healthy germ of extraordinary fertility; it was
impossible any longer to withhold from them recognition and respect. And
even in other departments of science, conscientious investigators of facts soon
protested against the over-bold flights of speculation. Still, it cannot be over-
looked that the philosophy of Hegel and Schelling did exercise a beneficial
influence; since their time the attention of investigators in the moral sciences
had been constantly and more keenly directed to the scope of those sciences,
and to their intellectual contents, and therefore the great amount of labour
bestowed on those systems has not been entirely thrown away.
We see, then, that in proportion as the experimental investigation of facts has
recovered its importance in the moral sciences, the opposition between them
and the physical sciences has become less and less marked. Yet we must not
forget that, though this opposition was brought out in an unnecessarily exag-
gerated form by the Hegelian philosophy, it has its foundation in the nature
of things, and must, sooner or later, make itself felt. It depends partly on the
nature of the intellectual processes the two groups of sciences involve, partly,
as their very names imply, on the subjects of which they treat. [Helmholtz
(1895) [PT, 7–8 ]]
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In addition to the influence of Helmholtz and Poincaré who played a prominent role in
the formation of Carnap’s thought on the problems pertaining to philosophy of space,
Carnap was strongly influenced in the early 1920s by an original neo-Kantian, Hans
Vaihinger (1852–1933), whose The Philosophy of As If (Die Philosophie des Als-Ob) made
a lasting impression on him. Vaihinger was known as a prominent Kant scholar, hav-
ing written a massive two-volume commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason as well as
having founded the prestigious journal Kant-Studien in 1896. The latter has remained
a prominent forum for Kant scholarship to this date. Vaihinger, regarding himself as a
Kantian, and a disciple of Lange (1828–1875), was persuaded in his thinking by quite
diverse ideas the most prominent of which had connotations of both Darwinism and
pragmatism. Indeed, he maintained that human intellectual life was subservient to prac-
tical ends, and therefore to (human) passions. Being an enthusiastic Darwinian, he saw
the culturally evolved tools of language and thought as essentially survival mechanisms
(“purposefully operating organic functions”) developed in natural evolution. The prod-
ucts of these “organic functions”, viz. theories and concepts, were to be understood
within the overall system of economically regulated human organism, essentially having
practical significance for the agency of the entire organism. Hence, the traditional picture
of concepts and theories as vehicles of accurate representation of something external to
the organism was insufficient, comprising a secondary task only, subsumed under the
primary task of survival and attaining practical ends. This overall philosophical vision
is put by Vaihinger with rectitude and delicacy in the beginning of the Die Philosophie des
Als-Ob:
Das wissenschaftliche Denken ist eine Funktion der Psyche. Unter “Psy-
che” verstehen wir zunächst nicht eine Substanz, sondern die organische
Gesamtheit aller sogen. “seelischen” Aktionen und Reaktionen; diese fallen
niemals unter die äussere Beobachtung, sondern müssen teils aus physischen
Merkmalen erschlossen, teils mit dem sogen. inneren Sinne beobachtet wer-
den. Die psychischen Aktionen und Reaktionen sind, wie alles uns bekan-
nte Geschehen , notwendige Vorgänge, d. h. sie folgen mit zwingenden
Regelmässigkeit aus ihren Bedingungen und Ursachen; will man die psychis-
chen Vorgänge mit einem Gebiet des äusseren Geschehens vergleichen, so
eignen sich dazu weniger die physikalischen und im engeren Sinne mech-
anischen Vorgänge, als die Funktionen des Organismus. [. . . ] Diese Be-
hauptung findet ihre Begründung in dem Umstand, daß wie bei den or-
ganischen Funktionen der leiblichen Sphäre, so auch bei den psychischen
Funktionen sogen. empirische Zweckmässigkeit beobachtet wird. Diese
Zweckmässigkeit äussert sich hier wie dort in einer geschmeidigen Anpas-
sung an die Umstände und an die Umgebung; in einer, die Erhaltung des
physischen oder psychischen Organismus anstrebenden und erreichenden
Reaktion auf äussere Anstöße und Einwirkungen; in der Aneignung und Auf-
nahme oder Aubstoßung neuer Elemente. In der Psyche findet nicht bloß ein
mechanisches Spiel von Vorstellungen statt, sondern die Vorstellungsbewe-
gung erfüllt in ihrer stetigen Abänderung in hohem Grade die Anforderun-
gen der Zweckmässigkeit. [. . . ] Sämtliche psychischen Prozesse sind in
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dem angegebenen Sinne Zweckmässig; vor allem aber partizipieren an dieser
Zweckmässigkeit die sogen. theoretischen Apperzeptionsprozesse. Das wis-
senschaftliche Denken besteht in solchen apperzeptiven Prozessen, es ist da-
her unter dem Gesichtspunkt einer organischen Funktion zu betrachten. [Vai-
hinger (1927), 1–2]
Vaihinger was seen by many as an intellectual ally of the American pragmatists.30 Ironi-
cally enough, he had a low opinion of William James. Vaihinger found James’ theory of
truth a bitter pill to swallow as it did not distinguish between truth and belief, a distinc-
tion that was essential to Vaihinger’s own philosophy. Beliefs, according to Vaihinger,
are useful fictions, akin to Kant’s ideals. We believe them in order to attain practical ends
(or minimally, to give us at least some prescription for action instead of sustaining all
beliefs and refraining from action). We believe them while realizing that they may well
turn out to be false. The fictions are necessary tools in acquiring knowledge about the
world: without fictions we are locked in a chaotic and utterly formless subjectivity of the
present moment. [Carus (2007), 126] The ultimate measure of fictions is their usefulness
in the conduct of life. The ingredient of skepticism in Vaihinger’s thought winds about
the idea that even if some of our useful fictions in science, for example, were actually
true, we could not have any way of knowing that.
In the following sections I intend to show the central significance of geometry and logico-
geometrical concept formation to Carnap’s early constitutional program of philosophy.
This early stage of the constitutional program is seen to be of utmost importance to the
later attempts of Carnap to refine the notion of “rational reconstruction”. The apogee of
this development is the method of explication introduced in 1950 in the Logical Foundation
of Probability. Indeed, the geometrical origins of the method become apparent, when
one notices the quite unusual sense of geometry that Carnap has recourse to in his early
studies. I intend to shed light on this particular issue. I will also briefly consider what
kind of ontological consequences this approach has for Carnap. The examples are mainly
taken from physics.
4.3 Foundational Studies in Geometry
Carnap’s philosophical career did not begin with a flying start. In the midst of his studies
at the universities of Jena and Freiburg the First World War broke out and Carnap was
recruited to the Prussian army. He served as a communications engineer at the front
and was wounded in action. Afterwards he was decorated. It is quite surprising that
even the ordeal of experiencing the horrors of war first-hand did not hamper Carnap
30Klaus Ceynowa has argued that there is a mutual ancestor to the philosophies of American pragmatism
and Vaihinger: the psychological theories of Alexander Bain. As is well known, they were directly adopted
by both James and Peirce, but their transmission to Germany was more indirect, having been conveyed
there by the neurophysiologist Adolf Horwicz. Vaihinger acknowledged him as an important influence.
[Ceynowa (1993)]
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from enthusiastically absorbing himself in intellectual pursuits. The following statement
from the Intellectual Autobiography [Carnap (1963), 3–84] reveals in particular his early
acquaintance with Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Even during the war, my scientific and philosophical interests were not en-
tirely neglected. During a quiet period at th Western Front in 1917 I read many
books in various fields, e.g., about the world situation and the great questions
of politics, problems of Weltanschauung, poetry, but also science and philos-
ophy. At that time I became acquainted with Einstein’s theory of relativity,
and was strongly impressed and enthusiastic about the magnificent simplicity
and great explanatory power of the basic principles. Later, in Berlin, I studied
the theory of relativity more thoroughly and was especially interested in the
methodological problems connected with it. I also wrote circular letters about
the theory to a few friends; I included an article or small book by Einstein or
others and added detailed explanations with diagrams. Thus I tried to share
my great intellectual enjoyment of the theory with friends. [Carnap (1963),
10]
The early interest in the theory of relativity instigated Carnap to study geometry in depth
for, as he realized, the methodological questions pertaining to the former had very much
to do with the latter. Furthermore, the philosophical import of these issues was consid-
erable. Carnap’s occupation with the philosophical issues pertaining to geometry was
quite typical at the time and reflected the general orientation of intellectual activity in the
academia. Indeed, investigations into the conceptual foundations of geometry were ac-
tively pursued by mathematicians, physicists and philosophers alike. Especially notable
among these investigations were the ones by Klein and Poincaré. In addition to resulting
in masterful presentations of the requisite concepts and methods in making the mathe-
matical study of geometry both more rigorous and general than it had been before, they
also exhibited awareness of and impeccable taste in regard to the philosophical issues
that related to them. Poincaré in particular maintained the intimate connection between
theoretical geometry and questions about human experience that was the hallmark of the
Kantian notion of the “pure form of our sensible intuition”. But equally enlightening are
the examples of the remarkable incentive that geometry formed in the thought of several
philosophers. A few specific examples should suffice: (i) It is well known that Bertrand
Russell’s first book was concerned with these questions. Indeed, this book — in fact,
his dissertation in philosophy — was titled Foundations of Geometry and was published
in 1897. Shortly after that he published another book, The Foundations of Mathematics, in
which the issues pertaining to geometry figured prominently. (ii) Ernst Cassirer is known
to have valued Klein’s Erlangen Programm31 highly, for he envisaged it as a guideline for
31The content of Klein’s program can be summarized in the following, intuitive, non-rigorous way: Klein
proposed to view geometry as “the study of the properties of a space which are invariant under a given
group of transformations”. To study geometry, he said, one needed not only objects (triangles, circles, icosa-
hedra, or much wilder things [fractals, or figures of fractional dimension, we could say today]), but also
movements. In the classical Euclidean regime which had been around for over two millennia, these move-
ments had always been rigid motions: pick up a figure and place an identical copy down in a new place.
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his critical idealism. Indeed, in Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff Cassirer devotes an
entire chapter to the question of concept formation in geometry. The reason for this is
philosophically transparent: Cassirer saw in geometry a paradigmatic model of concept
formation in science in general. This was not merely a refractory view deriving from the
neo-Kantian circles where geometry had a time-honoured place among the sciences, but
was symptomatic of the genuinely current tensions and pressures that affected the con-
ceptual foundations of geometry. (iii) Finally, Rudolf Carnap’s contributions in this field
were highly original. Carnap’s dissertation, Der Raum, Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre,
is a remarkable little book, acute in its conceptual approach and up-to-date in the prob-
lems it tackles. Strangely, it has been all but neglected among the scholars interested in
the philosophy of geometry and philosophy of science in general, and Carnap-scholars
in particular. Only a few reasonably sustained analyses of the book exist. Among these
the most important ones are Thomas Mormann’s articles about Der Raum and its position
in the foundational discourse about geometry in the first decades of twentieth century,
and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock’s provocatively titled The Young Carnap’s Unknown
Master — Husserl’s Influence on DER RAUM and DER LOGISCHE AUFBAU DER WELT. I
will adduce the main ideas of this important early work after laying some conceptual
and historical background.
4.3.1 A sketch of the history of non-euclidean geometries
I will briefly adduce the discoveries in mathematics leading to non-Euclidean geometry
to set the stage for the analysis of the philosophical issues that lie at the heart of these
mathematical questions. The issues involved comprise a fascinating web of ideas and
problems. First of all there is the mathematical side to the story, consisting of the his-
tory of the discovery and first developments of non-Euclidean geometry, where Gauß
plays the part of the originator with his initial researches motivated by his interest in
the foundations of geometry. This line of development reaches its culmination in Rie-
mann’s memoir of 1854. Another wave of research gains momentum after that with Bel-
trami traveling upon its crest. His Saggio of 1868 marks the beginning of a new approach
to these problems.32 Finally, intertwined with all these technical developments are the
philosophical questions pertaining to the nature of space, its ontological status, and our
knowledge about its form. Let me begin with the discovery of hyperbolic geometry. Chris-
tian Houzel reports that this variant of geometry that ultimately became known as the
geometry of Lobachevsky, “was discovered several times independently during a period
that extends from 1816 to 1829”. [Houzel (1992), 5] But similar efforts were made earlier,
albeit from a differently motivated basis. For instance, in the 18th century the most con-
spicuous results in this vein could be found in the works of Saccheri and Lambert. Their
aim was first and foremost to prove the fifth postulate of Euclid, and in that way to vindi-
cate the Euclidean theory of parallels. The method they used was tantamount to reductio
Klein’s radical idea was that other movements, which might stretch or twist the objects quite drastically,
could be thought of as geometrical movements too. [Mumford, Series & Drive 2002, 1–2]
32Incidentally, Beltrami’s work proved crucial for Einstein’s discovery of the correct form of the gravita-
tional field equations.
165
ad absurdum. This meant that a correlative to the fifth postulate was posited by negat-
ing the latter. This postulate could naturally take various forms. Applying similar non-
Euclidean hypotheses in their geometrical derivations, Saccheri and Lambert drew very
different morals from their results. Saccheri found the implication of the result that non-
Euclidean parallels must be asymptotic, namely their having a common perpendicular at
their point of intersection at infinity, repugnans naturae lineae rectae, that is, “repugnant to
the nature of the straight line”. [ibid.] Lambert did not concur. His opinion was rather
that the non-Euclidean hypotheses were difficult to refute, and hence one should be more
careful in judging the truth of the non-Euclidean geometries. However, as his motivation
was to vindicate the Euclidean viewpoint epitomized in the fifth postulate, he refrained
from publishing his results that were collected in his book Theorie der Parallellinien.
About a century later Riemann presents his fundamental new insights into the nature of
geometry. A philosophical motivation for Riemann’s work derives from J. F. Herbart’s
theorizing about so-called serial forms (Reihenformen). This motivation led to the crucial
invention of the notion of an n-ply extended manifold. In this Riemann relied on the simi-
lar notions of Grassmann and Schläfli, which he elaborated heavily . His approach was
considerably broader and more general, and made it possible to expand on the variety of
measure-relations that could be of use in both pure and applied geometry. The important
research questions for Riemann were, then, the number and type of distinct “measure-
relations that such a manifold is capable” and the possibility “to express geometrically
the calculated results.” [Riemann (1868) [Ewald (1996), 652–661]]33 Building on the foun-
dations laid down by Gauß in the celebrated memoir Disquisitiones generales circa superfi-
cies curvas, Riemann could give an outline of his geometric program in the paper On the
hypotheses which lie at the foundation of Geometry [Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie
zu Grunde liegen]:
Position-fixing being reduced to quantity-fixings, and the position of a point
in the n-ply extended manifold being consequently expressed by means of
n variables x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn, the determination of a line comes to the giving
of these quantities as functions of one variable. The problem consists then
in establishing a mathematical expression for the length of a line, and to this
end we must consider the quantities x as expressible in terms of certain units.
I shall treat this problem only under certain restrictions, and I shall confine
myself in the first place to lines in which the ratios of the increments dx of
the respective variables vary continuously. We may then consider these lines
broken up into elements, within which the ratios of the quantities dx may be
regarded as constant; and the problem is then reduced to establishing for each
point a general expression for the linear element ds starting from that point,
an expression which will thus contain the quantities x and the quantities dx. I
shall suppose, secondly, that the length of the linear element, to the first order,
is unaltered when all the points of this element undergo the same infinitesi-
mal displacement, which implies at the same time that if all the quantities dx
are increased in the same ratio, the linear element will vary also in the same
33Clifford’s translation; revisions by William Ewald.
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ratio. On these suppositions, the linear element may be any homogeneous
function of the first degree of the quantities dx, which is unchanged when we
change the signs of all the dx, and in which the arbitrary constants are contin-
uous functions of the quantities x. To find he simplest cases, I shall seek first
an expression for manifoldness of n − 1 dimensions which are everywhere
equidistant from the origin of the linear element; that is, I shall seek a contin-
uous function of position whose values distinguish them from one another.
In going outwards from the origin, this must either increase in all directions
or decrease in all directions; I assume that it increases in all directions, and
therefore has a minimum at that point. If, then, the first and second differ-
ential coefficients of this function are finite, its first differential must vanish,
and the second differential cannot become negative; I assume that it is always
positive. This differential expression, then, of the second order remains con-
stant when ds remains constant, and increases in the duplicate ratio when the
dx, and therefore also ds, increase in the same ratio; it must therefore be ds2
multiplied by a constant, and consequently ds is the square root of an always
positive integral homogeneous function of the second order of the quantities
dx, in which the coefficients are continuous functions of the quantities x. For




A few comments are in order here. By “Space” Riemann means three-dimensional Eu-
clidean space. The systematic consideration of different possible cases of dependence
between the quantities ds and dx leads Riemann finally to restrict the investigation to
“manifolds for which the line element is given by the square root of a differential expres-






where gij = gji are functions of the variables xi. This requirement is tantamount to a
guarantee that the n-dimensional space is locally Euclidean. This characterization of the
local geometry of an n-manifold is, as we shall see, an essential ingredient of the general
theory of manifolds.
The essential feature of surfaces that the Riemannian formulation of geometry enables
one to tackle with is their curvature. Perhaps it is expedient to give an informal descrip-
tion of the procedure of defining the principal curvature of a given surface. Without
making the definitions exact, we can give the following outline of the recipe for calculat-
ing the curvatures κ1 and κ2. Suppose S is a surface in R3, p is a point in S, and N is a
unit normal vector to S at p. Then, to calculate κ1 and κ2:
1. Choose a plane Π through p that contains N. The intersection of Π with S is then a
plane curve γ ⊂ Π passing through p.
2. Compute the signed curvature κN of γ at p with respect to the chosen unite normal
N.
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Figure 4.1: Principal curvatures. c©Wikipedia.
3. Repeat this for all normal planes Π. The principal curvatures of S at p, denoted κ1
and κ2, are defined to be the minimum and the maximum signed curvatures so
obtained.
4.3.2 The conceptual foundations of geometry
In the wake of the researches by Klein, mathematicians came to appreciate the pluralistic
nature of synthetic geometry. Discarding the dichotomy between Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometries and the suitability of the one or the other in describing the structure
of our spatial perception as the central question of synthetic geometry, a vast field of
inquiry was suddenly opened up. The radical insight was that synthetic geometry itself
provided a wealth of approaches to formulate the axiomatic basis of geometry. One of the
most distinctive novelties was the introduction of the idea of finite geometries. In these
systems one deals with only a finite number of basic geometrical entities, principally
points and lines. A famous example of these is Fano’s system of geometry, which is
a (formally symmetrical) system of only seven lines and seven points. Another crucial
insight was the idea of duality which asserts: Assume S to be a geometric system in which
points and lines are related to each other in a certain way. Then there exists a geometrical
system S∗ in which the points of S play the functional role of the lines in S∗ and the lines
of S correspond to the points of S∗. This means, in other words, that points and lines
are always defined interdependently: knowledge about the points of a geometric system
entails knowledge about its lines.
These considerations change radically the status of geometry in relation to the Kantian
question of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of spatial experience and
perception. But a valid kernel of the Kantian conception remains untouched: the very
principle of imposing such transcendental conditions on our experience. Only now the
centrality of Euclidean geometry is questioned. Thomas Mormann sheds light on the
core ideas of the newly conceived foundations of synthetic geometry. [Mormann (2003),
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47] He emphasizes that the Leitmotiv of synthetic geometry is the concept of order. Inci-
dentally, also Carnap conceived geometry as a general theory of Ordnungsgefüge. Carnap
intended this term in a semi-technical sense, implying by it something akin to “relational
structure” or “structured set”.34 By stipulating order on a domain (Ordnungssetzungen),
one conceives it as an Ordnungsgefüge. In general, the point of geometry is to study the
variety of different geometries. The two characteristics of this approach to geometry have
been summarized by Mormann as follows:
1. Space in the sense of synthetic geometry is a general term which comprises many
different spatial structures. Geometry has to study all of them without blinders to
single one as the “true” one. In this sense geometry is abstract, not in that it is
remote from applications.
2. Synthetic Geometry is relational. Its objects are determined by a net of implicit
relational definitions. The ontological status of any geometric object is determined
by its relational position within a certain relational system. [ibid., 48]
Another line of research was prompted by David Hilbert whose penetrating researches
into the foundations of geometry, especially in his Grundlagen der Geometrie, paved the
way for purely formal treatments of synthetic geometry. In addition, Hilbert was also
influential in instigating new insights into the nature of plane curves, anticipating the
theory of fractals.
4.3.3 Carnap’s analysis of space: Der Raum
In addition to the logical considerations mentioned above, the theory of relativity played
a prominent role in shaping the discussion about the foundations of geometry. Carnap’s
dissertation attempted to combine both of these approaches and, to a certain degree,
succeeded in it. The fundamental insight of his dissertation was the introduction of a
division of different kinds of spaces in order to demarcate different discourses from one
another. Bruno Bauch’s course on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason where the conception that
the geometrical structure of space is dictated by the form of our intuition was adduced,
made Carnap to pursue firmly the philosophical task of clarifying the underpinnings
of geometrical concepts and their varied use in mathematics, physics and philosophy.
Carnap maintained that while the same term “space” was used in all these disciplines,
each of them accommodated entirely different subjects under their purview:
[. . . ] I distinguished three meanings of this term, namely, formal space, in-
tuitive space, and physical space. Formal space is an abstract system, con-
structed in mathematics, and more precisely in the logic of relations; there-
fore our knowledge of formal space is of a logical nature35 Knowledge of in-
34As should be clear from this characterization, it is not a terminus technicus in geometry.
35In 1919 Carnap had studied the magnum opus of Russell and Whitehead, the Principia, and “was
strongly impressed by the development of the theory of relations in this work” [Carnap (1963), 11].
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tuitive space I regarded at that time, under the influence of Kant and the neo-
Kantians, especially Natorp and Cassirer, as based on “pure intuition” and
independent of contingent experience.36 But, in contrast to Kant, I limited
the features of intuitive space grasped by pure intuition to certain topological
properties; the metrical structure (in Kant’s view, the Euclidean structure) and
the three-dimensionality I regarded not as purely intuitive, but rather as em-
pirical. Knowledge of physical space I already as entirely empirical, in agree-
ment with empiricists like Helmholtz and Schlick. In particular, I discussed
the role of non-Euclidean geometry in Einstein’s theory. [Carnap (1963), 12]
Carnap saw clearly the importance of the concept of a topological space for the rigorous
development of the geometrical foundations of the general theory of relativity in partic-
ular, and for the foundations of geometry in general. It was therefore clear at the outset
that the classification of spaces should include topological spaces as one of the main cat-
egories. But there is another, conceptually more compelling reason. It is simply that the
notion of a topological space enables us to proceed in abstraction a little further from the
concept of a metric space that still contains some “extraneous” information. This kind
of an abstraction would make it possible, Carnap thought, to retain the Kantian idea of
the transcendental condition of our spatial experience in a more relaxed form. Reverting
to the mathematical aspects of the idea, it is clear that a homeomorphism between two
metric spaces need not preserve distances (a paradigmatic example is a homeomorphism
between two spheres with different radii). Mathematicians therefore introduce the con-
cept of a “space” without distances in which continuous functions still make sense. Thus
we end up with the following definition of a topological space:
A topology on a set X is a collection T of subsets of X, called open sets, satisfying the
following properties
(i) X and ∅ are elements of T .
(ii) T is closed under finite intersections: If U1, . . . , Un ∈ T , then their intersection
U1 ∩ · · · ∩Un is in T .
(iii) T is closed under arbitrary unions: If {Uα}α∈A is any (finite or infinite) collection of
elements of T , then their union ∪α∈AUα.
A pair (X, T ) consisting of a set X and a topology T on X is called a topological space.
The concept of a topological manifold is modeled on the concept of topological space.
More exactly, a topological manifold is a second countable Hausdorff space locally home-
omorphic to a Euclidean space En. By imposing a definite metrical structure (a Rieman-
nian metric) on the topological manifoldM and demanding in addition that it be smooth,
36Curiously enough, Carnap does not here mention Husserl, whose impact on the overall view of Der
Raum and especially on the parts concerning the intuitive space was conspicuous. The reasons for this
“selective amnesia”, as [Haddock (2008)] calls it, are not entirely clear.
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Figure 4.2: Map-projections. c©Tomasz M. Trzeciak. Source: LaTeX-Community.org.
i.e. that the function defined on M are C∞, that is to say, infinitely differentiable, one
ends up with a type of manifold that forms the basic tool in the general theory of relativ-
ity (Riemannian or pseudo-Riemannian manifold).
Carnap made a subdivision in his classification of spaces consisting of a mathematical
division into topological, projective and metrical spaces. The meaning of the concept of
topological space we have adduced above. The two remaining types of space can be
defined in various ways. (In the following I will employ just one particular definition
of them, and refrain from a detailed explanation of these concepts.) Carnap actually
confused the notions of projective and affine space,37 but this is not fatal for his treatment
of the general problem. The basic idea is that the notion of projective space was to play
an intermediate role between the topological space, where no metrical structure could
be specified and the metrical space, where such structure could be given by ascribing a
distance function, a metric to the space. In an intuitive language, projective geometry is
concerned with those properties of figures that are left unchanged when the figures are subjected to
a projective transformation. Illustrations of projective transformations in Euclidean space
are given in the above figure.
37Mormann in a personal communication to Haddock [Haddock (2008), 6n].
171








dimR ∈ {3, N}
Projective spaces
Rijk∈ P
dimR ∈ {3, N}
Metric spaces
Rijk∈ M

















This amounts to 18 different kinds of space in all.
Let us now specify in a little more detail the ideas behind this classification. In the
first place, Carnap means by formal space simply a relational structure (Ordnungsgefüge)
whose members lack of any determination (as elements of the space), and which are char-
acterized only by the most abstract relational properties of geometry. In practice such a
formal specification means that from certain connections of a determined kind one can
draw conclusions about connections of another determined kind within the same region.
In short, this class includes the purely mathematical aspects of spatial description. The
nature of the intuitive space is, however, something at once more concrete:
By intuitive space, on the other hand, is understood the structure of relations
between “spatial” figures in the usual sense [. . . ] whose determined partic-
ularity we apprehend by means of perception or mere representation. One
is still not concerned there with spatial facts present in empirical reality, but
only with “essence” of those figures, which can be recognized in any repre-
sentative of the species. [Carnap (1922), 5–6]38
The physical space, the elements of which comprise the material bodies, particles and
fields described by physics, and the existence of which is an empirical fact, presupposes,
in a purely logico-epistemological sense, the intuitive space, which, on the other hand,
presupposes the formal space. In Carnap’s words, “Cognitions of physical space pre-
suppose the cognition of intuitive space, and the latter [. . . ] finds the pure form of its
38Translation in [Haddock (2008), 5]. The German original reads: “Unter Anschauungsraum dagegen
wird das Gefüge der Beziehungen den im üblichen Sinne “räumlichen” Gebilden verstanden, also des Lin-
ien, Flächen- und Raumstücken, deren bestimmte Eigenheit wir bei Gelegenheit sinnlicher Wahrnehmung
oder auch bloßer Vorstellung erfassen. Dabei handelt es sich aber noch nicht um die der Erfahrungswirk-
lichkeit vorliegenden räumlichen Tatsachen, sondern nur um das “Wesen” jener Gebilde selbst, das an ir-
gendwelchen Artvertretern erkannt werden kann.”
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structure prefigured in formal space.” [ibid., 7] More specifically, the theories of formal
and intuitive space stand in the relation of specification, and the theories of intuitive and
physical space stand in the relation of subordination. This hierarchy is, then, quite clearly
seen to correspond to the Husserlian one specified in the Logische Untersuchungen, which
comprises the relations between formal ontology, regional ontology and factual science.
[Husserl (1970) [1900/1901], 303ff.] The alleged philosophical import of Carnap’s classifi-
cation, as he went on arguing, was that it enabled, together with a modification of Kant’s
original account, a dissolution of the traditional dispute over the Kantian doctrine of the
synthetic a priori basis of cognition of space in pure spatial intuition:
The old controversies between mathematicians, who disputed Kant’s asser-
tion, and philosophers, who defended it, were thus obviously unable to reach
any result, because the two sides were not talking about the same object. The
former had partly formal space in mind (e.g. Couturat) and partly physical
space (Riemann, Helmholtz, Poincaré), the latter intuitive space. So both Par-
ties were correct and could have been easily reconciled if clarity had prevailed
concerning the three different meanings of space. [ibid., 47]
Carnap provides a detailed presentation of the different sorts of space in the first three
chapters of Der Raum, whereas the relationship between these different spaces is speci-
fied in the fourth chapter. In the fifth and last chapter an overall evaluation of the three
conceptions of space is provided. In particular, the formal space (formaler Raum) is sin-
gled out as an individual chapter in the development of the logical theory of relations as
first systematically specified in the works of Russell and Whitehead, especially in Rus-
sell’s Principles of Mathematics and in Russell’s and Whitehead’s monumental Principia
Mathematica. Subsuming the theory of formal space in the general theory of relations en-
tails that along the properties of numbers (as specified in number theory), the properties
of formal space are, not only independent of experience, but ultimately derivable from
logic. Frege’s logicism, the influence of which on Carnap was briefly assessed in section
4.1.2, did not ruminate into the domain of geometry, as his conception of geometry was
very much in line with the Kantian one, constituting thus a peculiar tension between the
analyticity of arithmetic and the synthetic nature of geometry.
As to the specific content of the notion of intuitive space, Carnap’s presentation was
heavily influenced by Husserl, as we noted above. This is conspicuous in the remarks in
the fifth chapter of Der Raum:
Here [in intuitive space] we have distinguished between the principles in the
strict sense and the requirements. Those build the results of a determined
sort of “contemplations of essences” [Wesenerschauung] (in Husserl’s sense)
and as such, like all knowledge from this source, do not need the accumu-
lation of empirical facts, [and] as such are not to be referred to as empirical
knowledge, but also are not independent of every experience, since they are
obtained from any representative of the kind of objects concerned. Require-
ments, on the other hand, are not knowledge but stipulations that have to
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be made in order to obtain a total structure “space” from such knowledge,
which in virtue of their own nature [ihrem Wesen nach] seem limited to an in-
complete region. For these extensions to a complete structure different possi-
bilities were indicated. Topological space presents [darstellt] what is common
to all [of those possibilities] and on this ground ought to be seen as the form
of the spatial apprehensible in the contemplation of essences. Intuitive metric
spaces, on the contrary, also depend on the choice of the stipulations; and as
such lack the property of the unlimited validity, which possess [both] intu-
itive topological space and all knowledge originating in this source. [Carnap
(1922), 62–63]39
Thus, the principles of intuitive space, knowable by means of Husserlian intuition of
essences [Wesen], completely determine intuitive topological space. The primacy of the
purely topological properties of space is here also clearly visible. As to physical space,
Carnap contends that we come to know its properties empirically, through the factual
content of our experience. We generalize upon the most conspicuous features of these
contents by induction, and these features, once again, uniquely determine only the phys-
ical topological space. The systematic emphasis on the topological properties of space at
every level of the classification — formal, intuitive, physical — is a hallmark of Carnap’s
geometrical conventionalism. The idea originates with Poincaré, whose specific results
concerning the ‘topological equivalence’ of the Euclidean space and a particular hyper-
bolic representation of it very much influenced Carnap’s thinking in this vein. In a nut-
shell, Poincaré’s construction establishes an equivalence between the three-dimensional
Euclidean space and a ball centered at origin, the radius of which is R, and the metric
inside which is stipulated by a specific rule of dilatation:
Suppose [. . . ] a world enclosed in a large sphere and subject to the following
laws. The temperature is not uniform; it is greatest at the centre and gradu-
ally decreases as we move towards the circumference of the sphere, where it
is absolute zero. The law of this temperature is as follows: if R be the radius of
the sphere and r the distance of the point considered from the centre, the ab-
solute temperature will be R2− r2. Further, I will assume that in this world all
bodies have the same coefficient of dilatation, so that the linear dilatation of
39“Hier haben wir unterschieden zwischen den Grundsätzen im engeren Sinne und den Forderungen.
Jede bilden den Befund einer bestimmten Art der “Wesenerschauung” (im Husserlschen Sinne) und sind da-
her wie alle Erkenntnisse dieser Quelle nicht auf Häufung von Erfahrungstatsachen angewiesen, daher nicht
als Erfahrungserkenntnisse zu bezeichnen, aber auch nicht unabhängig von jeder Erfahrung, insofern als sie
an irgendwelchen Vertretern der betrefflichen Art von Gegenständen gewonnen werden. Die Forderun-
gen dagegen sind nicht Erkenntnisse, sondern Festsetzungen, die getroffen werden, um ein geschlossenes
Gesamtgefüge “Raum” aus jenen Erkenntnissen zu gewinnen, die ihrem Wesen nach auf ein nicht vollständi-
ges Gebiet beschränkt erscheinen. Für diese Erweiterungen zum vollständigen Gefüge zeigten sich ver-
schiedene Möglichkeiten. Der topologische Raum stellt das ihnen allen gemeinsame dar und ist deshalb als
Form des in der Wesenerschauung des Räumlichen faßbar anzusehen. Die metrischen Anschauungsräumen
dagegen sind auch noch von der Wahl jener Festsetzungen abhängig; daher fehlt ihnen die dem topologis-
chen Anscahuungsraum wie allen dieser Quelle enstammenden Erkenntnissen zukommende Eigenschaft
der unbedingten Gültigkeit.”
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any body transported from one point to another of different temperature is in-
stantaneously in thermal equilibrium with its new environment.40 [Poincaré
(1952) [1902], 65]
The construction of Poincaré had a considerable attraction for Carnap, who attempted to
extend the basic idea of that construction by showing that not only was it possible to en-
dow the Euclidean space E3 with a Riemannian structure of constant negative curvature
(as was the case with Poincaré’s hyperbolic representation), but also with a structure of
positive curvature (i.e. an elliptic geometry). This procedure got its thrust from the idea
that only the topological features of an Ordnungsgefüge were matters of fact, whereas the
metrical properties of space were merely stipulations, i.e., matters of convention. This, of
course, was a leading idea behind the representations of the philosophy of geometry by
other logical empiricists, too, and one that would reign the discussions about the foun-
dations of geometry all the way up to the latter half of the twentieth century. Carnap
summarized his conception in the following way:
The transfomation of a statement of matter of fact from one metrical space-
form into another — e.g., from the Euclidean one into one of the non-
Euclidean — has been aptly compared to the translation of a proposition from
one language into another. Now, just as the genuine sense of the proposition
is not its presentation in one of these linguistic forms — for then its presen-
tation in the other languages would have to appear as derivative and less
original — but is merely that in the proposition which remains unaltered in
translation; so too the sense of the statement of matter of fact is not one of its
metrical presentations, but that which is common to all of them (the “invari-
ants of topological transformations”) — and that is precisely its presentation
in merely topological form. [Carnap (1922), 65]
This, then, was the professed relevance of Carnap’s work for the philosophical and scien-
tific discourse that centered on the foundational problems of geometry. Although many
of his suggestions pertaining to geometry have been contested and some even refuted
(such is the case with his thesis that the Kantian conception of synthetic a priori can be
retained in the way of referring to fundamental topological facts [topologischer Tatbestand]
underlying any spatial configuration),41 the lasting influence of his exposition resides in





41For example, it is impossible, if it is assumed that the Riemannian metric is complete, to endow the Eu-
clidean space with a constant positive curvature. More generally, the relationship between the topological
and metrical structure of a space is far more intricate than the straightforward optimism of Carnap suggests.
Indeed, the mathematical progress made in the latter half of twentieth century has enabled us to delve in
much more detail to these questions, and the general contention is that all-encompassing generalizations
about these relations are in principle impossible to achieve. A convincing example of this is the notori-
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the variety of conventionalism that is introduced in that work. This conventionalism, in-
terestingly prefiguring his later ideas of linguistic pluralism, marks the first appearance
of one of the main motifs of Carnap’s philosophical work.
4.3.4 Reichenbach’s Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A priori
In his seminal book Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A priori about the philosophical sig-
nificance of Einstein’s relativity theory Hans Reichenbach presented an incisive critique
of Kantian views of space and time. Although educated under the influence of neo-
Kantianism and firmly embedded in its habits of thought — just as Carnap was — Re-
ichenbach came to play a significant role in liberating serious philosophical work pertain-
ing to science and its applications from the restrictive and partly outdated conceptions
of Kantian philosophy that were still largely dictating the modes of professional philos-
ophizing in Germany at the time. He was ideally suited to this task for in addition to
his impeccable mastery of traditional Kantian philosophy he attended Einstein’s lectures
on relativity theory at the University of Berlin. Furthermore, Reichenbach’s philosoph-
ical views on relativity theory had taken their shape in a unique environment: he and
Einstein used often to travel to their homes from the university by the same streetcar
and continue discussions on the themes adduced in the lecture. Later, when Reichen-
bach had secured a university position for himself in Berlin by the help of Einstein, these
commutes were made with Reichanbach’s tiny car42 and lengthy discussions on relativity
would ensue until the trip was over.
Reichenbach, more than giving merely a presentation of the inadequacies of the Kantian
approach in assessing the philosophical significance of modern scientific results, tapped
right into the core of contemporary concerns about the relationship between philosophy
and science. Indeed, he asserted to have introduced a new methodology of investigation
which he coined the method of of logical analysis. As we have seen, this was not a singular
phenomenon at the time. The setting for proposing methodological novelties was pro-
vided by the concrete theories and problems of the natural sciences and mathematics. It
is evident that Reichenbach’s thoughts about the status of the notion of a priori and the
meaning of the notions of space and time had a crucial influence on the development of
Carnap’s thought pertaining not only to the problems of the epistemology of geometry
but to the nature and extent of scientific philosophy in general. As a matter of fact, the
two men were in correspondence from 1919 onwards.43 However, it was not until 1923
ously recalcitrant problem of deciding the Poincaré Conjecture which was only recently proven by Grigori
Perelman. Whereas analogous problems for dimensions of four and higher were solved using similar meth-
ods, the Poincaré conjecture involving dimension three was tackled with completely differently (using the
so-called Ricci flows familiar from differential geometry).
42According to an anecdote told by Maria Reichenbach in the preface to the English edition of Relativitäts-
theorie und Erkenntnis A priori, in a midst of one such drive a policeman at the Brandenburg Gate waved them
on with “Get going with your baby-buggy”. [Reichenbach (1965), xv]
43The Reichenbach-Carnap correspondence comprises approximately two hundred letters and it is con-
tained in the Hans Reichenbach Collection. The Hans Reichenbach Collection is part of the Archives of
Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science, which also houses the Rudolf Carnap and Frank Ramsey Col-
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that they managed to meet in person at a conference in Erlangen that was organized by
them and a few others with similar ambitions in pursuing philosophy from a scientific
viewpoint with an emphasis on the conceptual tools provided by mathematical logic.
Carnap was also much influenced by Reichenbach’s reading of Kant. Reichenbach had
offered a précis of the Kantian account of “constitution” of the object of knowledge from
the distinct contributions of perception and categories:
According to Kant, the object of knowledge, the phenomenal thing, is not im-
mediately given. Perception does not give the object but only the material
[Stoff ] of which it constructed through an act of judgement. In judgement a
subordination [Einordnung] into a determinate schema is carried out, accord-
ing to the choice of scheme a thing or a determinate type of relation develops.
Intuition [Anschauung] is the form in which perception represents the material
of knowledge; accordingly, intuition contains a synthetic moment. However,
only the conceptual scheme, the categories, creates the object [Objekt]; the ob-
ject [Gegenstand] of science is therefore not a “thing-in-itself” but rather an
intuition-based reference structure [Bezugsgebilde], constituted through cate-
gories. [Reichenbach (1920), 46; English trans. (1965) 48–49]
To give a summary of Reichenbach’s critique of the Kantian analysis of space and time,
it is expedient to consider the principles that were essential to Kantianism but demon-
strably incompatible with the findings of modern physics in the context of the theory of
relativity. The principles in question were formulated by Reichenbach as follows:
• the principle of the relativity of uniformly moving coöordinates
• the principle of irreversible causality
• the principle of action by contact
• the principle of the approximate ideal
• the principle of normal induction
• the principle of absolute time
Reichenbach contended that, given the framework of relativistic physics, these were all
false. The juxtaposition between the Kantian and Einsteinian viewpoints sheds consid-
erable light on the dramatic shift in the presuppositions of Newtonian and relativistic
physics. The transition from the Newtonian (Kantian) picture to the relativistic one was
not, however, as abrupt as this presentation of Reichenbach seems to imply. The actual
process of transition was much more graded and some of the most ‘radical’ aspects of rel-
ativity theory were anticipated already by Leibniz. (This is demonstrated by John Earman
lections. The Archives of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science is located in the Special Collections
Department of the University of Pittsburgh’s Hillman Library.
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in his book World Enough and Space-Time [Earman (1989)]) The development of the con-
ception of physical spaces is succinctly captured by the following table of the “classical
space-times”, which provides a clear view of the differences of the historically important
conceptions of space and time since Aristotle: [Earman (1989), 36]
Name Structure Symmetries Invariants
1. Machian absolute simulta- x → x′α = Rαβ(t)xβ + aα(t) relative particle
space-time neity; E3 structure distances
of the instanta- t→ t′ = f (t), d f /dt > 0
neous spaces
2. Leibnizian (1) + time metric x → x′α = Rαβ(t)xβ + aα(t) relative particle
space-time velocities,
t→ t′ = t + const accelerations,
etc.
3. Maxwellian (2) + standard of x → x′ = Rαβxβ + aα(t) rotation for
space-time rotation an extended
t→ t′ = t + const body
4. neo-Newtonian (3) + inertial x → x′ = Rαβxβ + vα(t) + const acceleration
space-time structure of a particle
t→ t′ = t + const
5. Full Newtonian (4) + absolute x → x′ = Rαβxβ + const velocity
space-time space of a particle
t→ t′ = t + const
6. Aristotelean (5) + distinguished x → x′ = Rαβxβ distance
space-time spatial origin from the
t→ t′ = t + const center of
the universe
Reichenbach’s acute analysis of the different meanings of the Kantian notion of a pri-
ori and its relevance for modern science more than compensated such lapses in historical
knowledge, however. The essential novelty of Reichenbach’s book was the specification
of a system of coördination, i.e., a framework for cognitive systematization, in which the
results of modern physical theory could be more adequately described than in the Kan-
tian framework. Indeed, he went on to specify the differences between his and Kant’s
system of knowledge: “Our view differs from that of Kant as follows: whereas in Kant’s
philosophy only the determination of a particular concept is an infinite task, we contend
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that even our concepts of the very object of knowledge, that is, of reality and the possibility of its
description, can only gradually become more precise.” [ibid., 88] Moreover, the essential role
of the theory of relativity in instigating the reformulation of the character of the theory of
knowledge was clearly expressed by Reichenbach:
If the system of coördination is determined by reason in its conceptual rela-
tions, but in its ultimate construction by experience, then the totality expresses
the nature of reason and by the reality that the concept is intended to formu-
late. It is therefore not possible, as Kant believed, to single out in the concept
of object a component that reason regards as necessary. The idea that the con-
cept of object has its origin in reason can manifest itself only in the fact that
this concept contains elements for which no selection is prescribed, that is, el-
ements that are independent of the nature of reality. The arbitrariness of these
elements shows that they owe their occurrence in the concept of knowledge
altogether to reason. The contribution of reason is not expressed by the fact that the
system of coördination contains unchanging elements, but in the fact that arbitrary
elements occur in the system. This interpretation represents an essential mod-
ification compared to Kant’s conception of the contribution of reason. The
theory of relativity has given an adequate presentation of this modification.
[ibid., 88–89]
This passage, essentially containing an elucidation of what could be termed relativized-a-
priori, is important in pointing not only to the fact that contemporary theories in physics
were inspiring interesting work in philosophy, but further to the tendency, already visible
also in Carnap’s work, of an all-encompassing conventionalism. Given that Carnap and
Reichenbach were in contact from early on, it is plausible that they have exerted mutual
influence on each other’s views about the conventional elements in scientific theories. In
any case, Carnap’s work after Der Raum centered on fundamental issues of physics.
4.3.5 Ontological aspects of Carnap’s program
Originally Carnap had planned to write his dissertation on the axiomatics of physics.
This kind of work was not, however encouraged in the physics department (Max Wien,
Carnap’s tutor, had not been overtly enthusiastic about such a research project). Carnap
had to settle ultimately with the idea of writing his dissertation about the philosophical
foundations of geometry. This did not in the end compromise Carnap’s possibilities to
study in more detail the conceptual aspects of the theory of relativity that had originally
instigated his interest in the axiomatics of physics, because apparently, the questions on
the foundations of geometry and their relation to physics were ideally suited for an ax-
iomatic treatment.
The groundwork that Carnap had laid in his dissertation proved fruitful for his consec-
utive efforts to implement a program aiming towards an ideal system of physics. In the
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article “Über die Aufgabe der Physik” [Carnap (1923)], published shortly after the re-
vised version of Der Raum, Carnap had imagined that this system should consist of three
distinct compartments: the first one comprised the basic laws of physics represented as
a formal axiom system; the second comprised the phenomenal-physical dictionary, that is,
a set of correspondence rules establishing the relations between observable qualities and
physical magnitudes; and the third one comprised the description of the state of the uni-
verse for two distinct and arbitrary time points. What would this kind of an ideal system
of physics amount to? As Carnap makes clear, the result was a deterministic picture of
physical reality:
[. . . ] From these descriptions, together with the laws contained in the first
volume, the state of the world for any other time-point would be deducible
(Laplace’s form of determinism), and from this result, with the help of the
rules of correspondence, the qualities could be derived which are observable
at any position in space and time. [Carnap (1963), 15]
This passage is very revealing in making explicit the commitment to determinism.44 But
in 1923 it was a natural option for one mainly interested in analysing the axiomatic struc-
ture of established physical theories and the definability of physical concepts under their
purview. After all, Werner Heisenberg presented his version of quantum mechanics in
1925, and it was thus far too early for non-experts to fully realize the implications of the
quantum revolution that was under way. Furthermore, the importance of the classical
(deterministic) picture of physics for the development of the theory of relativity is well
known. Einstein stressed on many occasions his deterministic outlook and the theory of
relativity certainly was a manifestation of that outlook.45 As a matter of fact, the special
theory of relativity in particular is the singular exemplar of a physical theory where pure
instances of determinism can be found.46 Hence, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Car-
nap chose to give a glimpse of his ideal system of physics first in the context of special
relativity.
Remarks about time
In [Carnap (1923)] Carnap intended to extend the basic ideas of [Carnap (1922)] to com-
prise problems about time and causality. It was, then, very much the question about
assessing the viability of conventionalism in physics that formed the underlying motiva-
tion for the discussion in that paper. Here I do not wish to examine the explicit views
44A preliminary definition of causal determinism can be given along the following lines: The world is
governed by (or is under the sway of ) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the
way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.
45A hint of the depth of feeling with which Einstein took a stance with respect to determinism is given by
his statement reported in the Spinoza-Festschrift, 1632–1932 where he points with zealous devotion that the
application of determinism to human thinking, feeling and action requires “an unusual purity (Lauterkeit),
greatness of mind (Seelengrösse), and modesty.” [Spinoza-Festschrift, 1632–1932, ed. Siegfried Hessing (1962)]
46See especially John Earman’s account of how the relativistic structure of spacetime improves the fortunes
of determinism in [Earman (2007)].
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of Carnap in [Carnap (1923)] or its sequels [Carnap (1924), (1925)]. Instead I will briefly
sketch the modern outlook on this issue, especially with respect to time. This discussion
is a sort of preparation for the exposition on the questions of determinism that follows.
Three basic postulates characterize the conception of time that is familiar from modern
relativistic physics. (1) In a given system, time (a given geometric time47) flows in a unique
direction in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics;48 (2) the time flow can
be characterized both from an ‘objective’ and a relativistic point of view; and (3) causal
relations have a temporal direction associated with (1).
Since time has a physically determined direction of flow, it is possible — at least in prin-
ciple — to identify objectively temporally distinguished states of a given system. Nat-
urally, the choice of a particular, restricted set of observables will affect the way how
we identify and label those states, but generally such a distinction is possible and un-
ambiguous in the sense that given two (possibly overlapping, but non-identical) sets of
observables, O1 and O2, with a fixed procedure for their measurement, the temporal or-
der of any two given events, E1 and E2 remains invariant: tO1(E1) < tO1(E2) if and only if
tO2(E1) < tO2(E2). Hence, given any frame, we can always find a way of assigning time
to particular events in such a way that we can order them temporally in an unambiguous
way (excluding some anomalous cases in General Relativity). Now, time flow in a given
system can be given both an objective and a mind-dependent interpretation. A couple of
classic formulations of the mind-dependence thesis are given by Arhur Stanley Edding-
ton, the eminent astrophysicist, and Hermann Weyl, the illustrious mathematician. Let
us first relate the version of Eddington:
Events do not happen; they are just there, and we come across them. “The
formality of taking place” is merely the indication that the observer has on his
voyage of exploration passed into the absolute future of the event in question.
[Eddington (1920), 51]
Weyl restates the essentials of this view as follows:
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my
consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section
47In General Relativity Theory the assignment of time in a given frame is, in general, a complicated process
and consists of a choice between distinct geometric times. A (plain, affinely parameterized, or parameter-
ized) time for general relativity is called geometric if it satisfies the following conditions. (i) Its domain of
definition is closed under the action of D(V) on the space of solutions. (ii) If g and g′ are in the domain of
the time and g′ = d∗g for some diffeomorphism d : V → V, then the foliation assigned to g′ is the image
under d−1 of the foliation assigned to g (if the time is affinely parameterized, then we require that such a
d preserve the time difference between any two instants; if the time is parameterized, then we require that
such a d map the instant labeled by t to the instant labeled by t).
48Not that the second law of thermodynamics provides an implicit definition of time. I take the second law
only to indicate the direction of time, or “time’s arrow”, as it has become to be called. A. S. Eddington intro-
duced the phrase in 1928 in his Gifford lectures. Eddington had in mind only the singular time-asymmetric
phenomenon of the increase of entropy, but in 1979 Roger Penrose distinguished as many as seven different
‘arrows’. [Savitt (1995), 4]
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Figure 4.3: Spacetime and the orientation of the light-cone with respect to time axis.
c©Wikipedia.
of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously
changes in time. [Weyl (1949), 116]
Adolf Grünbaum has pondered in this context over the question: what it is that over and
above its occurrence at a stipulated, physical clock-time t, characterizes a physical event
E as now or as belonging to the present? Grünbaum gives his answer along the lines of
the mind-dependence thesis: a necessary condition for E to be so characterized is that
at t some mind-posessing organism M is conceptually aware of experiencing either E or
some other event simultaneous with it in M’s reference frame. [Grünbaum (1971), 206–
207] This view leads to relativity with respect to the direction of time, but it in no way
compromises the general principles of time assignment given above. Indeed, there is no
observer-independent label indicating which way is the future direction of flow, but once
a choice has been made on the basis of an observed anisotropy (due to irreversible or
other time-asymmetric processes), the observer looking at the universe will see a struc-
tural difference along the chosen time axis. The selection of the direction of past (and
future) is truly a mind-dependent choice. Hence, one can argue that a selection of a time
measuring procedure enables one to distinguish between past and future, but that this is
only a consequence of a situated decision of a conscious agent; in the physical space-time
there does not exist a qualitative difference between past, present and future.
Objective interpretations of time flow intend to dispute the mind-dependence theories
by stipulating that time flow is relativistic only in the sense that it manifests itself in a
frame-dependent, but not in a mind-dependent way. Without going into the intricate
details pertaining to these theories, we can relate their logical implications by giving an
outline of their semantics.49 The most important aspect of the semantics is its temporal
definition of truth, which I will give shortly. It is contrasted with the definition of timeless
truth that reads:
49Details of one such a theory are given by Storrs McCall [McCall (1976) [Tooley (1999), 257–282]]
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(A) If a sentence S is true at any time, then either S or a past or future-tensed variant of
S is true at any other time.
In the temporal theory of truth we stipulate instead,
(B) If an event-sentence S is true at a certain time t, then either S or a past-tense variant
of S is true at all later times. S or a future-tense variant of S may or may not be true
at times earlier than t.
As should be clear from the definitions, according to the theory of timeless truth the
law of bivalence50 applies to all event-sentences. In contradistinction, according to the
temporal theory, the law of bivalence fails for certain event-sentences given that their
assertion times are earlier than their times of reference. To illustrate how strong the truth
conditions in Storrs Mc Call’s theory [McCall (1976)] of semantics constructed on the
basis of (B) are, it is expedient to consider the following account of Mc Call:
Consider the following example:
(1) The earth collides with a comet in the year 2000.
If, as is quite possible, the position and velocity of the earth and the comet in
1976 are such that they are on a collision course for the year 2000, and if no
outside influences such as rocket motors mounted on the earth can alter this,
then the collision in the year 2000 will be on all possible futures and (1) will
now be true. These conditions might seem to have the effect of equating truth
about the future with inevitability. This may well be the case: the conditions
are strict, but probably no more so than everyday life ones for the truth of
future-tense statements. The man who appears in the turbine-house and asks
breathlessly if it is true that the dam is going to burst is not inquiring whether
the bursting is a feature of only some possible futures. [McCall (1976) [Tooley
(1999), 280]]
Now, the kind of theory McCall is advocating is a branching time theory. In addition, it
is one of a dynamic variety, indicating that the complete state-description of the universe
(the universe tree) is different at different times.51 According to McCall, “each moment
of time [. . . ] defines a separation of the universe into past and future that is ontological
rather than epistemological”. [ibid., 263] Assuming this model to depict the time flow in
the objective sense (for the sake of an argument), we end up with another possible answer
to the question of the qualitative difference between past and present. If, on the basis of
the account given by McCall, we live in a universe with branching time, these branches
50The Law of Bivalence says essentially: For any proposition P, P is either true or false.
51In terms of the universe tree representations, the difference amounts to this: For all pairs of the param-
eters t1 and t2 ∈ R (i.e. ‘values’ of time), if t1 < t2, then the universe-tree at t2 is a proper subtree of the
universe-tree at t1. [McCall (1976) [Tooley (1999), 263]]
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and the processes forming them define the separation into past and future. But, these
separations depend on the choice of the frame of reference. It follows that given an event
E, there exist pairs of observers and frames < Oi, Fi > such that for some observers in
particular frames the event should have happened which for the other observers in dif-
ferent frames merely lie on possible future branches. This makes the distinction between
past and future frame-dependent rather than mind-dependent.
An intermezzo: The metaphysics of determinism
Although Carnap was not explicitly concerned with the time-honoured problem of deter-
minism, he could not avoid taking implicitly a stance with respect to it. His occupation
with the foundations of geometry and their relation to physics steered him onto the ves-
tiges of deep ontological problems. The very formulations of space-time-topologies with
which he was concerned in the 1920s implied definite philosophical commitments as to
the ontological and epistemological reverberations of determinism in physics. To make
these commitments explicit, it is necessary to adduce the outlines of the conceptual dif-
ficulties and complexities inherent in the metaphysics of determinism. I will therefore
finish this section by presenting the main issues concerning determinism in its relation
with physics. Here, I will draw heavily on the work of John Earman who has done
more than any other contemporary philosopher of science to clarify these issues from the
point of view of physics. This final section serves simultaneously as a presentation of the
ramifications of the constitutional program that Carnap was involved in. However, it is
implausible that Carnap could have foreseen all of the difficulties involved.
As is well known, in pre-General-Relativity-Theory (“General Relativity Theory” is
henceforth abbreviated as GTR) physics, space(time) was thought to serve as a fixed
background against which the drama of physics is enacted [Earman (2007)], its dramatis
personæ consisting of classical fields (gravitational, electro-magnetic etc.) and particles.
Furthermore, in pre-Quantum-Mechanics (“Quantum Mechanics” is henceforth abbre-
viated as QM) it was in addition assumed that there exists a unique set O of genuine
physical magnitudes52 each of which takes a determinate value at every moment of time
[ibid.]. What, then, distinguishes genuine physical magnitudes from other physical mag-
nitudes? The other magnitudes that are of concern for a physicist are usually described
as dispositional, but this kind of a distinction seems quite vague.53 Nevertheless, the log-
ical relation between dispositional and non-dispositional magnitudes was assumed to be
52In the classical philosophical parlance, these are also referred to as “observables”.
53It is, as a matter of fact, quite challenging to give a satisfactory account of dispositional qualities and
quantities. The simplest analysis of dispositions is often given along the following lines: SCA (Simple
Conditional Analysis): An object is disposed to M when C iff it would M if it were the case that C. But,
as is easily seen, this does not amount to an adequate criterion for differentiating between genuine and
dispositional physical magnitudes. Another, more sophisticated, but nevertheless, defective characterization
of a dispositional property is the following: Sophisticated An object is disposed to M when C iff it has an
intrinsic property B such that, if it were that C, and if the object were to retain B, then the object would M
because C and because it has B. [SEP]
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captured essentially by insisting that the former supervene on the latter.54 To adduce the
classical picture of determinism in physics ab initio we shall have recourse to a couple of
additional auxiliary concepts. A history H is a map from R to tuples of values of the basic
magnitudes, where for any t ∈ R the state H(t) gives a snapshot of behaviour of the basic
magnitudes at time t. The world is Laplacian deterministic with respect to O just in case
for any pair of histories, H1, H2 satisfying the laws of physics, if H1(t) = H2(t) for some
t, then H1(t) = H2(t) for all t. The brevity of these stipulations obscure the scope of the
scrutiny that they deserve. I will now elaborate on this on a case by case basis.
¶It is essential to note that the parameter ‘t’ appearing here in the definition of histories
is a global time function. A definition is as follows: a global time function is a smooth map
t :M→ R, whereM is the spacetime manifold, such that for any p, q ∈ M, t(p) < t(q)
just in case there is a future directed timelike curve from p to q.55 The second requirement
concerning the orientation of time presupposes that a solution to the problem of the di-
rection of time has been found. [ibid., 1370] It is to be kept in mind that the definition of
the global time function applies equally to classical, special relativistic and general rela-
tivistic spacetimes. Global time functions are most easily definable in classical physics,
where all spacetimes are characterized by the notion of absolute simultaneity, that is, si-
multaneity independent of all observers. A timelike curve is then specified to be one
which is oblique to the planes of simultaneity; thus, in classical setting t is defined up
to a transformation of the form t → t′ = t′(t). The case in special relativity is equally
straightforward; timelike curves are defined to be those whose tangents at any point lie
54The notion of supervenience is at least as ambiguous as that of disposition: different definitions abound.
One of the most natural varieties with respect to physical magnitudes (which are our concern here) is perhaps
given by the Strong Individual Supervenience scheme: A strongly supervenes on B iff necessarily, if any-
thing x has some property F in A, then there is at least one property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily
everything that has G has F; or, in modal-operator formalism: ∀x∀F ∈ A[Fx → ∃G ∈ B(Gx&∀y(Gy →
Fy))]. In general, the weakest form of supervenience can be stated by stipulating that X supervenes on Y
if and only if within the range of possible cases, there is no difference in X without a difference in Y. Now,
according to this scheme, the strength and type of the supervenience relation is dictated by the space of
possible cases. How this space is determined, depends on the context. Here, as we are dealing with physical
systems, the range of possible cases is determined by the laws of physics, i.e. the possible cases in question
are all those cases c that are compatible with the physical laws.
55A few more technical conditions are necessary for these claims to hold: firstly, it is required that the
spacetime is temporally orientable and secondly, that one of the orientations has been singled out as giving
the “future” direction of time. (A relativistic spacetime (M, gab) is temporally orientable iff there exists a
continuous everywhere defined timelike vector field on M. If such a field exists, reversing the arrows gives
another such field. The choice of one of these fields as “pointing the way to the future” is what is meant by
the assignment of a time orientation.) N.B. A general relativistic spacetime may not be temporally orientable,
but a covering spacetime always is. (A (double) covering spacetime of a spacetime (M, gab) may be defined
as the set of all pairs (p, α) where p ∈ M and α encodes one of the two temporal orientations at p. A
projection
π : (p, α)→ p
maps events of the covering spacetime back into M. Locally, this projection must be a diffeomorphism
in order for the covering spacetime to inherit the local differential structure of M (a diffeomorphism is an
isomorphism of smooth manifolds). In case the double covering spacetime consists of two disparate parts,
there exist two different, globally consistent assignments of a temporal orientation and (M, gab) is time-
orientable. If the covering spacetime is connected, there exist smooth transitions from one time orientation
to the other and vice versa. This implies that (M, gab) is not time-orientable, but that the covering spacetime
is). All these results are rigorously derived in [Hawking & Ellis (1973)], section 6.1.
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inside the light cone in that point. General relativity provides instances of some patho-
logical behaviour, the most famous of which are without doubt the Gödelian spacetimes.
In Gödel spacetimes there can be no global time function, and the paradigmatic case of
global Laplacian determinism as defined above is undermined. However, in case there
exists a global time function for relativistic spacetime, this guarantees that many then
exist. The choice of this global time function is essential, because the success or failure
of Laplacian determinism depends on it; a poor choice of a global time function banishes
the Laplacian Demon from the relativistic quarters of spacetime.
¶The second issue of concern revolves around the distinction between natural laws and
initial or boundary conditions that the Laplacian formulation of determinism assumes.
Whether the form of determinism advocated is cogent or not depends largely upon how
clearly the two have been demarcated from each other and how their relative roles have
been defined. The philosophically oriented literature on natural laws is formidable.
However, most of it does not seem to touch, at least in an illuminating way, the prob-
lems concerning the practice of physics. The quite simplistic approach that most works
in this vein take with respect to physics is apt to deteriorate one’s interest in the dis-
cussions entertained in them. However, the stance that is taken on the other side of the
fence, that is, among the scientifically oriented philosophers, is often equally bale with
respect to the pragmatic and overtly simplistic attitude in setting the framework for dis-
cussion. For example, John Earman proceeds in his otherwise meritorious account quite
straightforwardly by merely stipulating that “an acceptable account of laws must satisfy
the empiricist constraint that the laws supervene on the totality of non-modal, particular
facts”.56 [ibid., 1371] Although Earman makes a justifiably sarcastic comment on philoso-
phers’ tendency to speculate on non-empiricist laws, the suggestion of his to model his
account of physical laws in terms of the account of David Lewis seems philosophically
unfinished, to say the least: “the laws of physics are the axioms or postulates that ap-
pear in the ideal theory of physics57: the laws of physics are the axioms or postulates that
appear in the ideal theory of physics, where the ideal theory is the one that, within the
class of true theories, achieves the best balance between simplicity and information con-
tent.58” Earman punctuates his thesis with the note that all of the relevant candidates
for deterministic laws in the history of physics involve only a relatively small subset
B ⊂ O of basic occurrent magnitudes, with the assumption that the remaining ones su-
pervene on those of B. A paradigmatic example of these is classical particle mechanics
where the basic “occurrent magnitudes” are the positions and momenta of particles, that
is B = {(q1i , q2i , q3i , p1i , p2i , p3i )|i ∈ A ⊂N}, where A denotes an ordered and indexed sub-
set of N (A = [k] = {1, 2, 3, . . . , k}). Here Earman is in good company. The assumption
(or ideal) of the simplicity of the true physical laws has been a mainstay among heuristic
principles of physicists in the last century. Especially Hermann Weyl shared this convic-
tion with Einstein (that simplicity must figure into the account of laws), but in a certain
sense he must have been dimly mistrustful of it for he went on to state that: “this cir-
cumstance is apt to weaken the metaphysical power of determinism, since it makes the
56This weak form of the empiricist constraint is coined by David Lewis as the condition of “Humean
supervenience”.
57Sic! My emphasis.
58Notice the resemblance to Carnap’s aspirations in his early work in the 1920s.
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meaning of natural law depend on the fluctuating distinction between simple and com-
plicated functions or classes of functions”. [Weyl (1932), 42.] This reflects, perhaps, the
modest but clear-sighted wisdom of a mathematician. Be that as it may, the issue is not
settled, and to pursue the investigation further may be easier for someone fortified by
faith than someone waiting to be convinced by argument.
¶The third issue hinges on the prospects of envisaging the world as only partially de-
terministic. More exactly, this is tantamount to the following scenario: the world could
be deterministic with respect to partial histories defined by the values of magnitudes in
some proper subset D ⊂ O of the occurrent physical magnitudes but non-deterministic
with respect to partial histories defined by the values of magnitudes in some other proper
subset N ⊂ O. (ibid., 1371) The plausibility of this scenario is best assessed by consider-
ing two cases: (i) both D and N are basic magnitudes; (ii) one or the other of the subsets
comprises non-basic magnitudes. First (i). This scenario comes down to this: assume that
the subsetN denotes the set of quantities undergoing a nondeterministic evolution. Then
it is necessary that the evolution of the quantities in D is unhampered by the evolution
of the magnitudes in N , that is, the magnitudes in N must not interact with those in D.
Alternatively, there would have to be a conspiracy of sorts, where the disturbing effects
of N cancel out, which amounts to the same thing operationally. It is therefore highly
dubious whether such a scenario could really work. Second, the possibility stated in (ii)
gives rise to an even more recalcitrant problem; in particular, in the context of certain
physical systems, stochastic processes on one level can supervene on deterministic pro-
cesses at a lower level. Thus, the phenomenally based inference from observed stochastic
behaviour to indeterminism is in general, as is said, fraught with peril.59
¶The fourth issue is of a mathematical nature. Because the laws of physics — in the most
typical cases at least — take the form of differential equations, the thesis of Laplacian de-
terminism raises the question as to the possibility of giving an initial value formulation for
the particular problem at hand. This formulation is tantamount to the question whether
for arbitrary initial conditions there exists a unique solution of the differential equation
agreeing with the given initial data.60 The nature of the initial data are in the mathemati-
cal sense clear-cut: they comprise the instantaneous values of the independent variables
in the equation together with the instantaneous values of a finite number of time deriva-
tives of these variables. The locution “arbitrary” is not to be taken too liberally, however;
the nature of the initial conditions depends crucially on the equations of motion, that
might impose non-trivial conditions on the initial data.
¶The fifth issue elaborates on the point made in the last paragraph: in relativistic setting,
the field equations can often be solved by separating them into constraint equations and
evolution equations. The former place restrictions on the initial data, and the latter gov-
ern how the initial data satisfying the constraints evolve over time. The most conspicuous
examples of these types of factoring field equations are provided by Maxwell’s equations
for electromagnetism ad Einstein’s gravitational field equations. Here the characteristic
59That is, it is not universally valid.
60More rigorous conditions could also be imposed on the solution, such as determining, for example,
whether the solution depends continuously on the initial data.
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property of the solutions is that once the constraint equations are satisfied they continue
to be satisfied over time (this is guaranteed by the evolution equations). This consequence
of the separability of the constraint and evolution equations marks a distinctive feature
of deterministic equations.
¶Finally, the sixth issue is more philosophical. Earman starts by pointing out that “while
there is no a priori guarantee that the laws of the ideal theory of physics will be determin-
istic, the history of physics shows that determinism is taken to be what might be termed
as a ‘defeasible methodological imperative’; start by assuming that determinism is true;
if the candidate laws so far are not deterministic, then presume that there are other laws
to be discovered, or that the ones that are so far discovered are only approximations to
the correct laws; only after long and repeated failure may we entertain the hypothesis
that the failure to find deterministic laws does not represent a lack of imagination on
our part but reflects the fact that Nature is non-deterministic”. [ibid., 1372] There is an
interesting tension between this statement and the second issue above, namely, the in-
sistence on greatest possible simplicity and informational content even at the expense of
the program of determinism. What is at stake here is a measuring of a balance between
distinct heuristic principles. Traditionally, all of the above mentioned heuristic maxims
have played a prominent role in the development of physical theories; in some notable
cases they have even worked in tandem. If the clear-sighted observation of Weyl is to be
taken seriously, the heuristic principles used by physicists should certainly merit further
scrutiny. But this is a task to which Carnap’s method of explication is ideally suited. I
will investigate the issue of determinism in its relationship to the concept of randomness
from precisely this point of view in Chapter 6.
4.4 Russell and Our Knowledge of the External World
For the generation of young philosophers and scientists that were educated around the
period spanning the World War I, Bertrand Russell signified a hero and role model, whose
penetrating insights into the interaction between logic, mathematics and philosophy had
opened up a completely new approach to philosophical enquiry as an intellectual under-
taking. It is commonplace to hear statements that Russell introduced what is known as
philosophical analysis. This is misleading in two senses. First, Russell was not the first
to introduce ‘analytic’ tools into philosophy. Second, the term “analysis” is ambiguous;
it is not at all clear what the method of analysis in philosophy amounts to (On the ambi-
guity of the term “analysis”, see Chapter 3.). As we have seen, ‘analytic’ approaches had
been common in philosophy ever since Kant presented the analytic/synthetic distinction
as the overarching theme around which the most interesting and challenging philosoph-
ical questions were winded. Indeed, much of the momentum of the discussions about
the foundations of mathematics in the late nineteenth century were in large part due to
the Kantian manner of approaching the problem, at least in its preliminary formulations.
Thus Frege’s position as the ‘grandfather’ of analytic philosophy stemmed from the Ger-
man tradition in logic where the dispute (at the level of conflicting formulations at least)
between Kant and Bolzano marked its starting point. Prominent German logicians in
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this lineage include at least Hermann Grassmann (1809–1877) who was philosophically
influenced by the neo-Kantian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), and who published
in 1844 an influential book Die Lineale Ausdehnungslehre, effectively a pioneering work
on linear algebra; Hermann’s brother Robert Grassmann (1815–1901), a philosopher and
logician by training, and a teacher and publisher by profession, whose Die Formenlehre
oder Matematik was a landmark in logic; and Ernst Schröder (1841–1902), a brilliant logi-
cian following traditional logic and C.S. Peirce in particular, his thought ruminating even
over Cantorian themes in the late 1800s. The modern period of mathematical logic starts
with Frege, Peano, Whitehead and Russell. This transition is one of the most puzzling in
the history of logic since the new developments largely overshadowed the work of the
logicians in the German tradition, notably the work of Schröder, whose contributions in-
cluded many novel insights and partly overlapped with the important discoveries of C.S.
Peirce. Analytic philosophy was, of course, to be influenced mainly by the ‘new’ mathe-
matical logic whose main exponents were Frege and Russell. Frege’s contributions to the
analytic methodology of philosophy we have briefly discussed above. Now it is time to
make explicit those contributions of Russell that played a decisive role in influencing the
thought of Carnap.
There is a well-known passage in Carnap’s Autobiography where he acknowledged the
tremendous significance of Bertrand Russell on his thinking. The latter’s Our Knowl-
edge of the External World, in particular, worked as a catalyst for Carnap’s still dormant
but tremendous powers of discernment and half-articulated views on the significance of
philosophy and its connection with science. As we saw in the section 4.1.4., the main
motivation for Carnap’s philosophical work sprang from the idea of developing a com-
prehensive system of knowledge. Although he was constantly occupied with various
special problems in the intersection of philosophy and science before 1922, these investi-
gations were always subjected to, and put in a perspective by, the overall aim of general
cognitive systematization: “I worked on many special problems, always looking for new
approaches and improved solutions. But in the background there was always the ul-
timate aim of the total system of all concepts. I believed that it should be possible, in
principle, to give a logical reconstruction of the total system of the world as we know
it.”61 [UCLA 1957a, E4] This is the intellectual situation in which Carnap found him-
self at the time of his dissertation Der Raum. The leading theme of the Aufbau is already
there, but the concreta of its realization remain still in the dark. André Carus has found
compelling evidence for maintaining that Carnap advocated this line of work in a sus-
tained and coherent manner all the way up to the publication of the Aufbau. The evi-
dence stems from the numerous notes that Carnap wrote during this period. According
to Carus, even in the earliest of these notes Carnap “implicitly rejects both the Marburg
and the phenomenological responses to Helmholtz’s empirical investigation of percep-
tion.” [Carus (2007), 139] The particular quotation from the notes (dated August 1920
and headed “Skeleton of Epistemology” [Skelett der Erkenntnistheorie] reads:
The first given: experiences (facts of consciousness) . . . In some cases I can
observe, rather than experience itself, a particular aspect of the experience:
61Cited in [Carus (2007), 139].
189
its ‘object’. (So not ‘intentional relation’); these experiences we call ‘ideas
[Vorstellungen]’. Some ideas are particularly singled out (give the criterion!):
‘sensations [Empfindungen]’.62 [ASP 1920c]
Contrary to the conclusion of Carus, I am not ready to downplay the role of phenomenol-
ogy in Carnap’s thought, especially during this early phase of his thinking. Although the
passage quoted hints at a possible rejection, claiming that such a rejection has effectively
taken place is unjustified. After all, Carnap uses a phrase “in some cases . . . ”. As these
notes stem from a very early period, there is no plausible case for attributing to Carnap a
view that is hostile to phenomenology. Indeed, much of the underlying motivation and
conceptual machinery of Der Raum (1922) stems from Husserlian thought. The role of
phenomenology is also visible in the Aufbau albeit not anymore as strong as in Der Raum.
Questions about Husserlian influence notwithstanding, it is clear how Carnap’s thought
here exercises itself with a conspicuously Russellian idea, viz. that of a progressive series
of (logical) constructs founded on the immediately given sensations, or sense-data, that
amounts to an instance of an application of the professed general method of construct-
ing a corpus of knowledge on a strictly empirical basis. In the material investigated by
Carus there is a further set of notes entitled “Analysis of the World Picture [Analyse der
Weltbildes]” where this issue is put in a succinct phrase: “The point of knowledge: bring-
ing order to the chaos of sensations.” This process of knowledge acquisition was to be
built on a “progressive hierarchy of ordering [Stufengang des Ordnens]” from groups or
patches “in the momentary visual field [im Augenblicksgesichtsfeld]” to enduring physical
objects to the ultimate end-point “regularity of succession; nature.” Moreover, Carnap
seemed to have thought that the third stage pertaining to the discovery of the regulari-
ties in nature, or laws of nature were effectively vehicles for extrapolating the scope of
our knowledge to future: “Every physical law is basically a claim about expected sensa-
tions!” But rather than advocating a distinctively Machian point of view, Carnap went
on to stress that the theoretical priority in science did not lay in the given but in the log-
ical constructions to the extent that “[Retrospective shift of viewpoint]: The constructions
now go by the name ‘real world’, the immediate by ‘just appearances’ (and sometimes
‘illusions’).”63 [ASP 1921a] Instigated by these general considerations Carnap attempted
to elaborate the general scheme of knowledge acquisition he had envisaged by theoret-
ically solidifying it. This necessitated a logical criterion for deciding which elementary
sensations were similar in their content. In devising a notation for indicating “identity
of content [Inhalts identität]” between these ‘elementary experiences’ – a veritable pre-
monition with respect to the essential ideas of the Aufbau – Carnap made his idealistic
conception of knowledge (which he held at the time) more precise. The interpretation of
the relation of content as identity of content was, however, an added “rational ingredient
[rationale Zutat].” Thus, Carnap is here concerned with essentially neo-Kantian questions
about deciding which components of our knowledge are “immediate [unmittelbar]” and
which “rational ingredients”. Carus reports that in the notes headed “On the analysis
of experiences [ Über die Analyse von Erlebnissen]”, “Carnap searches for a criterion to
determine which relations or distinctions among experiences and classes of experiences
62Cited in [Carus (2007), 139].
63Quoted passages cited in [Carus (2007), 139–140].
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are genuinely and unquestionably ‘immediate’ or ‘experiental [erlebnismäßig]’.” [Carus
(2007), 140] As we have seen, in the context of the Marburgian interpretation of the a pri-
ori constituents of our knowledge, such an attempt at distinguishing and identifying the
two elements of (empirical) knowledge would have been meaningless because according
to that interpretation experience generally was permeated with such rational ingredients
and would essentially be impossible without a rational basis. Carnap was thus following
in this issue the scientifically oriented neo-Kantians such as Helmholtz and individual-
ists like Dingler,64 advocating a view that such a demarcation could indeed be validly
made. As a matter of fact, Carnap’s dissertation about the foundations of geometry (that
formed the basis for the 1922 Der Raum) was effectively built on the presupposition that it
can be unambiguously decided “which a priori and which empirical elements turn up in
each of these spatial systems.”65 [UCLA 1920a, 37] This particular manner of conceiving
the analytic-synthetic distinction, with special emphasis on the pragmatic considerations
pertaining to it, was to remain one of the most important basic presuppositions of Car-
nap’s philosophy all the way up to the latest discoveries in inductive logic.
Now, a most forceful impulse to Carnap’s thinking along the lines of ‘construction theory’
alluded to above came from reading Russell’s book Our Knowledge of the External World –
as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy in early 1922. Its influence on Carnap stemmed
perhaps equally from the charming rhetoric of Russell as well as from its compelling in-
troduction of a general agenda for future philosophy as a whole. Stylistically Russell’s
writings are, indeed, nothing short of brilliant, representing in philosophy, what Virginia
Woolf’s essays represent in literary studies, “aristocrats of essays [. . . ] witty, beautifully
mannered and mellow.”66 In the opening chapter the new conceptual riches made avail-
able for philosophers were alluded to in a programmatic tone:
Philosophy, from earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer
results, than any other branch of learning. Ever since Thales said that all is
water, philosophers have been ready with glib assertions about the sum-total
of things; and equally glib denials have come from other philosophers ever
since Thales was contradicted by Anaximander. I believe that the time has
now arrived when this unsatisfactory state of things can be brought to an
end. [Russell (1914a), 13]
Even if the promise might have sounded portentous, Russell gave ample support for
such a sweeping claim. Indeed, the book tried to propound the idea that philosophy
should be founded on conceptual or logical analysis. Such an analysis professed to be
based on the newly constructed conceptual tools of mathematical logic, particularly the
64Called a “radical conventionalist” by Carnap, essentially holding similar views as Poincaré in the sense
that the background assumptions and presuppositions of geometry and physics cannot be extracted from
experience, nor derived by any form of transcendental deduction. He diverges from Poincaré in that he does
not believe that there is freedom to choose between alternative assumptions. Characteristic of Dingler’s po-
sition is his most uncompromising adherence to the classical edifices of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian
mechanics (Dingler notoriously opposed Einstein’s theory of relativity).
65Cited in [Carus (2007), 140].
66Rumer Godden in a review of Woolf’s Granite and Rainbow in NY Herald Tribune.
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theory of relations. What, then, did this analysis consist in? Russell did not settle with
merely a vague and general statement of this method, but attempted to make it as precise
as possible. Hence, he elaborated heavily on this idea in the body of the book:
In every philosophical problem, our investigation starts from what may be
called ‘data’, by which I mean matters of common knowledge, vague, com-
plex, inexact, as common knowledge always is, but yet somehow command-
ing our assent as on the whole and in some interpretation pretty certainly
true. . . . We are quite willing to admit that there may be errors of detail in
this knowledge, but we believe them to be discoverable and corrigible by the
methods which have given rise to our beliefs, and we do not, as practical men,
entertain for a moment the hypothesis that the whole edifice may be built on
insecure foundations. In the main, therefore, and without absolute dogma-
tism as to this or that special portion, we may accept this mass of common
knowledge as affording data for our philosophical analysis. It may be said —
and this is an objection which must be met at the outset — that it is the duty
of the philosopher to call in question the admittedly fallible beliefs of daily
life, and to replace them by something more solid and irrefragable. In a sense
this is true, and in a sense it is effected in the course of analysis. But in an-
other sense, and a very important one, it is quite impossible. While admitting
that doubt is possible with regard to all our common knowledge, we must
nevertheless accept that knowledge in the main if philosophy is to be possi-
ble at all. There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, obtainable by the
philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from which to criticise the whole
of the knowledge of daily life. The most that can be done is to examine and
purify our common knowledge by an internal scrutiny, assuming tha canons
by which it has been obtained, and applying them with more care and with
more precision. Philosophy cannot boast of having achieved such a degree
of certainty that it can have authority to condemn the facts of experience and
the laws of science. The philosophic scrutiny, therefore, though sceptical in
regard to every detail, is not sceptical as regards the whole. That is to say, its
criticism of details will only be based upon their relation to other details, not
upon some external criterion which can be applied to all the details equally.
The reason for this abstention from a universal criticism is not any dogmatic
confidence, but its exact opposite; it is not that common knowledge must be
true, but that we possess no radically different kind of knowledge derived
from some other source. Universal skepticism, though logically irrefutable,
is practically barren; it can only, therefore, give a certain flavour of hesitancy
to our beliefs, and cannot be used to substitute other beliefs for them. [ibid.,
72–74]
Russell’s attempt here to delineate the main ingredients of his analytical method struck a
tone in Carnap’s mind. Indeed, many of the leading themes of Carnap’s mature philos-
ophy are featured here, and it was thus not a mere sentimental feeling of indebtedness
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that made Carnap so openly relate the emotions that reading Russell’s book aroused in
him. The famous passage of the Autobiography is worth quoting in full:
Whereas Frege had the strongest influence on me in the fields of logic and se-
mantics, in my philosophical thinking in general I learned most from Bertrand
Russell. In the winter of 1921[–1922] I read his book Our Knowledge of the Ex-
ternal World, as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. Some passages made
an especially vivid impression on me because they formulated clearly and
explicitly a view of the aim and method of philosophy which I had implic-
itly held for some time. In the Preface he speaks about “the logical-analytic
method of philosophy” and refers to Frege’s work as the first complete ex-
ample of this method. And on the very last pages of the book he gives a
summarizing characterization of this philosophical method in the following
words:
The study of logic becomes the central study in philosophy: it gives the method of
research in philosophy, just as mathematics gives the method in physics . . .
All this supposed knowledge in the traditional systems must be swept away, and a
new beginning must be made. . . . To the large and still growing body of men engaged
in the pursuit of science, . . . the new method, successful already in such time-honored
problems as number, infinity, continuity, space and time, should make an appeal
which the older methods have wholly failed to make. . . . The one and only condition,
I believe, which is necessary in order to secure for philosophy in the near future an
achievement surpassing all that has hitherto been accomplished by philosophers, is
the creation of a school of men with scientific training and philosophical interests,
unhampered by the traditions of the past, and not misled by the literary methods of
those who copy the ancients in all except their merits.
I felt as if this appeal had been directed to me personally. To work in this
spirit would be my task from now on! And indeed henceforth the application
of the new logical instrument for the purposes of analyzing scientific con-
cepts and of clarifying philosophical problems has been the essential aim of
my philosophical activity. [Carnap (1963), 13]
What especially struck Carnap in view of the problems he was engaged with at the time,
was Russell’s suggestion of a strategy for the task of logical construction. In a chapter
entitled “The World of Physics and the World of Sense”, Russell went on to draw the
outlines of such a task, beginning from a remark that “Among the objections to the re-
ality of the objects of sense, there is one which is derived from the apparent difference
between matter as it appears in physics and things as they appear in sensation”. [Rus-
sell (1914), 106] Russell explicitly admitted of not having attempted to actually devise a
logical construction in all its completeness and detail. Rather, he quite modestly stated
what was the only conceivable goal of his discussion: “It is therefore necessary to find
some way of bridging the gulf between the world of physics and the world of sense,
and it is this problem that will occupy us in the present lecture. Physicists appear to
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be unconscious of the gulf, while psychologists, who are conscious of it, have not the
mathematical knowledge required for spanning it. The problem is difficult, and I do not
know its solution in detail. All that I can hope to do is to make the problem felt, and to in-
dicate the kind of methods by which a solution is to be sought.”67 [ibid.] The sketch Russell
proceeds to draw displays many of the central ideas that Carnap’s later elaborations in
the Aufbau hinged on. A basic presupposition of Russell is the impermanence of immedi-
ate data (of experience): “[i]n the world of immediate data nothing is permanent”. [ibid.,
109] In contrast to these he defines a thing “as a certain series of appearances, connected
with each other by continuity and by certain causal laws”. [ibid., 111] The construction
is alleged to be capable of proceeding in using only the logical notions of relations and
classes. Of course, this was a major ingredient in the approach’s attractiveness for Car-
nap. If the Frege-Russell logic could effectively be applied for this purpose, then there
inescapably opened up new horizons for applying the same tools for constructing the en-
tire edifice of knowledge deductively, without recourse to more classical conceptual tools
of philosophy, including Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva, Leibniz’s characteristica universalis or
Kant’s transcendental logic. An overall cognitive systematization of knowledge and con-
cepts could be acquired far more economically and efficiently than had been dreamed of.
There are, however, also problems within the account of Russell that are not compatible
with the stated purpose of the construction. Russell insists that he draws on the maxim
“which inspires all scientific philosophizing, namely ‘Occam’s razor’: Entities are not to be
multiplied without necessity.” [ibid.] This gives a markedly ontological flavour for Russell’s
discussion, amounting to an inconsistency since the main purpose of the whole discus-
sion is to construct physical objects out of the given (i.e. sense-data). Russell, although
having discarded talk about permanent things, has, nevertheless, retained an ontolog-
ical commitment to regularities such as continuity and causal laws, and even goes so
far as to define things at the outset as connected series of appearances. Now, the 1921–
1922 Carnap would certainly have found such commitments unacceptable. There arise,
then, two important questions with respect to Carnap’s connection with Russell’s book,
which Carus has rightly brought forth: (1) Why did Russell’s preoccupation with ontol-
ogy not prevent Carnap from enthusiastically endorsing the “logical-analytic method of
philosophy”? (2) Why did his acceptance of this programme nonetheless harden Car-
nap’s rejection of ontological questions as a legitimate object of discourse? [Carus (2007),
143] The answer to the first question lies largely in weighing of the relative merits of
the application of the “logical-analytic method”. Even if Russell retained in part a con-
spicuously ontological vocabulary in tackling the problem of logical reconstruction, there
were many benefits to be acquired from the use of the logical method. Indeed, Russell
had severely criticized the a priori character of philosophical reasoning in the ‘classical
tradition’ of philosophy:
The original impulse out of which the classical tradition developed was the
naı̈ve faith of the Greek philosophers in the omnipotence of reasoning. The
discovery of geometry had intoxicated them, and its a priori deductive method
appeared capable of universal application. They would prove, for instance,
that all reality is one, that there is no such thing as change, that the world
67Italics added.
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of sense is a world of mere illusion; and the strangeness of their results gave
them no qualms because they believed in the correctness of their reasoning.
Thus it came to be thought that by mere thinking the most surprising and im-
portant truths concerning the whole reality could be established with a cer-
tainty which no contrary observations could shake. As the vital impulse of
the early philosophers died away, its place was taken by authority and tra-
dition, reinforced, in the Middle Ages and almost to our own day, by sys-
tematic theology. Modern philosophy, from Descartes onwards, though not
bound by authority like that of Middle Ages, still accepted more or less un-
critically the Aristotelean logic. Moreover, it still believed, except in Great
Britain, that a priori reasoning could reveal otherwise undiscoverable secrets
about the universe, and could prove reality to be quite different from what, to
direct observation, it appears to be. It is this belief, rather than any particular
tenets resulting from it, that I regard as the distinguishing characteristic of the
classical tradition, and as hitherto the main obstacle to a scientific attitude in
philosophy. [Russell (1914a), 15–16]
Although Carnap was definitely a philosopher of an anti-ontological persuasion in 1922,
partly through the influence of some prominent philosopher-scientists as Helmholtz and
Dingler, he could not avoid being affected by the impression of a radical shift in the un-
derpinnings of philosophical truth-seeking that Russell reported to have taken place. As
matters stood, the newly discovered logical tools promised to bring within the grasp of
philosophers solutions of problems that the more traditional methods of philosophy had
failed to deliver. Indeed, it was just because the new methods brought about such a gen-
eral feeling of liberation that made Carnap and others endorse the new logical-analytic
tools enthusiastically. To solidify his case for the genuinely creative task of logic, Russell
had claimed that the use of logic in the classical tradition had been restricted to a negative
role: “In that tradition, logic becomes constructive through negation. Where a number
of alternatives seem, at first sight, to be equally possible, logic is made to condemn all of
them except one, and that is then pronounced to be realized in the actual world.” [ibid.,
18] In contradistinction, the sense of liberation brought about by modern philosophical
logic was succinctly put by Russell:
The true function of logic is, in my opinion, exactly the opposite of this [tra-
ditional function of logic]. As applied to matters of experience, it is analytic
rather than constructive; taken a priori, it shows the possibility of hitherto un-
suspected alternatives more often than the impossibility of alternatives which
seemed prima facie possible. Thus, while it liberates imagination as to what the
world may be, it refuses to legislate as to what the world is. [ibid., 18–19]
It can be fairly said, then, that Carnap very much appreciated this vision that accompa-
nied the Russell’s conception of applications of logic in philosophy. It formed a back-
ground to what would later constitute the gist of Carnap’s own endeavors in philosophy
– the mapping out of various possibilities for concept formulation and theory construc-
tion. Indeed, this aspect of Carnap’s thought has given rise to novel characterizations of
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which that by Thomas Mormann is the most illuminating. Mormann has advocated the
view that Carnap’s philosophy should essentially be seen as a kind of ‘science of pos-
sibilities’ or “Möglichkeitswissenschaft”: “Ich möchte behaupten, daß Carnap Philosophie
als Möglichkeitswissenschaft konzipiert, d. h. als eine Theorie, konzeptuelle Möglichkeiten
zu formulieren und auszuloten. Anstatt für einzelne Thesen zu argumentieren, eröffnet
Carnap Räume konzeptuellen Möglichkeiten. Dies ist eine Invariante, die für alle Phasen
seinen Denkens charakteristisch ist.” [Mormann (2000), 210] 68 This aspect of Carnap’s
thinking becomes more and more pronounced towards the end of his career. I will revert
to this later.
What is slightly harder to address is the second question why the assimilation of the
logical-analytic methodology led to a more critical attitude towards ontology than before.
Whereas Carnap had earlier entertained some kind of version of Helmholtzian ‘ontolog-
ical humility’, there now seemed to arise a conspicuous disdain for ontological questions
in general. How is this explained?
Carus has attempted to answer this question by emphasizing the ontological disdain
in Carnap’s developing view the first marks of which were already visible sometime
earlier. Alluding to a passage in Carnap’s Autobiography (original version), he argues
that Carnap’s ontological attitude was foremost influenced by the views of prominent
physicists and neo-Kantians whose works Carnap had studied. Especially the influence
of Kirchhoff, Boltzmann and Mach is acknowledged by Carnap, along that of Natorp
and Cassirer. [Carus (2007), 144n5] The question remains, whether these influences alone
were decisive for the gradual solidification of ontological disdain in Carnap’s thought,
or whether there were perhaps some additional features that could also have in part
determined the intellectual attitude that Carnap finally adopted. A plausible option is
that, as Carus maintains, Carnap saw his position to be unique in the sense that he was
best equipped to take up the task that Russell had envisaged, both in terms of possessing
adequate technical skills as well as being conscious of the (ontological) difficulties that
the Russellian approach was fraught with, thereby making him capable of suggesting
ways to circumvent those very difficulties. Thus, the prospects of improving the work
begun by Russell might well have worked as a stimulus in solidifying the requirement
of ontological parsimony. In a letter which Carnap sent to Russell along with the final
version of Aufbau in 1928, these same themes were still very much in the foreground:
I want to draw your attention straightaway to two points in which I have
been compelled to depart from your conception. These points of difference
68A translation reads: “I want to maintain that Carnap conceives philosophy as the science of possibilities, i.e.
as the theory of articulating and exploring conceptual possibilities. Rather than arguing for particular theses,
Carnap opens up spaces of conceptual possibilities. This invariably characterizes all phases of his thought.”
Mormann makes yet a suggestion that we should conceive the Carnapian science of possibilities as closely
akin to the “sense of possibilities” that figured as an important counterpart to the “sense of reality” in Robert
Musil’s great novel The Man Without Qualities [Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften]. What is more important, the
connection between the views of the two men go beyond mere surface similarities. Indeed, as I elaborate
elsewhere in this book, there is a remarkable similarity between their attitudes to some central questions of
modernism and culture at large.
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do not, however, rest on differences in basic attitude, which seems to me to be
entirely shared between us. The differences arise, rather, precisely from my
attempt to follow through on this basic attitude of yours more consistently
than has been done so far. I therefore believe myself here to have been ‘more
Russellian than Russell’ [“Russellischer als Russel”]
I placed a motto at the beginning of the book (p. 1) which I want to call the
‘construction principle’. Now I believe you have violated your own principle
by not constructing but inferring the heteropsychological (see §140). I believe
myself, through the way described of constituting the heteropsychological
(§57f., §§140–143), to have followed this principle. In the same way I believe
myself, through strict adherence to the ‘autopsychological basis’ (‘method-
ological solipsism’), to have followed your principle more closely than has
been done so far. You yourself call the retention of the autopsychological basis
desirable, but too difficult and hardly feasible. Through my system I believe
myself to have shown its feasibility, even if I have to admit that there can be
no question yet of a completely satisfactory implementation of the system in
all respects.
The second point of difference concerns the realistic way of putting the ques-
tion (see comments on the literature in §176). Here, too, I believe myself to
have carried through your basic attitude more consistently by rejecting the
(metaphysical) concept of reality. I believe that these questions about reality
— and thus the entire philosophical controversy about realism — have no
point or sense whatever [überhaupt keinen Sinn] (§§175–178 and part 2 of the
pamphlet ‘Pseudoproblems’, which is also being sent to you).69 [ASP 1928b]
This ‘post mortem’ review of the success of his constructional undertaking in the Aufbau
shows clearly how confidently Carnap had assimilated all the necessary issues and devel-
opments that he envisaged in defining the fundamental aims of the project in 1922. In the
first place, the early neo-Kantian formulation of the three separate domains of knowl-
edge had been given up, as a consequence of which knowledge consisted now only of
two domains: the domain of pure intuition (for which an independent role within the
structure of knowledge had been conferred in Der Raum) was disposed of. In its phe-
nomenological form, that had been retained in the 1922 book, it ceased to exist, and was
gradually replaced by a Wittgensteinian variety, envisioned as non-cognitive, being no
longer articulable in language. This was surely tantamount to a total eradication of the
Kantian outlook that still dominated Der Raum together with Husserlian elements. In the
second place, a more intimate connection had been made with empirical psychology with
a view that the basic questions aroused earlier (in a Vaihingerian formulation) could thus
be adequately answered. The influence of Max Wertheimer’s writings on Gestalt psy-
chology was especially notable, although some authors have downplayed this influence
(for example Carus), giving a more important role to the impact of Hans Vaihinger and
his formulation of the Kantian problems in the Philosophie des Als Ob.
The conceptual framework spanned by the Kantian questions that formed the back-
69Cited in [Carus (2007), 144-145].
197
ground of Carnap’s work in 1919–1921 was radically transformed under the influence
of Russell’s book. Carus backs this claim with ample textual evidence, including several
manuscripts, dating from 1922. [Carus (2007), 146f.] To make clear the connections of
Carnap’s thought with both Vaihinger’s account of the Kantian questions and the funda-
mental framework of the Gestalt theorists, it is expedient to review some of the ‘billets’
of concepts that Carnap had tentatively formulated in his proto-Aufbau notes in 1921.
We have mentioned above that Carnap had attempted to define the notion of “identity
of [phenomenal] content [Inhaltsidentität]” describing it as a concept that designates “a
non-definable relation of close similarity that can only be interpreted by pointing to ex-
periences [durch Hinweis auf Erlebnisse]”. The (phenomenal) contents that are compared
consist of that of the current experience (vorhandenes Erlebnis) and that of the memory
trace of a previous one. [ibid.] Through consideration of the essential characteristics of
these different modes of experience, Carnap comes to ponder the problem of how this
relation of identity between contents can be experienced, i.e. to what extent it possesses
what he called ‘experiantiality ’ [Erlebnismäßigkeit]. Indeed, if the professed identity be-
tween two contents could be realized only by subsequent rational interpretation [rationale
Deutung], how could it be maintained that this relation (and others akin to it) might be
experienced? For example, considering the relation between the experience of hearing a
single tone and that of hearing a triad containing that tone, Carnap seems puzzled at how
we could give criteria whether the inclusion was really experienced and not merely ratio-
nally constructed. Also, considering this and a converse case, where one distinguishes a
single pitch within a triad, Carnap pondered over whether these were genuinely distin-
guishable in experience (erlebnismäßige verschieden). Now, even if Carnap felt puzzled by
such cases, can we say anything with the advantage of hindsight that might contribute
towards finding a solution to these questions?
A straightforward case for deciding whether the identification of a particular tone within a
given triad is ‘experientially distinguishable’ from the recognition of that same tone within
a triad is provided by the following example. If we consider a simple case of comparing
the tonal qualities of two types of triads, (1) the major triad70 and (2) the augmented
triad,71 we may think of a following kind of an argument to establish that the two given
exemplars of musical perception are, indeed, distinguishable. First, consider the case (i):
a particular tone (say, G]) is first played singly; then a triad (say, E major) is played which
contains the previously played tone as a part. The task is to identify the tone that was
first played in isolation within a triad that is played consecutively. What are the gross
features of this kind of a process of recognition? Now, as regards the overall character
of the recognition task, we see that quite certainly the case is an example of auditory re-
tention. We hear a single tone first and are then asked to identify that tone in a sound
field of several masking tones. A well known aspect of such auditory retention tasks is
the added dimension of the knowledge base against which such pitch recognition takes
place. Remembered auditory knowledge of tonal systems affects how tonal events are
70In Western music, major triad is the chord exemplifying the basic tonality of the major scale, constructed
on the first degree (called the tonic) of the scale and consisting of the root, major third and perfect fifth. In
the scale of C major: C, E, G.
71The augmented triad is constructed on the third degree of the harmonic minor scale. In this case there is
an augmented fifth between the root and the leading tone. In the key of a harmonic minor: C, E, G].
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remembered. Bigand has argued that such knowledge may be largely implicit, even of
a sort that is called tacit knowledge. The accumulation of such knowledge takes a lot of
time and even the naı̈vest listeners possess such tacit schemas to the extent that makes
their auditory knowledge profound. [Bigand (1993) [McAdams & Bigand (1993), 231–
277]] The classical learning theory of Hebb (1949) took as its main premise that such an
organized knowledge base is an inescapable property of learning by mature organisms.
In a cultural background in which certain musical patterns and conventions dominate,
the recognition of certain ‘structured’ patterns is facilitated by the built-in tacit knowl-
edge of the listener. Therefore, given a certain tone in a context of a triad (which epit-
omizes one of the fundamental patterns in Western music), the retention of the single
tone that is a part of that chord is comparatively straightforward. But, as psychological
experiments have demonstrated, recognition is even easier, if the ‘interference tones’ do
not form a consistent tonality with the given single tone. (Therefore, recognizing the note
B[ imposed on the triad E, G], B should be even easier.) This example demonstrates
that the ‘experientiality’ of recognizing a single tone within a triad (or any set of inter-
ference tones) is dependent on auditory memory and the extensive knowledge base that
accompanies it. Therefore, the first example exemplifies to a large degree the rational
interpretation [rationale Deutung] of auditory data, just as Carnap emphasized. Second,
consider the case (ii): a particular triad (say, A major) is sounded after which we pick and
choose a certain tone within it. Is the experiential dimension of this experiment exactly
identical with that of the first case? It can be argued that such is not the case. Whereas
in the first case we have an auditory memory item of a single tone the correspondent of
which we then attempt to recognize in a given triad, the second case gives rise to a phe-
nomenon that is completely different, although the two are temporally symmetric. In the
second case, we first hear the quality of the given triad comprised by its interval structure.
It is characteristic to this quality that every tone in it has a function that distinguishes it
from the others. Comparing the major and augmented triads, we immediately perceive
their qualitative difference: our attention is attracted by the characteristic quality of the
fifth in the latter triad, in which it forms a conspicuous dissonance with the root. Al-
though skill can be acquired in recognizing the different qualities of various chords and
intervals (especially as the harmonic context gets more complex) the most conspicuous
aspect of a chord is its interval structure. Tones that have a special function within the
chord (the ones creating tonal tension for example) are more easily recognized. There-
fore the recognition of a tone in a chord is entirely different from the first case where a
given single tone was to be identified within a set of interference tones. To reiterate, in
the first case, an auditory memory item is constructed which is compared with a set of
given tones afterwards. The listener retains in his mind the memory of that single tone
and matches it with one of the tones of the interference cluster in the second phase. It is
therefore an act of identification. In the second case, however, the recognition of a tone is
not so much an identification as an act of ostensive reference: given a harmonic structure
(a triad, for example) we pick a single tone from it at our whim. The quality of the har-
monic structure may determine which tones we find more ‘interesting’ than the others,
but still it is not an identification between different instantiations of a given tone; it is
discerning a constituent of a qualitative structure, i.e. designating a particular tone in a
cluster of tones without an act of retention that would precede it. What we first recognize
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is the chord quality and then we perform a kind of an decompositional analysis in picking
out a particular tone out of that context. Indeed, there is extensive empirical evidence
that people recognize the sonorous qualities of a chord as a whole without analysing the
component tones of the chord. For example, it has been shown by studies made by Trehub
& Trainor that infants recognize good musical patterns from those that are not good (good
patterns being defined as those the mastery of which requires relatively limited expo-
sure). Hence, the infants they studied showed some ability at interval-processing that
enabled them to distinguish between the major and augmented triads, respectively. [Tre-
hub & Trainor (1993) [McAdams & Bigand (1993), 278–327]] In sum, there is no reason
to think of the two cases considered by Carnap as experientially indistinguishable. As I
have argued, the two differ considerably with respect to both their experiential content
and the cognitive capacities involved.
Such particular questions aside, what were the prominent doctrinal features of Gestalt
psychology that Carnap to a large extent adopted into his thinking about these problems?
One of the most succinct and elegant formulations of the main ideas of Gestalt theory
is a summary given by an eminent listener of Wertheimer’s lectures on epistemology,
Gabriele, Countess von Wartensleben. She published in 1914 a book extraordinarily titled
An Ideal Portrait of the Christian Personality: A Description ‘sub specie psychologica’, where
the following account of Wertheimer’s views was given in a footnote at the beginning of
the book:
M. Wertheimer’s Gestalt theory (which has not yet appeared in print, but
about which I learned in a lecture on epistemological problems which he gave
at the Frankfurt academy in the summer semester of 1913, and in many pri-
vate conversations) contains the following basic thoughts:
1. Aside from chaotic, therefore not, or not properly, apprehensible impres-
sions, the contents of our consciousness are mostly not summative, but con-
stitute a particular characteristic “togetherness”, that is, a segregated structure,
often “comprehended” from an inner center, which can be different accord-
ing to the nature of the ideational content [Vorstellungsinhalt]; e.g. an optical
or acoustical, or also a dynamic or intensity center. To this the other parts of
the structure are related in a hierarchical system. Such structures are to be
called “Gestalten” in a precise sense.
2. Almost all impressions are grasped either as chaotic masses — a relatively
seldom, extreme case — or as chaotic masses on the way to sharper forma-
tion, or as Gestalten. What is finally grasped are “impressions of structure”
[Gebildefassungen]. To these belong the objects in a broad sense of the word, as
well as “relational contexts” [Beziehungszusammenhänge]. They are something
specifically different from and more than the summative totality of the individ-
ual components. Often the “whole” is grasped even before the individual
parts enter consciousness.
3. The process of knowing — knowledge in a precise sense of the word [im
prägnanten Sinne] — is very often a process of “centering” of “structuring”, or
of grasping that particular aspect which provides the key to an orderly whole,
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a unification of the particular individual parts that happen to be present; what
results is that a structured unit emerges as a whole due to, and through, this
centering. The result of just this knowledge process is a springing forth [Her-
ausspringen] of the Gestalt from the “not yet formed” [noch nicht gestaltet]. Cer-
tain appearances [So-Färbungen] of the parts result from the specific total con-
ception; parts and specific states now become “understandable” on this basis.
The entity that results from the knowledge process depends is many respects
not only on the object, but also on the observer. Thus there are several ways of
grasping many phenomena, but generally only one can be correct: that which
makes all states understandable and derivable from the central “idea” and
thus gives meaning [Sinn] to the entire given.
The same statements made about different entities can have completely dif-
ferent directions, according to the way in which they ‘sit’ in the entity [drin-
sitzen], e.g., whether they are nearer or further from the center. Thus, e.g., in
the case of “the wall is red”, “red” ‘sits’ differently than in the case of “blood
is red” (though the logical situation becomes more complicated here). Thus
something completely different is meant by a complex connection such as
“drinker philosopher” [Trinkerphilosoph], according to whether the drinker is
thought to be in the philosopher or the philosopher in the drinker. [Scheerer
(1931), 84–85]72
These features figure prominently in Carnap’s thinking at the time (and ever since). What
especially engages one’s attention is the emphasis on the gradual ascension from an ini-
tial state of chaotic impressions which, given their particular Vorstellungsinhalt, constitute
a “segregate structure”, to a higher level of Gebildefassungen. Moreover, the essential char-
acteristic of experience which, from the point of view of the Gestalt-theorists, is “a unifica-
tion of the particular individual parts that happen to be present”, is precisely constituted
by “relational contexts” [Beziehungszusammenhänge]. As we have seen, the emphasis on
structure is one of the hallmarks of Carnap’s early conception of analysis. Later we will
see that the very same notion forms the centerpiece of the explicative procedures that
take place in the background framework of logic and mathematics.
Now, to revert back to our central topic in this section, we can summarize Russell’s ideas
on analysis in a manner that makes his influence, or the aspects of that influence, on Car-
nap more transparent. As we have seen, Russell’s conception of analysis in Our Knowldge
of External World was quite general, comprising the idea that analysis extends our in-
tellectual horizons by explicating the conceptual possibilities inherent in any particular
problem situation. Although Russell’s notion of analysis developed somewhat over the
years, and although its different aspects were emphasized in various ways during his
career, Russell stated in The History of Western Philosophy, summing up his career, that a
single method was common to all his philosophical ventures. [Russell (1946), 788-789]
Paul Hager has distinguished three major characteristics that describe Russell’s concep-
tion of analysis, these being repeatedly emphasized by Russell: [Hager (2003) [Griffin
(2003), 312–314]]
72Cited in [Ash (1995), 123–124].
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(i) Analysis is unlikely to be final. a) new premisses may be discovered in relation to
which existing premisses are results, b) possibility of alternative sets of premisses
for the same results
(ii) Analysis enlarges the domains of particular subjects. N.B. The philosophy/science
distinction “is one , not in the subject matter, but in the state of mind of the investi-
gator.” [Russell (1919), 1] It remains for philosophy to move to the new frontier.
(iii) Analysis leads to premisses that are decreasingly self-evident. “. . . it becomes ob-
vious that, if we are to believe in the truth of pure mathematics, it cannot be solely
because we believe in the truth of the set of premisses. Some of the premisses are
musch less obvious that some of their consequences, and are believed chiefly be-
cause of their consequences.” [Russell (1924) [Russell (1956), 325]]
We can immediately recognize here elements and principles which played a significant
role also in Carnap’s thinking about analysis and its application in philosophy. In the
sense of a Möglichkeitswissenschaft, (i) and (ii) are linked; they are both statements about
the opening up of new possibilities that analysis enables us to envisage. But also (iii)
played a significant part in Carnap’s conception of analysis; his technical contributions
to the theory of probability and induction are prominent examples of this. To sum up
the results of this section, we can illustrate the characteristics of Russellian analysis by
the following table of the qualities of its results and premisses (as given by [Hager (2003)
[Griffin (2003), 315]]):
Results (or Data) Premisses
More complex Simpler
Relatively concrete Abstract
Common knowledge [The outcome of special enquiry]
Vague Precise
Logically interdependent Logically independent
More obvious Less obvious
Undeniable [Disputable]








4.5 Reconstructing the world: Der Logische Aufbau der Welt
4.5.1 Tractarian semantics: Wittgenstein’s influence on Carnap
The question of Wittgenstein’s impact on Carnap’s thought is entwined with both his-
torical and systematic difficulties. In the first place, there are contested issues pertain-
ing to the actual communications between the two men and to the question about the
independence of some aspects of Carnap’s thought from the ideas of Wittgenstein. Fore-
most among these is the idea of physicalism. In the second place, the reverberations of
Wittgenstein’s influence on the members of the Vienna Circle extend to cover a relatively
long period of time. Thus it becomes problematic, foremost in connection with Carnap,
to state once and for all the import of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on his thinking. It is just
because Carnap frequently changed his thinking about the variety of issues he tackled
that it is so difficult to link Wittgenstein’s influence on him with a single phase in his
career. Nevertheless, it is evident that already in the Aufbau there can be discerned con-
spicuous marks of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Moreover, Carnap saw Wittgenstein’s over-
all conception presented in that book as providing for him a solution to a fundamental
problem that he had come across earlier in connection with the first attempts at a rational
reconstruction. This program that had its origins in the work pertaining to the founda-
tions of geometry in Der Raum and that was properly set in motion during 1922–1923,
relied essentially on philosophical considerations that laid great emphasis on the notion
of “structure”. The prominence of this notion derived from the philosophical writings
of Helmholtz and Poincaré who had propounded the general conception that the ulti-
mate component of knowledge that science is concerned with and the one that can be
said to be the only component of genuine knowledge is knowledge about structures, or
as Poincaré put it in 1904: “What science can attain to is not the things themselves but
only the relations among the things; apart from these relations there is no knowable re-
ality.” [Poincaré (1904), XIII] This principle had been assimilated by Carnap already in
1922, for he wrote in one of his position papers that “every science is a science insofar as
the study of structures [Strukturenlehre] is contained in it.”73 [ASP (1922d), a2] This idea
was very much in the focus of the questions that the neo-Kantians, with whom Carnap
was associated in his student years, addressed at the first quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury. Indeed, the central issues concerned the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge,
and the questions about Strukturenlehre appeared very much to be questions of this sort.
Was knowledge of structure actually synthetic? Moreover, if structural properties were
purely formal ones, and hence derivable from logic, was logic itself a synthetic discipline?
[ibid., 185] At least some of the most prominent logicians, including Frege and Russell,
seemed to think in this vein. Frege had envisaged his program of logic as a vehicle for
reducing mathematics to logic, but as is well known, this did not amount to a concep-
tion of mathematics with no real content. Indeed, Frege’s theory of concepts in a sense
salvaged the Kantian intuitions that had earlier comprised the fundamental guarantee of
the syntheticity of mathematics. Russell, on his part, propounded a version of ‘logicism’
that, in agreement with Frege, conceived logic as an a priori discipline but still accommo-
73Cited in [Carus (2007), 163].
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dated synthetic knowledge in the form of a codification of the most general features of
our world. The ‘universalism’ of Russell’s philosophy of logic has been a contested issue
recently, but perhaps one of the most interesting lines of interpretation has been to take
Russell as advocating a Bolzanian conception of logic.74 Carnap was beginning to feel
increasingly uneasy with such conceptions of logic. At the time of conceiving clearly the
principal ideas of rational reconstruction in 1922, he still held fast to elements of Kan-
tianism and Husserlian phenomenology, although these were already being somewhat
mitigated. At least the Kantianism displayed in Der Raum was already minimal, as we
have seen. But the phenomenological component in his thinking would remain strong
albeit tacit. It is one of the unexplained mysteries of the history of twentieth century
philosophy why Carnap downplayed the influence of Husserl in his explicit reports on
his own work although that influence was very clearly active within the confines of Car-
nap’s philosophical ‘mechanism’. Along with the question about the interrelation with
Wittgenstein, this is one of the most fascinating and important questions to make, and I
will attempt to give at least a partial answer to it in these final sections of this chapter.
Against this background it seem therefore questionable that “[. . . ] though phenomeno-
logical discernment had still played a role in the identification of the basis, in the 1922
version of the constitution system, by 1925 Carnap had set the goal of ‘overcoming sub-
jectivity: transition from material to structure”’, as Carus claims. [Carus (2007), 185] In
this respect we have to be attentive, not merely to what Carnap explicitly says of his goals
and the methods for attaining them, but also to the implicit presuppositions that can be
inferred from what he says in connection with systematic issues. This is an expedient
strategy to adopt in enquiring the relation of Carnap and Husserl. I will, however, begin
with adducing the most important aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought that demonstrably
influenced the members of Vienna Circle in general, and Carnap in particular. The natural
half-way house between the first phase of interaction between Wittgenstein and the Vi-
enna Circle and the next phase of ‘smooth waters’ when Wittgenstein temporarily retires
from philosophy, breaking all the contacts with the Circle, is the inception of Carnap’s
Aufbau. Giving an account of the main ideas and achievements of the book occupies us
for the most part of the later sections. In this connection it is also natural to take Husserl’s
role under discussion. After that I will say something of the historical difficulties pertain-
ing to interpreting the relation of Carnap and Wittgenstein. This will then lead to the
investigation of the logical issues that Carnap was interested in through the influence of
Wittgenstein, ultimately leading to the next, crucial phase in Carnap’s thinking during
which he becomes aware of the insurmountable difficulties with the original program of
rational reconstruction. This ‘crisis’ will then lead to the ‘liberation’ brought about the
ideas presented in Logische Syntax. But this will be the subject of Chapter 5.
Wittgenstein’s picture theory
A widely discussed topic within the Wittgensteinian literary corpus is the notion of
language as a picture of the world, or, as it has been coined by Hintikka and others,
“Wittgenstein’s picture theory”. A cornucopia of analyses of this ‘theory’ have been
74A sustained argument in this direction is presented in [Korhonen (2006)].
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published, attempting to scrutinize its basic tenets, methodological underpinnings, and
significance. To acquire a satisfactory conception of the influence that Wittgenstein in-
curred on Carnap, it of primary importance to give a balanced account of the essentials
of Wittgenstein’s picture theory, because it constitutes the core of the presentation of the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the book that had a tremendous impact on the members of
the Vienna Circle, Carnap included.
One of the most interesting analyses of the picture theory of Wittgenstein has been given
by Jaakko Hintikka. Effectively basing his analysis in part on the pioneering account of
Erik Stenius [Stenius (1960)], Hintikka professes to bring to light the inhomogeneity of
the issues entwined with Wittgenstein’s picture theory that usually are approached quite
uncritically under a unitarian view of a ‘Wittgensteinian picture theory’. Indeed, he does
not grow tired of emphasizing the “several different and largely independent” issues that
are involved beneath the surface of the unitary approach. Hintikka maintains that at least
six different tenets underlie the “picture theory”. These are:
1. An elementary proposition represents the (possible) state of affairs that it represents
in virtue of being an isomorphic replica of this state of affairs.75
2. The totality of possible combinations of simple objects matches the totality of pos-
sible elementary propositions.
3. Each name (primitive symbol) has the same logical form (logical and categorial
type) as the object it represents.
4. Elementary propositions are independent of each other.
5. All non-elementary propositions are (complex or otherwise derived) pictures of
facts in the same sense as elementary propositions.
6. A part of the background of all these different theses is a sixth one. It is the thesis
to the effect that that in logically correct language the logical (pictorial) forms of
propositions are their syntactical forms. [Hintikka (1996), 22]
Hintikka refers to these theses with the following locutions (I intend to follow him in
this practice): (1) Elementary propositions as pictures, (2) The mirroring thesis, (3) The
categorial matching thesis, (4) The atomicity thesis, (5) Complex propositions as pictures,
and (6) Pictorial form as a syntactical form, or the syntacticity thesis. [ibid.]
One of the most conspicuous discrepancies in the collection of the main theses of the Trac-
tatus is the thesis number six. It seems to be the odd one out, having presumably little
75This interpretive approach is essentially due to Erik Stenius. The notion of isomorphism is adapted from
group theory, and gives an accurate rendering of the intended notion of resemblance between propositions
and states of affairs. Consider the following definition. Given two sets G and G′, a homomorphism f : G →
G′ is called an isomorphism if there exists a homomorphism g : G′ → G such that f ◦ g and g ◦ f are the
identity mappings (in G′ and G respectively). It is trivially verified that f is an isomorphism if and only if f
is bijective. (N.B. A homomorphism of G into G′ is a mapping f : G → G′ such that f (xy) = f (x) f (y) for
all x, y ∈ G, and mapping the unit element of G into that of G′.)
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explicative force within the overall philosophical agenda that Wittgenstein professes. It
concerns primarily only a very elementary fact of propositional logic, the possibility of
representing every truth-function in accordance with Sheffer’s result, namely, in terms
of a single propositional connective.76 How could this result have anything of relevance
to do with the general program of illustrating the pictorial relations between language
and the world. Perhaps we can answer this question by addressing first a rather straight-
forward one: what does the proposition 6 of the Tractatus actually say? The answer is
simple: only one operation is needed for representing every possible truth-function. This
operation consists, effectively, of taking the conjunction of the negations of some given
propositions. On the face of it all of this seems to be quite irrelevant to the overall purpose
of the Tractatus. But, as Hintikka has argued (quite convincingly), the accommodation of
the Proposition 6 within the system is essential, because it works as a tool for extending
the picture idea of propositions from elementary to complex propositions. On a classical
reading the idea of a complex proposition picturing a fact or a state of affairs in the world
is incomprehensible, because it would make the Proposition 5 seem redundant. Indeed,
if all propositions are unproblematically taken to picture reality, what need is their, then
for the thesis that complex propositions are truth- functions of elementary propositions?
But readings falling under this classification have been marred exactly in their incapacity
to see the full import of the proposition 6 of the Tractatus. Rather than being an incoher-
ent sidestep in the development of the argument, it is in fact an essential part of it. Or so
Hintikka essentially claims. Let us see to what extent this can be justified.
Now, given Wittgenstein’s definition of the general form of the truth-function, we can
say something of the requirements of the picturing relations between complex proposi-
tions and the world. To reiterate, the general truth-function is of such a form that that
it reduces all complex propositions to a form that consists only of conjunctions of nega-
tions of propositions (in all but the simplest cases consisting of multiple layers of such
conjunctions of negations of propositions).77 How can such a truth-functional form be
interpreted as a picture? We may think of the correspondence as being constituted by
consecutive iterations of the two basic operations, negation and conjunction. Therefore
we have to consider what the pictorial representations of these basic operations amount
to. Hintikka regards these as quite straightforward. In the first place, conjunction is just
the superposition of two pictures (corresponding to two (elementary) propositions), a
“conjoint complex picture”. [Hintikka (1996), 40] Strictly speaking, I would considerably
qualify this type of description, but let us accept it for now, for the sake of an argument. In
the second place, the negation of a picture is not only a picture, it is the very same picture
but taken with the opposite sense (with the converse polarity). This alludes to Wittgen-
stein’s notion of bipolarity.78 Hintikka describes this idea (the relation between p and∼ p)
76In Wittgenstein’s own words, “[6.001] What this says is just that every proposition is a result of succes-
sive application to elementary propositions of the operation N(ξ)”. [Tractatus, 6.001]
77For example, considering a very simple case in propositional logic, the sentence “F = (A ∨ B)→ (¬B ∧
A)” can be transformed first into the CNF (conjunctive normal form) “(¬A∨¬B)∧ (¬A∨ A)∧ (¬B∨¬B)∧
(¬B ∨ A)”. This is equivalent to “(¬A ∨ ¬B) ∧ (A ∨ ¬B)”. Then, removing the disjunctions inside the
brackets by applying de Morgan’s rule, we get “(¬(A ∧ B)) ∧ ¬(¬A ∧ B)”. This is the required form of the
original sentence F.
78In the Tractatus the principle is effectively a criterion of sense – every meaningful proposition must be
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as analogous to the difference between the positive and negative print of a photograph.
This idea had figured already in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914–1916 where he is on record
saying: “What I mean to say is that we only then understand a proposition if we know
both what would be the case if it was false and what if it was true.” [Wittgenstein (1979)
[1914–1916]] Hintikka takes this as a convincing case for maintaining that “Wittgenstein
consistently insisted that the understanding of not-p is implicit in the understanding of
p.” [Hintikka (1996), 41] The claim that both kinds of understanding are pictorial must be
taken with a grain of salt to be palatable. In order to make the picture idea more tangible
one would have to give a concrete construction method for the complex presentations
of pictures and make precise what is involved in such a process of construction. If the
pictorial element in the correspondence between propositions and facts is to be taken se-
riously, and not as a mere allegoric way of speech, we are certainly justified to ask for a
more detailed description of the constructive features of such a picturing. Hintikka does
not provide many clues as to how to set up such constructions, although he makes an
allusion to the work of Hao Wang where the pictorial dimension of logical description is
explicated through domino problems. I will come to this issue shortly.
Still, there is one conceptual problem that needs to be clarified in order to make Wittgen-
stein’s account of the picture theory of propositions coherent. The problem concerns the
fact that according to Wittgenstein the syntactical form of a proposition of natural lan-
guage does not reveal its logical form. The syntactical form is accommodated into the
theory because
[i]n everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has
different modes of signification — and so belongs to different symbols — or
that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in
propositions in what is superficially the same way. Thus the word ‘is’ figures
as the copula, as a sing for identity, and as an expression for existence; ‘exists’
figures as an intransitive verb like ‘go’, and ‘identical’ as an adjective; we
speak of something, but also of something’s happening. (In the proposition,
‘Green is green’ — where the first word is the proper name of a person and
the last an adjective — these words do not merely have different meanings:
they are different symbols.) [3.323] . . .
To eliminate the ambiguities Wittgenstein mentions above it is necessary to construct “an
ideal language”, a language which is constructed in such a manner that its syntactical
forms reflect its logical forms. This is needed in order to retain the picturing capacity of
the language.
In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that ex-
cludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using
in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification:
either true or false.
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that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar — by logi-
cal syntax. (The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language,
though, it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes.) [3.325]
Now there arises a problem. How can the propounded picture relation between a propo-
sition and a state of affairs be preserved if the syntactical form of a proposition fails to
reveal its logical form? Wittgenstein has an answer ready at hand:
In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with
a sense. [3.326]
Furthermore, towards the end of the Tractatus there is a proposition which elaborates on
this:
The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are.
What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.
It is clear that logic must not clash with its application.
But logic has to be in contact with its application.
Therefore logic and its application must not overlap. [5.557]
These quotations are all in accordance with the interpretation that the pictorial form is
related with the syntactical form. However, the use of a given propositional expression is
the required pragmatic ingredient that renders the pictorial relation complete and com-
prehensible. Without this pragmatic ingredient there is no picturing of a state of affairs.
Therefore the “syntactical clothing” (Hintikka) of a sentence is seen to be insufficient to
fulfill the task of extra-linguistic reference. As Wittgenstein crystallizes it:
What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their
application says clearly. [3.262]
Here the “signs” are to be comprehended as signs comprising the expression of a given
proposition. The whole gist of the picture theory is that the picturing relation is defined
between propositions and states of affairs. In this respect some commentators have went
astray in thinking that the pictorial relation establishes a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween a given singular term in an expression and an object of the world. For instance,
given a proposition aRb designating a relation between the two objects a and b, the terms
‘a’, ‘R’, and ‘b’ are taken to ‘picture’ separately the particular objects a, R, and b of the
world.79 Peter Carruthers, for example, has interpreted the picture theory of Wittgen-
stein along these lines and made on this basis a distinction between a stronger and a
79Some authors speak about “reference” in this connection which commits a double mishap in misun-
derstanding the nature of the picturing relation and advocating a semantical mode of speech that does not
straightforwardly apply in the context of Wittgenstein’s theory. That the talk about “the reference of an
individual term” is problematic here is due to the fact that under Wittgenstein’s account individual terms
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weaker version of the doctrine of isomorphism. According to the stronger version not
only names but also the significant relations between them will stand in (the picture)
relation of reference to the world. In the weaker version the assumption of the signif-
icant relations having reference to the world is dropped. Carruthers himself advocates
an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s picture theory where a non-referential semantics for
predicative expressions is embodied in the Tractatus. [Carruthers (1990)] But this is, I
maintain, an erroneous line of interpretation. We cannot make sense of the picturing
relation in this mitigated case neither.80 Indeed, the reading of Hintikka makes it even
comprehensible why the “rejection of the picture theory by Wittgenstein” is not a rejec-
tion at all. Wittgenstein only dropped the requirement of defining pictorial form in terms
of the syntactical form of a proposition. Therefore, only the syntacticity thesis (6) was
dropped, leaving the other theses (1–5) more or less intact. In this sense Wittgenstein
never gave up the picture theory, as is made evident by the considerations appertaining
to the relation between him and the members of the Vienna Circle which are taken up
later in this chapter.
I will now revert to the case Hintikka has taken up in connection with his conception of
Wittgensteinian pictures as “jigsaw puzzles”. As I remarked earlier, it would certainly
make the whole idea of picturing more coherent and comprehensible, if the “picture”
aspect were taken seriously in it, and not only as an involved way of alluding to a some-
what mysterious relationship between linguistic expressions and states of affairs. Hin-
tikka describes Wittgenstein’s approach to this question as “jigsaw puzzle theory of the
nature of logic”. [Hintikka (1996), 48] What this means is that the sole foundation upon
which logic is constructed is a collection of names, corresponding to a collection of sim-
ple objects. (Hintikka risks here sliding towards a simplistic referential interpretation
of the picture theory.) In addition, each object is given together with a specification of
the ways in which it can or cannot be combined with the other objects. Hence the term
“jigsaw puzzle”. Now, the next step is to ask how the expressive force of the familiar
first-order logic could be built on such foundations. Prima facie such a task seems impos-
sible. But it is not impossible: in connection with certain investigations of the relations of
combinatorial games and logic, Hao Wang and his collaborators have shown that from a
relatively simple setting of a particular type of a combinatorial game, a surprisingly rich
never have senses on their own. Or, as is said in the proposition [3.142]: “Only facts can express a sense,
a set of names cannot.” Therefore only a propositional sign (as a whole) has a sense, and can be involved
in the picturing relation. Although the idea that reference or designation is a kind of ‘picturing’ seems
prima facie plausible, this kind of a relation has very little to do with the picture relation that Wittgenstein
envisaged. Consider the simple example “Bertrand Russell is talking with Alfred Ayer”. What would a ‘pic-
ture’ of Bertrand Russell abstracted from the situation in which he is presented to us (as sitting comfortably
in a chair discussing with Ayer) be like? For sure, the name “Bertrand Russell” designates the individual
Bertrand Russell, but the picturing relation is not defined for individual constants. When speaking in the
framework of his ‘picture theory’, Wittgenstein is not talking about reference of proper names in particular
or about reference in the model-theoretical sense in general. He is talking about pictures as some kind of
generic relations between propositions and states of affairs. Although the individual terms can be inter-
preted as designating certain concrete individuals, the logical framework Wittgenstein is working in does
not admit of such an interpretation. If we stick to the Fregean idea that the sense of a term determines its
reference, we do not, in the case of Wittgenstein’s picture theory have a well-defined notion of reference (of
individual terms). Only propositional signs enter into the picturing relation.
80The only coherent reading in my opinion being the one referred to in the preceding footnote.
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structure can be derived. Moreover, some of these structures are seen to be equivalent to
the structure (or a relevant substructure) of first-order languages. Especially interesting
is the case where Wang has shown that the decision problem of the entire first-order logic
can be expressed in the context of so-called domino-problems. The description of Wang’s
domino problem is as follows:
DOMINO PROBLEM involves assembling three coloured tiles called domino types to
form a block that can be infinitely extended with colours matching on all adjacent
edges (Fig.). It is assumed that the player has an infinite quantity of each domino
type and that no domino can be rotated in two dimensions. The problem is solved
by finding a rectangular block in which the colour sequence on the top edge is the
same as that on the bottom edge and the sequence on the left edge is the same as
that on the right. Such a unit can be repeated in all directions to fill an infinite plane.
[Wang (1990), 196]
The correspondence between a domino problem and a decision problem is the following:
for any given set of dominoes we can find a corresponding “AEA-formula”81 such that
the set has a solution if and only if the formula is not self-contradictory. In other words,
a domino problem can be transformed into a problem of determining whether a corre-
sponding AEA-formula is self-contradictory or not. From this it follows that since the
general domino problem is unsolvable, there is no general method for deciding whether
an arbitrary AEA-formula is self-contradictory.
The significance of this result is summarized by Wang himself as follows:
The result is useful because the complexity of formulas in logic is to a large
extent measured by the number and order of quantifiers, and the formulas
of logic are often put into different classes according to the structure of the
quantifiers [the quantifier prefix]. It is surprising that as simple a class as that
of AEA-formulas (with three quantifiers only) is undecidable. In fact, with
this result the decision problem for all quantifier classes are answered. Given
any string of quantifiers we can now tell if the class of formulas determined
by it is decidable.
The decision problem of logic is significant because all mathematical theo-
ries can be formulated in the framework of elementary logic. The question
of whether or not a formula (F) can be derived from a set of axioms (A) is re-
duced to deciding if the logical formula “A but not F” is not self-contradictory.
In this sense all mathematics is reducible to logic. Indeed, one measure of the
complexity of a mathematical problem is given by the structure of its corre-
sponding formula in logic. It is therefore an important enterprise to determine
the complexity of various classes of logical formulas. [ibid., 208]
81A first-order formula having the quantifier prefix AEA, denoting in effect a formula of the type
∀x∃y∀zP(x, y, z), where P is any complex predicate not involving quantifiers (with possibly a sequence
a0, . . . , an of individual constants, their number being dependent on the arity of P.
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Figure 4.4: Wang Tiles. c©Wikipedia.
Hintikka relates his own theory of the distributive normal forms to Wang’s account of
formulas in first-order logic to illustrate the coherence and fruitfulness of the idea of










a case can be made for the resemblance of the accounts of Wang and his in this particular
respect. The last term on the second line is a conjunction of atomic formulas (either
negated or unnegated). The interpretation of the rest of the terms is that they effectively
list all the different kinds of individuals there are. Moreover, each Ci[x] has the identical
form: ∧
j∈J








The consistency requirements for (4.2) are that (1) each x in (4.1) “has to find a slot among
the y′s in each conjunction occurring in (4.2).” As Hintikka remarks, “this is very much
like saying that any two jigsaw puzzle pieces must be compatible, capable of being fitted
into one and the same piece. Moreover, for each y in (4.2) there must be a compatible x
in (4.1). This is very much like saying that each gap left by any given jigsaw puzzle piece
must be capable of being filled by one of the available pieces.” [Hintikka (1996), 50]
This is, then, the more concrete sense of the picturing relation that we have been looking
for. Of the two interpretations of Wittgenstein’s picture theory (Wang’s domino-scheme
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and Hintikka’s distributive normal forms), the demonstration of the consistency of a
given first-order formula by means of a domino game seems more attractive and illus-
trative. As we are going to see, the picture theory underlies much of the philosophical
work of Vienna Circle. This is especially so with the logical work of Carnap. It com-
prises an overarching presupposition of nearly all of Carnap’s constructional enterprises
in logic and language engineering tasks far in to the 1930s when Carnap adopts a more
liberal and pragmatic attitude towards concept formation and theory construction. The
grasp of the picture theory over Carnap’s thinking is particularly strong in his Der Logis-
che Aufbau der Welt. This book is also one of the clearest expositions of the program of
rational reconstruction that Carnap had envisaged already in 1922. As this single book
accommodates such a prominent position in the development of Carnap’s thought and
in the subsequent discussions among the members of the Vienna Circle as well as within
contemporary epistemology in general, it is necessary to turn to adduce its main lines of
thought in more detail.
4.5.2 The objective of the Aufbau
For my philosophical work the period in Vienna was one of the most stimu-
lating, enjoyable, and fruitful periods of my life. My interests and my basic
philosophical views were more in accord with those of the circle than with
any group I ever found. From the very beginning, when in 1925 I explained
in the Circle the general plan and method of Der Logische Aufbau, I found a
lively interest. When I returned to Vienna in 1926, the typescript of the first
version of the book was read by members of the Circle, and many of its prob-
lems were thoroughly discussed. [Carnap (1963), 20]
The point of departure in the Aufbau is the epistemological problem alluded to above
in connection with Russell. It is raised by the observation that knowledge, for any given
agent, begins in the stream of personal experience of that individual. Now, individual ex-
perience is inherently something that we take as representing the paradigm of subjective:
the qualitative contents of individual experience are wholly private to the person whose
experience it is. This means that the peculiarities of the individual experience cannot be
communicated to others. Thus, we are led to the essential problem of the Aufbau: how,
then, “is it possible [. . . ] to attain an intersubjective, objective world that is conceptually
comprehensible and, indeed, as one identical for all subjects”? [Carnap (1967) [1928], §2]
Carnap’s solution draws on two essentially neo-Kantian ideas (although the details of the
solution depend equally on Husserl’s conception of knowledge acquisition)82: (1) there
are structural features in common among the individual streams of experience. (2) One
can define the objects of knowledge wholly on the basis of such shared structural features
of experience. [Richardson (1998), 32]
Thus, underlying Carnap’s solution of this problem is a conspicuously structuralist view
of objectivity, clearly influenced by the developments in the foundations of geometry that
82See especially [Haddock (2008)].
212
constituted the object of his very first philosophical investigations. Carnap gives a lucid
description of his view in §66 of the Aufbau:
Our problem now is how science can arrive at intersubjectively valid asser-
tions if all its objects are to be constructed from the standpoint of the indi-
vidual subject, that is, if in the final analysis all statements of science have
as their object only relations between “my” experiences? Since the stream of
experience is different for each person, how can there be even one statement
of science which is objective in this sense (i.e., which holds for every indi-
vidual, even though he starts from his own individual stream of experience)?
The solution to this problem lies in the fact that, even though the material of
the individual streams of experience is completely different, or rather, alto-
gether incomparable, since a comparison of two sensations or two feelings of
different subjects, as far as their immediately given qualities are concerned, is
absurd, certain structural properties are analogous for all streams of experience.
Now, if science is to be objective, then it must restrict itself to statements about
such structural properties, and, as we have seen earlier, it can restrict itself to
statements about structures, since all objects of knowledge are not content,
but form, and since they can be represented as structural entities. [Carnap
(1967), §66]
In paragraph §119 Carnap gives the two basic theorems of construction theory that ex-
press the overall purpose of the entire program of reconstruction. The first of these states,
on the one hand, that each scientific concept is either a class or a relation extension, which can be
expressed through the basic relation(s) alone. The second theorem states, on the other hand,
that each scientific statement is, in the final analysis, a statement about the basic relation(s).
[Carnap (1961 [1928]), 187] To give an example of the complexity that a constructional
definition yields even in connection with a relatively simple statement, consider the The-
orem 6 of Carnap’s book, essentially stating that the color solid is three-dimensional. Carnap
proceeds to adduce the example in the following terms:
Let us clarify this thesis [the second basic theorem] with the example of Th.
6 of the three dimensionality of the color solid. With the aid of the construc-
tional definition of Proxcol, Th. 6 can be transformed, through substitution,
into the sentence:
3 Dnhomvic (ε̆ | Sim | ε) B Color [. . . ]
Through step-by-step substitutions on the basis of the definitions of color,
Colid, Colidprox, Proxpl, place, Excl, sight, sense, Sim, qual, similcirc, Ps, and a
formal simplification we finally obtain from [the expression above] the fol-
lowing form for Th. 6; in this form, “Rs” is the only nonlogical symbol (Q, x
and the Greek letters are variables; the other symbols are logical constants):
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Figure 4.5: The Color Solid Cube. c©Wikipedia.
(∃Q, ν).3Dnhomvic(ε̆ | Q | ε)BAbstr′{α̂β̂((∃χ, λ, µ).χε̆ | Q | ελ.χε̆ | Q | εµ.




























The upshot of Carnap’s example is that the empirical statements concerning the three-
dimensional color solid can be formulated, in the given basis, as statements about “a
certain, purely formal, though very complicated, property of the basic relation Rs.” [ibid.] More-
over, the singular case of the color solid can be generalized to yield the principle that
underlies the constructional program: “In the same way, all empirical statements of science
can be expressed as statements about purely formal properties of the basic relation(s). This holds
generally, no matter which basic relations and no matter what constructional system may
be chosen.”83 [ibid.]
A central aspect of the construction theory that appertains to the characterization of vi-
sual sensations was the assumption of the two-dimensionality of visual space. Before
Aufbau this had more or less been taken as given by Carnap, an intuition too evident to
83Emphasis in the original.
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merit closer scrutiny. But this was a mistake, as Carnap came to admit later. A more crit-
ical attitude towards this assumption is shown in the Aufbau where the two-dimensional
visual field is constructed (in the §89 and §117) from the primitive relations.
A problem that Carnap proceeds to tackle in §126, viz. that of assigning colours to world
points, is different from the one that he had tackled in 1922. Whereas the earlier ac-
count had proceeded from an unorganized, chaotic impressions of the two-dimensional
“primary world” to the three-dimensional “secondary world”, the account given in the
Aufbau was not a description of an ‘ontological transition’ of this sort. The question could
now be seen as entirely mathematical, consisting essentially of the formal mapping of a
two-dimensional manifold to a three-dimensional one. Here, Carus has suggested, with
circumstantial evidence provided by Michael Friedman, that Carnap may have been in-
fluenced in this respect by Karl Menger, the mathematician that organized the parallel
discussion group to the Schlick Circle, the “Mathematics Colloquium”. Menger had pre-
sented his researches on dimension theory in a monograph Dimensionstheorie published
in 1928. Friedman regards it as probable that Carnap incorporated these ideas in the Auf-
bau without explicitly mentioning it. The circumstantial evidence I alluded to is a men-
tion of Menger’s monograph in Abriss der Logistik [Carnap (1929), 77] which has been
located by Friedman. As it happens, this conjecture is made highly plausible by another,
much more direct source, viz., the statement of Menger himself in his Reminiscences of the
Vienna Circle and the Mathematical Colloquium. [Menger (1994)] There is a passage in which
Menger relates that
Rudolf Carnap had visited Vienna in the spring of 1925 before I left the city
for Amsterdam. At that time, he and I had a long talk about his work and
about the theories of dimension and of curves which I was then developing
and in which he was greatly interested since he had just finished a booklet
about space.84 [Menger (1994), 63]
This passage renders it indisputable that Carnap was in fact influenced by Menger’s ideas
on dimension theory already in 1925 (instead of 1929). Thus, it becomes highly likely
that the assignment of colours to world points in §126 of Aufbau is actually influenced by
Menger although Carnap does not mention him.
4.5.3 The crisis of rational reconstruction
The central contention about the conception of language in the Vienna Circle at the time
was that although the basic approach propounded in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was indis-
pensable (including among others, the idea of non-factuality of analytic sentences), it
84Menger is here referring to Der Raum (according to [Menger (1994)]). However, a lapse of three years
would make it hard to justify talking about Carnap having “just finished a booklet about space”. I think it
is more probable that the ‘booklet’ Menger is alluding to (evidently on the basis of Carnap’s own reports) is
the article “Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität: Eine Untersuchung über den logischen Zusam-
menhang zweier Fiktionen” [Carnap (1924)]. At least this would suit more exactly the time and the subject
of their discussion.
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would have to be expanded to accommodate also physical laws and ‘elucidations’ con-
cerning metalinguistic facts. Carnap naturally shared this contention. But his relation-
ship to Wittgenstein was founded on a ‘bipolarity’ that comprised two contrary concep-
tions of the importance of Wittgenstein’s view. On the one hand, Carnap fundamentally
agreed with Wittgenstein’s conception of analytic truth. In Carnap’s view it was Wittgen-
stein who, more than any other, had made clear the nature of logical truth itself: indeed,
the essential insight of Wittgenstein was that the truths of logic are tautologies that hold
in all possible worlds (or, in accordance with Wittgenstein’s original intentions, in all pos-
sible states of affairs) and hence are inherently without content, saying nothing about the
world. This idea figured prominently in Carnap’s thinking:
For me personally, Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who, besides
Russell and Frege, had the greatest influence on my thinking. The most im-
portant insight I gained from his work was the conception that the truth of
logical statements is based only on their logical structure and the meaning of
their terms. Logical statements are true under all conceivable circumstances;
thus their truth is independent of the contingent facts of the world. On the
other hand, it follows that these statements do not say anything about the
world and thus have no factual content. [Carnap (1963), 25]
It is evident that the central point of agreement between Carnap’s thinking and the ideas
presented in the Tractatus is precisely the conception of the tautologous nature of logical
truths (they diverged with respect to mathematical truths).85 On the other hand, there
was also a critical point of disagreement: whereas Wittgenstein had built his treatment in
the Tractatus around the contrast between the sayable and unsayable, leading his expo-
sition towards the well-known coda of “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß
man schweigen”, Carnap vehemently advocated the view that the analysis of the struc-
ture of language, especially the linguistic forms in which we express and state facts, are
85Carnap illustrates this agreement by describing the essential contribution of Wittgenstein to the articu-
lation of analyticity as follows: “The conception of the nature of mathematics which we developed in the
discussions of the Vienna Circle came chiefly from the following sources. I had learned from Frege that all
mathematical concepts can be defined on the basis of the concepts of logic and that the theorems of mathe-
matics can be deduced from the principles of logic. Thus the truths of mathematics are analytic in the general
sense of truth based on logic alone. The mathematician Hans Hahn, one of the leading members of the Circle,
had accepted the same conception under the influence of Whitehead[’s] and Russell’s work, Principia Math-
ematica. Furthermore, Schlick, in his book Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918), had clarified and emphasized
the view that logical deduction cannot lead to new knowledge but only to an explication or transformation
of the knowledge contained in the premises. Wittgenstein formulated this view in the more radical form
that all logical truths are tautological, that is, that they hold necessarily in every possible case, therefore do
not exclude any case, and do not say anything about the facts of the world. Wittgenstein demonstrated this
thesis for molecular sentences (i.e., those without variables) and for those with individual variables. It was
not clear whether he thought that the logically valid sentences with variables of higher levels, e.g., with
variables for classes, for classes of classes, etc., have the same tautological character. At any rate, he did not
count the theorems of arithmetic, algebra, etc., among the tautologies. But to members of the Circle there
did not seem to be a fundamental difference between elementary logic and higher [order] logic, including
mathematics. Thus we arrived at the conception that all valid statements of mathematics are analytic in the
specific sense that they hold in all possible cases and therefore do not have any factual content.” [Carnap
(1963), 46]
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the most important objects of the “logical syntax” which he called theoretical science in
the strictest sense:
Furthermore, there is a divergence on a more specific point which, however,
was of great importance for our way of thinking in the Circle. We read in
Wittgenstein’s book that certain things show themselves but cannot be said;
for example the logical structure of sentences and the relation between the
language and the world. In opposition to this view, first tentatively, then
more and more clearly, our conception developed that it is possible to talk
meaningfully about language and about the relation between a sentence and
the fact described. [. . . ] [I] pointed out that only the structural pattern, not
the physical properties of the ink marks, were relevant for the function of
language. Thus it is possible to construct a theory about language, namely
the geometry of the written pattern. This idea led later to the theory which I
called “logical syntax” of language. [Carnap (1963), 29]
This, then, is the background against which the aspiration towards an expanded concep-
tion of language must be understood. The conception that Carnap had propounded in
the Aufbau, namely that all concepts were to be constituted by explicit definitions,86 was
beginning to be undermined. Carnap had come to realize that even some fundamental
concepts of the ‘pure’ sciences, such as those of arithmetic and set theory could only be at-
tained axiomatically. The challenge that resulted from this insight was that it now became
a problem to develop a language that would at the same time fulfill the requirements of
implicit definability of concepts (i.e. axiomatic representability of a system of concepts)
and the clarity and non-ambiguity of the concepts (Carnap uses the term “eindeutig”).
It was actually Moritz Schlick who instigated Carnap to tackle this problem, as he had
already in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918) addressed the problem of the seemingly
unbridgeable gap between axiomatically definable concepts and observable entities.87
This was the point of departure for Carnap’s 1927 paper in which the contrast between
“proper [eigentliche]” (explicitly definable) concepts and “improper [uneigentliche]” (im-
plicitly definable) concepts is for the first time presented:
86“Unlike other conceptual systems, a constructional system undertakes more than the division of con-
cepts into various kinds and the investigation of the differences and mutual relations between these kinds.
In addition, it attempts a step-by-step derivation or ‘construction’ of all concepts from certain fundamental
concepts, so that a genealogy of concepts results in which each one has its definite place. It is the main thesis
of construction theory that all concepts can in this way be derived from a few fundamental concepts, and it
is in this respect that it differs from most other ontologies.” [Carnap (1928 [1967]), §1] Cf. also [ibid., §2].
87“[. . . ] kurz, durch die konkrete Definition wird der Zusammenhang der Begriffe mit der Wirklichkeit
hergestellt, sie zeigt in der anschaulichen oder erlebten Wirklichkeit dasjenige auf, was nun durch den
Begriff bezeichnet werden soll. Die implizite Definition dagegen steht nirgends in Gemeinschaft oder
Verbindung mit der Wirklichkeit, sie lehnt sie absichtlich und prinzipiell ab, sie verharrt im Reich der Be-
griffe. Ein mit hilfe impliziter Definition geschaffenes Gefüge von Wahrheiten ruht nirgends auf dem Grunde
der Wirklichkeit, sondern schwebt gleichsam frei, wie das Sonnensystem die Gewähr seiner Stabilität in sich
selber tragend. Keiner der darin auftretenden Begriffe bezeichnet in der Theorie ein Wirkliches, sondern
sie bezeichnen sich gegenseitig in der Weise, daß die Bedueutung des einen Begriffes in einer bestimmten
Konstellation einer Anzahl der übrigen besteht.” [Schlick (1918), 35]
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Logically, the implicitly defined concepts differ so radically from proper con-
cepts that one may well have doubts about even calling them ‘concepts’ at
all. We will retain this name, however, in view of common usage, especially
within mathematics . . . [where] one talks as if one were dealing with concepts
— ‘point’, ‘line’, ‘between’, etc. — that meet all the requirements of a legiti-
mate concept. Since this is not the case, we will limit our terminological con-
cession to usage by calling implicitly defined concepts ‘improper concepts’.88
[Carnap (1927), 366-367]
There are some conspicuous similarities between the approach Carnap is taking here and
the view of Frege. Frege, as is well known, had established that a set of axioms that
was used to implicitly define a concept, comprised a basis for an explicit definition of
a second-order concept. This concept, being of of course of a higher type, could not be
substituted for the implicitly definable original concept. Moreover, as Carnap naturally
recognized, whereas explicitly defined concepts were in a definite sense constant terms
(under a linguistic representation), the implicitly defined concepts were variables, admit-
ting of several possible interpretations (ranging over different models), and could thus be
of use in the empirical sciences. [ibid.] This gave arise to the following problem, however:
Empirical concepts are constituted step-by-step in the systematic construction
[Aufbau] of our world-knowledge. Each empirical concept, as a component of
this structure, has a direct connection to reality. In contrast, the improper con-
cepts hang in the air, so to speak, awaiting instructions. They are introduced
by an axiom system, but that system does not relate directly to anything real.
The axioms of this system and theorems deduced in it do not properly form a
theory (as they are not actually about anything in particular), but rather just a
theory-schema, an empty framework for possible theories.89 [Carnap (1927),
372]
As Carus remarks, there are actually two partial problems relating to this question of Ein-
deutigkeit (disambiguation): (1) the question of determining whether a given particular
object falls under a given concept, and (2) the question about the criteria for establishing
whether a concept picks out a unique collection of objects.90 [ibid.] With regard to the
first question, Carnap remarks:
88Translated in [Carus (2007), 192]
89Translated in [ibid.].
90These difficulties reflect the ambiguity in the philosophers’ received notion of “implicit definability”.
This is the view according to which philosophers have sometimes referred to definitions by postulates as im-
plicit definitions. A notable examples of this is e.g. [Braithwaite (1953)]. But, as Veikko Rantala has remarked
in connection with his inquiries on definability, “it is not clear to what extent it is legitimate to consider
such a procedure as yielding a genuine definition of the notions involved [. . . ], and in any case defini-
tions by postulates [axioms] must be distinguished sharply from the logical notion of ‘implicit definability’
[. . . ].” [Rantala (1977), 11] (N.B. The semantic counterpart to the syntactical notion of implicit definability is
provided by Beth’s theorem which states that the following are equivalent: (i) For every model M for L,
|{X ⊆ Mm|(M, X) |= T(P)}| ≤ 1; (ii) There is a formula ϕ(x̄) of L such that T(P) ` ∀x̄(Px̄ ⇐⇒ ϕ(x̄)). (i)
expresses the formalization of the notion of implicit definability.)
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It belongs to the essence of a proper concept that for every object we can in
principle decide whether it falls under that concept or not; and for sufficiently
well known objects the decision can be carried out in practice as well. For the
empirical concept horse, for instance, and any visible object we can unam-
biguously [eindeutig] decide — insofar as the concept has sufficiently sharp
boundaries and the object is sufficiently well known — whether the object
satisfies the concept, i.e., whether or not it is a horse. But for an improper
concept the question whether a particular object falls under it is not decidable
and thus has no sense.91 [Carnap (1927), 367]
Carnap devoted the years 1927–1930 primarily for writing a comprehensive treatise fo-
cusing on the second question. Having settled in Vienna and having grasped and to a
large part assimilated the view of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it now became a priority for
him to address in a more concentrated and sustained manner the issue of definability.
The treatise was tentatively titled Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik92 and its goal
was to construct a system in which implicit definitions could be converted to explicit
ones. The requirement was essentially to set up all axiomatic systems within a ‘founda-
tional discipline’ [Grunddisziplin] which would comprise ‘absolute’ or explicitly defined
concepts. Carnap sometimes called his project in this book by the term “Metalogik”, al-
though it was not in a strict sense a treatment of metalogic proper.93 The central tenets of
the Untersuchungen were clearly stated by Carnap:
Durch die neueren Untersuchungen über allgemeine Eigenschaften von Ax-
iomensystemen, wie: Vollständigkeit, Monomorphie (Kategorizität), Enst-
scheidungsdefinitheit, Widerspruchsfreiheit u.a., und über die Probleme der
Kriterien und der gegenseitigen Beziehungen dieser Eigenschaften ist im-
mer deutlich geworden, daß die Hauptschwierigkeit der Probleme in der
ungenügenden Schärfe der verwendten Begriffe liegt. Das wichtigste Er-
fordernis für eine fruchtbare Behandlung der vorliegenden Probleme ist ein-
erseits eine ausdrückliche Festlegung der jeweils verwendeten logischen Basis,
die meist nicht genau umrissen wird, und andererseits eine Aufstellung schar-
fer Begriffsbestimmungen aufgrund dieser Basis. Es soll hier besucht werden,
diese beiden Forderungen zu erfüllen und dann durch die Ableitung einer
Reihe von Lehrsätzen der allgemeinen Axiomatik die Fruchtbarkeit des gelegten
91Translated in [ibid., 193].
92Originally comprising two parts, the first of which has quite recently been edited by Thomas Bonk and
Jesus Mosterin, and published in 2000. [Carnap (2000)]
93Indeed, the course which he held at the University of Vienna during the writing process and which
drew on the ideas of the manuscript to be published was actually called “Philosophical Foundations of
Arithmetic”. Hao Wang has commented on the significance of these lectures for the development of the
ideas of Gödel: “Carnap offered a course, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Arithmetic’, in the winter
semester 1928/1929 (listed in the catalogue of the University of Vienna, two hours weekly), which was
undoubtedly the one on ‘metalogic’ attended by G. It was probably only at the beginning of 1929 that the
first edition of Hilbert-Ackermann (published in 1928) [Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik] became available
to G and Carnap. Both the course and the book included questions of a mathematical character that bear
directly on basic logical concepts.” [Wang (1987), 22]
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Fundamentes zu erweisen. Unter “allgemeiner Axiomatik” ist dabei die The-
orie der allgemeinen, logisch-formalen Eigenschaften von Axiomensystemen
und der Beziehungen zwischen Axiomensystemen verstanden, zur Unter-
scheidung etwa von einer “speziellen Axiomatik”, die sich mit bestimmten
einzelnen Axiomensystem befaßt (z. B. einem Axiomensystem der euklidis-
chen Geometrie, der Mengenlehre, usw.).94 [Carnap (2000) [1927–1930], 59]
Carnap then turns to state more explicitly the underlying idea of his “general axiomat-
ics”. Notice the demarcation between an interpreted set of logical symbols and the non-
interpreted set of descriptive symbols of a system.
Aus einen vorgelegten Axiomensystem können nur Folgerungen gezogen
werden, wenn noch allgemeine Regeln des Folgerns gegeben werden. Jede
Behandlung und Prüfung eines Axiomensystems setzt also eine Logik vo-
raus, und zwar eine inhaltliche Logik, d. h., ein System von Sätzen, die nicht
Bloße Zeichenzusammenstellungen sind, sondern eine Bestimmte Bedeutung
haben. Denn sonst würden sie uns nicht in den Stand setzen, zu handeln; und
Deduzieren ist Handeln, denn es bedeutet: aus vorgegebenen Zeichenzusam-
menstellungen nach festen Regeln andere Zusammenstellungen bilden.
Im unterschied zu den logischen Zeichen haben die “Grundzeichen”, die Ze-
ichen der “Grundbegriffe” eines Axiomensystems keine bestimmte Bedeu-
tung. Denn das ist ja gerade das Wesentliche eines Axiomensystems, daß
es nicht auf ein bestimmtes Anwendungsgebiet festgelegt ist, daß es nicht
von Gegenständen handelt, die an sich schon bestimmt sind, sondern von
Unbestimmtem, das seine einzige Bestimmung erst durch das Axiomensys-
tem erhält. Hieraus geht hervor, daß das System der logischen Sätze, dessen
Voranstellung wir für jede Axiomatik gefordert haben, nicht selbst ein Ax-
iomensystem in dem hier gemeinten Sinne sein kann.95 [ibid., 60]
How could this conception of axiomatics be used within the empirical sciences? To give
an example, an axiom system of the kind that Carnap presented in the Abriss der Logistik,
for example, or the of the kind he envisaged even earlier in the beginning of the 1920s,
could be interpreted straightforwardly by substituting explicit definitions for each im-
plicitly defined basic concept in the system. In such a system of ‘empirical’ concepts
94Italics in the original.
95“Consequences can be drawn from a specified AS [axiom system] only if general rules of inference are
given as well. So every treatment and appraisal of an AS assumes a logic, and indeed a contentful logic, i.e.,
a system of sentences that are not just combinations of signs, but have a particular meaning. For otherwise it
wouldn’t put us in a position to act; and deduction is action, for it means: constructing collocations of signs
by fixed rules from other collocations of signs. In contrast to logical signs, the ‘basic signs’, the signs of the
‘basic concepts’ of an AS, have no definite meaning. For that is just the essential character of an AS — that it
is not tied down to a particular area of application, that it deals not with objects determinate in themselves
but with something indeterminate that gets its only determination through the axiom system. From this it
emerges that the system of logical sentences we required to be in place prior to everything axiomatic cannot
itself be an AS in the sense intended here.” Translation by Carus [ibid., 193–194].
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[Realbegriffe], each implicitly defined concept should be empirically constituted in such a
manner that the empirically constituted concept has the same formal character [formale
Beschaffenheit] as the original improper concept given in the AS in question.96
The first aim, then, is the construction of objects; it is followed by a second aim, namely,
the investigation of the nonconstructional properties and relations of the objects. The first
aim is reached through convention; the second, however, through experience.” [Carnap
(1928 [1967]), §179] This results, then, in what Carnap calls a “genuine theory”:
Through the contact between the empirical concept and the axioms (the for-
mer satisfying the latter), a connection is created, by a single stroke, with
the whole of the theory-schema resting on the axiom system. The blood of
empirical reality streams in through the point of connection and flows into
the most ramified capillaries of the hitherto empty schema, which is thereby
transformed into a genuine theory.97 [Carnap (1927), 373]
If the problem seemed to be ‘straightforwardly solvable’ in connection with ‘empirical’
concepts [Realbegriffe], then the case of mathematical concepts (the ones being implicitly
definable in an axiomatic system) proved more recalcitrant. As was clear to Carnap, in
order to succeed in his attempt to legitimate the applicability of mathematical concepts
to the empirical reality, the framework of logical concepts that coöordinate the relations
between logical and empirical concepts would have to be explicitly specifiable. More-
over, Carnap also saw a direct connection between the questions about completeness and
the notion of mathematical truth, which connected his interest in the ‘general axiomatics’
with his interest in philosophy of mathematics more generally. Thus, contemporaneously
with his work on the constructibility of empirical concepts in the Aufbau, Carnap was also
deeply involved with profound work in logic and metamathematics. At the time, the
questions associated with these areas were deep and perplexing. However, Carnap had a
novel strategy at hand to tackle even these problems. This strategy grew out of Fraenkel’s
and subsequent work on the issue of the completeness of axiomatic systems. Whereas the
research done by Hilbert and his school in the 1920s had mainly been concentrated on the
issue of consistency of deductive systems (wherein the goal of obtaining absolute consis-
tency proofs by syntactical means was most prominent), the question about complete-
ness was addressed more fully and explicitly by Abraham Fraenkel. The first detailed
discussion on completeness appears in the second edition of Frankel’s Einleitung in die
Mengenlehre (1923) in a long section titled “The Axiomatic Method”. This discussion had
a profound influence on Carnap, and as a consequence the two were shortly exchanging
ideas on the topic, both in correspondence and in person. Indeed, in the article alluded
to above, “Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe” (1927), Carnap presents ideas related
96From a logical point of view, however, statements which are made about an object become statements
in the strictest scientific sense only after the object has been constructed, beginning from the basic objects.
For, only the construction formula of the object — as a rule of translation of statements about it into state-
ments about the basic objects, namely, about relations between elementary experiences — gives a verifiable
meaning to such statements, for verification means testing on the basis of experiences.
97Translated in [ibid., 194]
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to the exchanges with Fraenkel. Frankel did the same in the third edition of his Einleitung
(1928). What provided the basis for the intensive exchanges between these two men? It
was first and foremost the following conviction that they shared, i.e.: that three different
notions of completeness needed to be distinguished. Fraenkel formulated these notions
as follows:
[T]he completeness of a system of axioms demands that the axioms encom-
pass and govern the entire theory based on them in such a way that every
question that belongs to and can be formulated in terms of the basic notions
of the theory can be answered, one way or the other, in terms of deductive in-
ferences from the axioms. Having this property would mean that one couldn’t
add any new axioms to the given system (without adding to the basic notions)
so that the system was “complete” in that sense; since every relevant propo-
sition that was not in contradiction with the system of axioms would already
be a consequence and, thus, not independent, i.e., not an “axiom” . . .
Closely related to this first sense of completeness, but by far not as far reach-
ing and easier to assess, is the following idea: . . . In general, a number of
propositions that are inconsistent with each other and that can, thus, not be
provable consequences of the same system of axioms can nevertheless be
compatible with that system individually. Such a system of axioms leaves
open whether certain relevant questions are to be answered positively or neg-
atively; and it does so not just in the sense of deducibility by current or future
mathematical means, but in an absolute sense (representable by independent
proofs). A system of axioms of that kind is, then, with good reason, to be
called incomplete . . .
Quite different, finally, is another sense of completeness, probably character-
ized for the first time by Veblen . . . According to it a system of axioms is to
be called complete — also “categorical” (Veblen) or “monomorphic” (Feigl–
Carnap) — if it determines the mathematical objects falling under it uniquely
in the formal sense, i.e., such that between any two realizations one can al-
ways effect a transition by means of a 1− 1 and isomorphic correlation. 98
[Fraenkel (1928), 347–349]
These notions can be characterized more briefly and in an updated terminology as fol-
lows [ibid. 184–185]:
(1) A system of axioms S is deductively complete if and only if for every proposition P in
the relevant language either P or not-P deducible from S.
(2) A system of axioms S is semantically complete if and only if there is no proposition P in
the relevant language such that both S together with P 99 and S together with not-P
100 are satisfiable, i.e. have a model.






(3) A system of axioms S is categorical (or monomorphic, as opposed to polymorphic) if and
only if all models of S are isomorphic.
The Eindeutigkeit of just such concepts was intended to be secured by a theorem that
formed the centerpiece of the first part of the Untersuchungen. Stated briefly, the the-
orem (called the Gabelbarkeitssatz by Carnap) says that the concepts “non-categorical”
(“polymorph”) and “gabelbar” are equivalent. It implies a theorem that is more trans-
parent: an axiom system is complete (entscheidungsdefinit) if and only if it is categorical
(monomorph).101 The underlying thought behind the introduction of this theorem is that
if we can show that a given axiom system is categorical, then it is known to be complete
as well, and hence any sentence containing the predicator standing for an implicitly de-
fined concept is decidable, i.e. the law of excluded middle holds for all such sentences.
To fully grasp the significance of the theorem it is necessary to cover some conceptual
background and provide exact definitions for the relevant concepts as Carnap’s defini-
tions of them are not entirely congruent with modern usage.102 Carnap’s statement of
the theorem is based on the following distinction between different senses of “complete-
ness [vollständigkeit]”: (i) “monomorph”, (ii) “nichtgabelbar” and (iii) “entscheidungsdefinit”.
Carnap goes on to give a preliminary description of these notions:
Die Möglichkeiten scharfer Definitionen werden nachher ausführlich erörtert;
vorläufig mögen die folgenden Andeutungen genügen, um verstehen zu
lassen, was gemein ist: ein Axiomensystem heißt “monomorph”, wenn nur
eine Struktur zu ihm gehört [. . . ]; ein Axiomensysteme heißt “nichtgabel-
bar”, wenn eine Gabelung [. . . ] nicht möglich ist; ein Axiomensysteme heißt
“entscheidungsdefinit”, wenn für jede formale Aussagenfunktion mit densel-
ben Variablen gilt, daß entweder siel selbst oder ihr Negat eine Folgerung des
Axiomensystems ist.103 [Carnap (2000), 127–128]
Carnap’s exposition uses a notational device that is confusing if its basic idea is not explic-
itly spelled out. The essential insight of Carnap is that the primitive symbols of an axiom
system may be treated as variables, and that by conjoining the axioms (by the operation
101Carus erroneously terms the latter theorem Gabelbarkeitssatz. [Carus (2007), 195] In [Awodey & Carus
(1998)], however, the reference is correct. The theorem referred to here is explicitly named in [Carnap (2000),
137].
102Indeed, it might seem that the theorem is plainly false, since, e.g., second-order Peano arithmetic fails,
though categorical, to be complete. [Carus (2007), 195n]
103Awodey and Carus give the following elucidations of these notions: “(1) Decidable. An axiom system f
is consistent if for no propositional function g, both g and ¬g are consequences of f . It is decidable [entschei-
dungsdefinit] if one of these two is always the case, i.e. if for every propositional function g, exactly one of
g or ¬g is a consequence of f . (2) Not gabelbar. An axiom system f is said to be satisfied if the proposition
(∃R) f (R) holds (in the basic system). Given a function g, the system f is called gabelbar (“forkable”) at g if
both f &g and f &¬g are satisfied. (Think for example of g as the axioms of parallels in Bolyai’s “absolute”
geometry, which is gabelbar at g because there are both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries.) An ax-
iom system is said to be gabelbar if it is gabelbar at some g. If an axiom system is satisfied and not gabelbar,
then any two models satisfy all the same propositional functions g. (3) Monomorphic. An axiom system is
said to be monomorphic if it is satisfied and any two of its models are isomorphic. It is polymorphic if it has
non-isomorphic models.” [Awodey & Carus (1998), 15]
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of conjunction), one obtains a propositional function. Hence, given an n-tuple of suitable
variables of a proper typeR = (r1, r2, . . . rn), one may express the whole axiom system as
a single propositional function fR = f1R& f2R& · · ·& fmR, where f1, f2, . . . , fm are the
individual axioms. For example, consider the system of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms
of set theory. Then the primitive symbols are r1 = ∅, r2 = a, r3 = b, etc. (compris-
ing only these three as individual constants, and in addition, a collection of variables),
and the axiom system can be written as R = f1R& f2R& · · ·& f10R, where the fi are the
10 axioms of the Zermelo-Fraenkel system ( f1 = Axiom of Extensionality, f2 = Axiom
of Foundation, f3 = Axiom of Subsets, etc.). A model of f is defined to be an n-tuple
A = (a1, . . . , an) of constants (of suitable types) from the basic system which satisfy f .
Finally, a propositional function f is said to be formal if it respects isomorphism, i.e. if A
and B are isomorphic structures of suitable type, and A satisfies f , then so does B. These
remarks should suffice to make the following discussion comprehensible.
To work our way towards the Gabelbarkeitssatz, it is expedient to adduce the few theo-
rems that figure in the proof. First, Carnap provides theorems about the pair of notions
“monomorph” – “polymorph”:
Theorem 1 Daß ein Axiomensystem fR (mit q-stufiger Variabler) MONOMORPH ist, ist äquiv-
alent mit:
1. zu f gehört genau eine Struktur, und zwar eine q-stufige, (nach Definition);
2. f ist erfüllt, und je zwei Modelle von f sind q-stufig isomorph:
(∃) f &(P ,Q)[( fP& fQ)→ Ismq(P ,Q)];
Dies nehmen wir als DEFINITIONSFORMEL für die Monomorphie
3. f ist erfüllt und nicht polymorph. [. . . ]
Theorem 2 Daß ein Axiomensystem fR (mit q-stufiger Variabler) POLYMORPH ist, ist äquiv-
alent mit:
1. zu f gehört mehr als eine Struktur (und zwar q-stufige Strukturen), (nach Definition);
2. es gibt zwei q-stufig nicht-isomorphe Modelle von f:
(∃P ,Q)[( fP& fQ)&Ismq(P ,Q)];
Dies nehmen wir als DEFINITIONSFORMEL für die Polymorphie
3. f ist erfüllt und nicht monomorph. [. . . ]
Here the expression Ismq(P ,Q) signifies an isomorphism (of degree q) between PandQ.
Next we introduce the definition of the concept “gabelbar” within Carnap’s system:
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Definition 2 fR sei “GABELBAR AN” gR, wenn f mit g und mit g verträglich ist und g formal
ist:
(∃)( f &g)&(∃)( f &g)&(P ,Q)[(gP&Ismq(Q,P))→ gQ].
Das positive Kriterium dafür, daß f an g (k-)gabelbar ist, besteht somit in der Aufweisung eines
gemeinsamen Modells für f und g, eines gemeinsamen Modells für f und g und eines Beweises
für die Formalität von g.
Wir nennen fR “GABELBAR”, wenn es ein gR gibt derart, daß f an g gabelbar ist. Das positive
Kriterium für die (k-)gabelbarkeit von f besteht somit in der Aufweisung eines derartigen g.
Given these theorems and the definition of the notion “gabelbar”, we may proceed to
study Carnap’s proof of the celebrated Gabelbarkeitssatz (I here reproduce Carnap’s proof
from [Carnap (2000)]. A sketch of the proof in English is given in [Awodey & Carus
(1998), 16].) As it turns out, the proof does not establish the intended relationship be-
tween the fundamental notions involved. The attested proof hinges on inadequate and,
strictly speaking, false assumptions that abrade the objective of Carnap, viz. establishing
that the two notions of semantic completeness and the categoricity of a system of axioms
are equivalent. The core of the difficulties that figure in Carnap’s proof is that the no-
tions of syntactic provability and truth in a system are not adequately demarcated from
one another. This is not extraordinary, since the content of these concepts were not fully
grasped by mathematicians or logicians at the time. Gödel’s incompleteness results were
announced at the Königsberg conference on epistemology of the exact sciences in Septem-
ber 1930. Carnap was among the first to assimilate their implications, and consequently
abandoned his work in the field of general axiomatics. Moreover, Tarski’s definition of
truth for formalized languages was reported at a conference in Warsaw in 1931. The im-
pact of this work on Carnap’s thinking was equally notable. But neither of these works
were available for Carnap when he first attempted to find an answer to the questions
of general axiomatics that he and Fraenkel had formulated in 1927–1928. So, despite its
central importance during the period 1927–1930, Carnap ultimately abandoned the Ax-
iomatics project in early 1930. Incidentally, he did this almost exactly at the time that a
summary of his Prague presentation appeared in Erkenntnis. [Carnap (1930d)]
It therefore came as no surprise that Carnap could not, given the improper conceptual
tools that he had recourse to in devising the proof, attain the goal that he had set for
himself. Let us now study the proof of the Gabelbarkeitssatz in detail, and see what the
difficulties amounted to in concreto. After the exposition we are in a better position to
evaluate the import of Carnap’s ideas in this particular domain.
Carnap divides the proof of the Gabelbarkeitssatz in two parts (Erster Teilsatz and Zweiter
Teilsatz), the first being the proof of the ‘only if’-part:
Theorem 3 (Der Gabelbarkeitssatz) Erster Teilsatz. Jedes polymorphe Axiomensystem ist
gabelbar.
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Beweis. Das Axiomensystem fR sei polymorph. q bezeichne die Stufenzahl der Mod-
ellvariabeln R; die Ausdrücke “Isomorphie”, “Struktur”, u. dergl. sind im folgenden
immer im Sinne von “q-stufiger Isomorphie”, “q-stufiger Struktur” usw. verstehen. Die
Polymorphie bedeutet: es gibt zwei Modelle von f , etwaR1 undR2, die nicht isomorph




Unsere Überlegung lautete nun: DaR1 undR2 nichtisomorph sind, so muß es eine struk-
turelle Eigenschaft geben, die demR1 zukommt, demR2 aber nicht. Die Aufgabe besteht
jetz darin, eine solche Eigenschaft explicit anzugeben, und zwar in so allgemeiner Form,
daß sie gemäß dieser Form in jedem konkreten Falle konkret konstituiert werden kann.
Die Aufgabe ist einfach zu lösen; wir nehmen die Eigenschaft “die Struktur von R1 zu
besitzen”. Diese Eigenschaft kommt sicherlich dem R1 zu, dem R2 aber nicht, da ja R2
nicht isomorph mit R1 ist. Die genannte Eigenschaft können wir auch so ausdrücken:
“isomorph mitR1 zun sein”, als Aussagenfunktion: Ismq(R1,R2, ); diese Aussagenfunk-
tion sei mit gR bezeichnet:
gR =D f Ismq(R,R1) (D)
Um f und g zu gabeln, müssen wir zunächst nachweisen, daß g formal ist. Gemäß (D)
gilt tautologish:
(P ,Q)[gP → Ismq(P ,R1)] (4)
(∼)
(P ,Q)[gP&Ismq(Q,P)→ Ismq(Q,R1)] (5)
(∼)
(P ,Q)[gP&Ismq(Q,P)→ qQ] (6)




Aus (3) (nach [(**)]105):
Ismq(R2,R1);
104(*) Die q-stufige Isomorphie ist stets (d. h. für einen beliebigen Wert von q) (total) reflexiv:
(P, q)Ismq(P, P).
105(**) Die q-stufige Isomorphie ist stets symmetrisch:




Aus (1) und (7):
fR1&gR1 (9)
Dies besagt, daß f mit g verträglich ist. Aus (2) und (8):
fR2&gR2 (10)
Dies besagt, daß f und g verträglich ist. Also ist f an g gabelbar.
This proof constitutes the demonstration of the necessity of the property of “gabel-
barkeit” for the non-categoricity of an axiom system. (Note that the statement is equiv-
alent with the updated formulation “The categoricity of an axiomatic theory implies its
semantic completeness.”) Carnap then proceeds to prove its converse, i.e. the theorem
Theorem 4 (Der Gabelbarkeitssatz) Zweiter Teilsatz. Jedes gabelbare Axiomensysteme ist
polymorph.
Beweis. Das Axiomensystem fR sei gabelbar. Das bedeutet: es gibt eine Aussagenfunk-
tion gRmit derselben Variabeln derart, daß (1) g formal ist, (2) f mit g verträglich ist, (3)
f mit g verträglich ist; in Formeln:
(P ,Q)[gP&Ismq(P ,Q)→ gQ] (1)
(∃G)( fG&gG) (2)
(∃Z)( fZ&gZ) (3)
Aus (2) und (3):
(∃G,Z)( fG& fZ&gG&gZ) (4)
Aus (1) [. . . ]:
(P ,Q)[gP&gQ → Ismq(P ,Q)] (5)
Aus (4) und (5):
(∃G,Z)[ fG& fZ&Ismq(G,Z)] (6)
Dies besagt: f ist polymorph.
Carnap has thus proven the following theorem:
Theorem 5 [Der Gabelbarkeitssatz ]
Die Begriffe “POLYMORPH” und “GABELBAR” sind äquivalent. 
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There are several points to be made regarding the proof. To begin with, the fundamen-
tal shortcoming in the method that Carnap used lay in its insensitivity to the distinction
between the axiom system under investigation and the logical language in which those
investigations were conducted. The understanding that has been gained with the help
of historical hindsight is that the reason why Carnap found these ideas natural is that he
held at the time a “universalist” conception of language. (This theme will come up in
more depth later.) According to this conception, there is only one logic, and all logical
analyses of and statements about an axiom system are to be conducted in the universal
system of which the axiom system under investigation is a part. Thus, Carnap did not
at this stage have the logical means to distinguish between the question of provability in
an axiomatic system and the question of provability of a statement about axiom systems.
This is tantamount to not having the distinction between metalanguage and object lan-
guage. Another problem that stems from the universalist conception of language is that
according to Carnap’s idea of the basic system, the Grunddisziplin, the sentences of that
system have ‘content’ (i.e. they are interpreted [inhaltlich]). This implies that the notion
of provability in a purely syntactic sense is impossible; indeed, we have not provability
but an “absolute” concept of truth. Therefore it becomes possible for Carnap to pass from
statements of the form
for no g, f → g and f → ¬g
to
¬(∃g)( f → g& f → ¬g) holds.
This means that “not-` p” and “` ¬p” are synonymous, and thus interchangeable. It is
the combination of these two assumptions (universality of the single system and abso-
lute truth within that system) that jeopardizes Carnap’s goal of elucidating the notion of
provability and completeness. The issue is not so much that Carnap’s results are false
(indeed, with the interpretation of the notions given by Carnap they turn out to be for
the most part trivially true), rather than the fact that given the tools he applied, he was
not addressing the problems he wished to consider.
It is expedient to consider the issue from a more modern point of view and state the
problems Carnap intended to tackle using updated terminology. The three notions of
completeness that formed the object of Carnap’s and Fraenkel’s investigations in the late
1920s can be related by the following conjectures (formulated as theorems):
Theorem I: An axiomatic system S is consistent (no contradiction is deducible from it) if
and only if it is satisfiable, i.e., has a model.
Theorem II: An axiomatic system S is semantically complete (non-forkable) if and only
if it is categorical (monomorphic).
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Theorem III: An axiomatic system S is deductively complete if and only if it is semanti-
cally complete (non-forkable). [Reck (2007) [Friedman & Creath (2007), 187]]
To correlate these with Carnap’s statements in the Untersuchungen, we may indicate that
Theorem I corresponds to Carnap’s “Satz 2.4.9” [Carnap (2000), 100], Theorem II (which
is, of course, the Gabelbarkeitssatz) to “Satz 3.4.10” [ibid., 138] and Theorem III to “Satz
3.6.1” [ibid., 144]. Remember that Carnap is working in higher-order logic, not first-order
logic. It is then immediately clear that Theorem I and Theorem III fail to hold.106 But
Theorem II is an interesting case that merits further scrutiny. This will become apparent
in a moment. For now I would like to delve in a little more detail to the sources of the
difficulties and ambiguities that figure in Carnap’s exposition.
Carnap’s approach in the Untersuchungen might be properly described as Russellian
rather than metamathematical. The distinction between the system which is under in-
vestigation (object language) and the system in which these investigations are effected
(metalanguage) is not yet made. This means that notions such as “logical consequence”,
“consistency”, and so on, are explicated internally to the logical system under consid-
eration. To provide an example, consider the notion of logical consequence. Carnap’s
definition of “logical consequence” (deducibility in Carnap’s general sense and a direct
descendant of Russell’s notion of “formal implication”) contains an ambiguity that un-
dermines the entire project of the Untersuchungen:
Definition 3 The proposition Q(t1, . . . , tn) is a logical consequence of the proposition
P(t1, . . . , tn) if and only if ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(P(x1, . . . , xn) ⊃ Q(x1, . . . , xn)) holds.107
The ambiguity here derives from the ambiguity of the verb “holds”. There are two dif-
ferent senses of “holding” that might intelligibly figure here. The first one attaches to the
verb the interpretation “being deducible in the given formal system.” This is, effectively,
the notion of syntactic consequence in higher-order logic. The second one attaches to the
verb the interpretation along the lines of “being true” (remember that Carnap is working
in a universal domain, following Frege and Russell). Then the meaning of the definition
is close to the contemporary one of the notion of higher-order semantic consequence. It
is now pertinent to ask, which of these two interpretations is Carnap working with in the
Untersuchungen? What does he mean, in particular, when he talks about “deducibility”?
Erich Reck has summarized the difficulties that the reading of Untersuchungen has posed
for modern scholars:
106Reck [ibid.] gives the following lucid demonstration of this: “Let PA be the higher-order Dedekind-
Peano axioms (assumed to be consistent); let G be the sentence shown to be true but not provable from PA in
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. Then PA together with ∼ G is consistent but not satisfiable. This shows
that the ‘only if’-part of Theorem I fails. As neither G nor ∼ G is provable, PA is not deductively complete,;
but it is semantically complete, because categorical. That shows that the [‘if’-part (* Reck erroneously writes
“ ‘only if’ part”)] of Theorem III fails. [. . . ]”
107Note that the operation of quantifying out the constants t1, . . . , tn is effectively similar to the now stan-
dard idea of varying the interpretation of all the non-logical symbols in the language.
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From a contemporary point of view, one would expect him to work with syn-
tactic consequence, especially since that seems to be the notion built into de-
ductive completeness as used in Theorem 3. Recall also Fraenkel’s informal
characterization of deductive completeness in Einleitung (1928) [. . . ] which
Carnap seems to want to explicate. Similarly, one would expect syntactic
consequence to be built into Carnap’s notion of consistency as occurring in
Theorem 1. Overall, however, Carnap leans more towards semantic notions
in Allgemeine Axiomatik, which point in the direction of semantic consequence;
and in so far as this is the case, his explications of Fraenkel’s distinctions are
not adequate, especially that of deductive completeness. But most impor-
tantly, Carnap simply does not seem to be clear about the difference between
syntactic and semantic consequence, both of which he can be read as invok-
ing, at different points in his discussion, as if they were equivalent. [. . . ] In
other words, he is implicitly working with an inchoate amalgam of the two
notions, and this is directly affecting his understanding of Theorems 1 and 3.
[Reck (2007), 189]
Similarly, other important definitions he provides are also simply inadequate for his pur-
poses. Another example is the notion of “consistency” which Carnap defines for a finite
system of axioms as follows (notation updated [ibid., 190]):
Definition 4 Suppose that P(t1, . . . , tn) is the conjunction of the given axioms. Then the axiom
system is called consistent if and only if ¬∃Q∀x1 . . . ∀xn(P(x1, . . . , xn) ⊃ (Q(x1, . . . , xn) ∧
¬Q(x1, . . . , xn))) “holds”.108 [Carnap (2000) [1927–1930], 97]
Besides thes’s the specific shortcomings in the Untersuchungen, the Hauptschwierigkeit of
the attempt at a “General Axiomatics” lay in the explicit (albeit unreflected) attachment to
a Fregean and Russellian “universalist” conception of logic. This is manifest in the way
how Carnap uses a single formal system embedded in a fixed, all-encompassing back-
ground language. This framework is endowed with a system of fixed rules of inference
that govern the logical reasoning taking place in that system. This universal framework
does not allow the variation of the interpretations of the symbols of the language, indeed,
the whole notion of interpretation is something intangible in this context. The symbols
denote the objects or relations they do by the sole means of their specific roles within
the universal system. The distinction between an object language and a metalinguistic
framework is not made. But then, this distinction is exactly what from our modern point
of view is seen to be essential for defining the notions and the relations between these
notions that Carnap is interested in, namely, the several notions of completeness, consis-
tency and so forth.109 That Carnap was deprived of such a distinction that allows for the
108N.B. the same ambiguity as in the definition of “logical consequence”.
109This view can be contested, of course. The metalinguistic perspective is not essential for defining all
the notions traditionally conceived as metalogical. Jaakko Hintikka has shown how the notion of truth, for
example, can be defined within a language endowed with suitable properties (the most prominent examples
being the so-called IF-languages in Hintikka’s locution). [Hintikka (1989), (1991)]
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definitions of the modern notions of syntactic and semantic consequence, can be seen, in
large part, as a reason for the failure of his project.
An index of the novelty of the whole domain of questions that Carnap was tackling
with was the way in which the faults of his exposition escaped the notice of the most
prominent mathematicians and logicians of the period. Indeed, Carnap had shown his
manuscript for part I to Fraenkel and Gödel already in 1928. Moreover, he was present-
ing the material in his public lectures (as mentioned above) and in talks in Vienna that
same year, and then, most importantly, at a conference in Prague, “the First Conference
on Epistemology of the Exact Sciences”, in 1929. In this conference, in particular, the im-
mediate response to Carnap’s work was enthusiastic, as is witnessed by a corresponding
diary entry written shortly afterwards:
My lecture: Investigations in General Axiomatics; just a brief summary. But
the proof is requested, and acknowledged. Though it was late, a lively discus-
sion on the basic issues afterwards; von Neumann, Zermelo, Hahn, Fraenkel
said that a final judgement will only be possible when the complete proof
[especially of Theorem 2 and 3 above] is available. Amazing interest in my
Investigations. [Quoted in Awoey & Carus (2001), 162]
Furthermore, Gödel’s understanding of Carnap’s project is reflected in the third para-
graph of his dissertation 1929, where he says that: “if we replace the notion of logical
consequence [. . . ] by implication in Russell’s sense”, then the assertion of completeness
of the logical system is provable in a few straightforward steps. He credits Carnap for
this observation. [Gödel, Collected Works, vol. I, 63] But what he does not note is that
at the time (explicitly in the Untersuchungen), Carnap thinks that logical consequence is
formal implication in the sense pointed to above. The tides began to turn in 1930 when
Tarski visited Vienna, and the two had several conversations together. As a result of these
discussions, which touched also the topic at hand, Carnap began to doubt the adequacy
of his approach. This is reflected in his diary remark from that period:
Tarski visits me [. . . ] talked about my Axiomatik. It seems correct, but certain
concepts don’t capture what is intended; they must be defined metamathe-
matically rather than mathematically. [Quoted in Awodey & Carus (2001),
163]
Another impulse to re-evaluate the views exposed in the Untersuchungen came from dis-
cussion with Kurt Gödel, who was, at the time, a research student at the University of
Vienna. Gödel attended Carnap’s talks and classes (as evinced by Hao Wang [Wang
1987]) and the two had many discussion upon logic in general and Carnap’s project of
“General Axiomatics” in particular. As is now well known, at least partly influenced by
his prolonged contact with Carnap and partly by the work of Hilbert and his school at
Göttingen (foremost by the important Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik (1928) by Hilbert
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and Ackermann), Gödel discovered his now celebrated results: the Completeness The-
orem for first-order logic and the Incompleteness Theorems for arithmetic and higher-
order logic.110 As Warren Goldfarb reports, “Carnap was among the first of those whom
Gödel told of his incompleteness discovery, in a conversation on 26 August 1930, and he
was in the audience at Gödel’s first public announcements of his result during a confer-
ence in Königsberg on 5–7 September 1930” [Goldfarb (2003) [Gödel, Collected Works, vol.
IV, 335]] Carnap was, then, quick to notice the shortcomings of his proposals for proofs
pertaining to the relations of the central metamathematical notions. Consequently, he
abandoned the research program of “General Axiomatics” and turned to investigating
the possibilities of devising a metalogic on another basis. However, this contingent turn
of events left an important aspect of Carnap’s work undiscovered. Only recently, due to
the work of Steve Awodey and Erich Reck [Awodey & Reck (2002a)], this aspect has been
brought back to light.
Thus, considering Carnap’s contributions to metamathematics afresh, what can be said
about the Gabelbarkeitssatz from our modern vantage point? We happen to know (due to
the result of Lindebaum and Tarski (1935)) that the ‘if’-part is actually true (i.e. the cate-
goricity of an axiomatic theory implies its semantic completeness). This result holds, not
only in the first-order predicate logic, but also in higher-order logic for axiomatic theo-
ries. The question about whether the converse is true is to this date undecided, at least in
its most general formulation. As Awodey and Reck remark, the “inference from seman-
tic completeness to categoricity, depends crucially on two background conditions: first,
it depends on the logical language used, in particular on what sorts of sentences ϕ are
supposed to occur in the definition of semantic completeness. Clearly, the inference fails,
e.g., if we restrict attention to just first-order sentences. But what about the case of higher-
order logic? Here, secondly, it is crucial to be precise about what is meant by ‘axiomatic
theory’. Indeed, it is not hard to see that the inference from semantic completeness to
categoricity fails again if we consider general ‘theories’ in the sense of arbitrary sets of
sentences in some given language.” [Awodey & Reck (2002a), 25] Given these reserva-
tions it then becomes possible to address the following question that sharpens the original
problem considerably: “[F]or a theory T with finitely many axioms in higher-order logic,
does the semantic completeness of T imply its categoricity?” [ibid.] Answering this ques-
tion was one of the main tasks that Carnap set himself in the second half of the 1920s (but
in which he failed, as we have seen). We have come to recognize now the intrinsic inter-
est of this and related questions that Carnap tackled in his Untersuchungen and research
papers from that period. As Awodey and Reck have convincingly shown, the insights
gained by Carnap in the 1920s, when freed from the restrictions that accompany them,
open up fruitful vistas for further development in the foundations of mathematics and
in the study of higher-order axiomatics.111 This makes Carnap’s work in logic appear
in a completely new light and testifies to his importance as a pioneer of mathematical
logic. There is, however, another important point to be noticed. Notwithstanding their
interest from the point of view of foundational questions in mathematics, the ideas in the
110In 1975, in an answer to an inquiry by Burke Grandjean, then a doctoral student of sociology at the
University of Texas, about the important influences on his work on completeness, Gödel picked out Hilbert
and Ackermann (1928) and Carnap’s lectures. [Gödel, Collected Works, vol. IV, 449]
111Cf. especially the sequel to [Awodey & Reck (2002a)], viz. [Awodey & Reck (2002b)].
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Untersuchungen crucially prepared Carnap for the next step in his escape from the highly
restrictive framework of rational reconstruction that was essentially facing a crisis. Car-
nap took the next step quite soon, and the result was one of the most important books of




LOGICAL SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
AS VEHICLES FOR ANALYSIS
5.1 The Phase of Liberation
5.1.1 Der Wiener Denkstil
The title of this subsection refers to a little book by Arnold Keyserling, a compilation of
seminal writings by Ernst Mach, Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the purpose
of which is to illustrate and render better understood the singularly original mode of
philosophical thinking that is foremost associated with the Vienna Circle, but which de-
rives its basic ethos from the general intellectual atmosphere of fin-de-siècle Vienna. The
quite conspicuous differences in their overall approaches and vocabulary notwithstand-
ing, each of these three philosophers attempts to promote a new approach to philosoph-
ical problems in general – or, alternatively, novel means of avoiding certain philosophical
problems in particular. The approach can most naturally be described as antimetaphysical.
The selection from Mach in Keyserling’s book is “Antimetaphysischen Vorbemerkun-
gen”, from Carnap, “Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik”, and from Wittgenstein, ex-
tracts from “Philosophische Untersuchungen”. Keyserling attempts to link the ideas of
all these thinkers under a broad intellectual approach that he calls Der Wiener Denkstil.
What does he mean by this locution? In the introductory part of his book he discerns
three important concepts around which this particular intellectual mode of thought set-
tles. These concepts are those of element, structure and game. These are the fixed points of
the intellectual ambit of a whole series of philosophers representing a particularly Vien-
nese style of thinking. As Keyserling puts it himself:
Dieses Wiener Denken kreist um drei komplementäre Begriffe: um die Be-
deutung des Elements, der Stuktur und des Spiels. Dies ist nun eine ganz
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neue und eigenartige Trinität, die in dieser Form in der europäischen Geistes-
geschichte geworden war; sonst bewegte sich das Denken im Rahmen allge-
mein geläufiger Gegensatzpaare, wie Ding und Erscheinung, Idealismus und
Materialismus, Notwendigkeit und Freiheit, Individuum und Gemeinschaft.
Doch in Wien wurde zum erstenmal eine ganz andere Problematik angegan-
gen, die in folgender These gipfelt: alles philosophische Denken vollzieht sich
zwischen den drei Polen des klar bestimmten Elements, einer festgefügten
Struktur von Gesetezen und deren möglicher freier Kombination; so wie sich
zum Beispiel alle materiellen Körper als Teil oder Verbindung der gleichen
chemischen Elemente fassen lassen, und ihre Verknüpfung ganz bestimmten
Gesetzen folgt; oder wie sich die Sprache aus den immer gleichen Buchstaben
und Satz-Bausteinen (Elementen), nach gewiseen Gesetzen (Struktur) zusam-
mengefügt, zu freier Aussage (Spiel) aufbaut; oder wiederum die Musik auf
der Abwandlung einer begrenzten Anzahl Tönen zufolge den Gesetzen der
Harmonik beruht; und wie sich schließlich selbst die individuelle Charak-
teristik einer menschlichen Persönlichkeit auf die besondere Kombination
der Gene in den Chromosomen, also auf die besondere Verknüpfung der
Bausteine der Erbanlage, zurückführen läßt.
Diese Gedanken bewegten nun un Wien eine ganze Reihe von Geistern, in
deren Werk sich die drei Begriffswelten Element, Struktur, Spiel immer klarer
und wesentlicher herausschälten. Wir wollen versuchen, der Gestaltwerdung
dieser Problematik bei drei Philosophen nachzugehen: bei Ernst Mach, Rudolf
Carnap und Ludwig Wittgenstein, und anschließend die Folgen ihrer Entdeck-
ung aufzeigen. [Keyserling (1965), 5–6]
I think this way of approaching the thoughts of these three thinkers is illuminating. It
provides, particularly with respect to Carnap and Wittgenstein, a conceptual framework
in which to assess their work in a broad perspective, enabling one to discern the de-
tails of their intellectual relationship and the transitions in their thought. Especially the
problematic relation between Carnap and Wittgenstein becomes more comprehensible.
Although they shared a bundle of important basic notions and presuppositions, their
relationship (in both collegial and personal terms) was fraught with bitter controversy
(more often than not instigated by Wittgenstein’s flamboyant character). The tension be-
tween the two becomes most pronounced in connection with the issue of physicalism. I
will comment on this in the section 5.1.5. There it will also become clear how their shared
conviction of the superfluity of metaphysics figured in that debate. Now it is expedient
to try to understand how Carnap attempted to answer the challenge set by the crisis of
the program of rational reconstruction alluded to in the section 4.9.7. I will now turn to
the crucial insight that launched Carnap onto the path that resulted in a formulation of a
metalogic and its polished version in the book Logische Syntax der Sprache.
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5.1.2 The path to metalogic
The story of the process by which Carnap came to formulate a new foundation for his
program of reconstruction is made more comprehensible if it is embedded in the frame-
work of universalism. This term alludes to a general conception of language that already
Frege entertained in his Begriffschrift in 1879. Frege’s system in that book was intended
to represent a universal language the purpose of which was to elucidate the laws of ra-
tional thought. This attitude towards language as a medium of thought and rational
discourse has been coined as “the universal conception of logic and language” by Jean
van Heijenoort. The essential characteristics of this conception comprise the theses that
nothing can be said or expressed outside the system itself and that there does not exists
a meta-level on which one could discuss the meta-systematic or metalogical questions
concerning the original (not necessarily formal) system. These meta-systematic questions
include, inter alia, the question about the consistency of the system, the one concerning
the independence of the axioms of the system, and the one concerning the completeness
of the system. The most eminent philosophers in the analytic tradition have followed
Frege in propounding this universalist conception of language. But which features of
Frege’s thought on language actually exemplified such universalism? According to van
Heijenoort:
[The] universality of Frege’s lingua characterica is, first, the universality that
quantification theory has in its vocabulary and that the propositional calcu-
lus lacks. Frege frequently calls Boole’s logic an ‘abstract logic’, and what he
means by that is that in this logic the proposition remains unanalyzed. the
proposition is reduced to a mere truth value. With the introduction of pred-
icate letters, variables, and quantifiers, the proposition becomes articulated
and can express a meaning. The new notation allows the symbolic rewriting
of whole tracts of scientific knowledge, perhaps all of it, a task that is alto-
gether beyond the reach of propositional calculus. We now have a lingua, not
simply a calculus.
[. . . ] However, the opposition between calculus raticinator and lingua character-
ica goes much beyond the distinction between the propositional calculus and
quantification theory. The universality of logic expresses itself in an impor-
tant feature of Frege’s system. In that system the quantifiers binding individ-
ual variables range over all objects. [. . . ] Frege’s universe consists of all that
there is, and it is fixed.
[. . . ] Another important consequence of the universality of logic is that noth-
ing can be, or has to be, said outside of the system. And, in fact, Frege never
raises any metasystematic questions (consistency, independence of axioms,
completeness). Frege is indeed fully aware that any formal system requires
rules that are not expressed in the system; but these rules are void of any intu-
itive logic; they are ‘rules for the use of our signs.’ In such a manipulation of
signs, from which any argumentative logic has been squeezed out, Frege sees
precisely the advantage of a formal system. [van Heijenoort (1967) [Hintikka
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(1997), 233–239]]
More generally, we may present the differences between these two conceptions schemat-
ically in a table as follows:1
UNIVERSALITY OF LOGIC/LANGUAGE THE MODEL-THEORETIC TRADITION
1. Interpretation cannot be varied. 1. Interpretation can be varied.
2. Model theory is impossible (or 2. Model theory is possible (and
irrelevant). important).
3. Only one world can be talked 3. Many worlds can be talked
about. about.
4. One domain of quantification 4. Ranges of fully analysed quantifiers
in the last analysis. can be different.
5. Logical truths are about this 5. Logical truth as truth in all
(the actual) world. possible worlds.
6. (Genuine) metalanguage is 6. Metalanguage is possible and
impossible. legitimate.
7. Truth as correspondence is 7. Truth as correspondence is a
unexplainable/unintelligible. legitimate notion.
Now, the development of Carnap’s philosophical views — especially those concerning
language — can certainly be investigated within this framework. Although it is too
coarse-grained to function as an overall interpretive tool in studying Carnap’s philo-
sophical development, I will briefly indicate how it can be understood to shed some
light on Carnap’s philosophy. Given van Heijenoort’s distinction between Lingua Uni-
versalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator, it is then possible to demarcate, roughly, two phases in
the development of Carnap’s thought. The first phase comprises the work that Carnap
did while in Vienna at the time when the Schlick Circle gathered regularly, i.e., during
the years 1926–1931. During that time Wittgenstein was a major influence for the mem-
bers of the Circle, attracting most prominently the attention of Moritz Schlick himself and
Friedrich Waismann. While more reserved in his appraisal for the new and radical ideas
of Wittgenstein, Carnap adopted a notable proportion of them into his own thinking, as
we have seen. It is precisely the Tractarian idea of a uniform, all-encompassing linguis-
tic framework that underlies Carnap’s idea of rational reconstruction, so central to the
Vienna Circle, of which the Aufbau had been a paradigmatic example. This phase can
most naturally be thought of as one during which Carnap adhered to a purely universal-
ist conception of language. It is the gradual loosening of this strict adherence to a single
uniform logical framework, Lingua Universalis, that finally amounts to the abandonment
of the restrictive conception of a single language of science, resulting in a transition to
another phase. During this new phase Carnap comes to hold a representation-theoretical
view of language in line with van Heijenoort’s idea of a Calculus Ratiocinator. There are
now many possible linguistic frameworks from which to choose according to the ana-
lytic task at hand. The choice among them is no longer a question of picking a correct
1Adapted from [Kusch (1989), 6–7]
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language for scientific purposes but rather a question about pragmatic utility and fruit-
fulness. In this sense there definitely is a transition in Carnap’s philosophy the particular
characteristics of which the distinction of van Heijenoort undoubtedly captures. Accom-
modating this qualitative change within its purview it sheds some light on the peculiar-
ities of Carnap’s philosophical development. However, the framework is too rough for
assessing the multilayered character of Carnap’s thinking. Indeed, elements of the prag-
matic ingredients in Carnap’s thinking are already visible in his early work on geometry.
In particular, in Der Raum Carnap discussed explicitly the necessity of adopting differ-
ent linguistic frameworks to make sense of the different modes in which philosophers
and scientists talk about space and spatial perception. The seeds of linguistic plurality
are there right from the beginning, and the overtly universalist conception of language
that dominated the outlook of Vienna Circle in the late 1920s has to be seen more as a
sign of a solidification of particular aspects of Carnap’s thought than as a fundamental,
all-encompassing transformation. This transition is an index of the continual efforts of
Carnap to increase the precision of the linguistic tools and forms of expression that he
has recourse to in expressing the content of his philosophical views. Under this view, the
universalist element in Carnap’s thinking reflects only the range of linguistic forms that
Carnap at the time conceived as capable of expressing that content with sufficient rigour.
As soon as one recognizes that a constant feature of Carnap’s philosophical development
is the gradual extension of the scope of the problems that can be tackled with precision
and exactness, the universalist conception that he entertains at one stage becomes an
understandable link in the overall development of his thought. One to emphasize this
aspect in Carnap’s thinking was Abner Shimony. In his reminiscences of Carnap he put
this point succinctly:
I do not want to suggest, however, in pointing to the systematic character of
Carnap’s thought, that he was inflexible. [. . . ] I want to add that he took
particular delight in technical advances which permitted him to widen the
scope of his investigations without loss of precision. Perhaps the most impor-
tant such advance for him was Tarski’s work on the concept of truth, which
enabled him to extend his investigations of language from syntax to seman-
tics. In Testability and Meaning and Foundations of Logic and Mathematics he
himself did the main technical work which permitted the relaxation and ex-
tension of the empiricist criterion of meaningfulness. A third and more re-
cent example was Kemeny’s work on models, which permitted him to define
c-functions on languages which could not be readily analyzed semantically
in terms of state-descriptions. The general drift of his philosophical devel-
opment towards greater flexibility, openness, and richness indicates that his
early program for the elimination of metaphysics was never an attempt to
contract the scale of the world or to view it anthropocentrically, as some crit-
ics have claimed. Rather, it was the result of his intense desire to understand
things clearly, and my personal impression was that he experienced much joy
in finding that clarity is compatible with greater and greater scope. [Shimony
(1975) [Hintikka (1975b), XXVIII–XXIX]]
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The gist of Carnap’s work in philosophy in general, and logic in particular, consists of
the attempt to delineate the expressive power of language (more accurately, formal lan-
guages) and to make explicit the structural features of various disciplines that are revealed
through the expressive function of (formal) language.2 In this way his philosophical
agenda is seen to comprise a bewildering group of problems. In the most general terms,
Carnap’s program to define the boundaries of meaningful discourse about logic, lan-
guage and truth was essentially built on the foundations of the classical questions per-
taining to philosophy of logic that already Plato had addressed. These questions were:
1. What is it that can properly be called true or false?
2. What link is it that makes valid inference possible, or what is necessary connexion?
3. What is the nature of definition and what is it that we define? [Kneale & Kneale
(1962), 17]
Certainly, the answers that Plato gave to these questions do not touch exactly the same
issues that Carnap and other modern philosophers or logicians were interested in. This
has undoubtedly much to do with the fact that for Plato these questions were to a marked
degree obscured by the metaphysical and epistemological questions that formed the true
focus of his philosophical enquiries. Nevertheless, the questions themselves originate
with him, and jointly with them, philosophy of logic. In any case, they constitute a gen-
eral framework in which Carnap’s work in philosophy may be assessed. Indeed, during
the years 1931–1947, Carnap’s work very much focuses on these questions, or their clos-
est relatives.
The vision of a “general theory of linguistic forms”
In the summer of 1931, Carnap moved to Prague to take up a professorhip at the German
University. During this period his philosophical thinking went through a transformation
the repercussions of which would affect everything that he wrote henceforth. During his
first years at Prague, Carnap was principally occupied with writing his Logische Syntax der
Sprache [Carnap (1934)], the idea of which had come to him, when, as he later recounted,
the whole theory of language structure and its possible applications in philos-
ophy came to me like a vision during a sleepless night in January 1931, when I
2Herbert G. Bohnert, in reporting his experience of attending a seminar conducted by Carnap, gives a
succinct description of the amazement he felt after having conceived the startling consequences of Carnap’s
overall view: “Carnap went on to say, after supplying the needed details of definition, that the importance
and power of logicism stem from the fact that all inferences about any subject matter depended only on
the relational structure, and structural properties, of that subject matter. Completely corresponding results
were assured for quite different subject-matters provided only that there be a structural similarity. And —
my thoughts echoed — all structures and structural properties are definable by logic alone. We seemed in
possession, then, of all possible forms of all possible knowledge!” [Bohnert (1975)[Hintikka (1975b), XXXVII–
XXXVIII]]
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was ill. On the following day, still in bed with a fever, I wrote down my ideas
on forty-four pages under the title ‘Attempt at a metalogic’. [Carnap (1963),
53]
He went on to characterize his technical end as follows:
One of my aims was to make the metalanguage more precise, so that an exact
conceptual system for metalogic could be constructed in it. Whereas Hilbert
intended his metamathematics only for the special purpose of proving the
consistency of a mathematical system formulated in the object language, I
aimed at the construction of a general theory of linguistic forms. [ibid.]
Inspired by his Versuch Carnap intended within the following two weeks to construct a
“suitable meta-language”, or a canonical “meta-logic”. This labour resulted in a formu-
lation of a system of language that was soon to become known as the “formal mode of
speech”. However, despite the intensive and inspired elaboration on the Versuch, the first
version of the system turned out to be insufficient and it took Carnap a considerable effort
to work out modifications of this system that would ultimately constitute an acceptable
formulation, resulting in the Language I of the Logische Syntax der Sprache published in
1934. The results of the initial formulation of the new approach were to be presented
in an elementary exposition of logic and method (as a part of a popular series of mono-
graphs that Neurath was planning) tentatively entitled Introduction to Scientific Philosophy
(‘Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Philosophie’ preparing the publication of Die Auf-
gabe der Wissenschaftslogik (1934) within Neurath’s series Einheitswissenschaft). As can be
read in the UCLA papers [UCLA (1930c), (1931a), (1931c)] its first part was intended to
be an overview of language, logic and mathematics entitled “The Language of Science”.
The second part was intended to include a treatment of empirical sciences, including
psychology and social sciences, naturally, with a view to their underlying unity. Carnap
began this project in late February and, by the middle of March (actually 11 March), had
written 115 pages in the Stolze-Schrey shorthand (habitually used by him).
What was the general goal of this project? Quite simply, to make the following view
both coherent and plausible: that all of logic — logic in the sense of inferential practices
and reasoning — could be represented purely formally. This implied that logic was to be
constructed from the bottom up without recourse to semantics, i.e. with no machinery for
exemplifying the referential relations between the terms of the formal system and some
extralogical domain. Carnap envisioned here a system that was in a sense a realization
of the Leibnizian idea of calculus ratiocinator, a purely formal system of rules without
interpretation. The starting point for this program is Carnap’s method of introducing
elementary propositional logic using truth tables. Thus Carnap proceeds to define the
connectives, the notions of “range” and “content”, logical consequence, and the concepts
of tautology and contradiction. Of course, the notion of tautology that was central to the
conception of logic originated by Wittgenstein could not be defined without truth tables
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(in the context of propositional logic), because it is an inherently semantical notion.3). But
then Carnap abruptly changes the mode of speech, laying emphasis on the novelty of the
approach:
Now we shall go on to revisit this entire train of thought in a different form,
this time with the help of the ‘calculus’, of calculation with logical formulas.
We must learn this method as it is an exact and indispensable tool for appli-
cations . . . In a sense, we have two languages before us here. The first consists
of the ‘logical formulas’, sign-complexes in which the signs ‘p’, ‘q’, . . . , ‘∼’,
‘∨’ are concatenated in a certain way. In the second language, which we are
now considering, we pay no attention to the meaning [Sinn] of the logical
formulas; we do not distinguish, as in the first language, whether p is true
or false. In this second language, the so-called metalogical language, we form
‘metalogical’ concepts with which to describe the formulas of the first language
as figural complexes.4 [UCLA (1931e), 17–18]
The particular challenge that arises here is the definition of the inherently semantical no-
tions of “tautology” and “content” in purely formal terms. It is interesting to note that
while Carnap is not able entirely to accomplish this in the first part of “The Language of
Science”, he comes in the process to use concepts that were to become essential for him
later in his ‘semantical phase’. Thus, the notion of the content of a sentence is defined
along Wittgensteinian lines as the set of rows of its truth table a sentence excludes, the
‘range’ of the sentence being defined as the complement of “content”, i.e. the set of rows
in which the sentence is true. The problem of defining this pair of concepts in a purely
formal manner merged in a more general problem of defining the interrelations of them,
since tautology as a sentence that is true in all rows of its truth table had no content at
all. These stipulations are evident precursors of the definitions of the concept of semantic
information worked out by Popper, Carnap and Bar-Hillel in the 1950s. What the stip-
ulations intended to capture was a sense in which metalogic would be provided with a
criterion of ‘pure formality’, i.e. criteria to stipulate [festzusetzen] whether a given for-
mula is a tautology. Now, these stipulations do not entirely dispense with the notion of
“truth”, as can be seen. Although the implicitly semantical notions of “tautology” and
“content” are here defined by the purely syntactic notion of “set of rows in the truth table
of a given sentence”, the assignment of the truth values to the constituents of different
sentences is not an entirely arbitrary matter. Even if these assignments are thought of
as linguistic conventions, they do not repudiate the inherently semantical nature of the
truth-value ascriptions. It might well have seemed possible in Carnap’s eyes to circum-
vent this semantic ingredient by having recourse to this syntactical way of using the truth
tables. However, the truth tables were soon found out to be insufficient for the task of
3According to the classical division of levels in the study of language, there are three main categories
of inquiry (summarized as follows in [Carus (2007), 21]): (1) syntax considers languages as pure calculi, in
isolation from anything extralinguistic they might be thought of representing; (2) semantics considers languages as
representing extra-linguistic affairs, but still in isolation from actual uses of language by humans; and (3)
pragmatics considers languages in relation to their use contexts and their users.
4Cited in [Carus (2007), 234].
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defining the tautologies which in turn formed the backbone of the idea of purely formal
relations between sentences. Gödel’s recent address of the problem of the unentscheid-
bare Sätze in Principia Mathematica and the accompanying proof of the incompleteness
theorem resulted in a dilemma: if the property of tautologousness were taken as a the
principal criterion of ‘formality’, then the provability of a sentence from given axioms
could no more provide a basis for it. As a consequence of the incompleteness result,
truth and proof (within a mathematical axiom system) were no longer equivalent. Some-
thing stronger was required. The questions was effectively: what could provide us with
a criterion of tautologousness that would still count as ‘formal’ but was independent of
the notions of truth and falsehood? Carnap was convinced that a viable alternative could
be found since he wrote that “in metalogic we cannot work with the concepts of truth
and falsehood.” [ibid.] How could such a definition be given? Some scholars have here
misconceived the scope of the problem, taking it for granted that among mathematicians
the notion of mathematical truth was unproblematically equated with provability in a
formal system before Gödel’s incompleteness results, thereby giving the impression that
the problem Carnap was tackling was merely a problem of finding a new formal method
of deciding the logical truth of a given sentence. Carnap was from the very start of his
Versuch trying to devise a system in which the logical relations of sentences could be ex-
pressed purely formally without recourse to any interpretation. In mathematics, such a
conception of formalism was evidently a minority view. Even if formal (formal in the
more strict sense of the word) proofs constituted an essential part of the work of some
eminent mathematicians (cf. Hilbert’s work), they were always used in a context which
involved interpretation of the symbols involved. Thus, the transition of Carnap marked
by the assimilation of Gödel’s results was not so much a matter of finding a strong enough
axiom system for a certain fragment of mathematics to establish provability of all the rel-
evant theorems, but a matter of dispensing with truth altogether, contrary to the attempts
of most mathematicians.
Steve Awodey has presented an analogy between the problem situation of Carnap and
that of a chess game. If we think of the starting position of the pieces (any position
within a game that has been reached in accordance with the rules) on a chess board as
the axioms, and the rules for permitted moves of the pieces as the rules of inference,
then a sequence of moves that ends up in a checkmate may be regarded as a proof of
a theorem. The crucial observation here is that there exist configurations of the (given)
pieces in the board that correspond to a checkmate position but that cannot be reached
by the rules of permitted moves from the initial configuration of the pieces. In a certain
sense, a checkmate position of this kind corresponds to an analytic sentence that has no
formal proof.
Retaining the concept of provability in the form of rules of inference of a formal system,
Carnap thought it could be possible to define the notion of analyticity that would be in ac-
cordance with the former concept of a ‘provable sentence’ and yet be of wider scope than
“provable”. The goal was to devise a notion that could play the role that was formerly
conferred on the Wittgensteinian concept of tautology. The new concept of analyticity
was envisaged as providing a notion of truth for the meta-language.
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5.1.3 Carnap’s concern with analyticity
The source of the difficulties that related to the definition of analyticity for mathematical
language(s) lay clearly in the incompleteness results of Gödel: for what they irrevocably
showed was that one could not rely on a representation of a system of language based
on definite axioms and deduction rules, if the professed specification of such a repre-
sentation was to yield all mathematical truths. Thus, driven by the need to formulate a
stronger notion of what is constitutive of a language, Carnap was impelled in the direc-
tion of investigation that consisted of attempts to provide a definition of analyticity for
mathematics (purely mathematical sentences of a language).
Following the circulation of Carnap’s Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik among
colleagues (including Gödel, who made some remarks concerning it in the opening para-
graphs of his dissertation), Carnap and Gödel held discussions from time to time over
the next few years. These discussions focused on — what else? — questions in logic and
the foundations of mathematics. Carnap was among the first to hear of the incomplete-
ness discovery of Gödel, as the latter told of it to Carnap in a conversation on 26 August
1930. Moreover, as mentioned in the Section 4.5.3, Carnap was among the audience at
the Königsberg conference where the result was first publicly announced. After Carnap’s
move to Prague in the summer of 1931, the two men began a correspondence that con-
cerned mainly Carnap’s attempts at refining his conception of the theory of linguistic
forms, especially the notion of analyticity that figured prominently in those attempts,
finally culminating in his Logische Syntax der Sprache.
Correspondence with Gödel
The first letter that Carnap sent to Gödel on New Year’s Day 1932, consisted of an in-
quiry whether Gödel would be interested in reading the first part of his manuscript titled
“Metalogik” (the would-be Syntax-book). Gödel presumably replied with interest, for the
second letter from Carnap to Gödel in February begins with the following words:
Dear Mr. Gödel, [i]n the coming days Hempel will send you the first part of
my “Metalogic”, which is what I have written so far. Feel free to keep the
manuscript for a few weeks. When you have finished reading it, please do
not send it back, but rather let me know. I would be very grateful for your
critical comments. [1. Carnap to Gödel [Gödel, Collected Works, vol. IV, 343]]
In his reply, Gödel does not mention Carnap’s manuscript, but requests that Carnap send
him the second part, in case it is finished. The second part of the manuscript was referred
to as “Semantics” by Carnap, and Gödel’s letter in September 1932 to Carnap contains
several interesting remarks on it. In this second part Carnap had attempted to provide
a truth-definition for mathematics (i.e. for the purely mathematical sentences of a lan-
guage that incorporated the theory of types), which amounted precisely to a definition
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of analyticity in Carnap’s terminology. The definition proceeded by induction on the
complexity of formulas. Gödel’s remarks are worth quoting:
First of all, I think that the definition of “analytic” for the extended language,
and therefore the W-proof as well, is faulty. You specify rules by means of
which the question of whether a formula is analytic is traced back to the same
question for other formulas. Accordingly, then, the concept “analytic” would
only be defined if this procedure were always to lead finally to formulas for
which it is settled by other means whether they are analytic (for example,
0 = 0). But it seems to me that this is not always the case. For let us take,
e.g., the formula (F)F(0) ∨ F(0); in order to establish whether it is analytic,
one must do that for all formulas of the form P(0) ∨ P(0). Towards that end,
one must replace each constant predicate P by its definiens; but in the latter,
bound predicate variables could again occur, and so on, so that one runs into
an infinite regress. This becomes most evident in that, under certain circum-
stances, the same formula can always recur. [. . . ] In my judgement, this error
may only be avoided by regarding the domain of the function variables not
as the predicates of a definite language, but rather as all sets and relations
whatever. (*[A footnote inserted by Gödel:] This doesn’t necessarily involve
a Platonistic standpoint, for I assert only that this definition (for “analytic”) be
carried out within a definite language in which one already has the concepts
“set” and “relation”.) [3. Gödel to Carnap [Gödel, Collected Works, vol. IV,
347]]
Carnap had thus attempted to define the notion “analytic sentence” inductively, having
recourse to a method that we nowadays refer to as a substitutional treatment of quantifi-
cation. To illustrate the possible form that this initial definition of Carnap took, (nothing
of the original first draft of the Syntax manuscript, apart from a table of contents, has
survived5) consider an arithmetical sentence of the form (∀x) f (x), where quantification
is taken over the numerical variable x and f (x) is a formula in which at most the appear-
ance of x is free. Then it would be quite reasonable to define:
(∀x) f (x) is analytic⇐⇒ f (a) is analytic for all numerical constants a.
It is plausible, on the basis of the comments made by Gödel, that Carnap had attempted to
generalize this idea further, providing a definition involving higher-order quantifiers that
range over all properties or sets. In short, he considered also the analyticity of formulas
of the form (∀X) f (X). Considering the singular case of f (X) = X(0), one would have
the definition
(∀X)X(0) is analytic⇐⇒ A(0) is analytic for all predicate constants A.
5This, at least, is the well-founded assessment of Awodey and Carus [Awodey & Carus (2007)].
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The problem with this definition is that it places no restrictions on the range of possi-
ble predicate constants A(x) to be substituted for X. Thus, testing for analyticity, one
could even consider substitution instances in which A(x) gets the valuation (∀X)X(x).
This makes the definition circular, and thus incapable of as serving as an adequate defi-
nition of analyticity. The so-called impredicativity of the higher-order quantifier is at the
root of the problem here, so that in order to circumvent the problem, one should restrict
the range of predicate constants by, e.g., limiting the allowable substitutions to predi-
cates of lower “order”, to be defined in a suitable sense. As Awodey and Carus aptly
remark, such a procedure “would result in a workable scheme, but it would only pro-
vide a definition for a system like ramified type theory, which is inadequate for classical
mathematics.” [Awodey & Carus (2003), 17]
Carnap’s first attempt to reconstruct Gödel’s proposal is markedly desperate, as is evi-
dent from his reply to Gödel of 25 September. Carnap finds it difficult to come up with
a suitable interpretation of the predicates in the object language L, in effect a difficulty
residing in the professed necessity to capture “all values” of these predicates in L. It is not
easy to make it explicit how this idea would be expressed, even with respect to another
language L′ in which the values are to be taken. Moreover, a definition with respect to a
language L′ would not be sufficient, for then predicates not definable would be left out,
whereas one apparently needs all ‘arbitrary’ ones. The latter notion, however, is some-
thing “ziemlich bedenklich”, according to Carnap. In the end, he is forced to ask for Gödel’s
help in finding the right definition, as everything else in the professed book will depend
on it:
Prag XVII, 25 September 1932
N. Motol, Pod Homolkou
Dear Mr. Gödel,
Thanks very much for your letter. I am very grateful to you for having made
me aware of the faultiness of the definition of “analytic”. In the meantime
I have attempted to work out a better definition, somewhat in the direction
of your suggestions (if I have correctly understood them). But in this cer-
tain difficulties arise that I still cannot overcome. In any case, I realize that
one will not arrive at the formulas of classical mathematics about real num-
bers if the universal quantifier with predicate variables (or function variables)
ranges only over the predicates definable in a definite delimited system. You
say: it must range over “all sets”; but what does that mean? My attempt goes
as follows: by a predicate valuation I understand a rule that assigns to each
numerical expression (for example, “0′′′”), or, respectively, to each n-tuple of
such, either “0 = 0” or “0 6= 0”; a function valuation is a rule that assigns a
numerical expression to each n-tuple of numerical expressions. With the aid
of this concept, “evaluation” is defined: in the formula under consideration
the assigned formula is put in place of “F(. . .)” and the assigned expression in
place of “ f (. . .)”. “[F](. . .)” is analytic if “. . . ” is analytic with respect to each
valuation of F. In its entirety the definition is rather complicated, but it can be
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done. But now the objection. If the definition is to achieve what was striven
for, then for the rule — which must of course be formulated in the language of
semantics — one may take not a restricted semantic language, rather the rule
may be constructed with arbitrary semantic notions. (For otherwise certain
sets of numbers would again remain outside, sets that are indeed plausible,
but that cannot be comprehended within the system.) But is that not question-
able? It seems to me not questionable if “analytic in the language S” cannot
be defined in a semantics that is formalised in S, but only in a semantics that
is formalised in a more extended language S2. But to operate with a concept
for which there is no language at all in which it can be rigorously defined is
certainly rather questionable.
But perhaps you see a way to define the concept in a definite language. Or
how is your remark to be understood: “. . . that this definition for ‘analytic’
may be carried out in a definite language in which one already has the con-
cepts ‘set’ and ‘relation’ ”? Can you define the concept “set” within a definite
formalized semantics?
A further difficulty concerns the higher-type predicates; such things must be
represented by assignments to valuations of lower type (or by a semantic set
of sets, and so on, of expressions).
Will you perhaps be soon writing up a first draft of your paper, so that I could
read it and make use of it? That would be extraordinarily valuable to me. Or
can you at least tell me now by letter further details about the definition of
“set” and “analytic”? For the purposes of my book, the concept “analytic” is
very important, because I want to tie the usual concepts (especially “content”,
and so on) to it. In case your definition is usable for my purposes (which is
surely to be expected), it would be most practical for me to adopt it from
you (of course, with mention of your authorship), instead of first seeking one
myself, which subsequently might prove to be worse than yours. In any case
it would be of utmost value to me to see in what sense your definition really
leads to a formalizable concept.
As to terminology: The term “true” seems to me very unsuitable; in any case,
its usage would not be in accord with general linguistic usage. For accord-
ing to the latter, the sentence “Vienna has so and so many inhabitants” is of
course true, whereas the definition proposed by you surely does not apply to
it. Thus one would surely have to say “logically true” or “logically valid” or
“tautological” or “analytic”; and of those expressions the last seems to me the
most suitable. [4. Carnap to Gödel [Gödel, Collected Works, vol. IV, 349–353]]
Gödel had hardly any time to ponder over his answer, for Carnap wrote him again, two
days after the first reply, announcing that he had found a solution to the problem. Indeed,
he had realized that the recalcitrant question about the interpretation of “all values” of a
predicate could be answered in the context of a formal meta-language L′ simply by using
universal quantification over the predicates: (∀X) . . . X . . ..
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Prag XVII, 27 September 1932
N. Motol, Pod Homolkou
Dear Mr. Gödel,
The day before yesterday I wrote to you about a difficulty in the definition
for “analytic”. Yesterday I found the solution: The locution “for every valu-
ation . . . ” that occurs in the definition can still be expressed in a semantics
formulated in a definite language, namely by “[F](. . .)”, since a valuation is
of course a semantic predicate. This is possible even though in the semantics
under consideration not all possible valuations, that is, predicates, can be de-
fined. To be sure, in application to predicates and functions of higher types
and mixed types the matter becomes quite complicated indeed.
[. . . ]
One more question: If in the language one allows predicate- and function-
variables in operators, can one do without recursive definitions, without loss
to definable predicates and functions? [5. Carnap to Gödel [Gödel, Collected
Works, vol. IV, 355]]
The key new idea of Carnap here is that the language L′ in which the valuations are
taken needs to be stronger (in terms of expressive power) than the one for which they
are given. [ibid., 18] This seems to have been precisely the idea that Gödel had hinted at
in his earlier letter, as he confirms Carnap’s suggestion in a reply (considerably delayed)
written on 28th November:
As I gather from your second letter, you have understood my suggestions
about the definition of “analytic” entirely as I meant them. In order to be able
to carry out the matter in general, that is, for functions of arbitrary finite type,
one needs a variable of the next higher type (type ω), i.e., one which runs
through all finite types. This could be seen a priori, since one can never de-
fine “analytic” in the same system — otherwise contradictions will result. I
believe moreover that the interest of this definition does not lie in a clarifica-
tion of the concept “analytic”, since one employs in it the concepts “arbitrary
sets”, etc., which are just as problematic. Rather I formulate it only for the fol-
lowing reason: with its help one can show that undecidable sentences become
decidable in systems which ascend farther in the sequence of types.
[. . . ]
The question you pose at the end of your letter of 27 September is to be an-
swered affirmatively if the axiom of reducibility or an equivalent (e.g., your
definition rule for functions) is contained within the system. [6. Gödel to
Carnap [Gödel, Collected Works, vol. IV, 355–357]]
Gödel also refers in the letter to a “similar definition for ‘analyticity’ ”given by Tarski in a
paper that was to appear [Tarski (1932)], about which the latter had reported earlier in the
248
Anzeiger der Wiener Akadmie no. 2. Tarski’s famous ‘impossibility result’ concerning the
definition of the notion of truth in the object language was clearly one of the reasons why
Gödel never worked out and published the professed sequel to his famous [Gödel (1931)].
The upshot of the correspondence was, then, something very different from what one
would expect from the viewpoint of the Wittgensteinian universalism that had been very
prominent in Carnap’s thinking from 1929 on. As a matter of fact, the resulting definition
of “analyticity” that at the outset had formed such a crucial element of the architectonic of
the professed Metalogik, was now omitted from the first published version of the Syntax
book because of “reason of space”. The true reason underlying this decision was the
recognition, hinted at by Gödel in his footnote on Platonism, that the notion of analyticity
thus defined was not ‘absolute’, but rather, in a certain sense, conventional (i.e., relative to
a language). This conception of analyticity, in as much as it undermined the universalism
in Carnap’s thinking, was perfectly in harmony with the conventionalism of his earlier
work, including Der Raum and the Aufbau.6 For now, the definition gave a notion of
“analytic in L”, but only with respect to another language L′, i.e., a metalanguage used
for the interpretation of L. This entailed that the question of correctness of a linguistic
framework lost its all-encompassing significance; indeed, the issue of whether the choice
of a language L′ would be most natural in the sense that it is conducive to an illuminating
notion of analyticity, could surely be raised, but it could hardly be claimed that such
a choice would provide us with the correct notion of analyticity for a given language.
This realization marked a watershed in Carnap’s thinking, as it turned out to be of a far
greater significance for the subsequent development of his philosophy than the specific
metalogical results from which it sprang.
5.1.4 The principle of tolerance
The first public signal of the radical turn that Carnap had taken was the discussion contri-
bution “Über Protokollsätze”, published in the Erkenntnis No. 3, a response to Neurath’s
“Protokollsätze” (in the same issue of Erkenntnis). Neurath’s paper was, in turn, a re-
sponse to Carnap’s “Die physikalische Sprache”, where Carnap had presented a proposal
for compatibility between the physical and phenomenal languages, arguing for their use-
fulness for different purposes. In his criticism of Carnap’s paper, Neurath had raised the
question about which single language should one then have recourse to, granted that the
single-language strategy was viable. Although Neurath had done much to inspire Car-
nap’s turn to physicalism during the years 1930–1931, he was especially unhappy with
the paper on physical language for he saw traces of foundationalism in it. Furthermore,
he thought that he was unfairly anticipated as well as misrepresented in it. [Carus (2007),
252] After an emotional correspondence with Carnap in the early 1932, he sent a draft ver-
sion of his reply in May. Carnap, as the co-editor of Erkenntnis set to work on drastic re-
visions, and the result was “Protokollsätze”.7 Carnap, in turn, began to write his reply to
6That even the Aufbau still contained elements of conventionalism is clearly visible from the observation,
made in the book, that there are different possible bases for the construction of conceptual content.
7This paper contained “the proposal for a physicalistic, observer-indexed form of basic observation sen-
tence, to counteract the danger of absolutising or hypostatising evidence reports”, as succinctly put by Carus.
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Neurath’s critique and a defense of his position in the “Physikalische Sprache”. The early
draft of this reply seems to have survived as section I of the article “Über Protokollsätze”.
[Carnap (1932d)] The ripening of the core ideas regarding protocol sentences and physi-
calism seems to have taken place in the Tyrolean Alps where Carnap spent the later part
of the summer in 1932. Incidentally, in September Herbert Feigl stopped by for several
days with Karl Popper in tow, and the three had long conversations about protocol sen-
tences during their extended walks in the mountains. During these conversations Popper
put forward his suggestion about the relative status of basic statements. Thus, in keeping
with his later repulsion for the purely linguistic aspects of philosophical analysis, Pop-
per’s account was probably already then framed in the manner of his presentation in the
§§29–30 of Logik der Forschung. The relevant passage reads:
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles
are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or
‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are
firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. [Popper (1935),
§30, 75–76; PT 111]
This account fits very well with the conception presented in the “Über Protokollsätze”;
in fact there was a section in the paper that explicitly discussed Popper’s position. The
general contention of that paper was that physicalistic protocol sentences have prece-
dence over other language forms but this was stated in a manner that did not exclude
in a categorical way the possibility of having recourse to other language forms, includ-
ing the phenomenalist one, as a last resort. What especially strikes one in the article is a
completely novel tone with which the issues are discussed. This new tone in his writing
would become deeply characteristic of all his subsequent work. For example, as a reply to
the challenge presented by Neurath about the choice of a ‘correct’ language form, Carnap
says that: “In my view the issue here is not between two conceptions that contradict each
other, but rather between two methods for constructing the language of science, which are both
possible and justified.” [Carnap (1932d), 215]8 The grounds of this pluralism, brought for-
ward by the discussion on analyticity with Gödel, as we saw above, were clearly spelled
out:
Not only the question whether the protocol sentences are inside or outside the
syntax language, but also the further question regarding their precise speci-
fication, is to be answered, it seems to me, not by an assertion, but by a stip-
ulation [Festsetzung]. Though I earlier [in “Die physikalische Sprache”] left
this question open, [. . . ] I now think that the different answers are not con-
tradictory. They are to be taken as proposals for stipulations [Vorschläge zu
[ibid.]
8“Nach meiner Meinung handelt es sich hier aber nicht um zwei einander wiedersprechende Auffassun-
gen, sondern um zwei erschiedene Methoden zum Aufbau der Wissenschaftssprache, die beide möglich und berechtigt
sind.”
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Festsetzungen]; the task is to investigate these different possible stipulations
as to their consequences and assess their usefulness. [ibid., 216]9
The tendency towards assimilating elements of pragmatism in his philosophy is here
clearly visible. The break with the view of the pre-1931 programme of Vienna Circle
is decisive: the essential content of his original reply to Neurath is retained but now
expressed more pronouncedly in a pragmatic context. The gist of this move comprises
the idea of evaluating different proposals for a system of language in a given domain; these
evaluations, in turn, are coördinated pragmatically; whether this or that language form
suits better the purposes and goals of a particular situation. Carnap is very much aware
of the radical departure from his and the Vienna Circle’s earlier position, as he states in a
further paragraph:
In all theories of knowledge to date there is a certain absolutism: in the real-
istic theories an absolutism of objects, in the idealistic ones (including phe-
nomenology) an absolutism of the “given”, of “experiences”, of “immedi-
ate phenomena [unmittelbare Phänomene]”. Even in positivism we find this
residual idealistic absolutism; in the logical positivism of our circle — in the
works of the logic of science (epistemology) published to date by Wittgen-
stein, Schlick, Carnap — it takes the more subtle form of an absolutism of
primitive propositions (“elementary propositions”, “atomic propositions”).
[ibid., 228]10
Here is, then, expressed in its essentials, the view that would later be termed the “Princi-
ple of Tolerance” by Carnap. In the Logische Syntax der Sprache it would be explicitly put
forward as a principle for coördinating the discourse on the foundations of mathemat-
ics, where the controversy between the three principal ‘philosophies of mathematics’ —
formalism, intuitionism and logicism — had resulted in an embarrassing muddle of con-
ceptions. Indeed, as Carnap stated in the preface to the book, progress in logic had been
severely hampered by the timid notion that logic had to be ‘correct’ and that the object
was to find the ‘true’ logic. The goal of the Syntax book is to untie the ship of logic from
its mooring to the prejudice of ‘correctness’ by eliminating this notion. Overcoming this
9“Nicht nur die Frage, ob die Protolkollsätze außerhalb oder innerhalb der Systemsprache stehen, son-
dern auch die Weitere Frage nach ihrer genaueren Kennzeichnung ist, wie mir scheint, nicht durch eine
Behauptung, sondern durch einen Festsetzung zu beantworten. Während ich früher [. . . ] diese Frage offen
ließ und nur einige mögliche Antworten andeutete, meine ich jetzt, daß die der verschiedenen Antworten
einander nicht widersprechen. Sie sind als Vorschläge zu Festsetzungen aufzufassen; die Aufgabe besteht
darin, diese verschiedene möglichen Festsetzungen auf ihre Folgerungen hin zu untersuchen und ihre
Zweckmäßigkeit zu prüfen.”
10“In allen bisherigen Erkenntnistheorien steckt ein bestimmter Absolutismus: in den realistischen ein
Absolutismus der Objekete, in den idealistischen [einschließlich der Phänomenologie] ein Absolutismus
des “Gegebenen”, der “Erlebnisse”, der “unmittelbare Phänomene”. Auch im Positivismus findet sich ein
Rest dieses idealistischen Absolutismus; in den logistischen Positivismus unseres Kreises — in der bisher
veröffentlichten wissenschaftslogiken (erkenntnistheoretischen) Schriften von Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap
— nimmt er die verfeinerte Form eines Absolutismus der Ursätze (“Elementarsätze”, “Atomsätze”) an.”
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timid conception, we set sail and “before us”, states Carnap with palpable enthusiasm,
“lies the open sea of free possibilities.”
This then, was the context in which the Principle of Tolerance was conceived. As we have
seen, the correspondence with Gödel very much prepared Carnap to take the step toward
linguistic pluralism. This pluralism is then the background framework for the studies of
philosophy of mathematics undertaken in the Syntax book. As far as the foundations
of mathematics are concerned, the situation could be described as follows. In the light
of the incompleteness results of Gödel, the hopes of constructing a universal language
for the purposes of promoting the program of unified science abraded. Moreover, the
status of the program of logicism altered dramatically. Carnap was, as already pointed
out, among the first philosophers to fully realize this and its implications for any episte-
mological project attempting to set our knowledge on a firm ground of logic. Even the
nature of mathematics and its epistemological basis became once again, after a period of
unflinching confidence in logicism, an issue of concern, although from a completely new
angle. However, what has sometimes been seen as a negative impact of Gödel’s results
with regard to theoretical pursuits in the various sub-domains of mathematics, has in fact
turned out to be a liberating insight about the possibilities and aims of a mathematician.
Indeed, as soon as it is realized that the incompleteness results do not concern the descrip-
tive completeness of a language that a mathematician uses to characterize the objects and
structures that he is interested in, but ‘only’ the deductive completeness of that very same
language, it becomes clear that a large part of what can be said to comprise the most
important and most interesting part of mathematical theory construction, is retained. In
keeping with this insight, Norbert Wiener, a prominent mathematician and a prodigy,
known for his seminal work in the measure-theoretical investigations in probability the-
ory, once characterized the nature of mathematical work in the following beautiful way:
To other mathematicians, the task of the mathematician is to use a rigid and a
demanding medium to express a new and significant vision of some aspect of
the universe; to express aperçus which reveals something new and something
exciting. If this medium is strict and confining, so are in fact the media of all
creative artists. [Wiener (1956), 62]
The gist of Wiener’s description lies in the observation that the creative dimension of
mathematics is not in the least affected by the ‘negative’ results of Gödel. On the contrary,
what seems to be the contention of many great mathematicians is that Gödel’s results
confirm their belief based on their working experience that they are really investigating
a “primordial mathematical reality” with the instruments of apprehension that the dif-
ferent axiomatic representations provide. A prominent example of this basic attitude is
Alain Connes’ remark, expressed in a discussion with André Lichnerowicz and Marcel
Paul Schützenberger, about the import of Gödel’s theorem:
The content of Gödel’s theorem is not only undecidability, that is, the exis-
tence of undecidable propositions, whatever the system of axioms one uses.
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Far more important in any logico-deductive system (one that is sufficiently
elaborate to be able to handle the natural numbers) is the existence of propo-
sitions that are true but that cannot be proved within the system. The mental
image of this statement is that of a world that I call “the primordial (or prim-
itive) mathematical world” and which is never exhausted by the instruments
of comprehension one constructs, based on logical reasoning and on a given
axiomatic system. Indeed any such system is always found wanting since
Gödel’s theorem guarantees the existence of an infinite number of true propo-
sitions dealing directly with arithmetic, but which are not provable within the
logical system. [Connes et al. (2001), 6]
As distant as Connes’ basic attitude seems to be from that of Carnap who eschewed all
references to a “primordial reality”, there is one particular aspect of Connes’ account that
is strikingly similar to the basic ethos of Carnap’s linguistic pluralism. This similarity is
exemplified in Connes’ conception of axiomatic systems as different linguistic tools for
grasping the mathematical reality. In a similar manner, Carnap, while bracketing any
talk of an “objective reality”, is willing to assess the usefulness of different linguistic pre-
sentations for different practical tasks. Notwithstanding the difference of their motives,
the application of different frameworks is a hallmark of the scientific activities of both the
Carnapian and the Platonist mathematician:
It is worth noting that most mainstream mathematics only requires the count-
able axiom of choice. Solovay has constructed an axiomatics in which all the
sets are measurable.11 This axiomatics is just as non-contradictory as that of
set theory with the global axiom of choice. It does not depend on a hypothesis
about inaccessible cardinals, but I will spare you the details. [. . . ]
This is another illustration of my opposition between primordial mathemat-
ical reality and the axiomatic system that enables us to perceive it. It is clear
that our perception of this reality will change depending on the lens we use.
If we take an axiomatic system with the uncountable axiom of choice, we will
have a certain view, a certain grasp of this primordial reality, and if on the
other hand we take Solovay’s axioms with the countable axiom of choice and
measurability, we will have another. But there is absolutely no contradiction.
The primordial reality is unaffected; it remains immutable. It remains identi-
cal to itself. [ibid., 21]
5.1.5 Logische Syntax der Sprache
The sense of breakthrough that characterized the enthusiastic expressions in “Über Pro-
tokollsätze” [Carnap (1932d)] is still equally present in the famous introduction to the
Logische Syntax der Sprache, where the new insights brought forward in connection with
the protocol-sentence debate are reiterated with breaching confidence:
11The reference is to J. Stern: “Le problème de la mesure”, Séminairé Bourbaki 1983/1984, Exp. 632.
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Der Kreis möglichen Sprachformen und damit der verschiedenen möglichen
Logiksysteme ist [. . . ] unvergleichlich größer als der sehr enge Kreis, in dem
man sich in den bisherigen Untersuchungen der modernen Logik bewegt hat.
Bisher ist man von der schon klasscisch gewordenen Sprachform, die Rus-
sel gegeben hat, nur hin und wieder in einigen Punkten abgewichen. [. . . ]
Der Grund dafür, daß man sich bisher nicht weiter von der klassischen Form
zu entfernen wagt, liegt wohl in der weit verbreiten Auffassung, man müsse
die Abwiechungen “rechtfertigen”, d.h. nachweisen, daß die neu Sprachform
“richtig” sei, die “wahre Logik” wiedergebe. Die Auffassung und die aus ihr
entspringenden Scheinfragen und müßigen Streitigkeiten auszuschalten, ist
eine der Hauptaufgaben dieses Buches. [Carnap (1934a), v]
The programmatic tone of the introduction adds to the impression that a radical step has
been taken with respect to traditional accounts of language. As Carnap says, the first
attempts to escape from the “classical” language forms were certainly daring. But they
were still hampered by the prejudice of ‘correctness’: “Aber sie waren gehemmt durch
das Streben nach ‘Richitigkeit’.” The introduction is concluded with the picturesque
words: “Nun aber ist die Hemmung überwunden; vor uns liegt der offene Ozean der
freien Möglichkeiten.” The explicit expression of the Principle of Tolerance is found in
the §§16–17 where it is accompanied with a general discussion about the necessity to
state the meta-theoretic or wissenschaftslogische proposals in precise terms. These propos-
als have to be expressed as explicit rules or definitions, within the formation or transfor-
mation rules of a precisely defined language or calculus. As a number of scholars have
observed, the constructive requirements represented in these paragraphs exemplify the
voluntaristic dimension of Carnap’s thought:
Hat man sich einmal klar gemacht, daß alle pro- und kontra-intuitionistischen
Erörterungen von der Form eines Kalküls handeln, so wird man die Frage
nicht mehr in der Form stellen “Wie ist das und das?” sondern “Wie wollen
wir das in der aufzubauenden Sprache einrichten?” [. . . ] Damit verschwindet
die dogmatische Einstellung, durch die Diskussion häufig unfruchtbar wird.
[Carnap (1934a), 42]12
One of the main motives of the Syntax, as we have already hinted at above, was to bring
order into the chaos that prevailed in the field of philosophy of mathematics. What Car-
nap especially wanted to accomplish was to set up a framework in which to express
clearly and unambiguously the constructivist viewpoint in mathematics represented by
Brouwer, Kaufmann, Wittgenstein and others. This line of work derived from the inves-
tigations of Leopold Kronecker (1823–1891). The constructive arguments were further
cultivated by French mathematicians, most prominently by Poincaré and Borel. In 1912
12“Once it is understood that all pro- and anti-intuitionist considerations are concerned with the form of a
calculus, the question will no longer be asked in the form ‘What is the case?’ but rather ‘How do we want to
set this up in the language being constructed?’ [. . . ] And with that, the dogmatic frame of mind that often
makes the discussion unfruitful is banished.”
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Brouwer was still inspired by the classical conception of constructivism à la Poincaré
which was based on the desideratum of prescribing a law whenever a set with infinitely
many points is worked with. A classical example is the determination of the set of dec-
imals of the irrational number
√
2 which is infinite but determinate because there is a
specific procedure to calculate all the decimals. In 1916 Brouwer presented a version
of constructivism based on the principium tertii exclusi. (The presentation was given as
a part of a course on the theory of point sets which was run during the academic year
1915–1916.) His notes dating from that time express clearly the new point of view:
A mathematical thing is either an element of a previously constructed funda-
mental sequence F (governed by induction, like the sequence ρ) or a funda-
mental sequence f (which is not finished and not governed by induction) of
arbitrarily chosen elements from F or a finite set. With such a sequence one
can work very well, if one always has at each phase for the finite thing d or the
fundamental sequence r that is derived from it, to work with a suitable initial
segment of f (r is then in general also never finished) [. . . ] A set is now a law
by means of which a d or an r is derived from f ; this r can then, for exam-
ple, contain also relation symbols (e.g. ordering ones), so that the law can, for
example, lead to well-ordered sets or other ordered sets, or to functions (one
can indeed not get the set of ordered sets or the set of well-ordered sets). In
addition one can accept pseudo-sets defined by comprehension, better called
species, and one can call one species of a higher cardinality than another one,
or two species equivalent. [Cited in van Dalen (1999), 240–241]
Carnap’s Language I in the Syntax was effectively a framework for expressing more rig-
orously the philosophical tenets of constructivism as advocated by Brouwer and oth-
ers. The success of the articulation of the intuitionist tenets and their implications in this
framework was however questionable, as Carnap himself pointed out, because there was
no way of telling whether the reformulation of them as precise definitions and rules re-
ally captured the views of intuitionists. The problem was that many of the articulations
of philosophical views by mathematicians were made only in terms of vague “Erörterun-
gen” that leave many crucial technical questions open “when one gets down to the brass
tacks of constructing an actual language”. [ibid., 44] These tendencies were then clearly
addressed in Carnap’s general statement of the Principle of Tolerance:
Unsere Einstellung zu Forderungen dieser Art sei allgemein formuliert durch
das Toleranzprinzip: wir wollen nicht Verbote aufstellen, sondern Festsetzungen tr-
effen. [. . . ] In der Logik gibt es keine Moral. Jeder mag seine Logik, d.h. seine
Sprachform, aufbauen wie er will. Nur muß er, wenn er mit uns diskutieren
will, deutlich angeben, wie er es machen will, syntaktische Bestimmungen
geben anstatt philosophischer Erörterungen. [Carnap (1934a), 45]13
13“Our attitude to demands of this kind may be stated generally by the principle of tolerance: we do not
want to impose restrictions but to state conventions. [. . . ] In logic there are no morals. Everyone can construct
his logic, i.e., his language form, however he wants. If he wants to discuss it with us, though, he will have
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This formulation makes it evident that a crucial step is already taken towards the suc-
cessor project of “rational reconstruction”, viz. the project of “explication”. The general
desideratum of replacing a vague concept (or even a system of concepts) with a precise
equivalent is, naturally, nothing new, as the earlier Vienna Circle view had accommo-
dated precisely this requirement in its program of “rational reconstruction”. Rather, what
is new is the exhortation to give precise rules within a linguistic framework to be able
to judge the practical merits or drawbacks of a proposal. Indeed, as the rigid conception of
‘correctness’ is dropped once and for all, the only criterion that remains for the task of
selecting among different frameworks is practical usefulness. The pragmatic dimension
that became to characterize the successor program of “explication” was not formulated
explicitly by Carnap until 1945.14 Why did it take Carnap so long to arrive at the notion
of explication? In the Syntax-book the ideal of explication, sketched in the statement of the
Principle of Tolerance, took a form that was soon recognized by Carnap to be inadequate.
Its implementation was called in the Syntax “translation from the material mode into the
formal mode of speech”. This notion of explication was still very much influenced by
certain residual ideas from the earlier period. Indeed, the original syntax idea that Car-
nap conceived in the sleepless night in 1931 represented, above all, a rejection of meaning
in Wittgenstein’s sense, i.e., the thesis about the ineffability of semantics.15 One of the clear
indications that Carnap indeed advocated a view that could be termed as the thesis of
the ineffability of semantics, is the fact that in the heyday of the Vienna Circle in the early
thirties, already before the publication of the Syntax, he preferred what the members of
the circle called the formal mode of speech to what they called the material mode of speech.
In general, this marked an inclination to express one’s theoretical views on language in
syntactical rather than semantical terms. A often-quoted example is Carnap’s preference
for the formal mode of saying “‘Five’ is a number word” instead of the material mode of
saying that “Five is a number”. This simple example illustrates how the entire program
of the “logical syntax of language” belonged to the orbit of ideas associated with the inef-
fability of semantics and the idea of language as a universal medium. This fundamental
idea allegedly has its roots in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. As is well known, in an angry
letter to Moritz Schlick, dated 8 August 1932, Wittgenstein accused Carnap of borrowing
the idea of the formal mode of speech from his Tractatus without due acknowledgment:
You know yourself very well that Carnap is not taking a single step beyond
me when he approves of the formal and rejects the “material mode of speech”.
It is inconceivable to me that Carnap should have misunderstood the last few
propositions of the Tractatus — and hence the basic idea of the entire work —
so thoroughly [as not to know it, too]. [Nedo & Ranchetti (1983), 254–255]
Was Wittgenstein’s reaction justified? Wittgenstein’s notorious self-centeredness notwith-
standing, it is arguably true that a significant part of Carnap’s conception of the impor-
to make precise how he wants to set things up. He has to give syntactic rules rather than philosophical
considerations.” [PT, 51–52]
14That is, in the article “Two Concepts of Probability” [Carnap (1945)]. The most detailed exposition of the
new method of explication was provided in as late as 1950 in Chapter 1 of Logical Foundations of Probability.
I will survey the essentials of that exposition in the Chapter 6.
15Carnap later referred to this view as “absolutist”. [Awodey & Carus (2003), 22]
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tance of syntactic methods in the theoretical study of language derived from the Tractatus.
But what Wittgenstein missed was another important ingredient in Carnap’s view. Car-
nap was not so much opposed to the material mode of speech as he preferred the formal
mode of speech. Regarding his contact with Gödel and the impact that the latter had
on his thinking, it is not extraneously speculative to conjecture that Gödel’s method of
arithmetization that enabled him to construct a syntax for the language of (Peano) arith-
metic in that language itself, was a major source of inspiration in Carnap’s attempts to
construct a general theory of linguistic forms on a similar basis. Carnap’s ultimate aim
was, after all, to construct a truly universal language for language theory. Thus, he was
not so much concerned with the fundamental limitations of the universalist approach to
linguistic analysis as with the constructive possibilities that such a line of attack made
available. As is well known, this underlying idea is exemplified in the Language I of the
Logische Syntax, which briefly stated, includes, on the mathematical side, the elementary
arithmetic of the natural numbers with certain restrictions imposed on the sentences that
are expressible in that language. The most important restriction consists of the condition
that only definite number-properties occur. This refers to such properties of numbers the
possession or non-possession of which can be determined in a finite number of steps ac-
cording to fixed rules given within the language. It is useful to note that this restriction
does not, however amount to a violation of Gödel’s incompleteness results. Indeed, the
language is indefinite in the sense that it contains sentences that are not resoluble (i.e.
either demonstrable or refutable). As to the illegibility of the material mode of speech,
Carnap gave an explicit rendering of his stance in §81 of the Syntax (titled “The Admis-
sibility of the Material Mode of Speech”): “We have spoken of dangers and not of errors
of the material mode of speech. The material mode of speech is not in itself erroneous; it
only readily lends itself to wrong use. But if suitable definitions and rules for the ma-
terial mode of speech are laid down and systematically applied, no obscurities or con-
tradictions arise.” [Carnap (1937), 312] What is furthermore emphasized by Carnap in
that very same paragraph is that especially when important conclusions or philosophical
problems are represented by sentences in the material mode of speech, it is advisable to
transform them into the formal mode of speech so as to make them free from ambiguity.
Moreover, Carnap reiterates his point by saying that: “It is not by any means suggested
that the material mode of speech should be entirely eliminated.” [ibid.] To illustrate his
thesis that “translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the touchstone for
all philosophical sentences”, consider the following example of how that method is used
in practice: [Carnap (1937)]
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Philosophical sentences Syntactical sentences
(Material mode of speech) (Formal mode of speech)
A. Generalities (about things, properties, facts, and so on) [. . . ]
27 a. A property of a thing- 27 b. A 2pr is not a 1pr.
property is not itself a thing-
property.
28 a. A property cannot pos- 28 b. There is no pr of a level
ses another property (As op- higher than the first. (As op-
posed to 27 a.) posed to 27 b.)
29 a. The world is the totality 29 b. Science is a system of
of facts, not of things. sentences, not of names.
30 a. A fact is a combination 30 b. A sentence is a series of
of objects (entities, things). symbols.
31 a. If I know an object, 31 b. If the genus of a symbol
then I also know all the possi- is given, then all the possibilities
bilities of its occurrence in facts. of its occurrence in the sentences are
also given.
32 a. Identity is not a relation 32 b. The symbol of identity
between objects. is not a descriptive symbol.
This example shows clearly how Carnap had overcome the restriction of the ‘picture-
theoretic’ viewpoint of Wittgenstein while retaining the latter’s notion of language-
relativity of knowledge. The liberation from the Tractarian straightjacket of meaning-
constitution via truth-functional concatenation of atomic sentences representing atomic
facts was made possible by extending a Hilbertian or Tarskian formalist view from logic
and mathematics to the whole of knowledge. The question remains, however, about the
extent to which the notion of tolerance propounded by Carnap depends on a specifically
“syntactic” approach. Awodey and Carus maintain that “tolerance depends on two com-
ponents of the original insight of the sleepless night: (a) the distinction between language
(a calculus, a purely syntactic symbol system) and its interpretation; (b) the requirement
that a language be entirely specified by explicit rules. These two components survive
unscathed and undiminished into the semantic period. (So it is rather misleading to
call them ‘syntactic’; Carnap’s original term ‘metalogical’ might be more appropriate.)”
[Awodey & Carus (2003), 24] The original all-encompassing skepticism about the possi-
bility of explicating “meaning” (inspired by Wittgenstein) does not survive the transition.
Moreover, the restriction of interpretation to the object language which was Carnap’s first
response to the necessity of distinguishing between a language and its interpretation,
was mitigated further, as he came to see that interpretation could be specified by explicit
rules (governing the application of such semantical notions as satisfaction, designation and
truth). [ibid.] Thus, the transition to an overtly semantical approach to philosophical
problems in Carnap’s subsequent work was not an abrupt change in the basic orienta-
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tion of his philosophy. In keeping with the Principle of Tolerance, the reinstatement of an
explicated form of meaning was a sign of the recognition that the informal pre-theoretical
notion of meaning was not in itself the source of difficulty but rather a particular, inher-
ited and singularly obscure conception of it. This new explication met the standards set
for evaluating the practical utility of the notion of “meaning”, i.e., the very standards
on the basis of which the previous conception had been rejected. As Awodey & Carus
eloquently put it, “The original rejection of ‘meaning’ had proscibed what seemed an
occult property, just like the rejection by Lavoisier of the traditional explanation of burn-
ing as the release of a substance (‘phlogiston’ in Stahl’s theory) into the surrounding air.
[. . . ] In the same way, the later instatement of the idea that burning (oxidation) involved
the release of electrons by the substance being oxidized met the standards of the post-
Lavoisier principle of the conservation of matter, by which all reactions are regarded as
recombinations of indestructible atoms. The new explication of the informal concept of
‘meaning’ has no more in common with the previous occult property than electrons do
with phlogiston.” [ibid., 25]
5.2 The Semantic Turn
5.2.1 Introduction to Semantics and the correspondence with Neurath
In 1942 Carnap was in a position to re-evaluate the philosophical import of his general
principles underlying language construction, i.e. the principle of general syntax and the
principle of tolerance. Instigated by the thoroughgoing discussions with, inter alia, Morris,
Nagel, Neurath and Tarski, Carnap had come to appreciate the significance of semantic
analysis in such language-engineering tasks. He was thus able to considerably relax the
formal requirements pertaining to syntax that in large part still dictated the general out-
look of the Logical Syntax. In Logical Syntax the principle of tolerance did not yet play a
prominent role; indeed, it was a kind of late comer in Carnap’s thought, not necessary to
the overall conception of the book. But later, it was to turn over the whole basic approach
of Carnap, ultimately winning out the basic conception of the formal mode of speech. In
his Introduction to Semantics (1942), the necessary modifications of Carnap’s earlier views
that figured in the Logical Syntax are discussed briefly in a section at the end of the book.
Especially, “[t]he Principle of Tolerance (perhaps better called ‘principle of conventionality’)
[. . . ] is still maintained. It states that the construction of a calculus and the choice of its
particular features are a matter of convention.” [Carnap (1942), 247] But, in view of the
essential characteristics of the principle, an important qualification is made, to the effect
that “[. . . ] the construction of a system of logic, i.e. the definitions for the L-concepts,
within a given semantical system is not a matter of mere convention; here the choice is
essentially limited if the concepts are to be adequate [. . . ].”16 With regard to the formal mode
of speech, more radical modifications are required: “[Syntax] Part IV gives an outline of
general syntax, which ‘is to be regarded as no more than a first attempt’ [. . . ] Here, as
16My italics.
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was to be expected, greater changes are necessary. Some definitions (especially those for L-
concepts) have to be abandoned. In general, the syntactical discussions remain valid; but
in many cases, they should be supplemented by semantical discussions.” [ibid.]17 The
most important changes occurred with regard to the distinction between logical and de-
scriptive signs, and the related distinction between logical and factual truth. Carnap came
to see it as necessary to make these distinctions in semantical, not syntactical, terms. The
reasons were quite clear for Carnap. Even if the relevant concepts allowed for a formal-
ization, in effect a representation by syntactical concepts in an appropriate calculus, “the
question whether or not a given syntactical concept, e.g. ‘C-true in K’ is the formal rep-
resentation of the corresponding L-concept, say ‘L-true in S’, is a question which cannot
be answered in syntax alone”. [ibid.] On the level of general objectives of philosophy, the
classical theses of Logical Syntax remained valid in spirit albeit not in form. The first thesis
(a. “Theoretical philosophy is the logic of science”) remained valid without qualification.
For Carnap, it is only a question of terminology whether “philosophy” could be used in
a wider sense, including certain problems of empirical origin. If so, then these problems
would most naturally fall into the area of pragmatics. [ibid., 250] The second thesis (b.
“Logic of science is the syntax of the language of science.”) had to be modified, however.
Carnap suggests that “[t]he whole thesis is changed to the following: the task of philosophy is
semiotical analysis.” [ibid.]
It has already been observed by some researchers, notably by A. W Carus, that there is
very little evidence, published, or unpublished, bearing on this important transition in
Carnap’s thought. Carus claims that the very transition was brought about by the adop-
tion of the principle of tolerance, but that its significance had not been immediately clear
to Carnap. There was a considerable period of latency between figuring this principle out
in the first place, and its emergence as the Archimedean point of Carnap’s overall pro-
gram. This is undoubtedly true. However, the reasons Carus gives for the considerable
delay in the full development of the principle in Carnap’s thought, are controversial:
Though Carnap had abandoned the idea that we cannot step outside lan-
guage, this idea had in turn rested on a foundation that was not so easily
dismantled. The sharp distinction between concepts and sentences internal
to a system and those outside it had been one of the main lessons Carnap had
learned from Frege, and the application of this Fregean distinction to epis-
temology had been the basis of the Vienna Circle’s formulation of rational
reconstruction. [. . . ] It had made possible their characteristic approach to the
replacement of folk concepts in the context of a deductive system of knowl-
edge. Wittgensteinian considerations about the impossibility of stepping out-
side language had then reinforced that sharp distinction even further. But
even when that further element had been dispensed with, it was difficult now
to backtrack from the sharp Fregean distinction between internal and exter-
nal, and make this dichotomy less absolute. It was hard to retain the idea of
a sharp distinction between internal and external for constructed languages
while allowing room for other systems (ordinary language) that lacked this
17Italics in the original.
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sharp distinction. And only this concession would make it possible, in the
late 1930s, to regard ordinary language and formal systems as mobile points
along a continuum rather than as fixed diametrical opposites. [Carus (2007)
263–264]18
Although concise and consistent, such an explanation is not fully acceptable, however.
There were at least two conspicuous routes by which Carnap could have come to the
conception of the relative elasticity of the boundaries between internal and external ques-
tions with regard to language engineering. Moreover, it seems that he must have been at
least dimly aware of this elasticity and its prominent role in language construction well
before the late 1930s. The first route was provided by the long-time interest of Carnap
in artificial languages, especially his concern with Esperanto.19 The second was pro-
vided by his obsession with a critical enquiry concerning physicalism, an issue which
Neurath enticed him to turn his attention to. Immersion in both of these fields of in-
terest must have brought it clearly within his view that the questions pertaining to the
pragmatic concerns of constructing a language appropriate to any particular task are not
straightforwardly soluble within the formal mode of speech alone. Even if the variety of
artificial languages and the issues relating to their pragmatics did not convince him of
this, the discussions between him and Neurath about the fortunes of physicalism must
have, at least unconsciously, prepared him for the new semantic conception. Further-
more, Wittgenstein had by then already abandoned the Tractarian program of language
as a universal medium. Already in his Blue and Brown Books dictated between 1933–1935
we find very clear presentations of a conception of language as an interpreted calculus
in connection with which the transitory boundaries between internal and external ques-
tions in Carnap’s sense were clearly manifested. Indeed, a hallmark of Wittgenstein’s
analyses of the different “language-games” was the use of swift, back-and forth transi-
tions between the expressions of a particular language form and its description in a collo-
quial language. Although Carnap may not have been fully aware of these developments
in Wittgenstein’s thought at the time of their inception, Carnap himself was very much
occupied with similar considerations in his correspondence with Neurath. It must be ad-
mitted, however, that the tension between the diametrically opposite elements alluded to
18Italics in the original.
19There is an interesting excerpt in the Autobiography which includes reminiscences about Carnap’s in-
volvement with the international Esperanto movement. This excerpt makes it evident how Carnap’s insis-
tence on the possibility of devising artificial languages for completely practical purposes of life reflect the
idea of the relatively elastic boundaries between artificial and natural languages: “After the World War, I
had some opportunities of observing the practical use of Esperanto. The most extensive experience was in
1922, in connection with the Esperanto Congress in Helsingfors, Finland. There I became acquainted with
a Bulgarian student; for four weeks we were almost constantly together and became close friends. After
the congress we traveled and hiked through Finland and the new Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. We stayed with hospitable Esperantists and made contact with many people in these countries.
We talked about all kinds of problems in public and in personal life, always, of course, in Esperanto. For us
this language was not a system of rules but simply a living language. After experiences of this kind, I cannot
take very seriously the arguments of those who assert that an international auxiliary language might be suit-
able for business affairs and perhaps for natural science, but could not possibly serve as an adequate means
of communication in personal affairs, for discussion in the social sciences and the humanities, let alone for
fiction or drama. I have found that most of those who make these assertions have no practical experience
with such a language.” [Carnap (1963), 69]
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by Carus above, was certainly bleak and unrelenting, to the extent that Carnap was keen
to hold the Fregean distinction as the more promising way to go. The point of transition
is important, not only from the point of view of adopting the Principle of Tolerance, but
also because it marks another, related transformation in Carnap’s thought. This is the
transition from the conception of language as a universal medium to the conception of
language as a calculus, the terms already having figured above in our discussion about
Carnap’s connection with Wittgenstein.
An important incitement to the development of the semantical conception of Carnap to-
wards the more general program of explication came from the discussions between him
and Neurath over the basic semantical concepts of truth, meaning, translation etc. A most
useful source of information in this respect is their correspondence, the most important
and interesting part of which dates from the early 1940s, coinciding with the ‘semantic
turn’ of Carnap.20 A symptomatic expression of his liberated notion of language engi-
neering is found in the letter to Neurath (November 7th, 1942), where a suggestion for an
auxiliary language by Lancelot Hogben is discussed:
I am very much interested in what you wrote about Hogben’s ideas on
language-making and about his own auxiliary language. I remember our pre-
vious discussions where I maintained the superiority of artificial languages in
comparison to Basic English, while you were rather sceptical about their prac-
tical chances. You say that Hogben’s Interglossa seems better than the other
artificial languages; do you know enough of the other ones to make a critical
comparison or do you merely infer it from Hogben’s good ideas about the
method of language-making? As Morris wrote you already, we think it better
to see first Hogben’s book before we decide on a monograph of his for the En-
cyclopedia. Who will be the American publisher of Hogben’s book and when
is it to appear? I am looking forward to it with great interest. [WKA (1942a)]21
The monograph Carnap is alluding to, and which was under consideration to be included
in the series International Encyclopedia of Unifed Science, was presumably Principles of An-
imal Biology (1940). It was published in the series in the volume dedicated to Biology.22
The Interglossa did not appear until 1943. By October 7th, 1944 Carnap had already re-
ceived the book from Neurath and read it, enabling him to make some critical comments:
I read it with very great interest, and I own and read likewise “The Loom of
Language” which I found likewise very interesting and which in some points
gives no more detailed explanations of the reasons for Hogben’s decisions. In
20This correspondence is kept up in the Noord-Hollands Archief forming part of the collection Vienna Circle
Papers [References to this correspondence are henceforth abbreviated as WKA (= Wiener Kreis Archiv)].
21Cited with the compliance of the Wiener Kreis Stichting (Amsterdam). All rights reserved.
22As Carnap writes to Neurath in a letter dated February 4th, 1944: “I agree with the choice of Hogben for
the biology monograph, as Morris will have written to you. When and where will his ‘Interglossa’ appear?
I am looking forward to it with great interest.” The Interglossa had already appeared in 1943, published by
London: Penguin/Pelican Books.
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some points this new language has made important improvements in com-
parison with the earlier projects. I am not quite sure whether the choice of
mostly greek word roots is the best possible. I have always thought that any
new project should make improvements in two important respects: (1) to uti-
lize the improvements made in Basic English, especially the principle of word
economy; (2) certain improvements in the logical structure of the language
which might be learned from symbolic logic. Hogben has done very well in
the first point; and his construction of a very simple syntax is a great achieve-
ment. However, with respect to logic his language seems to me to have some
weak points; e.g. the line between observable things and properties is not
always drawn in the right place, and the whole matter of this distinction be-
tween tow word classes could probably be simplified still more; further his
treatment of “all”, “every”, “any”, “some” etc. is not satisfactory. The exam-
ples of translations which he gives at the end deviate in many points consid-
erably from the original; thus a re-translation into English would lead to quite
different texts. Tests of this kind made with earlier languages (e.g. Esperanto
and Ido) had much better results. [WKA (1944x)]23
Notwithstanding Hogben’s ideas, which certainly plucked a string in Carnap’s mind,
the correspondence between him and Neurath concentrated very much on clarifying the
points upon which the two men disagreed and on what grounds. The correspondence
was always conducted in the most sincere and friendly manner despite the occasional
outbursts (often committed tongue-in-cheek) of one or the other (more frequently Neu-
rath) caused by the alleged absurdity of the position of the correspondent. An example
of this is the letter of Neurath to Carnap on January 15th, 1943 (in answer to Carnap’s
dated November 7th, 1942):
[. . . ] I am just looking through the main chapters [of Introduction to Semantics],
particularly the chapters you mentioned in your letter. I am really depressed
to see here all the Aristotelean metaphysics in full glint and glamour, bewitch-
ing my dear friend Carnap through and through. As often, a formalist drap-
ery and hangings seduce logically minded people, as you are very much. I
anticipated that, as I anticipated the coming of a religion founder — such is a
certain behaviour of movements which are based on empiricism. The analogy
with Comte’s positivism is not so far away. But why not — we are mortals,
and therefore we have to be like mortals. [WKA (1943a)]24
Carnap attempted to counter the criticism that Neurath directed at his position, regret-
ting that “you are so intolerant with respect to some ideas of people who share with us
the fundamental empiricist attitude.” [WKA (1943b)] In fact, in his reply Carnap was
effectively bringing forth his notion of tolerance (for the first time in connection with the
semantic issues), and making remarks about the general nature of philosophical concept
23Cited with the compliance of the Wiener Kreis Stichting (Amsterdam). All rights reserved.
24Cited with the compliance of the Wiener Kreis Stichting (Amsterdam). All rights reserved.
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formation. These remarks are already imbued with the fundamental ethos of the idea of
explication:
In the case of Popper, I believe your reaction is chiefly caused by the fact that
he criticized the Vienna Circle quite unnecessarily. He was overcritical and
so you are now. Even when he wrote the book [Logik der Forschung] he was
in agreement with us on most fundamental points. When later he came into
personal contact with us the agreement became even more strong and con-
scious to him. Some of his views which you criticize, e.g. the refutability
of hypotheses, have the same defects — and, I think, the same merits — as
many of our earlier views: they might be taken as first approximations but closer
inspection shows that they are not entirely adequate but must be replaced by better
approximations. I suppose that the same holds for many of our present views,
including mine, where we do not see today how they should and can be im-
proved. [. . . ] I think for the sake of the movement it would be much better if
we were more tolerant towards each other. If your intolerance would become
the general custom, then I am afraid that you would be among the first to
be declared a heretic and excommunicated. By tolerance, of course, I do not
mean acceptance of each others’ views. The differences of opinion should and
will be discussed. But this discussion is not helped by labeling the views of
the others as nonempiricist and metaphysical. [WKA (1943b)]25
Carnap is here quite serious about the necessity of propounding more generally the con-
versational maxims pertaining to the Principle of Tolerance. However, the full content
and the implications of the principle are discussed but in a cursory manner. It would
surely have benefited Carnap in his juxtaposition with Neurath (and more generally in
the realization of his overall program of explication) if he had more explicitly adduced
the presuppositions of the notion of tolerance that he leaned on. What is especially dam-
aging to Carnap’s program of explication is that the moral presuppositions of tolerance
(besides purely logico-mathematical aspects) were never made fully explicit by him which
also renders it understandable why Neurath had difficulties in grasping his position and
why the overall significance of the Principle escaped so many of his colleagues. At the
end of his letter Carnap returns to the more technical discussion of the Semantics and re-
minds Neurath that “when you read my ‘Semantics’ and especially when you write to
me about it, please keep in mind that the semantical concepts used there are meant for
application also to the language of science, especially the concepts ‘true’, ‘L-true’, and
similar ones.” [ibid.] Indeed, Carnap is here reminding Neurath of the ultimate motiva-
tion of his own work that is still, despite all the skepticism of Neurath, thoroughly based
on the wish to construct concepts that could be of concrete use to scientists in their cog-
nitive enterprise. It seems that Neurath here completely misses the more nuanced and
relaxed conception of language-engineering that Carnap has already envisaged and is
effectively implementing: “In any case, the concept of truth as I deal with it is meant as
a systematization of the inexact term ‘true’ as used by scientists and in everyday life.”
[ibid.]
25Cited with the compliance of the Wiener Kreis Stichting (Amsterdam). All rights reserved.
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5.2.2 A summary of Carnap’s work in semantics in the 1940s
“I do not indulge in this vice [modal logic] generally and thoroughly. [. . . ] Although we
do not like to apply intensional languages, nevertheless I think we cannot help
analyzing them. What would you think of a entomologist who refuses to investigate
fleas and lice because he dislikes them?” — Carnap to Quine in 1938
Carnap first presented the new semantical viewpoint in Foundations of Logic and Math-
ematics [Carnap (1939)], where a “logical calculus” is distinguished from other calculi
simply in virtue of its “customary interpretations”. Carnap writes that “[t]his classifica-
tion is rather rough and is only meant to serve a temporary, practical purpose.” [ibid.,
29] However, Carnap does not provide an improved or less “rough” account of this clas-
sification later in the monograph. Within just a few years Carnap embarked on a larger
project of explicating semantic notions. The result was Studies in Semantics, the first vol-
ume of which was Introduction to Semantics (1942), and the second Formalization of Logic
(1943).26 Finally, an account of semantics built on a new basis, Meaning and Necessity,
was published in 1947. In this book, Carnap made heavy use of the distinction between
extension and intension, utilizing modal notions. Carnap gave a succinct description of
the emergence and content of the semantic viewpoint in his philosophy in the preface to
the Introduction to Semantics:
Tarski, both through his book and in conversation, first called my attention to
the fact that the formal method of syntax must be supplemented by semanti-
cal concepts, showing at the same time that these concepts can be defined by
means not less exact than those of syntax. Thus the present book owes very
much to Tarski, more indeed than to any other single influence. On the other
hand, our conceptions of semantics seem to diverge at certain points. First
[. . . ] I emphasize the distinction between semantics and syntax, i.e., between
semantical systems as interpreted language systems and purely formal, un-
interpreted calculi, while for Tarski there seems to be no sharp demarcation.
Second, within semantics, I stress the distinction between factual truth, de-
pendent upon the contingency of facts, and logical truth, independent of facts
and dependent merely on meaning as determined by semantical rules. I be-
lieve that this distinction is indispensable for the logical analysis of science;
and one of the chief problems discussed in this book is that of representing
this distinction, which has been made in some form or other by most philoso-
phers since ancient times, by exact semantical definitions. Here again, Tarski
seems to doubt whether there is an objective difference or whether the choice
of a boundary line is not more or less arbitrary. (The two points of divergence
mentioned seem, incidentally, to go back to a common root, namely to the
distinction between logical and descriptive signs.) At present, it is not quite
clear to me whether the divergence is a genuine difference of opinion ir per-
26Incidentally, the second volume was written before the first one.
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haps merely a difference in emphasis, direction of attention, and preference
in procedure. [Carnap (1942), x–xi]
As it turned out, Carnap actually failed to answer satisfactorily the question about the ob-
jectivity of the distinction: “Our previous discussion has shown the difficulties connected
with the problem of a general formulation of these distinctions (§§13 and 16). This prob-
lem is very much in need of further investigation.”. [Carnap (1942), 243] More generally,
as Steve Awodey has pointed out, there are several serious problems afflicting Carnap’s
semantic program for defining analyticity (notwithstanding the earlier liberating result
found during the correspondence with Gödel): “First, despite his efforts in Formalization
of Logic, Mac Lane’s problem of capturing the distinction between logical and descriptive
symbols in a general way still remained:”27 [Awodey (2007) [Friedman & Creath (2007),
236]]
So far we have discussed the distinction between logical and descriptive ex-
pressions only in the form in which it appears when we have to do with a par-
ticular semantical system, in other words, as a question of special semantics.
The problem is more difficult in the form it takes in general semantics. Here it
is the question whether and how “logical” and “descriptive” can be defined
on the basis of other semantical terms, e.g., “designation” and “true”, so that
the application of the general definition to any particular system will lead to
a result which is in accordance with the intended distinction. A satisfactory
solution is not yet known. [Carnap (1942), 59]
“Second,” Awodey continues, “how do we explain the all-important idea that the truth of
a sentence ‘follows from the semantic rules alone’?” [ibid.] Whereas in the Logical Syntax
Carnap’s idea had been to identify the logical truths with the semantic truths consisting
entirely of logical symbols, the same strategy could not be implemented in the framework
of the Studies in Semantics. Because in that context all terms are interpreted, the former
procedure became too narrow. Consider the example provided by Awodey (where S de-
notes the predicate “is blue” and a is an individual constant denoting Titisee28 [ibid.]:
S(a) true, because the Titisee is blue;
¬(S(a)&¬S(a)) true, but not because of anything about
the Titisee
Carnap’s idea here is that the truth of the second clause holds independently of of the
27“Mac Lane’s problem” refers to the objection, raised by Saunders Mac Lane in his critique of Carnap’s
Syntax, that Carnap’s definition of the logical symbols as the largest collection of symbols such that every
sentence constructed only from them is determinate on the basis of transformation rules, is mathematically
unworkable. The gist of the objection is that there is no unique such maximal set of symbols. For, as Awodey
makes clear, “while there are various different sets that are maximal, in the sense that they admit no further
extension, the intersection of all such sets (as Carnap proposes) is itself no longer maximal. The situation is
similar to one arising frequently in abstract algebra, as Mac Lane surely recognized.” [Awodey (2007), 233n]
Mac Lane’s criticism was published as [Mac Lane (1938)].
28I.e., a lake in the southern Black Forest in Baden-Württemberg.
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interpretation of the non-logical constants S and a occurring in it, and thus independently
of the (physical) fact that the Titisee is blue. What is characteristic of the second clause
that it remains true, even if we substitute entirely different non-logical constants for S
and a, e.g., b for a, or R(x, c) (or even Q(x1, . . . , xn)) for S and so on. The putative defini-
tion of a sentence that is true by the sole meaning of the words that it contains could then
be stated as: the analytic sentences are precisely the ones that remain true for all substitu-
tions for their non-logical constants. This does not amount to an improvement, however,
because it presupposes the distinction between logical and descriptive symbols which
was precisely seen to be the crux of the “Mac Lane problem” referred to above. Another
important criterion for analytic sentences to be characterized in the semantic framework
is that they should be devoid of content. Thus, it becomes obligatory to demonstrate that
logical truth does not depend on or imply factual (contingent) truth. As Awodey puts
it, in the logical Syntax this was to have been ensured by “(1) the prohibition of extra-
logical ‘meanings’ combined with (2) the requirement of determinacy: analyticity is then
empirically empty, since (by (1)) no empirical facts are used in its specification, and (by
(2)) any consequence of an analytic proposition is analytic.” [ibid., 237] What complicates
the situation in the context of Studies is the fact that Carnap works with a mixed frame-
work of both logical and empirical concepts and propositions. Combined with the use
of “extra-logical” meanings such a system is especially conducive to the risk that the two
might become entangled. A purportedly promising line of attacking this problem would
be to stipulate that every purely mathematical sentence is “semantically determinate” in
the sense that it would be uniformly true (false) under all permissible substitutions. In that
case its content (defined as its consequence class) would be trivial.
Here one encounters the fundamental shortcoming of Carnap’s account of semantics. The
problem for Carnap lies mainly in the fact that if one is to determine logical truth (nowa-
days called logical validity), the substitutional strategy of varying the valuations of the
different constant symbols in a single interpretation is not, generally, sufficient. What
Carnap would essentially need is the modern model-theoretical characterization of logi-
cal truth: the idea that the truth of a logically true (valid) sentence is independent of the
interpretations of its non-logical constants in all possible interpretations of these constants
over all possible domains of quantification. Thus, he lacks the distinction between the no-
tions of truth in a particular model and truth in all models. However, the model-theoretical
viewpoint was simply absent in the 1940s. Even Tarski, who is generally considered to be
the pioneer in this field, did not have recourse to purely model-theoretical concepts in his
classic paper on truth [Tarski (1936)], nor in his other works until 1952.29 In keeping with
this, Carnap’s semantical work in the 1940s always took place within a framework of a
language with a single fixed interpretation. This is a general feature of Carnap’s work
in semantics, an idée fixe, which Hintikka has called the one-domain assumption (shared by
Carnap and Wittgenstein):
This one-domain assumption is probably the most important background as-
sumption in Carnap’s later philosophy of logic and, to some extent, also in his
29As Awodey remarks, “the idea seems first to have suggested by Kemeny [Kemeny (1948)], who was an
associate of Carnap and was explicitly responding to Carnap’s semantic work.” [ibid., 238n]
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philosophy of mathematics. Its manifestations and consequences are worth
spelling out somewhat more fully, partly for the purpose of illustrating the
import of this assumption.
First, we can register a clear-cut consequence of the one-domain assumption
in Carnap’s approach to the foundations of mathematics. If one assumes, as
Carnap does, that each interpreted (first-order) language carries with itself a
fixed given domain of individuals, one cannot compare in one’s language tow
different domain with each other. Yet, such comparisons played an interest-
ing role in the background work in the so-called extremality axioms, that is
axioms calculated to enforce the maximality or minimality of the domain of
the intended models of a mathematical axioms system. [. . . ]
The same assumption was ingrained elsewhere in Carnap’s thinking. It
clearly is a relic of the universalist attitude, and in a certain sense it rules out,
or at least discourages, a consistently model-theoretical attitude. For Carnap,
the semantical value of an individual constant is an individual. The main
problem that an applier of semantics faces is then to keep track of that given
individual as it enters and exits the different possible configurations of such
given individuals. For a consistent model theorist, the prime given materi-
als in one’s semantics are the possible worlds themselves. An individual is
conceived simply as the function that picks out as its value that particular in-
dividual in the different worlds in which it can make its appearance. And this
function is, in principle, chosen by us — not, of course by each of us individ-
ually but by the tacit decisions of the language community. These decisions
are codified in what has been called [. . . ] individuating functions. [Hintikka
(1997), 200–201]
This evaluation of Carnap’s conception of semantics is poignant. As Hintikka has else-
where emphasized [Hintikka (1975a)], Carnap was very much in possession of the basic
concepts needed to take the steps towards the fully-fledged model-theoretical viewpoint,
but that against all odds, he did not take these steps. This is all the more curious as
Carnap was in possession of these tools (or similar ones) already in 1927–1930 when he
was occupied writing his Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Axiomatik. In that work he pio-
neered the notion of a “model” of a formal language, which he used to define the notion
of logical entailment — “A implies B” — along the lines of “every model of A is a model
of B”.30 Psychologically, the cautiousness about employing these tools later might have
been affected by the overall failure of that work the goal of which, as we remember, was
to establish a general framework for metalogic, including the specification of the rela-
tionship between the different notions of completeness. Finally, it was precisely Carnap’s
own conception of entailment that logicians recognized as the required notion to build
the model-theoretical notion of logical consequence on and which they were able to rec-
ognize as providing the solution to the problems that Carnap was tackling with in his
Studies in Semantics and in the later Meaning and Necessity.
30“Wir hatten g eine ‘Folgerung’ von f genannt, wenn f → g, d.h. (R)( fR → gR) gilt; diese ‘Implika-
tionaussage von g’ kann jetzt so ausgesprochen werden: ‘alle Modelle von f sind auch Modelle von g’.”
[Carnap (2000), 95]
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Following his work in the Studies in Semantics Carnap gradually worked his way towards
implementing the strategy of distinguishing between analytic and synthetic sentences by
having recourse to more precisely specified version of intensional identity and logical
“necessity” (with empirical “contingency” corresponding to syntheticity). First in the pa-
per “Modalities and Quantification” [Carnap (1946)], and then more explicitly in Meaning
and Necessity [Carnap (1947)], he developed a series of intensional and modal languages
which constituted a framework for proposing a new definition of analyticity, i.e., analyt-
icity defined in terms of intensionality or logical necessity (instead of truth). According
to Carnap’s new proposal, the notions of intension and logical truth can be related as
follows [Awodey (2007), 241]:
Two expressions A and B have the same extension iff A = B is true;
they are then said to be extensionally equivalent.
Two expressions A and B have the same intension iff A = B is L-true;
they are then said to be (intensionally, or) L-equivalent.
This distinction is further refined by the following definitions provided by Carnap.31
First, the one given for extensional contexts: [Carnap (1947), 48]
Definition 5 a. The expression Ui is extensional with respect to a certain occurrence of Uj
within Ui in the system S =D f Ui and Uj are designators; the occurrence in question of Uj
within Ui is interchangeable with any expression equivalent to Uj in S.
b. The expression Ui is extensional (in S) =D f Ui is a designator (in S); Ui is extensional with
respect to any occurrence of a designator within Ui (in S).
c. The semantical system S is extensional =D f every sentence in S is extensional.
Second, the one for intensional contexts: [ibid.]
31The distinction between intension and extension that Carnap introduced in Meaning and Necessity was
not at all new. It had a venerable history with its roots traceable back at least to Aristotle, although the literal
use of terms having the same function derives from the early modern period. Perhaps the most natural
point of reference is the Logique de Port Royal of Pierre Nicole and Antoine Arnauld, the two sharp-witted
Jansenists. The following table gives a rough picture of the development of the terminology and the use of
the distinction among some of the most prominent philosophers of the last 350 years. (The table is adapted
from [Krauth 1970, 37].)
Logique de Port Royal: compréhension – extension
J. S. Mill: connotation – denotation
Frege: Sinn – Bedeutung
Russell: meaning – denotation
Quine: meaning – reference
Church: sense – denotation
Carnap: intension – extension (nominatum)
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Definition 6 a. The expression Ui is intensional with respect to a certain occurrence of
Uj within Ui in the system S =D f Ui and Uj are designators; Ui is not extensional with
respect to the occurrence in question of Uj within Ui; this occurrence of Uj within Ui is
L-interchangeable with any expression L-equivalent to Uj in S.
b. The expression Ui is intensional (in S) =D f Ui is a designator; Ui is, with respect to any
occurrence of a designator within Ui, either extensional or intensional, and is intensional
with respect to at least one occurrence of a designator.
c. The semantical system S is intensional =D f every sentence in S is either extensional or
intensional, and at least one is intensional.
Simple examples of this distinction could be devised as follows: let us consider a propo-
sitional function having the form “x is y”, where x ranges over names or definite descrip-
tions, and y ranges over properties. Then, the context “x is white” is extensional: e.g. “the
sixth tallest building in Helsinki is white” follows on the basis of extensional equivalence
from “The Tower of the Olympic Stadium in Helsinki is white”. By contrast, “I believe x
is white” is intensional , because “I believe the Tower of the Olympic Stadium in Helsinki
is white” follows from “I believe white is the colour of the Tower of the Olympic Stadium
in Helsinki”, but not from “I believe the sixth tallest building in Helsinki is white”. The
distinction is applied by Carnap to solve puzzles like the “antinomy of identity”, which
is epitomized by Frege’s famous example of Venus. Clearly, it is necessarily true that
“Phosphorus is Phosphorus”, but it requires empirical inquiry to find out that “Phos-
phorus is Hesperus”. In the latter sentence, the extensions of the names are the same,
viz., the planet Venus, but the intensions differ, the one signifying the notion “morning
star” and the other the notion “evening star”. A considerable systematic advantage of
Carnap’s system in the Meaning and Necessity is that not only are the notions of intension
and extension definable from L-truth, but also they and the alethic modalities are all in-
terdefinable. For example,
N(A) is true iff A is intensionally equivalent to True
(which holds iff A is L-true)
from which it follows:
N(A = B) is true iff A is intensionally equivalent to B
(i.e. A = B is L-true).
The philosophical import of these definitions is that the three distinctions that play such
a prominent role in Carnap’s theory of semantics, viz., intension vs. extension, analytic
vs. synthetic, and necessity vs. possibility “become just three sides of the same coin,
as it were.” [Awodey (2007), 242] We have already alluded to the characteristic difficul-
ties inherent in the Carnapian approach. Lacking a genuinely model-theoretical point of
view Carnap did not grasp the practical possibility of devising an extensional semantics
for modal languages. This realization had to wait for the logical results independently
found by Jaakko Hintikka (1957), Stig Kanger (1957) and Saul Kripke (1959).32 By this
32Steve Awodey mentions in this context only Saul Kripke’s work of 1963 [Kripke (1963)], betraying an
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time, however, Carnap’s interests already lay elsewhere. From 1945 on he is increasingly
occupied with the work on inductive logic and foundations of probability. This stage
would then last until his death in 1970. Summing up his work in semantics, Hintikka
writes:
[I]t seems to me that possible-worlds semantics overwhelmingly suggests that
Carnap was on the right track. It makes the weight of his reply to Quine (that
is what “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages” [Carnap (1955a)]
essentially is) felt in a new way, and puts the onus of producing specific criti-
cisms much more on Carnap’s critics than has been recognized in recent dis-
cussion. What is even more important, it suggests new constructive, empirical
approaches to the pragmatics of beliefs and intensions. As such, it amounts to
an important partial vindication of Carnap vis-à-vis his critics, and shows the
power of his ideas to inspire and to guide further development of the studies
to which he himself already contributed so much. [Hintikka (1975a), 98]




THE IDEAL OF EXPLICATION AS AN
EMBODIMENT OF RATIONALITY
6.1 Explication in its Context: The Logical Foundations of Prob-
ability
During the years 1942–1944, having been granted a leave of absence by the University of
Chicago and financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, Carnap developed many of the fea-
tures of the theory of inductive logic (including results concerning the central conceptual
tool of that theory, viz., the function c∗). These investigations finally resulted in a formu-
lation of a system of inductive logic based on a logical notion of probability, an account of
which was ultimately published as the monograph The Logical Foundations of Probability
in 1950. [Carnap (1950b)] This monograph was planned only as the first volume in a pro-
jected two-volume work called Probability and Induction. In this first volume Carnap set
out to tackle the fundamental problem of formulating a new basis for a theory of proba-
bility which would account for the various uses of the notion “probability” in science as
well as in everyday-life. According to Carnap, “[o]ne of the main tasks of any new theory
of probability is to supply adequate explicata for the concept of probability and the for
the methods of inductive reasoning which are at present applied in science and in statis-
tics. However, there does not seem to be sufficient clarity and agreement concerning the
requirements that an adequate explicatum for any explicandum must fulfill.” [Carnap
(1950b), vii] To compensate for this state of affairs, Carnap provides in the first chapter
of the book a methodological discussion about explication, “although”, he goes on to
remark, “this topic should be dealt with more appropriately in a book on concept forma-
tion in science.” [ibid.] In spite of these reservations, the first chapter of the book is worth
of serious consideration; it remained the most elaborate discussion about the method of
explication Carnap ever provided. In its scant 18 pages it intends to shed some light on
the radically new framework of concept formation that Carnap had already envisaged in
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the 1940s in connection with his work on semantics.1 The opening passage of §2 provides
the first tentative description of the new method:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less inexact
concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the second. We
call the given concept (or the term used for it) the explicandum, and the ex-
act concept proposed to take the place of the first (or the term proposed for
it) the explicatum. The explicandum may belong to everyday language or to
a previous stage in the development of scientific language. The explicatum
must be given by explicit rules for its use, for example, by a definition which
incorporates it into a well-constructed system of scientific either logicomath-
ematical or empirical concepts. [ibid., 3]
Carnap then goes on to relate the historical background of the notion in the works of
Kant, Husserl and C.H. Langford. Kant’s notion of explication refers here to the process
of obtaining a particular predicate (a concept) by analysis of the subject (an individual
concept). This is inextricably entwined with the Kantian notion of analyticity which we
presented in the Chapter 3. Kant seems to understand explication in the sense of clarify-
ing what is already implicitly thought in the subject, thereby making explicit the concep-
tual content of an initially non-determinate (individual) concept through an explicative
judgement [Erläuterungsurteil]. In the same paragraph Carnap implies that his notion
of explication is partly motivated by Husserl’s talk of “explication” as “the synthesis of
identification between a confused, non-articulated sense and a subsequently intended
distinct, articulated sense” the latter of which Husserl calls the “Explikat” of the former.
[ibid.] Although Carnap provides in this connection as his only reference the [definition
by Dorion Cairns in the] Dictionary of Philosophy [1942] edited by D. Runes, it is doubtful
that this is the source of Carnap’s knowledge about Husserl’s conception.2 Although the
most conspicuous signs of Husserl’s influence on Carnap can be detected in Carnap’s
early works, especially in Der Raum and in the Aufbau, it would seem rather odd if Car-
nap did not keep himself informed about the evolution of Husserl’s views. Although no
direct influence can here be detected, it still serves a definite purpose to adduce Husserl’s
notion of explication as a backdrop for the following presentation. Husserl’s most sub-
stantial discussion on explication occurred in Experience and Judgement [EJ], in chapter 2
of Part I. This work was edited by Ludwig Landgrebe (Husserl’s assistant at the Freiburg
University) under the authorization of Husserl, and published posthumously in 1939
(Husserl died in 1938). The central concepts that figure in Husserl’s distinction are, on
the one hand, the notion of “simple” or “immediate” apprehension [schlichte Erfassung],
and on the other hand, the notion of “Explication” [Explikation], which can enter into the
1Very early in Meaning and Necessity (§2) Carnap writes: “The task of making more exact a vague or
not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or
rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks
of logical analysis and logical construction. We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an explication for,
the earlier concept; this earlier concept, or sometimes the term used for it, is called the explicandum; and the
new concept, or its term, is called an explicatum of the old one.” [Carnap (1947), 8–9]
2Michael Beaney provides no evidence to back up his belief that this indeed is the case. [Beaney (2004),
141]
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“synthesis of identification”. [EJ, §22] The distinction sets a coördinate frame for the phe-
nomenological analysis of the different levels of reflective perception of an object. These
levels constitute a hierarchy in which the “simple apprehension” is the lowest level at
which we are conscious of the object as a whole deprived of any particular character-
istics. Transgressing the boundaries that delimit the core of such a qualitatively simple
content of consciousness is possible through the re-cognition of the “internal horizon”
associated with every experience of a thing. Husserl had asserted the existence of such
a “horizon” in [EJ, §8], where its significance was explained to be that of defining the
boundaries of an area of possible knowledge regarding a particular object. Two other im-
portant concepts that characterize the qualitative content of our experience, according to
Husserl, are the “retentional” and “protentional” aspects of the structure of experience.
Strikingly in line with the modern view of cognitive psychology, Husserl explains that
these aspects are exemplified in the way that our experience is informed (‘modulated’)
by our existing knowledge and expectations. We may recall previous perceptions (as in
an auditory retention of a chord quality) or already have a clear comprehension of the
type that a particular object of our perception instantiates (“That is a dominant-seventh
altered chord with a 13th.”). Concerning visual perception, for example, we can imag-
ine what the object would look like from a different point of view in space or anticipate
how its color changes if we move to another position (taking into account the reflection
of light from a stained surface, for example). The level of explication in the Husserlian
picture of perception marks the enrichment of our knowledge as we elucidate more and
more detailed aspects of the object:
Explication is penetration of the internal horizon of the object by the direction of per-
ceptual interest. In the case of the unobstructed realization of this interest, the
protentional expectations fulfill themselves in the same way; the object re-
veals itself in its properties as that which it was anticipated to be, except that
what was anticipated now attains original givenness. A more precise deter-
mination results, eventually perhaps partial corrections, or — in the case of
obstruction — disappointment of the expectations, and partial modalization.
[EJ, §22]
What should especially be noticed is that Husserl here distinguishes explication from
“analytic clarification” [analytische Verdeutlichung], where the object of the explication
need not be “intuitively given”. An example is the analysis of “brother” as “male sib-
ling” (Chico does not have to think about Harpo, Groucho, Gummo or Zeppo to perform
the analysis). Husserl clearly does not have conceptual analysis (of the sort of Kant, for
example) in mind as he presents the distinction. Rather, the Husserlian explication is
an enrichment of sense that operates within the domain of intuition. But as the above
passage makes clear, Husserl allows for partial corrections in the explication, if our ex-
pectations concerning perception are disappointed. This aspect comes quite close to the
Carnapian idea of explication. In this sense, both Carnap and Husserl see the explication
as a process or vehicle of precisification by means of which, as Beaney puts it “our ordinary
understanding is refined, and if necessary, transformed.” [Beaney (2004), 142] Carnap,
however, sees his own view of explication as a relative of C. H. Langford’s conception of
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analysis: “What I mean by ‘explicandum’ and ‘explicatum’ is to some extent similar to
what C. H. Langford calls ‘analysandum’ and ‘analysans’: ‘the analysis then states an ap-
propriate relation of equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans’. [. . . ]; he
says that the motive of an analysis ‘is usually that of supplanting a relatively vague idea
by a more precise one’.” [ibid., 3] However, Carnap remarks that his procedure of expli-
cation must be understood in a wider sense than the (traditional) procedures of analysis
or clarification of Kant, Husserl and Langford. Indeed, what he wants to emphasize is
that his notion of explication does not fully comply with the traditional notion of philo-
sophical analysis (in its decompositional and resolutive senses), but comprises rather a
different (transformative) kind of meaning conferring: “The explicatum (in my sense) is
in many cases the result of an analysis of the explicandum (and this has motivated my
choice of the terms); in other cases, however, it deviates deliberately from the explican-
dum but still takes its place in some way [. . . ].” [ibid.]
The above account of the historical and motivational background of Carnap’s method of
explication captures only some of the aspects that are relevant for characterizing its over-
all significance. In the following sections we will see how the method can be understood
in a wider frame, providing an account of what may be termed the “ideal of explication”.
The thesis that Carnap’s method, conceived as a regulative ideal of assessing different
proposals for theoretical frameworks or languages to be used in different domains of
human activity, is to be taken as a formulation of a modern conception of rationality or
reasonableness, is more closely scrutinized. I will especially concentrate on the sugges-
tion, systematically developed by A. W. Carus [Carus (2007)], that Carnap’s method of
explication embodies a distinctively modern variety of Enlightenment thought. Now,
before I proceed to present the wider implications of Carnap’s method and assess the
fortunes of the interpretation of Carus, it is necessary to provide a more accurate account
of the desiderata that Carnap himself set for the explicata to be worked out in the different
situations. This will be the subject of the next section.
6.1.1 The criteria for explication
To begin with, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term “explication” on a gen-
eral level so as to exclude the possibility of any misunderstanding. To provide a clear-cut
starting point for our discussion, consider the definition of “explication” provided in the
Chambers’ Etymological Dictionary. According to this source, the use of explication as an
English term is documented from 1528 on as having the meaning “detailed statement or
account [. . . ] from explicare unfold”. 3 Regarded as a special philosophical term “expli-
cation” does not refer solely to the elimination of conceptual ambiguities or vagueness,
contrary to what is often thought to be the case. Were explication understood merely in
this sense, it would be tantamount to the method of analysis to which it admittedly bears
a close relationship. Explication, as Carnap conceives it, comprises essentially also a syn-
thetic ingredient, as we already noticed above. According to Carnap’s crucial insight,
3[Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, Chambers Harrap Publishers (1988)]
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explication must be regarded as an instrument for comparing and evaluating entire arti-
ficial language systems. The practical task of comparison and evaluation is naturally most
often undertaken in a stepwise manner, one concept at a time, especially when one of the
systems under consideration is our colloquial language. But in the case of artificial and
highly technical language systems (such as the various systems of intensional logic) we
have at our disposal powerful meta-theoretical tools to implement a much more efficient
comparison and evaluation. As far as these more technical contexts of explication are
concerned, I will present some examples relating to mathematical physics in the sections
to come. For now it suffices to clarify the basic features of explication as Carnap presents
them in the LFP.
The conspicuous feature of Carnap’s account of explication is the asymmetry between
the explicandum and the explicatum. While the former is a non-articulate and inexact,
sometimes even vague, concept (possibly taken from everyday-language), the latter is
articulate, exact and distinct. As Carnap readily remarks, one must define certain condi-
tions on how the problem itself ought to be stated, i.e., how the explicandum should be
given:
There is a temptation to think that, since the explicandum cannot be given in
exact terms anyway, it does not matter much how we formulate the problem.
But this would be quite wrong. On the contrary, since even in the best case we
cannot reach full exactness, we must, in order to prevent the discussion of the
problem from becoming entirely futile, do all we can to make at least prac-
tically clear what is meant as the explicandum. What X means by a certain
term in contexts of a certain kind is at least practically clear to Y if Y is able to
predict correctly X’s interpretation for the most simple, ordinary cases of the
use of the term in those contexts. It seems to me that, in raising problems of
analysis or explication, philosophers very frequently violate this requirement.
They ask questions like: ‘What is causality?’, ‘What is life?’, ‘What is mind?’,
‘What is justice?’, etc. Then they immediately start to look for an answer with-
out first examining the tacit assumption that the terms of the question are at
least practically clear enough to serve as a basis for an investigation, for an
analysis or explication. [Carnap (1950b), 4]
The task of explication must, then, be preceded by the task of clarification. Those in-
volved in the process must reach a satisfactory degree of agreement about what they are
de facto explicating. Carnap is optimistic about the prospects of achieving the requisite
mutual understanding: “Even though the terms in question are unsystematic, inexact
terms, there are means for reaching a relatively good mutual understanding as to their
intended meaning. An indication of the meaning with the help of some examples for its
intended use and other examples for uses not now intended can help the understand-
ing. An informal explanation in general terms may be added. [. . . ] By explanations of
this kind the reader may obtain step by step a clearer picture of what is intended to be
included and what is intended to be excluded; thus he may reach an understanding of
the meaning intended which is far from perfect theoretically, but may be sufficient for
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the practical purposes of a discussion of possible explanations.” [ibid., 4–5] In spite of
this optimism, Carnap very clearly perceived the challenge of the largely informal task of
establishing the identity of the explicandum that should precede the process of replace-
ment with a more exact concept. Another, perhaps more serious, problem arises in the
situation when the explicandum, informally identified, is chosen from an evolved, ‘nat-
ural’ language, and juxtaposed with an explicatum precisely defined within a language
having more artificial or constructed features. The relation between such concepts cannot
be precise. This has generally been taken as a reason for not taking Carnap’s suggestions
seriously at all. Regarding the method of explication as a form of analysis, the critics take
the non-specificity of the relation between the explicandum and explicatum as a deci-
sive reason for rejecting the method out of hand. What these critics very much ignore
is that the framework of explication is diametrically opposite to the earlier program of
rational reconstruction in terms of its domain of application. Whereas the method of
translation into the ‘formal mode of speech’ had been the characteristic of the pre-1931
rational reconstruction (i.e. before the Syntax), the process of translation being internal
to the language, the method of explication was presented explicitly as a process operat-
ing externally to the precise target language in which a particular explication was to be
adduced. As Carnap remarks:
Since the datum is inexact, the problem itself is not stated in exact terms; and
yet we are asked to give an exact solution. This is one of the puzzling pecu-
liarities of explication. It follows that, if a solution for a problem of explication
is proposed, we cannot decide in an exact way whether it is right or wrong.
Strictly speaking, the question whether the solution is right or wrong makes
no good sense because there is no clear-cut answer. The question should
rather be whether the proposed solution is satisfactory, whether it is more
satisfactory than another one, and the like. [Carnap (1950b), 4]
The predicator “right or wrong”, of course, means “true or false” in Carnap’s locution;
and the predicator “satisfactory” is understood in the sense of “being useful or fruitful
for the practical purposes in question”. This fundamentally pragmatic ingredient of the
method of explication as well as the consequent distinction between the internal and ex-
ternal questions4 pertaining to a language or a group of languages was clearly pointed
out by Carnap’s student Howard Stein:
The explicatum, as an exactly characterized concept, belongs to some formal-
4This distinction is figured also in a completely different vein, i.e. in Pierre Bordieu’s conception of science
as ‘fields of activity’. According to Bordieu, the goal of the scientist is to achieve recognition from competitor
peers. This primary objective, however, does not preclude the possibility of the scientist furthering the
progress of science itself, as is made clear in [Bordieu (1975)]. The progress of science is dictated by the
dialectical relation between the internal and external determinants which are constituted, respectively, by the
scientific field and by what Bordieu calls “habitus”. [Lloyd (1993)] gives a succinct definition of this notion:
“The habitus is the principle of a form of subjective, implicit, practical knowledge that is unconscious and
not requiring consciousness, although it masters objective necessity, thus enabling social competence.” [ibid.,
33] In Bordieu’s account, as Lloyd relates, the subjective/objective dichotomy in explanation is overcome
through the realization of the ‘ontological complexity’ of the two determinants.
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ized discourse — some ‘framework’. The explicandum [. . . ] belongs ipso
facto to a mode of discourse outside that framework. Therefore any ques-
tion about the relation of the explicatum to the explicandum is an ‘external’
question; this holds, in particular, of the question whether an explication is
adequate — that is, whether the explicatum does in some appropriate sense
fully represent, within the framework, the function performed (let us say)
‘presystematically’ by the explicandum. [Stein (1992), 280]
One can here discern the characteristically Carnapian conception of a mutual feedback re-
lation between the different linguistic frameworks, one of which functions as the medium
for identifying an explicandum through a process of clarification, and the second of which
is the ‘more constructed’ medium for providing an explication of the explicandum. The
external question concerns, essentially, “the practical problem whether or not to incorpo-
rate into the language the new linguistic forms” pertaining to the practical situation at
hand. [Carnap (1950a), 209] Now, provided that the participants of a discussion concern-
ing the adoption of a suitable linguistic framework for a specific use have a preliminary
mutual understanding of the concepts to be specified (via the precisification enabled by
explication), what are the general conditions that must be imposed upon the explicata
themselves? Carnap answers this question in §3 of LFP titled “Requirements for an Ex-
plicatum”: “If a concept is given as an explicandum, the task consists in finding another
concept as its explicatum which fulfills the following requirements to a sufficient de-
gree.”: [(1950b), 7]
1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in most cases in
which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used; however,
close similarity is not required, and considerable differences are permitted.
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use (for instance,
in the form of a definition), is to be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the
explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts.
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of many
universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical
theorems in the case of a logical concept).
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as simple as the more
important requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit.
As Carnap makes clear in (4), the requirements are not on a par; the requirement of sim-
plicity, closely related to the Machian ideal of conceptual economy, is relegated to the
lowest rank. At first blush, it seems to be a purely aesthetic criterion, akin to the criterion
that mathematicians usually allude to in talking about beauty in mathematics. Still, it has
a practical significance, especially in the more developed compartments of science, where
definite restrictions have to be imposed on the informational complexity of a cognitive
representation, if just to account for the finite capacity of humans to process informa-
tion. The first three requirements pertain more clearly to the fundamental purpose of
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explication, i.e., the task of providing conceptual tools for cognitive systematization and
unification of science. I will comment upon these features in more detail in the course of
the discussion of Carus’ interpretation of the Carnapian framework of explication. For
now, to summarize the general ‘structural’ conditions of explication, let us take a brief
look at the types of concepts that are explicated.
The medium of explication is first and foremost the conceptual space of any particular
compartment of knowledge. As we saw above, the process of explication necessarily
presupposes an aggregate of more or less informally defined concepts as its data, or ex-
plicanda. The kinds of concepts that might act as the starting point of an explication can





































The functional classes are described by Mario Bunge in the following terms [Bunge
(1967)]:
Formal
Basic: those providing the rational cement, like “and”
“all”, “set”, “square root”, “distance”
“group”
Metalogical: those occurring in analyses and theories of
formal theories; e.g., “well-formed formula”,
“provable”, “axiom”, “theorem”, “theory”
Non-formal
Descriptive: those enabling us to describe experiential
matters of fact, like “body”, “red”, “near”,
“event”, “between”, “liquid”
Interpretive: those occurring in the interpretations of
descriptions, like “species”, “atom”, “birth rate”,
“motivation”, “inhibition”
Prescriptive: those occurring essentially in norms, rules, and
conventions — e.g., those designated by verbs
in the imperative form.
These schematized presentations illuminate the variety of the ‘conceptual engineering
tasks’ that fall under the purview of Carnapian explication.5 Moreover, they can be seen
5In a more abstract and philosophical level it might be expedient to have recourse to accounts like that
of Robert Nozick which aim to systematize the process of structuring of (philosophical) concepts. Nozick’s
classification is presented in the context of the problem of personal identity but it generalizes to all kinds of
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as tools for facilitating the process of clarification that precedes the more exact process
of explication. Schemes such as these help in coördinating the different explicative tasks
and work as aids in the more general task of a descriptive study of human cognition that
underlies Carnap’s conception of naturalized epistemology. Carnap’s conception, in its
broad outlines similar to the one that Quine advocated, constitutes a basis for interpreta-
tive possibilities that go far beyond what Carnap ever stated explicitly himself. Building
upon this basis, André Carus presents a radical interpretation of Carnap’s ideal of expli-
cation as an account of reason. I will now turn to his interpretation of Carnap’s overall
epistemological program.
6.2 Carus’ Interpretation of Explication: Possible Vistas for Fur-
ther Development
André Carus presents his interpretation of Carnap’s ideal in his illuminating and meri-
torious book Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought — Explication as Enlightenment [Carus
(2007)]. The starting point of his exposition of explication in Chapter 11 is the observation
that the Principle of Tolerance which Carnap introduced in 1932, comprised substantial
potential for application which Carnap was unable to fully realize himself: “The full
application of the new principle was impeded for many years by lingering prejudices
from earlier stages in his development. This delay, combined with Carnap’s predilection
for working on particular language projects rather than the architectonic of the overall
ideal, meant that he never fully spelled out his ideal of explication as an account of rea-
son, and it is left to those following in his footsteps to piece together the hints he left.”
[Carus (2007), 273] This is precisely what Carus has set out to do. In keeping with the
naturalistic framework of Carnap’s epistemology, Carus sketches his suggestion for re-
constructing the Carnapian ideal by rounding out and supplementing the fragments left
by Carnap with pertinent material from the corpus of contemporary scientific knowl-
edge. This sketch intends to convey how the Carnapian ideal “could be relevant to real
life”, giving it “some social and historical texture.” [ibid.]
concepts and can be utilized in a number of situations:
I. Intrinsic Abstract Structural. A concept C’s holding at a time is analyzed in terms of an abstract structural
description involving only mondadic predicates holding at that time. [The personal identity of some-
thing is an intrinsic feature of it, most usefully discussed without considering any entities other than
it or any of its features at any other time. (For example, the identity resides in the soul.)]
II. Relational. X falls under concept C if X stands in a certain relationship R to another, sometimes earlier,
thing of a specified sort. [For example, X is the same thing as the earlier Y if X is spatiotemporally
continuous, or psychologically continuous, with Y.]
III. Closest Relative. To the relational view is added the condition that nothing else is as closely related
under R to that other (previous) thing. [The closest continuer theory of personal identity is of this
sort.] [Nozick (1981), 47–48]
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6.2.1 The presuppositions of Carus’ interpretation
The fundamental presupposition of Carus’ interpretation is that Carnap, “faced with the
Hegelian task of a history of reason”, would have started from a sharp distinction be-
tween “two kinds of coding or representation systems”. [ibid.] Carus refers to these
as the “evolved” and “constructed” systems, respectively. This fundamental distinction
is known to have been made by Carnap who used such locutions as “informal” and
“formal” [languages], or “word-languages” and “artificially constructed symbolic lan-
guages”, or “natural” and “artificial languages”. This distinction is similar to the one,
as Carus suggests, made by Gaston Bachelard between scientific and everyday modes of
thinking, who referred to it with the emblematic phrase “coupure épistemologique” (epis-
temological discontinuity or rupture). One of Bachelard’s original views on rationality
and language constitution was the thesis that “we are autonomous and responsible be-
ings (both individually and as a species) only in so far as we construct our conceptual
frameworks self-consciously, rather than going complacently with the flow of our inher-
ited concepts.” [Carus (2007), 274]6 But despite the rupture, there is also a continuity
between the two types of discourse, as Carnap observed more and more clearly, espe-
cially towards the late 1930s. Carus notes how Carnap had in the Syntax regarded even
evolved languages as calculi, i.e., essentially as systems of formation and transformation
rules.7 As a result, he was able to conceive of a broad spectrum of different language sys-
tems, with one end of the spectrum consisting of languages regarded as unambiguous
cases of different types of calculus, and the other end consisting of languages the status
of which was not as clearly defined, i.e., languages which contained more ‘evolved’ el-
ements. (All in all, every system contained at least some constructed elements.) Carus
rejects the suggestion by Thomas Ricketts [Ricketts (2004a), (2004b)] that the artificial
languages should be conceived as some kind of conceptual maps or coördinate grids
superimposed on a system of evolved language. There is not any natural demarcation
line between the evolved and constructed languages, “nor is there any suggestion that
a constructed calculus is to be taken as a map or grid constraining a more amorphous
evolved language, such as that used by scientists. The constructed languages are to be
regarded, rather, as candidate vehicles for the construction of science as a unified theory,
including a meta-language in which to construct and evaluate the syntax of the object
language (later also its semantics and pragmatics).” [ibid.] The historical development
of different linguistic frameworks provides an illustration of the mutual interaction be-
tween more ‘constructed’ and evolved systems. For example, as Carus notes, very early
in the history of different civilizations there have arisen partly formalized languages de-
vised by groups of specialists to be used as tools in various domains of activity, including
the use of specific language systems in government, trade and theological disputation.
The evolution of such systems of language has been very gradual. Still, there are ex-
6Carus provides here references to [Bachelard (1934), (1938)].
7N.B. The classification of calculi by their formation and transformation rules has become standard. It
is often thought that the distinction was first introduced by Carnap. This is not the case, however. In
Logische Untersuchungen [1900/1901] Husserl had already made a distinction between the material (synthetic)
absurdity and formal, analytic absurdity (Investigation IV, §14). The rules governing the avoidance of these
absurdities correspond to the Carnapian rules of formation and transformation.
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amples stemming from Antiquity that demonstrate the coupure épistemologique between
constructed and evolved languages in a most dramatic way. Especially the development
of synthetic geometry in Greece which culminated in the unified system of Euclid with its
strictly axiomatic character exemplified the very radical estrangement of the constructive
types of language used in science from the language of everyday life. It is solely because
of the limited applicability of the language of Euclidean geometry to practical problems
of every day life that the rift between these modes of thinking was not experienced as
forcefully as we nowadays experience the one between our everyday language and the
language of mathematical physics, for example. It is perhaps true, as Carus claims, that
“it was only in the seventeenth century, and especially with the publication of Newton’s
Principia in 1687, that it became more widely clear to educated people that the language of
genuine knowledge was starkly different from the evolved language of daily life. Only at
that point did a scientific culture begin to form, and an international community of those
acculturated in the new attitudes and fluent in the new languages. (The existence of such
a community, however small and embattled, was the basis for Enlightenment.)” [Carus
(2007), 275]
From the point of view of Carnap’s naturalized epistemology, it is plausible to allow for
the evolution of both the evolved and constructed languages. The social scientists in-
formed by a biological or evolutionary point of view regard cultural evolution (of which
the evolution of constructed languages is a part) and physical evolution as interacting
processes. Especially the competitive aspect of learning and experience-mediated spe-
cialization are seen as essential features of social organization in which physical evolu-
tion plays a prominent part. This is quite clear in the context where individuals compete
for scarce resources of food, for example, but can the evolutionary viewpoint of biology
offer anything of real substance in relation to more complex social situations? The evolu-
tionary biologist’s view is succinctly put by Mary Jane West-Eberhard:
Learning takes an entirely new aspect when competition is for social status
and socially defined rewards, rather than other kinds of resources, especially
in organisms, such as humans, and perhaps other animals, capable of ma-
nipulating and learning socially defined rewards and punishments. Then so-
cial development (socialization) can come to occur within a framework where
successful behaviors change from group to group, and generation to genera-
tion, for success no longer is defined by some fixed or slowly evolving crite-
rion, such as ability to find and handle particular kinds of food (which might
be sufficiently recurrent to produce genetic correlations between phenotypic
traits). Under socially defined competition, success has relatively flexible and
changeable criteria invented and imposed by parents and influential dom-
inant leaders, reinforced by mimicry and strong rewards and punishments
that enforce both conformity and change. This is one reason why it can be
extremely misleading to suppose that particular human learned behavioral
traits are evolved. The role of genetic variation and evolution should be
sought in any traits that would recurrently influence success despite rapid
social change, such as generalized ability to communicate, observe and adapt
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to shifting criteria of success, and so forth. This follows from the principle that
to be molded by natural selection, a trait not only must be heritable (show ge-
netic variation correlated with phenotypic variation) and affect reproductive
success, but also must be sufficiently recurrent in a population across genera-
tions for natural selection to act. [West-Eberhard (2003), 350]
The Carnapian viewpoint is not completely subsumed under the explanatory framework
of biology, however. As Carus remarks, “this empirical viewpoint is compatible with an
ideal viewpoint that places positive value on the one kind of evolutionary process because
of its role in liberating the human species (especially those who seek it out) from unre-
flective passivity in thought and action.” [ibid., 275–276] The core tenet of Carus’ inter-
pretation is that “[f]rom Carnap’s ideal viewpoint, [. . . ] the liberation of human thought
from passive complacency and the shackles of the past depends on the progressive re-
placement of evolved by constructed languages.” [ibid.]8 It is easy to agree with Carus’
thesis that explication aims less to describe the relation between two kinds of linguistic
system in social practice than to raise the degree of construction (and precision) in human
languages. This, as we saw, was already emphasized by Carnap in Chapter 1 of LFP.
What is not as fully spelled out in that chapter is the problematic associated with the the-
sis that theory choice and language choice are to be regarded as practical matters. In the
level of external questions about the applicability and fruitfulness of a certain proposal
(for a linguistic system to be used for a definite purpose), the sentences used to evaluate
the options no longer have “cognitive” meaning; indeed, some must have normative or
“optative” meaning.9 The thesis that the ideal of explication determines an area of nor-
mative pragmatics, i.e., a framework for improving our systematic pursuit of knowledge
in the way of elaborating devices for this purpose — e.g. various communicative systems
— needs to be scrutinized from precisely this ‘optative’ viewpoint. Are there explicitly
spelled out optative rules that determine such a normative pragmatics? Let us scrutinize
Carus’ answer to this particular problem in more detail.
6.2.2 Criticism of Carus’ position
After having spelled out the Carnapian requirements for explication, Carus writes:
“[T]he choice among alternative explications is a practical problem. It must be made
8Carus cites Carnap [ASP (1956a)] to back up the thesis about the importance of the constructed languages
in Carnap’s epistemology: “I do not share the apparently widespread view that the vagueness and ambiguity
of most words in everyday language do not much interfere with human communication. It is hard for me to
understand how someone could really believe this, in view of the countless misunderstandings and failures
to get something across that we observe daily. I would have thought that there could be no disagreement
about the damage done by this vagueness.” [ibid.]
9This is a locution which Carnap uses in the section VI titled “Value Judgements” in [Carnap (1963), 999–
1016]. There Carnap gives the following characterization of “optative”: “There is a general kind of meaning
common to all statements expressing a wish, a proposal, a request, a demand, a command, a prohibition, a
permission, a will, a decision, an approval, a disapproval, a preference, or the like, whether or not they also
contain meaning components referring to matters of fact. I shall call a sentence which, among others, has
meaning component of this kind an ‘optative sentence’ or for short ‘an optative’.” [ibid., 1001]
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in the context of action, which overlaps to some degree with the Lebenswelt in which the
participants articulate the values and preferences that guide their choices. The process
of choice can of course itself be formally represented within a decision theory or game
theory or other formalism, but the values and preferences embodied in the utility func-
tions that occur in the relevant interpretations of such formalisms must still be supplied
from outside by the people making the choice.” [Carus (2007), 280] Yes, indeed. But
what must be made explicit is the actual process by which the values are arrived at, and
precisely how these values coördinate the regulative constructed language systems. This
is an issue to which Carus provides a surprisingly insufficient answer, or, regarding the
category shifting he undertakes, no answer at all. Elaborating on the issue of the value
background of such language engineering projects, he says: “For Carnap, then, the con-
text of action and the context of knowledge are not mutually interreducible. He would
of course agree with Quine (who also acquiesces in an is-ought distinction [. . . ]) that
our values are just as much part of nature as our organisms or our social interactions or
whatever else produces those values [. . . ], and that the theory of nature is thus also a (de-
scriptive) theory of values.” [ibid.] This seems to me an unsatisfactory line of argument.
In the first place, the dynamic interplay between the language construction process and
the values that guide this process is not made any clearer by relegating the problem to
the level of (routine) science in the hope that, given sufficient time, it will discover the
mechanism of “social interactions or whatever else produces those values”. In the sec-
ond place, although such a solution might be (hypothetically) found, it does not relieve
us from the responsibility of carefully scrutinizing the presuppositions of such a hypoth-
esis. Although the thesis about the reducibility of the domain of values to the domain of
facts might in itself be philosophically insulting to some, the far more serious neglect is
Carus’ utter and disastrous silence about the relationship between systems of regulative
constructive language and the coördinating function of values in choosing a particular
linguistic framework. This lapse severely undermines the plausibility of the thesis that
his reconstruction of Carnap’s framework vindicates the Enlightenment core of Carnap’s
philosophical program.
Carnap’s program of explication, as we have seen, is clearly undergirded by the Principle
of (logico-mathematical) Tolerance presented in the Logische Syntax der Sprache (published
in 1934). The importance of the liberation brought about this transition within the do-
main of knowledge acquisition and systematization can hardly be exaggerated. Carnap’s
notion of explication that opens up a whole new space of possibilities (in a truly Musilian
spirit of a Möglichkeitswissenschaft) for language construction and scientific communica-
tion, must be seen as a potential vehicle for bringing order to the occasionally frustrating
juxtapositions between different proposals for a theory in a particular domain. Exem-
plary domains of scientific activity where a Carnapian approach might bring about new
possibilities for scientific dialogue are easy to find. We have mentioned several exam-
ples in the preceding sections, such as open problems within the foundations of physics,
philosophy of science and historiography.
I do not want to imply that Carus’ reconstruction of Carnap’s ideal is in the wrong track.
On the contrary, I think he has captured the essential core of Carnap’s covert philosoph-
ical motivation. What I find wanting in the reconstruction is the casual by-passing of
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the value-theoretical background that underlies Carnap’s program. True, Carnap never
spelled out the ethical presuppositions of his program, although there are definite hints
that such a background framework was really active in his thought (this is exemplified
in his correspondence with Neurath, for example). There are some important remarks
about the relationship between beliefs and attitudes (which is precisely what the Principle
of Tolerance is about) and about the compatibility of difference in attitudes with agree-
ment in all (relevant) beliefs in the Section VI: “Value judgements” in [Carnap (1963)],
but on the whole the discussion focuses only on the explication of certain classes of op-
tative statements without tapping into the moral presuppositions of those statements.10
Although a superficial assessment might guide us to believe that Carnap advocates a
hollow moral pluralism, there is one conspicuous feature in his philosophy that talks
back against this: the Principle of Tolerance. This principle is calculated to guarantee the
gradual improvement and precisification of the linguistic tools that we use to describe
the world. Moreover, it is calculated to guide the process of evaluation and assessment
of the different proposals for such linguistic tools in a way that leads to a convergence of
the representations that we devise and utilize to describe the world. The unity of science
(and knowledge more generally) was an ideal that Carnap never abandoned. Precisely
because this ideal undergirds much of Carnap’s work in philosophy, it would be essential
to scrutinize more carefully the presuppositions of this ideal and to spell out clearly the
moral framework in which the Principle of Tolerance is embedded. This is an issue that
needs to be delved into in far greater detail than is possible here. My intention has been
only to show that, if Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance is to be taken seriously, a reconstruc-
tion of the value-theoretic background of his ideal cannot be eschewed. Carus does not
take up this task, as we have seen. There is, however, a very important aspect to his rep-
resentation of the Carnapian ideal which I wholeheartedly endorse. I will return to this
aspect in the following sections. But on Carus’ reading, what is left of the Enlightenment
core of Carnap’s ideal, deprived of the moral basis, is bound to remain an impression of
an ethereal azure:
The ideal does not claim to know what reason is. It imposes a minimal con-
straint — any larger conception of reason must accommodate our knowledge;
it cannot be obviously inconsistent with what we know. But our knowledge is
10The conclusion of the “Value Judgements” hints at the fact that Carnap might have been interested in
spelling out his moral philosophy in more detail: “In line with my general tendencies, I would regard it as
advisable to propose explications of value statements in standardized forms in a constructed language. I
think the fact that standardized forms for cognitive statements, both logical and factual, have existed for a
long time, has contributed significantly to our clearer understanding of the nature of these statements and
the logical relations between them. I think it will hardly be possible to state precise rules for translating
value statements of the ordinary language, including those of the customary philosophical language, into
standardize forms, because the customary forms are too vague or ambiguous. The same hold of course also
for the customary cognitive statements. However, it is important that the meanings of the standardized
value statements should be made sufficiently clear, at least for practical purposes, as has been done for
cognitive statements. Furthermore, logical rules must be stated for the logical relations, especially for logical
implication, both between value statements and between value statements and cognitive statements. [. . . ] If
I had time to devote myself to this task, I would try to develop explications in the direction indicated,on the
basis of the analyses which have been given so far by pragmatists and logical empiricists. The direction of
my own work would probably be closest to that of Stevenson and Reichenbach.” [Carnap (1963), 1012–1013]
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so limited, compared to the vastness of our ignorance, that this is a very loose
constraint. It is much too early in the history of systematic human cognition
to make pronouncements about the ultimate nature of reason. We are in our
cognitive infancy. Sixty years after he first set his sights on the open sea of
free possibilities, it still lies before us, all but unexplored. We have been ex-
tremely timid, clinging to the shoreline, hardly daring to venture out of sight
of land. The warm, familiar, safe harbour of habit and tradition appeals to us
as much as it ever did to our ancestors. It is time we ventured forth again in
the pioneering spirit of the Original Enlightenment, emboldened by Carnap’s
example. [Carus (2007), 309]
6.3 History of Particular Explications as a Prerequisite of Expli-
cation
As Carus remarks in his book, “Carnap never got very far in characterising the kind
of external discourse in which ‘theoretical investigations and practical deliberations and
decisions with respect to an acceptance or a change of frameworks’ would be carried on.
He gave it a name, ‘pragmatics’, but remained vague about the details.” [Carus (2007),
266] That Carnap envisaged such an area of scientific discourse is interesting. The idea of
such a framework for addressing external questions was, of course, in stark contrast with
the position of Quine for whom all questions were internal. Quine famously regarded
the supposed distinction between semantics and pragmatics a “pernicious error.” [Quine
(1987), 211] Carnap, although entertaining hopes of making pragmatics a technical sub-
ject in keeping with his philosophical predilections, remained quite realistic about the
prospects of constructing a formal theory of pragmatics. To provide an example, Carus
relates how Carnap’s student R. M. Martin had given a proposal for a technical apparatus
for pragmatics [Martin (1959)], but that Carnap had taken a reserved stance, writing to
Evert Beth, the editor of the series to which Martin’s book had been submitted, that “it
might have been best to clear ground first with more preliminary clarifications, as agree-
ment had not yet been reached even there.” [ibid.] Carnap elaborated the general idea
further:
Since probably at the present time various authors would choose different
concepts and different methods, it might at first be advisable to write a less
technical treatise explaining the concepts, defining them informally in such a
way as to indicate clearly how they would be defined in a formalised metalan-
guage without necessarily giving actually their formalised definition, study-
ing alternative explications of the various concepts, etc. (What I have here in
mind is roughly analogous to Russell’s preparatory discussions in his Princi-
ples of Mathematics before writing the Principia or my preliminary discussions
in Meaning and Necessity in preparation for a not yet written treatise of a se-
mantics of extensions and intensions in either an extensional or an intensional
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formalised metalanguage.) [ASP (1958a)]11
Comparing the tenets of Carnap and Quine, it is easy to overlook the issues over which
they were largely in agreement. Indeed, regarding both as representatives of “naturalistic
epistemology” (a locution used by Quine), the convergence of their views on one aspect
of epistemology is notable. Although they classified the activities pertaining to knowl-
edge acquisition differently, there was a purely scientific, descriptive element to it that
brought Carnap’s view closer to that of Quine. As Carus emphasizes, “this was a part
of what he called descriptive pragmatics — the descriptive study of human cognition
in all its aspects as an essential basis for the practical task of conceptual engineering. It
was essential for that task because the biological, physiological, psychological, linguistic,
sociological, economic, and historical knowledge about our cognitive capacities and the
development of our actual knowledge are the data we have at our disposal when we seek
to construct languages and decide among explications. They define the existing possibil-
ity space within which we construct languages adequate to what we know already, and
from which we can extrapolate to imagine new possibilities.” [Carus (2007), 267] Carus’
view on the status of the descriptive element in the method of explication is succinctly
presented by the following analogy:








The relevance of the descriptive study of human cognition for the Carnapian project of
explication is, according to Carus, buttressed by the fact that “naturalistic epistemology
in this broad sense has made great strides since Carnap’s death, on many different fronts.
We know much more now about the processing involved in the various human sensory
systems, and can model higher-level capabilities like understanding language and writ-
ten texts. One of the early protagonists of the cognitive revolution, Noam Chomsky,
had used Carnap’s own idea of regarding natural languages as systems of rules. This
rule-based approach has been challenged by theories that modeled human processing on
self-organising weighted networks (parallel or ‘connectionist’ processing). Hybrids be-
tween these two approaches, seeking to portray human thought as a dialectical interplay
between the two poles of receptive processing and active shaping of a ‘situation model’
[. . . ] recapitulate a basic Kantian motif and are thus reminiscent of Helmholtz, who has
justly been called the father of cognitive science.” [ibid., 268] The accelerated progress in
these fields has been amazing, of course. What seems to pose a significant challenge to
scholars working in this vein is the social dimension of a “naturalized epistemology” that
rests upon the detailed findings of cognitive science. The situation is especially problem-
atic in connection with the constitution of scientific knowledge and the basis of scientific
rationality. How exactly is the social dimension of scientific activity accommodated in
the viewpoint of cognitive science? What are the specific social mechanisms responsible
for the process of knowledge acquisition and systematization that takes place under the
11Cited in [Carus (2007), 267n]
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purview of the scientific enterprise? What is often taken as a critical shortcoming of
Carnap’s approach is, as Carus rightly remarks, that “he did not in practice distinguish
between the scientific enterprise [as a sociological phenomenon] and the knowledge gen-
erated by it as an objective artefact.” For us this distinction has become something of a
habitude of thought, thoroughly infused as we are with the ideas of the tradition of sci-
ence studies that took shape in the wake of Thomas Kuhn’s hugely influential Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. What Kuhn perpetuated was a systematic application of empirical
inquiry in studying empirical inquiry. When Carnap (who was the editor of the series in
which Kuhn’s book appeared) encountered Kuhn’s book, he embraced it with enthusi-
asm. In fact, he regarded it as both a natural and important supplementation of his own
work in inductive logic. [Reisch (1991)] But it is doubtful that he would have approved
of the general view on the scientific enterprise that the ‘Science Studies’ had constructed
by the end of the twentieth century. He did not foresee this development of course, the
“Pandora’s Box that Kuhn’s book would open”. [ibid., 269] As Carus puts it, “[h]e could
not have conceived of the situation that has now resulted, in which there is no agreement
among historians and philosophers of science even on the most basic assumptions about
the character of the enterprise.” What is most needed, then, is “a pluralistic view that
regards the different positions as proposals for the form of meta-language for the study
of science.” Only such a view “could have any hope of bringing about whatever mutual
understanding might still be possible.” [ibid.] It is precisely here that Carus’ interpreta-
tion of Carnap’s program proves to be most illuminating. Taking into account the highly
perplexing situation in philosophy and history of science, Carus proposes that Carnap’s
method of explication, the prerequisite of which, as we saw above, is a process of clari-
fication, suggests “a program for clarificatory pragmatics consisting in a certain kind of
conceptual history of the scientific enterprise, with special attention to episodes in which
major changes of theoretical direction were undertaken.” [ibid.] Such ‘internal’ histories
should then be supplemented with the point of view provided by external histories of sci-
ence, including sociology, psychology, economics, and anthropology of science, which
all work in the service of descriptive pragmatics. But this is not an adequate picture of
the whole range of historically informed studies of science, as Carus readily emphasizes.
What is, in my view, the most illuminating aspect of his interpretative framework is the
importance he places on histories of particular explications:
But even the sum of such internal and external histories do not yet suffice to
yield what Carnapian pragmatics actually requires to support the program
of explication, the external discourse in which ‘theoretical investigations and
practical deliberations and decisions with respect to an acceptance or a change
of frameworks’ are pursued. For this we need, rather, something that can
shed light on the history of explication itself, or more concretely, the history
of particular explications. It is only against the background of such histories
that the present activity of explication can be properly informed about its limits
and its possibilities. [Carus (2007), 270]
This viewpoint is in perfect harmony with the Machian conception of history of science
as a background framework for our creative tasks of knowledge acquisition and sys-
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tematization which I alluded to in Chapter 1. If we believe Mach, history of science is
irreplaceable; no other discipline could equally act in the role of facilitating the process of
devising new and fruitful theories and conceptual tools in the way of opening our minds
to conceptual possibilities on the one hand, and disclosing tacit principles and modes
of thought on the other. The project of historical elucidation of the different particular
explications in a given field is thus seen to be one of the most important undertakings
in philosophy of science. In keeping with this observation Howard Stein has drawn a
distinction between “the enterprise of knowledge” and the “enterprise of understand-
ing” [Stein (2004)], thus showing us how acutely conscious he is of the fact that to be able
to use our knowledge, we must understand it (at least to some degree). The “enterprise
of understanding”, then, as Carus remarks, “at least partly consists in constructing and
explaining precisely those conceptual genealogies, sequences of explications, that pro-
vide present tasks of explication with their possibility space.” [Carus (2007), 270] Such
an approach might well be called, according to Carus, philosophical history of science. I will
now proceed to give an example of the problems that this kind of history of science could
tackle with.
6.3.1 An example of philosophical history of science
Probabilistic concepts in physics
In this section I will illustrate with an example how the prerequisite of explication, viz.,
the task of providing genealogies of important scientific concepts and ideas, proceeds in
the intersection of mathematics, physics and philosophy. I concentrate on the application
of probabilistic notions in physics and the perennial problem of determinism. Giving
an account from a historical point of view of one of the most recalcitrant problems in
mathematics and physics, the three-body problem, I illustrate how the approaches of all
these different disciplines supplement each other and contribute towards acquiring an
enhanced understanding of one of the most challenging issues in modern science. I begin
with a general note on the significance of probabilistic notions in physics.
The interrelation between the development of physics and of probability theory is from
a philosophical point of view a relatively little researched, but intellectually stimulating
topic. Probabilistic notions were first developed independently without recourse to prac-
tical problems in physics. As is well known, this took place in France in the 1650s, when
gambling was a popular and fashionable habit. A passionate gambler, the chevalier De
Méré, had the idea of consulting one of the most illustrious amateur-mathematicians of
his time, Blaise Pascal, on some questions connected with certain games of chance. This
instigated Pascal to begin correspondence with some of his mathematical friends, most
notably Pierre de Fermat. This correspondence marked the origin of classical probability
theory. But it was only after the development of classical statistical mechanics in the late
1800s that the probabilistic concepts started their invasion to physics. This had impor-
tant consequences for the development of modern probability theory. Another impulse
came from astronomical dynamics where the problem of determining the distribution of
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the partial quotients in the continued fraction expansion of a real number was crucial for
the application of perturbation theory. The latter problem, which had seemingly no con-
nection with more general problems in physics, led in the hands of Henri Poincaré to the
first sketch of the theory of dynamical systems. Moreover, the computational possibilities
for applying these notions widened considerably during the latter half of 20th century as
modern computers became available. This opened up a completely new area of research,
the theory of computability, which brought about a number of interdisciplinary innova-
tions in mathematical logic, computer science, mathematics, physics and even biology.
The most important new ideas in the theory of computability were provided by Kurt
Gödel, Alonzo Church, Stephen Kleene and Alan Turing, among others. In addition to
these developments the scientific community witnessed the birth of the fundamentally
indeterministic physical picture of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, which received its
first coherent formulation in Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics of 1925. As von Plato relates
in his historical study on the foundations of modern probability theory: “The concept of
probability in quantum mechanics arose through Born’s work in the middle 1926, from
the soil of Heisenberg’s and Einstein’s transition probabilities, de Broglie’s matter waves,
Einstein’s gas theory and Schrödinger’s wave function.” [von Plato (1994), 17] It is ar-
guably true that without the changes brought about the development of modern physics,
modern probability theory could not have obtained the remarkable position it today en-
joys in scientific and philosophical thinking.
This, however, is not the whole story. Firstly, the transition from classical to modern prob-
ability is not at all as well documented as one would be inclined to think. Jan von Plato’s
monograph Creating modern probability [ibid.] is one of the rare contributions towards clar-
ifying the conceptual developments in the early 1900s in probability theory. More work
remains to be done. Secondly, a thorough historical and philosophical analysis of the
importance of computational ideas in the attempts to intellectually grasp the nature of
some intricate dynamical phenomena in physics and astronomy — e.g. the three-body
problem — is wanting. The history and evolution of the problems that gave rise to the
theory of dynamical systems and their connection to the computational ideas, such as the
theory of complexity, remains inadequately charted. This is an especially grave shortcom-
ing in the light of the attempts to found an objective interpretation of probability on the
basis of ergodic theory. The task of clarifying and representing the historical evolution
of these seemingly disparate areas of research will in a very important way open new
conceptual possibilities for the clarification of the philosophical problem which concerns
probability and its role in physics. Thirdly, the significance of the notion of probability in
quantum mechanics is still widely disputed. On the one hand it is contested which fun-
damental principles the probability calculus of QM is to be founded on. If the program
of ergodic theory is entertained, a suitable candidate for the foundations of quantum me-
chanical probabilities is the quantum stochastic calculus developed among others by K.
R. Parthasarathy. On the other hand some interpretations of quantum mechanics make
explicit use of probabilities in the epistemic sense, that is, they are inherently subjectivist
in nature. How exactly this is going to be reconciled with the objectively interpreted
probability amplitudes predicted by Schrödinger’s equation remains an open problem.12
12In my view, the attempts of David Deutsch, David Wallace and Hilary Greaves to reformulate the Ev-
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I think that here as well, Carnap’s method of explication finds its most natural field of
application. A much broader and deeper account of the theoretical and experimental de-
tails of modern quantum theory is called for, and such an undertaking is ideally suited
to researchers acting in several interdependent fields.
One of the most prominent areas where explication might prove its mettle is the very
interesting current attempt to devise a coherent theory of Quantum Gravity. The discus-
sions within this area essentially center around the question about which form the pu-
tative fundamental theory of physics should take. Given the cornucopia of different ap-
proaches in quantum gravity (string theory, loop quantum gravity, QFT in curved spaces,
lattice approaches, Euclidean quantum gravity, non-commutative geometry, quantum
cosmology, twistors, etc.) there is a genuine need for a general framework for evalu-
ating the different proposals in a non-biased manner. It seems to me that this situation
in physics presents a proving ground par excellence for the kind of conceptual engineer-
ing tasks coördinated by the ideal of explication that Carnap envisioned in the twenti-
eth century. The multiplicity of the mathematical models and the variety of different
theoretical frameworks flourishing in this particular field is primarily an indication of
the fact that progress cannot be obtained on a purely formal or technical level, but that
we are essentially dealing with a very complex problem in the determination of which
all the following ingredients enter in a fascinating way: rigorous mathematics and bold
speculations, concrete physical models and general schemes, fundamental questions and
technical issues as well as phenomenological scenarios (which refer to models which are
not explicitly based on derivations from fundamental laws but operate on an ‘emergent’
level). The conceptual problems are mainly semantical: it is not entirely clear how the dif-
ferent mathematical proposals are related on the level of fundamental physical concepts
and theory construction. One of the major watersheds among the theory-candidates is
the assumption of a background space-time: some theories (such as string theory and
M-theory) presuppose the existence of a background space analogously with quantum
field theories, whereas others presuppose that the quantum states themselves define and
determine the space-time analogously with the way in which the solutions of the equa-
tions of General Relativity determine space-time. A clear account of the general situation
is provided by Carlo Rovelli, one of the leading researchers in the discipline: “Conceptu-
ally, the key question is whether or not it is logically possible to understand the world in
the absence of fundamental notions of time and time evolution, and whether or not this
is consistent with our experience of the world. [. . . ] The difficulties of Quantum Gravity
are indeed largely conceptual. Progress in Quantum Gravity cannot be just technical. The
search for a quantum theory of gravity raises once more old questions such as : What is
space? What is time? What is the meaning of ‘moving’? Is motion to be defined with
respect to objects or with respect to space? And also: What is causality? What is the role
of the observer in physics?” [Rovelli (2009), 8; in Approaches to Quantum Gravity (2009),
Cambridge University Press]
Since its honorable beginnings physics has evolved to an extraordinarily rich discipline
with a wealth of subdisciplines. This has also meant increasing interaction between
erettian interpretation of QM by means of decision theoretic concepts seems quite problematic.
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physics and computer science. In the first place, in a practical level, computer science
has given physics mainly computational power, creating within physics whole new ar-
eas of specific interest such as soliton theory, chaotic dynamics and quantum lattice the-
ory. But, in the second place it has given rise to an entirely new conceptual approach to
physics. In a sense, it has brought about a diffusion of concepts, one of the most extreme
examples of which is the idea of the physical world as a computer. It is these more fun-
damental, ontological ideas, that have proved to be the most important ingredients in the
discussion about the importance of computability theory in physics. However, it seems
that the more sober approach of tracking the historical development of the basic ideas
of computability and their relation to probabilistic notions in physics would also shed
considerable light on the more fundamental questions about the computable features of
physical processes. For this purpose it would be expedient to assess to what extent the
classical dynamical problems in physics and astronomy have worked their way back to
the core of the discussions about the role of randomness in nature and probabilistic laws
in the physical sciences. Indeed, notwithstanding the intriguing questions brought up by
the recent developments in quantum mechanics concerning the prospects for quantum
computation and the algorithmic nature of all physical processes, it can still be argued
that our understanding of probability and probabilistic laws in physics will be enhanced
by familiarity with the classical dynamical problems in physics and astronomy. I will
briefly adduce a putative line of research with respect to these questions in the following
section.
On determinism, randomness and chaos in classical mechanics
As mathematicians, physicists and philosophers of science well know, the fascinating in-
terplay between the notions of determinism, randomness and chaos constitutes one of
the most profound conceptual puzzles of modern science. It is my goal in this section to
shed some light on the origins of the theoretical developments that have led to the obser-
vation that essential to an understanding of determinism in a more philosophical sense
is an appreciation of the varieties of ways it works in physics. It is often said that New-
tonian physics presents the paradigmatic example of causal determinism. Nothing could
be further from the truth, however. In this section I reiterate the reasons for this, drawing
on the accounts of determinism of John Earman and Patrick Suppes. My exposition is far
more limited, though, than the one provided by [Earman (1986)], for example. I attempt
to present only some of the important lines of the historical development that have led to
the appreciation of the richness of the notion of determinism in physics. I focus explicitly
on the three-body problem and its significance for the development of the contemporary
notions of determinism and instability.
The most prominent contribution in this area has been made by Henri Poincaré whose
pioneering researches in celestial mechanics opened up the way for the theory of dynam-
ical systems. Poincaré is the first mathematician to have illustrated the ideas pertaining
to what is known today as chaos. Another important line of research, not altogether un-
related to Poincaré’s, is the theory of random sequences first articulated by the Russian
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mathematician A. N. Kolmogorov, and subsequently elaborated by Gregory Chaitin, Per
Martin-Löf, and Michiel van Lambalgen. I attempt to show that these seemingly dis-
parate lines of mathematical research come together under the purview of the theory of
dynamical systems and that the interaction between them has resulted in the most ef-
ficient conceptual tools for analyzing the role and meaning of determinism in modern
science. At the very least, I hope that I can convey the reader the necessity of thoroughly
examining the workings of determinism, randomness and chaos in physics to get a firm
grasp of their conceptual relations. A proper place to start is classical physics, more par-
ticularly celestial mechanics, where all of these notions come to play a significant role.
Preliminary remarks on determinism
To begin with, we need a decent enough working definition of determinism. But this
poses us a challenge of its own. As John Earman has made clear, “we cannot begin to
discuss the implications of physics for the truth of the doctrine of determinism until we
know what determinism is; on the other hand, no precise definition can be fashioned
without making substantive assumptions about the nature of physical reality [. . . ]”. [Ear-
man (1986), 4] Any working definition (of determinism) is bound to be somewhat vague.
In Earman’s impish phrase: “the price for this vagueness is the loss of precision or gen-
erality, or both.” [ibid.] But this is not fatal at this point: as we investigate a concrete
example from the history of celestial mechanics, the boundaries of the notion become
sharper, and hopefully we begin to get a firmer grasp of what is at issue.
The following working definition of determinism is quite familiar. However, it is not
the only intuitive conception of determinism in the market (even household determinism
comes in many flavors). What I wish to convey is the extraordinary difficulty arising from
the complex interplay between epistemological and ontological issues. Precisely because
of the rough interface between these domains in the problem of determinism it is of ut-
most importance to clarify both aspects of the problem; undue emphasis on either aspect
results in a deficient conception of determinism. Philosophically it would be desirable
to be able to answer the following questions: What are the main conceptual constituents
of the notion of determinism? What are the problems that it allows us to define more ac-
curately and how does it confine the possibilities for solution of these problems? I do not
intend to answer these questions in this section; I will merely cover some background
both historically and conceptually that would facilitate the work on these general, yet
delicate, problems. The areas that are essential to understanding determinism include at
least traditional philosophy of science, mathematics, metaphysics, practical physics and
history of science. The pluralistic approach is called for by the very nature of the prob-
lem; only by interweaving these disparate threads of erudition shall we be able to delve
into the intricacies of determinism.
295
A working definition for determinism
The definition that shall work as a starting point for our inquiry has a connection to
a quite artistic vision of William James, who in a 1884 lecture to the Harvard Divinity
School stated:
What does determinism profess? It professes that those parts of the universe
already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall
be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part
we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future
complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in
each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron
block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning. [James
(1956), 150]
This vision encapsulates the gist of what John Earman [Earman (1986), 5] has called the
classical world picture. It consists of the view that the spatio-temporal structure of the
world is assumed to embody an absolute or observer-independent simultaneity. Thus,
contrary to the lesson we allegedly ought to have learned from special relativity, ‘the-
world-at-a-given-time’ is a meaningful concept. Furthermore, at each instant of time,
the world is completely characterized by specifying the values of all the relevant (physi-
cal) magnitudes namely instantaneous positions and velocities of particles, instantaneous
values of electric and magnetic field vectors, gravitational fields etc. Nevertheless, this
form of determinism does not assume materialism or mechanism in any narrow sense.
All that is required is that all relevant variables or magnitudes have a spatio-temporal
representation.13The definition of determinism that is probably quite familiar and the
one which I deem adequate for the present purposes is this:
Classical Determinism The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determin-
ism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go
thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. [SEP: “Causal Determinism”14 [Hoefer
(2010)]]
The above definition is often alternatively taken to present the definition of causal deter-
minism (a purely terminological difference). This is likely to lead to a confusion. Thus, a
few things need to be emphasized. I am explicitly confining the issue of causation out-
side the present discussion. There is a regrettable terminological confusion pertaining
to the use of the terms causation and causality in the philosophical literature. On the
one hand, I will here stipulate causality to mean the phenomenon of determinism as cap-
tured by the above definition. On the other hand, causation is a concept that I take to
13This requirement being compatible, for example, with the Leibnizian ontology of monads, which by my
lights cannot be rendered materialistic (straightforwardly), no matter which way you look at it.
14The acronym “SEP” refers to the internet portal Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This particular refer-
ence can be identified as http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/.
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pertain especially to the notions of cause and effect, and the plethora of problems relat-
ing to them. These problems are notoriously obscure.15 Therefore the strategy of tackling
determinism via causation seems to me impetuous. We will be better served by trying
another route. Maybe causation could be approached more fruitfully once we have a
firmer grasp of determinism simpliciter,16 but for our present purposes such a detailed
examination is not needed. I will therefore leave this issue aside. Let me now proceed to
introduce definitions of determinism that put the emphasis differently from the distinctly
ontological mode presented above.
Laplacian determinism
For nearly two hundred years an alternative vision of determinism has greatly affected
the thoughts of eminent scientists and philosophers. For some this approach has had con-
siderable appeal. It was first formulated eloquently by Pierre Simon de Laplace, whose
work has been pivotal to the development of mathematical astronomy. However, the
view in question is not to be found in his magnum opus on celestial mechanics,17 but in
the equally awe-inspiring book on probability theory [Laplace (1820)]. In it one finds the
following passage in which a metaphysical tone is quickly modified to an epistemological
one, conflating the nuances of Jamesian determinism with the scheme of predictability:
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its
anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one
instant an intelligence which would comprehend all the forces by which na-
ture is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it —
an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis — it would
15This at least is the case with the majority of philosophical literature dealing with the subject. I think it
is yet premature to try to assess how the concepts of determinism and causation would interact given the
theoretical framework of Judea Pearl [Pearl (2000)] for explicating causation (Pearl’s book is from my point
of view misleadingly titled Causality!). Pearl is mainly working with probabilistic models, whereas in this
essay I am explicitly concerned with (systems of) deterministic differential equations. The issues are not
unrelated, however.
16D. H. Mellor would certainly disagree, for he has chosen the exactly opposite strategy of tackling causa-
tion first [Mellor (1995)]. Only afterwards has he something substantial to say about physics and determin-
ism, but this seems to me to be a dubious order of procedure. The main problem with Mellor’s approach is,
I think, that it is confined explicitly within the boundaries of metaphysics. For he says: “Some philosophers
reduce their metaphysics to physics, others to logic and semantics. I reduce mine to neither, while taking
account of both. So while I accommodate the relevant results of modern physics, I will not for example
leave it to quantum physics to tell me whether causation can act immediately across space-like intervals. On
the contrary: only when our metaphysics has told us what causation is can we see if physics could reveal
unmediated action at a distance (it couldn’t).”[ibid., 5.] I am not able to see how Mellor is taking the relevant
results of physics (or logic and semantics for that matter) into account, if it is only metaphysics that can pro-
vide the answer to the question what causation is. What I feel necessary to emphasize is the pressing need
of studying the most intricate conceptual tools of philosophy of science in conjunction with the concrete
problems provided by natural sciences.
17Laplace’s results pertaining to celestial mechanics are compiled in the five-volume Mécanique Céleste
(1799-1825).
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embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the uni-
verse and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and
the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. The human mind offers,
in the perfection which it has been able to give to astronomy, a feeble idea
of this intelligence. Its discoveries in mechanics and geometry added to that
of universal gravity, have enabled it to comprehend in the same analytical
expressions the past and future states of the system of the world. Applying
the same method to some other objects of its knowledge, it has succeeded in
referring to general laws observed phenomena and in foreseeing those which
given circumstances ought to produce. All these efforts in the search for truth
tend to lead it back continually to the vast intelligence which we have just
mentioned, but from which it will always remain infinitely removed. This
tendency, peculiar to the human race, is that which renders it superior to an-
imals; and their progress in this respect distinguishes nations and ages and
constitutes their true glory. [ibid.]18
This is a portentous view indeed. Although it has much of the aesthetic charm of James’s
rendering of determinism, it lacks definiteness. If this approach to determinism is to
work, we first need a standard (an ideal epistemic agent analogous to Laplace’s demon)
for assessing which phenomena lie in principle within the sphere of predictive power. But
this seems somehow obscure. How is this standard going to be defined? What are the
characteristics of an ideal epistemic agent? Furthermore, how are we going to accommo-
date the progressive nature of science within the scheme of a fixed epistemic viewpoint?
That is, how do we guarantee that the standards of the ideal epistemic agent actually ren-
der it capable of accounting for all of the possible configurations of natural phenomena,
a majority of which certainly lie beyond our present capacities for both mental and the-
oretical presentation? In fact, these standards are bound to be merely arbitrary rules to
settle which natural processes we regard as deterministic (mechanistic, computable, etc.).
Even if this definition were feasible, it would be bound to change with time; an awkward
result given that one of the intuitive ideas behind determinism is that of immutability
(cf. James’s vision above). Even though our whole project is about assessing different
senses of determinism, the epistemic approach appears to provide too many of them.
For example, the most efficient Cray computer, a hypothetically more efficient quantum
computing device, or a Turing machine would all yield different senses of determinism.
How to settle this question? How to arrive at a satisfactory definition of determinism-
as-predictability if the notion of predictability depends essentially on the attributes and
skills of the agent that makes the prediction? Perhaps the most cogent way is to drop
the condition for predictability out of hand and concentrate on the ontological features
of determinism. Be that as it may, the epistemic approach has taken such a firm grip of
some notable philosophers of science, that we must provide a glimpse of their views and
(mis)conceptions about determinism. To these I now turn.
18P. Suppes’ translation in [Suppes (1974), 5]
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Popperian determinism
Karl Popper distinguished two senses of determinism. He referred to these as metaphysi-
cal and scientific determinism, respectively. Now, what did Popper mean by the former? I
do not see a better way of explicating it than the vivid rendering of James quoted above.
Therefore, it seems to me that with the term “metaphysical determinism” Popper alludes
rather to a tendentious presupposition of determinism than to a genuine doctrine con-
cerning it. A realist in spirit, his intellectual inclinations led him to explicate determin-
ism (as a philosophical doctrine) from a starting point quite different from the Jamesian
view. The latter variant of determinism, which Popper called scientific, seemed to him
adequate as a philosophical definition of determinism. Popper thought that the doctrine
of scientific determinism concerned only that part of the world that was described by a
scientific theory. To be more precise, according to Popper scientific determinism is
the doctrine that the state of any closed physical system at any given future
instant of time can be predicted, even from within the system, with any speci-
fied degree of precision, by deducing the prediction from theories, in conjunc-
tion with initial conditions whose required degree of precision can always be
calculated (in accordance with the principle of accountability) if the predic-
tion task is given. [Popper (1982), 36]
The connection with determinism of the Laplacian variety is obvious. But what distin-
guishes Popper’s account from that of Laplace is the idea that
The Demon, like a human scientist, must not be assumed to ascertain initial
conditions with absolute mathematical precision; like a human scientist, he will
have to be content with a finite degree of precision. [ibid., 34]
As Earman points out, the principle of accountability is imposed to ensure that the re-
quired degree of precision for the initial conditions can be known beforehand. [Earman
(1986), 8] This is to parry the dismissal of a prediction which fails to meet the specified er-
ror limits on the grounds that the initial data were not accurate enough. The conclusions
Popper draws from these premisses are somewhat surprising — in two distinct senses.
Firstly, Popper reaches the correct (from the point of view provided by hindsight) conclu-
sion that, contrary to widespread belief, classical physics exhibits systems which are not
deterministic. This is an important result; it is only that the justification for it seems to
be in the wrong track. I will explain this in a moment. Secondly, he infers somewhat im-
petuously that because the combination of a strong form of instability with the inability
of the Demon to ascertain initial condition with mathematically exact precision may lead
to breakdown in prediction, determinism must fail also. The conclusion does not follow,
if we drop the requirement of prediction and determinism working in tandem. Indeed,
in accordance with the ontological predicament of James, some future states of a given
system may be unpredictable (given any suitable explication of the Popperian criteria of
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predictability) although any other future complement of the given process of dynamic
evolution than the one fixed from eternity is impossible.
Now, what is wrong with the justification Popper provides for maintaining the thesis
that classical physics need not be deterministic? The justification Popper seems to have
in mind is the following: classical physics does not imply determinism any more than
quantum mechanics does, because there is always an irreducible statistical element in
any prediction made with a prima facie deterministic theory.19 So the reason for the break-
down of determinism for Popper is the (practically) unavoidable uncertainty pertaining
to statistical analyses of the data provided by observations. It is therefore a purely epis-
temic matter to assess whether a given phenomenon is under sway of determinism. What
complicates Popper’s position is that he somehow tends to regard certain theories, e.g.,
classical physics (the status of which as a theory is not unambiguously decided without
certain reservations and conceptual refinements) as intrinsically deterministic (cf. his no-
tion of a prima facie deterministic theory above). As Popper’s criterion for determinism
is epistemic, he encounters severe problems in explicating determinism in the context
of classical mechanics. The theory of Newtonian mechanics is interpreted in the Poppe-
rian framework by its observational consequences. The semantics of such a theory has
to be deductively derivable from the evidence reported (possibly in a observational sub-
language). But as has been shown by Stein, for example, [Stein (1992), (1994)] no such
comprehensive theory exists. What is required, is an auxiliary schematization of the ob-
servational procedure to help in the derivation of future observations from the theory
without requiring the theory itself to account for the entire process of observation. The
rather intricate questions of instrumentation and selection of statistical models, among
other things, greatly complicate the seemingly straightforward picture of classical me-
chanics provided by Popper. (Classical physics cannot provide a very realistic picture
of the tools and processes of measurement, for example.) The assumption about pre-
dictability at any given level of accuracy is too strong to be accounted for, even in the
Newtonian picture. Nevertheless, with regard to his conception of prima facie determin-
istic theories, Popper seems to be sliding towards a position resembling Laplace’s. As
Earman has noted, “Popper’s view is particularly awkward in the case of classical statis-
tical mechanics because it has the effect of brushing aside one of the central foundations
problems; namely, how can the ‘random’ and ‘chaotic’ behavior exhibited on the macro-
level by, say, a box of gas be reconciled with the micro-determinism of the gas molecules?
After many decades of research, it has become apparent that a large part the answer lies
precisely in instability.” [Earman (1986), 9] If Popper’s aim was, as he claimed in The
Open Universe, to “make room within physical theory [. . . ] for indeterminism” [Popper
(1983), xxi], it has to be admitted that he succeeded — but only according to his own
inadequate standards. His success is explainable by his advocating an arbitrary formula
of determinism (determinism defined in terms of finite prediction tasks) which was to
be couched as a ‘scientific’ doctrine, scientific determinism, in accordance with his fal-
sifiability criterion. What ultimately challenges this kind of approach — irrespective of
19Classical physics is for Popper a prima facie deterministic theory on the grounds that its determinism is a
property of the theory and not of the world. N.B. It is not at all clear how this conception is to be reconciled
with the Popperian account of determinism as predictability. I will touch upon this matter shortly.
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being critical of the epistemic point of view — is that in certain well-defined situations,
if the Popperian demon is incapable of charting the unfolding of physical events, this
could follow, not from the indeterministic nature of the system, but from its instability.20
Thus, there are varieties of deterministic unfolding of events which Popper’s definition
is entirely insensitive to. Let me now investigate yet a couple of other definitions which
do not seem to have this same defect.
Alternative definitions of determinism
¶In the article “On the Notion of Cause with Applications to the Free-Will Problem”
(1953) [Russell (1953)], Bertrand Russell makes the effort of finding a definition of deter-
minism that would not be burdened by the emphatically epistemic elements of Laplace’s
description. Here’s his proposal:
A system is said to be ‘deterministic’ when, given certain data, e1, e2, . . . , en at
times t1, t2, . . . , tn respectively, concerning this system, if Et is the state of the
system at any time t, there is a functional relation of the form
Et = f (e1, t1, e2, t2 . . . , en, tn).
The system will be ‘deterministic throughout the given period’ if t, in the
above formula, may be any time within that period . . . If the universe, as a
whole, is such a system, determinism is true of the universe; if not, not. [ibid.,
398]
Is this a successful, scientifically accurate rendering of the Jamesian vision of determin-
ism? At first glance it would seem so, but when analysed more carefully, it is seen to
result in the following position. If we take the example provided by Russell (and reit-
erated by Earman [Earman (1986), 11]), we can, for the sake of an argument, think of
a universe so simple that it contains only a single dimensionless particle. Furthermore,
we may suppose that the state of the particle at any instant t is specified by its position
coordinates xt, yt, zt. Now, imagine the particle moving in an arbitrary manner, the only
condition being that it can occupy only a unique place at a time; the trajectory of the
particle may be as complex as you like, provided only that the uniqueness condition is
satisfied. Then it is a mathematical fact that there must exist functions f1, f2, f3 such that
xt = f1(t), yt = f2(t), zt = f3(t). The upshot of this is that the definition amounts to
triviality, no matter in which way you complicate the picture by adding other particles
and additional state variables. As Russell noted:
It follows that, theoretically, the whole state of the material universe at a time t
must be capable of being exhibited as a function of t. Hence our universe will
be deterministic in the sense defined above. But if this is true, no information
is conveyed about the universe in stating that it is deterministic. [ibid., 401]
20I will come to the issue of instability in a moment.
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Russell tries to evade the triviality result by imposing additional conditions, in the first
palace on the function (universally termed Russell function), and in the second place on
the universe — the latter being a time-honored strategy of genuine meta-physicians. The
condition on the Russell function is that it ought to be simple. But how tight is the connec-
tion between determinism and simplicity? To a fairly unprejudiced thinker, not that tight.
Search for simplicity is a heuristic principle well worth considering in lesser contexts, but
when tackling determinism (and the state function of a given system), not a very plau-
sible one. Indeed, one could have either of the following extreme combinations: utmost
simplicity of the universe (both in terms of content and temporal evolution) without a
trace of the Jamesian variety of determinism on one hand, and a highly complex universe
with a completely deterministic pattern of evolution, on the other. How about the latter
condition? Russell suggests that time should not be allowed to enter explicitly into the
definition of the Russell function. This condition is justified by the independent assump-
tion about the “uniformity of nature”, which Russell explains to have the meaning that
“no scientific law involves time as an argument, unless, of course, it is given in integrated
form, in which case lapse of time, though not absolute time, may appear in the formulae”.
[ibid., 401] The issue of uniformity, however, is quite complicated. Though it might seem
upon the surface that a divergence from uniformity might result in an indeterministic
picture of the universe (as in the case of a constant of nature, such as the gravitational
constant G, changing linearly as a function of time) it is not at all clear that such dynam-
ics entails non-deterministic evolution that is open to ambiguous future possibilities. It
is evident that the problem of time and time symmetries are most intimately connected
with the problem of determinism. And they definitely figure prominently within the is-
sue of uniformity. Thus, to give a satisfactory account of the question of “the uniformity
of nature”, careful scrutiny would have to be given to these issues.21
¶Patrick Suppes, whose seminal work in the philosophy of science has proven invalu-
able in instigating and guiding the study of the issues pertaining to determinism and
indeterminism, presents the familiar Laplacian view of determinism in his lectures on
‘probabilistic metaphysics’ (1974):
Undoubtedly, the most famous single passage on determinism is that by
Laplace, found, I emphasize, not in his Celestial Mechanics, but in the intro-
duction to his treatise on probability. He asserts that from a knowledge of
the present state of the universe an ‘intelligence’, or as perhaps we might say
in modern terminology, ‘a computer adequate to the task’, would be able to
determine the entire past and future of the universe. [Suppes (1974), 4]
Suppes himself does not subscribe to this view of determinism, of course. He maintains
that it is the prevalent view on determinism, and, consequently, one that he should be
prepared to criticize in promoting his program of probabilistic empiricism. (This appears
on the surface to be the familiar process of making straw-men, although it seems that
21It is necessary to note here that it is not the principle of explicating functional relationships as such that
is problematic in Russell’s account. Rather, the problem verges on the preposterous attempt to encapsulate
the whole of physical reality in a single functional relationship (cf. the Weltformel of Einstein).
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Suppes is here perfectly guileless.) What distinguishes Suppes’ approach from that of
Popper is that he links the Laplacian version of determinism to a concrete physical the-
ory, namely the special system of particle mechanics of which an axiomatic presentation
has been given in [McKinsey, Sugar & Suppes (1953)]. The importance of this step can-
not be exaggerated. The condition of predictability is not explicitly referred to, although
it undoubtedly is tacitly assumed. Most importantly, nothing in Suppes’ formulation of
determinism hinges on predictability. Instead of a general and indefinite description that
Popper gave in connection with his definition of determinism we are now provided with
a definite, mathematical theory which purports to exemplify determinism in the Lapla-
cian sense. It is expedient for our purposes to adduce the explication of Suppes. After
this we are in a good position to understand the radical transition in our understanding
of determinism brought about the three-body problem.
Suppes’ system of axioms for the system of particle mechanics is based on five primitive
concepts: a finite set P of particles, an interval T of real numbers for the measurement of
time, a mass function m, a position function s, and a force function f . The reader who is
interested in the exact structure of the system and the content of the axioms is advised to
consult the original paper [ibid.]. I give here only the theorem that according to Suppes,
captures essentially the idea of Laplacian determinism. The theorem is as follows:
Theorem 6 Let P = 〈P, T, m, s, f 〉 and P ′ = 〈P′, T′, m′, s′, f ′〉 be two systems of classical
particle mechanics such that P = P′, T = T′, m = m′ and f = f ′, and for some t0 in T let the
positions and velocities of identical particles in the two systems be identical. Then the trajectories
of the particles in both systems are identical or, in other words, the position functions are identical
for the two systems, i.e. s = s′. [Suppes (1974), 6]
Note that the theorem depends on the absence of collisions. Thus it is necessary to make
either of the following assumptions for the theorem to hold: (1) particles are penetrable,22
(2) during the period of time T for which the analysis holds, no collisions occur, either
because of separation of distance or because of the particular configuration of motion.
This theorem is, in essence, equivalent to the definition of Laplacian determinism which
John Earman gives in his book [Earman (1986)]. The only difference is that Earman uti-
lizes the “pictorially appealing approach” of possible worlds. In Earman’s nomenclature
W stands for the collection of physically possible worlds (possible worlds satisfying the
natural laws obtaining in the actual world). The definition runs:
Definition 7 The world W ∈ W is Laplacian deterministic just in case for any W ′ ∈ W , if
W and W ′ agree at any time, then they agree for all times. [ibid., 13]
22Although not a tenable assumption within classical physics, this is not as unreasonable a restriction as it
sounds: for example, two photons cannot couple together directly, since they carry no charge. This means,
roughly, that in a certain sense a system of photons can be regarded as penetrable particles. However, there
are higher order processes in which photon-photon interactions play a very important role, and hence the
assumption of unobstructed penetration is not universally valid even in the case of photons. Neutrino-
neutrino interactions are even more exotic (and do not manifest at all within the ordinary energy range
encountered in the solar system, for example), taking place mainly in core-collapse supernovæ, Early Uni-
verse, and possibly in gamma-ray bursts. These are the best examples I can think of in connection with the
assumption of free penetration.
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Other varieties of determinism could be produced indefinitely by explicating the features,
and modifications of those features, of the space-time regions which are determined, and
which, in their turn, do the determining. These varieties would turn out useful in dis-
cussing the status of determinism in relativistic particle mechanics [ibid., pp. 17 & 55–79],
but since my focus in this section is on classical celestial mechanics, I do not examine
their characteristics here, but turn to matters celestial instead.
The three-body problem — its historical background
The notorious three-body problem, “the most celebrated of all dynamical problems”
[Whittaker (1937)], can be presented deceptively simply: How do three celestial bodies
move under their mutual gravitational attraction? To be a little more specific, this may
be enunciated as follows (as is done by one of the most prominent mathematicians of the
beginning of the last century):
Three particles attract each other according to the Newtonian law, so that be-
tween each pair of particles there is an attractive force which is proportional
to the product of the masses of the particles and the inverse square of their
distance apart: they are free to move in space, and are initially supposed to
be moving in any given manner; to determine their subsequent motion. [ibid.,
339]
The simplicity of the statement of the problem — as is often the case in mathematics
— belies the complexity of the issues involved. Although the corresponding problems of
one and two bodies are exactly solvable in the sense that there is a solution in closed form
in terms of elementary functions for both of them, the problem of three bodies is a diffi-
cult, nonlinear problem for which no similar type of solution exists. In addition to being
a fascinating, well-posed problem of pure mathematics, the three-body problem has had
considerable interest for potential solvers because of its relevance for the question about
the stability of the solar system. According to June Barrow-Green, between 1750 and the
beginning of the 20th century, more than 800 papers relating to the problem were pub-
lished. [Barrow-Green (1997)] The first particular solutions to the problem were found
by Lagrange in his prize memoir, Essai sur le Problème des Trois Corps, which was sub-
mitted to the Paris Academy in 1772. The solution Lagrange found is universally called
the Lagrangian equilateral triangle solution. Lagrange’s method consisted of dividing
the problem into two parts: (a) the determination of the mutual distances of the bodies,
and (b) having solved (a), the determination of the plane of the triangle in space and the
orientation of the triangle in the plane. Furthermore, he proved that if the part (a) could
be solved, the part (b) could be solved also. Other prominent characters who worked on
the restricted three-body problem included Jacobi (1836)23, Tisserand (1889, 1896) (who
studied the problem in connection with devising methods for identifying comets), Hill
23In parentheses is the year of the original publication of the result provided by the particular character in
question.
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(1878) and Delanauy (1860). The so called ‘classical’ period of the studies on the problem
reached its final phase with Poincaré (1892-1899).24
In spite of the successes in tackling the special cases of the problem, the solution of the
general three-body problem remained elusive even after two-hundred years following
the publication of Newton’s Principia. In the general problem, as adduced above, all
the masses of the three bodies are non-zero and their initial positions and velocities are
arbitrary, i.e. they might not be arranged in any particularly symmetric way. This implies
that there are not any coordinate transformations that would significantly simplify the
problem. A large part of the mathematical difficulties derives from this fact. In the two-
body problem, for example, the solutions are most easily found by utilizing the center
of mass coordinate system. In the two-body problem and in the restricted three-body
problem the situation can be dynamically reduced to a consideration of inverse square
force fields with the lines of force passing through the center of mass of the system. In the
general case this is not possible: the lines of mutual forces do not pass through the center
of mass of the system. This means that the motion of each body has to be considered
in conjunction with the motions of the two other bodies. Before the age of powerful
computers, this was the primary cause for the problem’s intractability.
The problem was considered so important and difficult that at the suggestion of leading
scientists, the King of Sweden and Norway, Oscar II established a prize for its solution
to mark his 60th birthday on January 21, 1889. The condition for the solution was that it
should be in the form of a series expansion giving the positions of the three bodies at all
future moments of time following an arbitrary starting configuration. The competition
achieved unusual recognition that stretched well beyond the circles of mathematics. This
has undoubtedly been due to a combination of royal patronage and carefully planned
public relations, as Barrow-Green has pointed out. [Barrow-Green (1997), 49] But the
personality of King Oscar II may have been a considerable factor also, as the following
excerpt from Sonya Kovalevskaya’s autobiography illustrates:
King Oscar is a pleasant and cultivated person. As a young man he attended
lectures at the university, and still today shows an interest in science, although
I cannot vouch for the profundity of his erudition. He has no official con-
tact with the university but is extremely sympathetic to it and very amicably
disposed towards its professors in general and to myself in particular. [Ko-
valevskaya (1978), 228]
Taking all these factors together, the publicity gained by the competition was deemed to
result in the universal celebration of the mathematician who would solve the problem.
For many years the prize remained unclaimed. The prize was eventually awarded to
24In the restricted three-body problem the mass of the third particle is assumed to be 0. In such a configu-
ration, the energy function of the massless particle is H(x, y, z, ẋ, ẏ, ż) = 12 (ẋ
2 + ẏ2 + ż2)− ω(x, y, z), where
the last term is the effective potential ω(x, y, z) = 12 (x
2 + y2) + 1−µr1 +
µ
r2 . The so-called Hill’s region is defined
as the projection of H(x, y, z, ẋ, ẏ, ż) = constant into position space (x, y, z) and its surface is called a zero
velocity surface. The topology of the Hill’s region depends on the energy level.
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Poincaré in 1899 on the basis that he was thought to have made most progress in the sub-
ject. What strikes one as particularly ironic in this is that Poincaré was the one least con-
vinced of the suitability of the series expansion method in solving the problem. In fact,
he severely criticized such methods. Poincaré did not solve the given problem. It was
only after twenty odd years that Karl F. Sundman completed the given task. However,
the series expansion given by Sundman proved to be useless for the purpose of calculat-
ing orbits: his expansion converged so slowly that it was of no practical help in doing
the calculations. Nevertheless, a more fundamental objection to Sundmans’ method be-
came evident only much later. It turned out that Poincaré had been on the right track
from the start: as modern computer calculations of orbits have verified, the dynamical
laws governing the orbits bring about chaotic behavior and thus any deterministic series
expansions thought to describe the motion are wide off the track.
Poincaré’s results pertaining to the problem of three bodies were published in two sepa-
rate memoirs, the first of which was submitted for the Oscar’s competition, and the sec-
ond of which was a revised version of the competition memoir.25 The paper of Poincaré
which became widely applauded was not, curiously enough, the one which won the Os-
car competition, but the one that was a revised version of the original. Poincaré made
substantial corrections and alterations to the original but gave no indication of the extent
of his alterations. This was to arouse some confusion in the mathematical community
for many years, since it was widely believed that the revised version was in fact the one
that won the competition. Only the discovery of a printed version of Poincaré’s original
memoir has made it possible to reconstruct the nature of his alterations. [ibid., 1] The
issues Poincaré tackled with in his memoirs can be briefly depicted as follows. The most
important concept Poincaré focused on (although he discussed several mathematical con-
cepts within the memoirs) is that of Hamiltonian systems with two degrees of freedom.
This concept is intimately related to the restricted three-body problem. In developing
the theory, a major role is taken up by the topics of invariant integrals and periodic so-
lutions. It is in these memoirs that Poincaré for the first time takes the issue of invariant
integrals under careful scrutiny and thereby gives a detailed account of them along with
his famous recurrence theorem. Furthermore, the notion of periodic solutions is for the
first time shown to be a powerful tool for studying the qualitative questions pertaining
to the theory of (ordinary) differential equations. In connection with this issue, the most
important role is seen to be bestowed on his theory of asymptotic solutions. All of these
theoretical questions are tackled in the first parts of the two memoirs. The application
of the theory of asymptotic solutions to the restricted three-body problem is taken up in
the second part of the memoirs. Poincaré proceeded by a series of approximations. This
implied that Poincaré was enforced to take into account an increasing number of terms
in the power series expansion for the solution and then interpret the geometrical nature
and significance of these improved approximations. The geometrical point of view was
important, because it is the geometrical description of the asymptotic solutions that is
most dramatically affected by the discovery and correction of the error in the series ex-
25It is not possible for me to give a detailed elaboration of Poincaré’s work on the three-body problem here.
June Barrow-Green’s book [ibid.] provides an illuminating historical and topical account of the problem, and
anyone who is interested in the details of Poincaré’s work should consult this book.
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pansion. Nevertheless, the essential changes that the correction entails are in fact due
to a conjunction of errors arising in two separate parts of the preceding analysis. What
was the upshot of these seminal mathematical insights? Barrow- Green puts this most
succinctly:
Briefly, in his original account Poincaré did not draw a distinction between
autonomous and nonautonomous Hamiltonian systems of differential equa-
tions. As a result he drew mistaken conclusions about the convergence of the
series used to describe the asymptotic solutions of the problem. Originally he
had believed that the series were convergent and led to asymptotic trajecto-
ries with behavior which he could easily understand. In the revised memoir
he showed that the series were actually asymptotic expansions, and, with his
discovery of homoclinic points, he found that the behavior of the trajectories
was anything but easy to describe. In fact the behavior was what today would
be called chaotic. Thus, contrary to what is sometimes thought, Poincaré did
not win the Oscar prize for his discovery and analysis of the behavior what
he called doubly asymptotic solutions (and later called homoclinic solutions),
that is, the ‘chaotic’ trajectories, but rather for the underlying theory which
eventually led to his correct description of these solutions. [ibid., 3]
It is well known that Poincaré continued his work in celestial mechanics after the pub-
lication of the first two memoirs, and the period of prodigious productivity was fi-
nally crowned in the famous multi-volume treatise Méthodes Nouvelles published between
1892-1899. After that, the road was open for the most fascinating developments in math-
ematics but only in principle. It took many years before mathematicians started to ap-
preciate the real significance of Poincaré’s results, but once the depth of his findings was
realized, it resulted in an exultant period of unfathomable creativity. The appreciation
of Poincaré’s work has grown steadily thereafter. Quite recently Philip Holmes, whose
book (co-authored with John Guckenheimer) on dynamical systems is a landmark in the
field, has described Poincaré’s memoir as: “. . . the first textbook in the qualitative the-
ory of dynamical systems.” [Holmes (1990)] I will now turn to study the outlines of the
development in another branch of mathematics which ultimately was brought to bear
heavily on the issues related to classical mechanics, namely, randomness.
What is randomness?
Randomness is an elusive concept. A first approach to enquire its meaning on an every-
day level brings various images of different stochastic phenomena, such as tossing of a
coin, to mind. The more philosophical question to ask is: what is common to these dif-
ferent stochastic processes? Is there possibly a criterion of determinacy for the concept of
“randomness”? Philosophers have traditionally thought the concept too vague to be cap-
tured by any adequate definition. A notable exception is Richard von Mises (the Viennese
mathematician and philosopher), one of the first to suggest a way to approach the defin-
ability problem. Following the pioneering work of von Mises, independent attempts to
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define randomness have been made among others by A.N. Kolmogorov and Per Martin-
Löf. [Martin-Löf (1966), (1970a), (1970b), 1971]26 The fundamental idea lying behind the
efforts of von Mises, Kolmogorov and Martin-Löf to define randomness is, roughly, to
make explicit the criteria for determining whether a given sequence (of numbers) exem-
plifies randomness. By devising tools to study the properties of a given sequence, each
of them arrives at a particular notion of a random sequence. What does this idea of a ran-
dom sequence consist in? Inspired by Richard von Mises’s work relating to randomness
A.N. Kolmogorov devoted his later life to investigating the problem of the foundations
of probability. Concerning the meanings conferred to the term “randomness” he once
remarked:
In everyday language we call random these phenomena where we cannot find
a regularity allowing us to predict precisely their results. Generally speak-
ing, there is no ground to believe that a random phenomenon should possess
any definite probability. Therefore we should have distinguished between
randomness proper (as absence of any regularity) and stochastic randomness
(which is the subject of probability theory). There emerges a problem of find-
ing the reasons for the applicability of the mathematical theory of probability
to the real world. [Kolmogorov (1984)]
Kolmogorov is here making a very important distinction between two kinds of random-
ness. I alluded above to the very popular idea of associating randomness with a stochas-
tic process. But this is seen to be too narrow a view; according to Kolmogorov, irregular
sequences are distinguishable from those which show irregularities and statistical reg-
ularities (as the stochastic processes do) by the following property: in the latter type of
sequences, the Kolmogorov-complexity of an initial segment divided by the length of that
segment tends to stabilize. This amounts to the kind of behaviour that can be described
by the usual notions of statistics and probability, such as the normal distribution and
standard deviation, for example.
I briefly explain the meanings of the relevant notions. Kolmogorov– complexity is usually
defined as follows:
Definition 8 Let A : 2<ω → 2<ω be a partial recursive function with Gödel number pAq. The
complexity KA(w) of w with respect to A is defined to be
KA(w) =
{
∞ if there is no p such that A(p) = w
| p | if p is a shortest input such that A(p) = w.
Here A means effectively a rule which produces a given sequence from its code p. The
intuitive idea is that the complexity of a word w with respect to a rule A is the length of
26Their approaches are masterfully surveyed in the doctoral dissertation of van Lambalgen. [van Lambal-
gen (1987)]
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Figure 6.1: Sitnikov Problem Configuration. c©Wikipedia.
the shortest input (code) p such that A(p) = w. This is a very elegant and powerful con-
cept, indeed. In a nutshell, then, it can be stipulated that a sequence is random if it is of
maximal complexity. Intuitively this means that a genuinely irregular sequence cannot
be compressed to a representation the length of which is less than that of the original
sequence. Kolmogorov’s work on complexity and randomness is far too sophisticated to
be adduced here in its full richness. Nevertheless, I feel that the rough depiction of ran-
domness I have given above has prepared us to move on to study an interesting example
of the three-body problem, where the questions of determinism, randomness and chaos
all come together.
Randomness in a deterministic system — the three-body problem
In what follows, I will present a special case of the three-body problem which very clearly
displays the intrinsic chaotic features characteristic of instable dynamical systems. The
intuitive idea of instability is this: wide divergence in the behavior of two systems identi-
cal except for initial conditions is observed even when the initial conditions are extremely
close. There are two sources of difficulty as regards the prediction of the behavior of un-
stable systems. The first difficulty results from the fact that the initial conditions of a
given system can be measured only approximately. This leads to the impossibility of pre-
dicting the behavior of the system for any but short intervals of time. Predictive failures
are then attributed to possible inaccuracies in the initial conditions. This difficulty I have
already touched upon in connection with Laplacian determinism. The second source of
difficulty is mathematical. It might happen that the solutions are not representable in a
closed, analytical form. A usual procedure, then, is to use various approximative tech-
niques, of which the series expansion methods are the most common. The problem with
the series expansions is that they do not allow for accurate predictions. The accumu-
lation of small errors in numerical methods of approximations can lead to unavoidable
problems of accuracy. These both aspects are relevant for the following example.
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The special case of the three-body problem I would like to consider is this:27 There are
two particles of equal mass m = m1 = m2 moving according to Newton’s inverse-square
law of gravitation in an elliptic orbit relative to their common center of mass which is
at rest. The third particle has a nearly negligible mass ( m3m → 0), so it does not affect
the motion of the other two particles, but they affect its motion. This third particle is
moving along a line perpendicular to the plane of motion of the first two particles and
intersecting the plane at the center of their mass — let this be the z-axis. From symmetry
considerations we can see that the third particle will not move off the line. The restricted
problem is to describe the motion of the third particle. To obtain a differential equation
in simple form, we normalize the unit of time so that the temporal period of rotation
of the two masses in the x, y-plane is 2π, we take the unit of length to be such that the
gravitational constant is one, and finally m1 = m2 = 12 , so that m1 + m2 = 1. The force on







where r is the distance in the x, y-plane of particle 1 from the center of mass of the two-
particle system m1 and m2, and this center is, of course, just the point z = 0 in the x, y-
plane. Note that r31√
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There are fundamental analytical difficulties entwined with this easily describable prob-
lem, but some basic results are quite understandable in informal terms. One special case
deserves particularly to be mentioned. Near the escape velocity for the third particle (the
velocity at which it leaves the system and does not periodically return) the periodic mo-
tion is very irregular. There is a very remarkable theorem that can be proved about this
periodic motion. If we denote by t1, t2, . . . the times at which the particle intersects the
plane of motion of the other two particles, then the following theorem about the largest
integer sk equal to or less than the difference between tk+1 and tk multiplied by a con-
stant28 can be proved:
Theorem 7 Given that the eccentricity of the elliptic orbits is positive but not too large, there
exists an integer, say α, such that any infinite sequence of terms sk with sk ≥ α, corresponds to a
solution of the deterministic differential equation governing the motion of the third particle.29
27The presentation of the problem is adapted from Patrick Suppes. [Suppes (1987), 243–245]
28This constant is the reciprocal of the period T of the motion of the two particles in the plane.
29This theorem is due to the Russian mathematicians Sitnikov and Alekseev.
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In the framework of the theory of random sequences, the following corollary immedi-
ately follows:
Corollary 1 Any random sequence with terms sk ≥ α corresponds to a solution of the determin-
istic differential equation governing the motion of the third particle.
Especially striking is the possibility of interpreting this sequence as the random sequence
of heads and tails. We only have to pick two integers greater than α to represent this se-
quence — one representing heads and the other tails. This illustrates in a most dramatic
way that the motion of the particle is completely unpredictable even though determin-
istic. For each random sequence there exists a set of initial conditions that determines
the corresponding solution. What is worth pointing out is that, contrary to the actual
experiment of flipping a coin, there is no distribution over initial conditions and thus
no uncertainty about them in the problem here considered. And conversely, no single
trajectory in the coin-flipping case exhibits in itself such random behavior.
Summary
Now, what are the implications of these observations for evaluating the status of deter-
minism? I think the above example points clearly towards a now familiar answer: the
fact that the same phenomena can be both deterministic and random, forces us to revise
our presuppositions about the importance of the classical determinism/indeterminism
distinction. It seems evident on the basis of examples like the one adduced above, that
randomness is, in one sense, just a feature of the most complex deterministic systems. In-
deed, the most sophisticated definitions of randomness are given in terms of complexity,
as I noted above in connection with randomness. Let me reiterate the idea of complexity
in somewhat different terms: the most primitive sense of complexity reduces to the clas-
sical computational definition of complexity. According to this definition the complexity
of a sequence of integers is associated with the minimal computational capabilities nec-
essary to reproduce it. More exactly, the complexity of a sequence of infinite symbols is
measured by the length of a minimal computer program that will generate the sequence.
According to this definition, random sequences are of maximal complexity. This defi-
nition is effectively equivalent to the definition of Kolmogorov-complexity given above.
The particularly important implication of these observations is the separation of deter-
minism and predictability. The most complex deterministic systems are totally unpre-
dictable in their behavior. We are then left in a situation where we cannot distinguish
between determinism and indeterminism (as traditionally conceived). This is one of the
lessons to be learned from the complex behavior of the classical dynamical systems.
This particular problem in the interdisciplinary cross-section of mathematics, computer-
science, physics and philosophy is a fine example of the kind of concept-forming pro-
cesses that fall under Carnap’s general program of explication. It is precisely genealogies
of this kind (the above presentation providing only a sketch of such a genealogy), that
311
are needed to back up the more detailed tasks of explication that have recourse to specific
methods of formalization. In this particular example of a survey of the relations between
determinism, indeterminism and randomness we have all the characteristics of a process
of clarification that is an essential prerequisite of Carnapian explication. In fact, we have
(1) a sufficiently well-defined problem stated in terms of a relatively precise language that
we can reach mutual agreement on, (2) various, well-founded strategic options to tackle
the problem in question, (3) a variety of languages (formal systems, professional idiolects,
etc.) in which to state the strategic options exactly, (4) a dialectic among the different sug-
gestions, and (5) a convergence towards a commonly accepted exact formulation of the
problem and specific techniques for its solution that are taken as the standard for the time
being. Of course, many other problems in science are tackled in a similar manner. It is
only that the problem of randomness seems to provide a particularly illuminating ex-
ample of the process of clarification and – more importantly – one of continuing interest
among contemporary scientists.
The domain of philosophical history of science is, of course, vast. To orient oneself in
the menagerie of different histories provided of particular explications, and to acquire
the skills needed to devise such histories, one would certainly benefit from some gen-
eral guidelines as to the general methodology of history. The level of methodological
self-consciousness of philosophers in this vein has not been particularly high, especially
not in the area of history of natural sciences. This is one reason for attempting to make
more explicit the tools that are available for philosophers (and historians) who take up
the important task of Carnapian clarification. Such tools may then serve the purpose of





“E>ic Õdor pnta nluesjai.” “everything dissolves in water”
– Thales
7.1 Carnap as an Exemplar of the Scholar’s Vocation
In the preceding pages I have provided a panorama of the range of problems and ques-
tions that constitute the living kernel of Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy. These comprise an
honorable collection including the nature of pseudo-problems in philosophy, the founda-
tions of mathematics, physicalism and the unity of science, the logical syntax of language,
the nature of empiricism, (pure) semantics, language planning, probability and inductive
logic, the status of theoretical language, and problems concerning values and practical
decisions. Rather than focusing on a particular class of problems, I have attempted to
discern an overarching thematic and a certain continuity in Carnap’s thought. One rel-
atively stable feature of Carnap’s philosophy is the reliance on particular methodolog-
ical tools. The body of this work concentrates on the development and applications of
the method of analysis in Carnap’s philosophical work during the years 1922-1950. The
apogee of this development is the method of explication, the most elaborate and system-
atic characterization of which is found in the first chapter of Carnap’s Logical Foundations
of Probability [Carnap (1950b)].
Another stable feature of Carnap’s philosophy is covert; the overall motivation behind his
philosophy. In keeping with the cosmopolitan cultural atmosphere of the Youth Move-
ment in Germany and the later radical utopianism of the Vienna Circle, Carnap remained
a political radical throughout his life. It was mainly due to adverse circumstances that
he never clearly spelled out his political motifs. In his Autobiography he ventured to
provide the following account of his moral and political convictions:
The view that recognition of the non-cognitive nature of value-statements is
either conducive to or symptomatic of a loss of interest in moral or political
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problems seems clearly refuted by my own experience. I have maintained the
thesis for about thirty years. But throughout my life, from my childhood to
the present day, I have always had an intense interest in moral problems, both
those concerning the life of individuals, and, since First World War, those of
politics, but I was always interested in political principles and I have never
shied away from professing my point of view. All of us in the Vienna Cir-
cle took a strong interest in the political events in our country, in Europe,
and in the world. These problems were discussed privately, not in the Cir-
cle which was devoted to theoretical questions. I think that nearly all of us
shared the following three views as a matter of course which hardly needed
any discussion. The first is the view that man has no supernatural protec-
tors or enemies and that therefore whatever can be done to improve life is
the task of man himself. Second, we had the conviction that mankind is able
to change the conditions of life in such a way that many of the sufferings of
today may be avoided and that the external and the internal situation of life
for the individual, for the community, and finally for humanity will be essen-
tially improved. The third is the view that all deliberate action presupposes
knowledge of the world, that the scientific method is the best method of ac-
quiring knowledge and that therefore science must be regarded as one of the
most valuable instruments for the improvement of life. In Vienna we had no
names for these views; if we look for a brief designation in American termi-
nology for the combination of these three convictions, the best would seem to
be “scientific humanism”. [Carnap (1963), 82–83]
Relating this discussion to the more explicitly scientific aspects of Carnap’s philosophy,
it is easy to see that Carnap’s method of explication potentially provides a framework for
such a politically motivated improvement of the condition of humanity. Carnap never
worked out the broader implication of his method of explication, the range of problems
that it would enable one to address, and the possibilities thus opened for systematic so-
cial planning. This is the motivation behind André Carus’ interpretation of Carnap’s
ideal, i.e., to attempt a reconstruction of the Carnapian method of explication as a vehicle
of Enlightenment. I have critically examined the suggestion of Carus within an inter-
pretive framework that adds a novel historical dimension to the discussion. I argue that
the Principle of Tolerance which played such a prominent role in modifying and cat-
alyzing Carnap’s thought about the method of explication, merits careful scrutiny, both
as a philosophical principle (a task somewhat neglected to this date) and as one of the
constitutive notions of the program of Enlightenment. Although widely acknowledged
as an important regulative principle in Carnap’s system, Carus’ interpretation, to my
knowledge, is the only one that ventures to press the implications of Carnap’s basic idea
to their limits. Even so, Carus’ interpretation leaves one crucial aspect of the Principle
unexamined, viz., its moral underpinnings. I have argued that a full recognition of the
importance of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance requires a careful scrutiny of the value-
theoretical background in which it is embedded. Carus eschews this task. Even though
there are some definite aspects to Carnap’s ideal that render it similar (in spirit but not
in letter) to the one advocated by the harbingers of Radical Enlightenment, the interpre-
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tation of the ideal of explication as a modern vehicle of Enlightenment seems to me im-
petuous. The fundamental characteristic of the classical Radical Enlightenment systems
of thought, most notably the one of Spinoza, is the harmonious confluence of intellectual
and moral dimensions of Reason. Such a confluence must, in order to be effective, be
backed up with an ethical theory.
The remaining question is, then, whether Carnap in fact had such a value-theoretical
background to draw on. This is bound to remain an open question as long as no explicit
documentary evidence about Carnap’s explicit ethical views can be found in Carnap’s
Nachlass. Nevertheless, the general idea about explication as an instrument of improve-
ment of the human condition is very attractive. It is also surprisingly close to the view of
R. G. Collingwood who envisioned a gradual betterment of human knowledge through a
process of evolution which he called “a scale of forms”. Collingwood explicitly identified
these scales with series of terms in dialectical relationship. A key feature of a dialectical
relationship is the distinction between implicit and explicit, where the the consecutive
terms in a series are related so that the later terms make explicit what remains only im-
plicit in the earlier terms. Collingwood reports of this insight dawning on him in Specu-
lum Mentis:
I may perhaps be permitted here to refer to a book called Religion and Philoso-
phy which I published in 1916, and in which I tried to give a general account
of the nature of the religious consciousness, tested and illustrated by detailed
analyses of the central doctrines of Christianity. With much of what that book
contains I am still in agreement; but there are certain principles which I then
overlooked or denied, in the light of which many of its faults may be cor-
rected. The chief of these principles is the distinction between implicit and ex-
plicit. I contended throughout that religion, theology and philosophy were
identical, and this I should now not so much withdraw as qualify by pointing
out that the ‘empirical’ distinction (i.e. real but unexplained) between them is
that theology makes explicit what in religion as such is always implicit, and
so with philosophy and theology. This error led me into too intellectualistic or
abstract attitude towards religion, of which many critics rightly accused me.1
Although the framework in which Collingwood presents his thesis – concentrating ex-
plicitly only on the relations between religion, theology and philosophy – is quite foreign
to the Carnapian framework of explication, there is a family resemblance. Collingwood
intended his theory of scale of forms to be applicable in all compartments of human
knowledge. The essential insight of Collingwood is, then, that the effort of the conscious
mind to attain clarity and distinctness ruminates in every conceivable area of human ac-
tivity, including the delicate problems pertaining to values and practical decision making.
Similarly, Carnap’s method of explication provides the broad framework of addressing
such questions, given the qualifications about the value-theoretical background of his
method.
1[SM 108n] My italics.
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The tension between the characteristic habitudes of both Enlightenment and Romanticism
which manifests itself quite clearly in Carnap’s intellectual development raises once more
the question whether any thinker who has interests as wide as Carnap, can straightfor-
wardly be classified as a representative of a singular intellectual tradition. The contem-
porary trend in Carnap scholarship has very much been along the lines of an attempt
to focus on those aspects of his thinking that embrace open-mindedness, tolerance and
pragmatism in contrast to the (already passé) varieties of interpretation which forged Car-
nap a solid reputation as a philosophical dogmatist in the mid-twentieth century. More
recently, the general contention has been that the more one engages with Carnap’s ‘real’
thought, the more clearly one discovers elements of philosophical pluralism and toler-
ance for intellectual diversity in general. Indeed, the revisionist picture of Carnap as the
unyielding bridge-builder who is always looking for possibilities to reconcile seemingly
irreconcilable philosophical positions reaches its culmination in the bold conjecture of
André Carus who reads Carnap as essentially promoting the ideal of Enlightenment in
our modern society. This ideal, quite true, is not any of the original forms of Enlight-
enment ideals that flourished in the Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. These are all obsolete by now and their rehabilitation per se would seem quite
absurd. Carus explicitly states this as he pleads for a modern, Carnapian variety of En-
lightenment:
The Enlightenment has traditionally claimed that there are impersonal proce-
dures that can effectively determine what makes a given piece of knowledge
‘better’ (in a more or less precisely specifiable way) than another. [. . . ] And
indeed, it has proven much more difficult than anyone had ever imagined to
specify any such procedures (as the failure of Carnap’s own lifelong efforts
eloquently testifies). The Enlightenment’s heavy reliance on them is clearly
no longer tenable in its original form. The original Enlightenment, though
ethically and politically pluralistic, was intellectually not pluralistic. It really
did think that natural science — including social science, in its view — would,
progressively, find the true answers. Science, it thought, would provide the
replacement, once and for all, for the lore of the church and other traditional
institutions, thereby providing authoritative knowledge, in an authoritative
(encyclopaedic) language, in the ideal future. [Carus (2007), 307–308]
This ideal can be justifiably be said to have been discredited. But Carus assures his read-
ers that the “Carnapian ideal can correct this shortcoming by building in a radical plural-
ism at the very heart of the Enlightenment project.” [ibid.] This is not at all as evident as
Carus wants to make us believe.
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7.2 The Tension Between the Inner and the Outer in Carnap’s
Thought
As we have seen, there is an essential tension between the diametrically opposite currents
of Enlightenment and Romanticism which both figure prominently in Carnap’s develop-
ment. Firstly, the prospects of Enlightenment thought in the post-world-war Germany
were quite bleak and unrelenting, as the many varieties of anti-intellectualism and irra-
tionalism of that period attest. We have already referred to these phenomena and the
influence of Lebensphilosophie upon German intellectual culture at large. Philosophically
there was, however, a more systematic reason for the disdain that was felt towards En-
lightenment thought. For example, John Dewey had already remarked in German Phi-
losophy and Politics [Dewey (1915)] on the difficulties upon which German philosophy
had stumbled because of the “systematic intellectual error” the essence of which he diag-
nosed as being too close an adherence to a dualistic interpretation of Kant’s philosophical
architectonics, according to which there are two strictly separated realms, “one outer,
physical and necessary, the other inner, ideal and free”. [ibid., 28]. The dualism between
Geist and Leben which was a hallmark of the more superficial strands of German philo-
sophical thought had its impact also on Carnap’s philosophical development. The ten-
sion between the inner and the outer which he was never able to release satisfactorily,
drove Carnap on philosophical paths that would drift further and further apart. Outside
observers, like Dewey, saw the situation in German philosophy as symptomatic of a more
general cultural influence:
since Kant’s times [it] set its intellectual and spiritual clocks by the Kantian
standard: the separation of the inner and the outer, with its lesson of freedom
and idealism in one realm, and of mechanism, efficiency and organization
in the other. [. . . ] It does seem true that [. . . ] Germans [. . . ] can withdraw
themselves from the exigencies and contingencies of life into a region of In-
nerlichkeit which at least seems boundless. [Dewey (1915), 45]
Celebration of the inner which manifested most clearly in neo-romantic art, music and
poetry was possible also in a purely theoretical realm. This was fully evident to Carnap
who saw the “the ocean of unlimited possibilities” of the newly discovered beautiful for-
mal systems in logic and mathematics as an independent, pure and solid region of Inner-
lichkeit. This element of German philosophical culture in Carnap’s thought has been most
succinctly described by Thomas Mormann as “formal romanticism”. The purely formal
interpretation of the realm of the possible was, however, marked by a certain intellectual
stubbornness, which was to characterize Carnap throughout his life. As Mormann puts
it:
Complementarily to his predilection for exploring formal possibilities, through-
out his intellectual career Carnap had no sense for the “messiness” of the
practical realm. Scientific matters that pointed in this direction he delegated
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to disciplines such as psychology, sociology, or history — he himself was al-
ways really interested only in the pure realm of philosophy of science as logic
of science. He never showed any sympathy for matters of approximation,
vagueness, and ambiguity and never took seriously Neurath’s pet idea that
“Ballungen” were inevitable even in our best science. [Mormann (2010), 11]
In Mormann’s view, Carnap’s predilection for purely formal and theoretical questions in
the theory of science, his relentless quest for a true Wissenschaftslogik, was more akin in
spirit to the Romantic influences operating in the Wilhelminian pre-world-war Germany
than the Enlightenment ideals perpetuated by the French philosophes or their successors,
like Condorcet, Saint-Simon or Auguste Comte, who all exemplified the engineering and
revolutionary spirit of the early ninenteenth-century École polytechnique. Mormann gives
Nietzsche a pride of place among the romantic philosophers who had a most powerful
impact on intellectual culture in Germany. It is true that Carnap’s generation was heav-
ily influenced by Nietzsche, but to boldly claim that even Carnap himself was deeply
influenced by Nietzsche’s powerful and visionary writings, seems prima facie impetuous.
Gottfried Gabriel, who has classified philosophical styles along a continuum which has
the fixed points of poetry and science as its two diametrically opposed poles, described
the tension in Carnap’s philosophy in the following terms: “For Carnap, Frege’s Begriff-
sschrift lied on the desk, so to speak, and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra on the bedside table”
(cf. [Gabriel (2004), 12]). Mormann wants to go beyond this, asserting that “Nietzsche
was more than just a metaphysical poet (Begriffsdichter) who expressed the Lebensgefühl
of Carnap’s generation in unequaled rhetorical elegance and intensity. Nietzsche influ-
enced considerably his thought-style and even the content of philosophizing.” [ibid., 12]
Unfortunately, Mormann does not provide in his paper but only a couple of examples
to back up his claim. Admittedly, a thorough examination of the philosophical relation-
ship between Carnap and Nietzsche would require a far more lengthier treatment than
is possible in a paper. Nevertheless, Mormann has opened up an interesting topic for
academic discussion and his interpretation of the Carnap–Nietzsche connection is likely
to raise a lengthy debate among Carnap scholars. At the very least Mormann has shown
that the dialectic between the Enlightenment and Romanticism in Carnap’s thought is
much more delicate than has hitherto been admitted.2 Remember the remarks Nietzsche
made on the thematic of objectivity and its many varieties, both in the arts and sciences:
“There is required above all great artistic facility, creative vision, loving absorption in the
2The salient examples Mormann provides in this connection are (i) the manuscript Vom Chaos zur Welt
[Carnap (1921/22)] which Carnap himself considered as the “nucleus of the Aufbau”, (ii) “Überwindung
der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” [Carnap (1932)] and (iii) “Theoretische Fragen und
praktische Entscheidungen” [Carnap (1934)], all of which are claimed to have been influenced by Nietzsche.
Mormann states that “[i]n Chaos Carnap subscribed to a pseudo-Nietzschean ‘will to order’ (for him appar-
ently more appealing than the original ‘will to power) that was the ‘irrational starting point’ of the orderly
constitution of the world which the philosopher attempted to realize. In Aufbau, Carnap quoted several
times approvingly a rather apocryphal edition of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power (edited by Max Brahn) (Auf-
bau §§65, 67, 163)).” Furthermore, “Overcoming Metaphysics by Logical Analysis of Language” rehearses,
according to Mormann, a key theme of Zarathustra, to wit, “overcoming” and “self-overcoming”. And fi-
nally, “[i]n ‘Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen’ (Carnap 1934) Carnap raged against the-
ology and metaphysical philosophy as ‘dangerous narcotics having a detrimental effect on reason’ in a way
that reminds one not only of Marx but also on Nietzsche (cf. The Gay Science, Book 3, 147).” [ibid.]
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empirical data, the capacity to imagine the further development of a given type — in any
event objectivity is required, but as a positive quality. So often objectivity is only a phrase.
Instead of the outwardly tranquil but inwardly flashing eye of the artist there is the af-
fectation of tranquility; just as the lack of feeling and moral strength is accustomed to
disguise itself as incisive coldness and detachment.” [Nietzsche (1874) [Breazeale (1983),
93]] Nietzsche thus drew our attention to a deep problem: the problem of the inherent
instability of both objectivity and the scientific self that practiced it. We have seen that
the proposal of adopting structural objectivity as a solution to this problem was not suc-
cessful. The program of the Aufbau could not be pulled through. A pluralism of various
different language forms instead took its place as the guiding principle in the Carnapian
theory of science. As Mormann puts it, “[f]rom Logical Syntax onwards, Carnap no longer
was content to rationally reconstruct the world of scientific knowledge in a neat and or-
derly manner, rather, he aimed at the logical conquest of the entire universe of possible
worlds”. [ibid.] In fact, Mormann sees a deep analogy between the programs of new
philosophy provided by Nietzsche and Carnap. The following passages from Nietzsche
remind us very lively of the metaphors devised in the Syntax:
Get on the Ships! — . . . [We need] . . . new philosophers! The moral earth, too,
is round! The moral earth, too, has its antipodes! The antipodes, too, have
their right to exist! There is yet another world to be discovered — and more
than one! On the ships, you philosophers! [The Gay Science, Book IV, §289]
. . . finally the horizon seems clear again, even if not bright; finally our ships
may set out again, set out to face any danger; every daring of the lover of
knowledge is allowed again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; maybe there
has never been such an “open sea”. [ibid,, Book V, §343]
In his Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought Carus wholeheartedly endorses this romantic
reading of Carnapian pluralism, treating (along Thomas Mormann) Carnap’s philosoph-
ical program as a science of possibilities [Möglichkeitswissenschaft]. But the romantic roots
of Carnap’s pluralism went deeper than the merely conceptual or purely formal ones:
the strict dichotomy between the regions of Geist and Leben that in such dramatic a way
characterized German thought at the turn of the twentieth century, also hindered Car-
nap from fully making evident the kernel of Enlightenment thought in his philosophy.
Carnap was led to strict noncognitivism with respect to values and value judgements (as
far as his published writings may be taken to represent his final views on these matters).
From 1928 onwards, his fundamental values belonged and were nourished by the region
of Leben and did not thus enter the region of rational deliberation. This fundamental du-
alism in his thought attests to the fact that Carnap’s Enlightenment was not practical, and
thus definitely not ‘Radical’ or spinozist; Carnap’s Enlightenment was restricted to the
purely theoretical. Nevertheless, there remains a strange feeling of an unreleased tension
in his philosophical program. In the light of the history of objectivity and the tradition of
intellectual virtues, including the flirt with the ideas of Nietzsche, Carnap seemed to have
all the necessary tools in hand to try out to construct a unique synthesis out of these el-
ements, vindicating the time-honored tradition of intellectual virtues and the techniques
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of the scientific self. Carnap, however, never took to heart the possibility to deliberate
upon these matters in a rational way. Still, these very same problems haunt us as today
as vividly as they did in the heyday of logical empiricism, and we may safely predict that
they will continue to do so in the future.
In a summary, despite its shortcomings, Carus’ interpretation of Carnap’s philosophical
work and its underlying motivation seem to be on the right track, as far as its cultural
background is concerned. It is backed up by ample textual and contextual evidence, and
more importantly, it enables us to formulate problems that Carnap never ventured to
formulate explicitly but which he nonetheless found important. The import of Carus’
interpretation is that he has stated Carnap’s method in a language that is familiar to us
and congruent with our contemporary problems. Moreover, making Carnap’s approach
in tackling those problems part of our own quest of structuring our knowledge and prac-
tice, we have incorporated tools into our thinking that facilitate our struggle to answer
the most important questions of life and society more coherently and purposefully than
would be possible without them. But as we have seen, the straightforward reading of
Carnap’s program as a modern form of Enlightenment does not hold water. Additional
research is necessary to provide a balanced picture of Carnap’s development and his ma-
ture program.
In the end, however, a humble attitude towards these questions prevails. This is in many
ways an incomplete work, sketching only some of the background necessary for fully
appreciating Carnap’s contributions to philosophy, and even to the methods of analysis.
Further work is necessary to enquire in more depth the specific technical problems per-
taining to Carnap’s overall program. Only through such enquiries can the full import of
the ideal of explication be realized. And still, many questions that concern Carnap as a
person remain in the dark, as important as they would be in forming a more adequate
conception of the intimate relations between his scientific thought and moral convictions,
providing a broader panorama of the integrity of his philosophy. I started my work with
a quotation from Emil Staiger, emphasizing the importance of being open to the insights
that history can provide in our intellectual undertakings. It is equally apt to finish this
work with the following words of his:
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Man is not an object about which wrong or even final pronouncements can
be made. Man’s essence is formed, arises in what he thinks of himself, in
the unfolding of his self-consciousness. By giving specific answers to the
question: “What is man?” we commit ourselves to specific possibilities.
We become aware of ourselves, become conscious of ourselves in a specific
way. Thus, one can say: In every system, in the worldview of every writer
something of what man is capable of being is realized. The truth of such
a worldview cannot be measured by what man actually is in the depth of
his being. For this actual person, this person in and of itself, does not exist.
Or he exists only for a spirit we would have to call divine. Here, too, the
truth can only be measured by the degree to which it can be fruitful, to
which it is capable of elucidating our present and our past.
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